

## INFORMATION TO USERS

This material was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent pages to insure you complete continuity.
2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame.
3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being photographed the photographer followed a definite method in "sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is continued again — beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.
4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from "photographs" if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver prints of "photographs" may be ordered at additional charge by writing the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and specific pages you wish reproduced.
5. PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as received.

### **Xerox University Microfilms**

300 North Zeeb Road  
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106



75-22,633

HYMAN, Drew Walton, 1939-  
CITIZEN'S ADVOCACY AND POLITICAL RESPONSIVENESS  
IN A POLYCENTRIC POLITICAL SYSTEM: A  
STUDY OF THE GOVERNOR'S BRANCH OFFICES IN  
PENNSYLVANIA.

University of California, Los Angeles, Ph.D.,  
1975  
Political Science, general

**Xerox University Microfilms**, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

© Copyright by

Drew Walton Hyman

1975

THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Los Angeles

Citizen's Advocacy and Political Responsiveness

in a Polycentric Political System:

A Study of the Governor's Branch Offices in Pennsylvania

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy


in Political Science


by


Drew Walton Hyman

1975

The dissertation of Drew Walton Hyman is approved.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Jerome Cohen

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
John C. Ries

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Harry M. Scoble, Chairman

University of California, Los Angeles

1975



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

### Chapter

1. INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY . . . . . 1
  - The Origin of the GBO's
  - Black People's Advocates for the Immediate, Specific Response
  - The GBO's as a Formalized Mechanism for Citizen's Advocacy
2. ACCESS AND RESPONSIVENESS: FOUNDATIONS FOR AN OPERATIONAL MODEL FOR THE ANALYSIS OF CITIZEN'S ADVOCACY PROGRAMS . . 26
  - Access and Gatekeeping: The Two Faces of the Boundary of the Polity
  - Access for Whom? Types of Political Actors
  - Responsiveness as Differentiated from Access
  - The Political System: Simultaneous Games and Multiple Arenas
  - A Typology of Citizen's Advocacy
  - The GBO's and Citizen's Advocacy
3. THE RESEARCH SETTING AND METHODOLOGY . . . . . 74
  - The Research Setting
  - A Key Event for Entry and Choice of Method
  - The Participant Observer Role
  - Emergence of the Qualitative Methodology
  - Formal Interviews with Key Informants
  - Unobtrusive Measures: Documents, Files and Episodic Case Records
  - Systematic Extraction of Data from Episodic Records
  - A Note on the Quantified Data Presented Herein
4. THE GBO'S AS A DIALECTICAL ORGANIZATION . . . . . 115
  - The Importance to this Study of Characterizing the GBO's as "Dialectical"
  - The Establishment and Authority of the GBO's
  - A Note on the Authority of the GBO's



- Organizational Structure, Location, Staffing, Ideology and Operational Principles of the GBO's
- Staffing the Dialectical Organization--Radicalized Workers
- The Characteristic Thinking of the Governor's Representatives
- Operating Principles Rather than Procedures
- Interaction with "The System": Gatekeeping and the Prerequisites for Access and Responsiveness

5. CITIZEN'S ADVOCACY FOR INDIVIDUALS . . . . . 172

- Overall GBO Activity
- The Study Sample
- Local-Level GBO Activity
  - Local-Level "GBO Only"
  - Local-Level Referrals
- Central Office GBO Action
  - Authoritative Support for Demands on the GBO'S
  - The Volume and Variety of Central Office Demands
  - Criteria for Escalation to the State Capitol
  - Examples of Central Office Action
  - GBO Central Office: Comments, Interpretation
- System Responsiveness and the Governor's Branch Offices
  - Responsiveness Variables and Sources of Data
  - Response Time: Quality of Treatment and Citizen Satisfaction
  - Summary
- Final Resolution of Demands
  - Statistical Analysis of Case-Record Data
  - Concluding Comments on Responsiveness
- Governor's Branch Offices: Concluding Comments on Citizen's Advocacy on Behalf of Individuals

6. "SYSTEM CHANGE": CITIZEN'S ADVOCACY FOR INTERESTS . . . . . 264

- "System Change" Activities of the GBO's
- Reorientation of the Overall Program of the Governor
- Change In the Employment Sub-System: Improved Access and Responsiveness and Incremental Steps Toward Publicly Assured Jobs
  - Increased Public Responsibility
  - Changes Within the State Bureaucracy
- Change in the Housing Sub-System: Action in the Private Sector and vs Local-Level Authorities
  - Increased Public Responsibility
  - Changes Within the System: Local Housing Authorities
- Change in the Financial Aid Sub-System: Toward Welfare as a Right
- Changes in the Law-Enforcement Sub-System: Success and Failure in System-Change



- Legal Services for Poor People
  - Failure of the Governor's Attorney General to Respond
  - Initiation of a Statewide Legal Services Program
- "Other" Citizen's Advocacy for Interests Actions by the GBO's
- Citizen's Advocacy on Behalf of Interests--Concluding Comments

7. THE CITIZEN'S ADVOCATE AS A FORMALIZED COMMUNICATIONS AND CONTROL MECHANISM . . . . . 321

- The Immediate Precipitant: Urban Crisis in the Nation
- Bureaucratization, Polycentricity and Citizen's Advocacy
- The Search for Contemporary Alternatives
- Areas for Further Investigation
  - System-Level Issues
  - Mid-Range Issues
  - Micro-Level Issues
- Concluding Comments

Postscript . . . . . 389

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . 419

APPENDIX I: Summary of the Evaluation Regarding the Location and Staffing of the GBO's (February 1968) . . . . 431

APPENDIX II: Documents and Forms . . . . . 441



## LIST OF TABLES

Table		Page
1.	Race Characteristics for Cities with 50,000 or More Population--Pennsylvania (1970), and Percent of Change 1960-1970 . . . . .	133
2.	Recommendations of the Study of Location and Staffing of GBO's (February 1968) and Actions Taken . . . . .	135
3.	Percentage Distribution of GBO Workers by Previous Employment (1967-1971) . . . . .	140
4.	Entry Classification of GBO Workers by Year 1967-1971 . . . . .	142
5.	Percentage Distribution of Racial Characteristics of GBO Workers (1967-1971) . . . . .	142
6.	GBO Access Levels--Four Year Totals . . . . .	173
7.	Citizen's Advocacy Activity of the GBO's by Type of Advocacy and Community Sub-System (August 1, 1967 - July 3, 1971) . . . . .	174
8.	Local-Level Citizen's Advocacy by Action Jurisdiction and Type of Advocacy (in the Study Sample) . . . . .	176
9.	"GBO Only"--Local-Level Handling by Type of Advocacy . . . . .	178
10.	Local-Level Referrals by Type of Advocacy and Jurisdictional Structure (Type of Agency) of Final Action . . . . .	189
11.	Central Office GBO Referrals by Problem Type (August 20-September 15, 1967) . . . . .	212
12.	GBO Central Office Class and Legal Advocacy Mean RESTIME by Problem . . . . .	231
13.	GBO Central Office Class and Legal Advocacy Mean RESTIME by Agency . . . . .	232
14.	GBO Central Office Class and Legal Advocacy Mean RESTIME by Intime (Quarter) . . . . .	233
15.	GBO Central Office Class and Legal Advocacy Resolution (Percent Favorable) by Problem . . . . .	242



Table	Page
16. GBO Central Office Class and Legal Advocacy Average Action (Percent Favorable) by Agency . . . . .	244
17. GBO Central Office Class and Legal Advocacy Average Action (Percent Favorable) by Intime (Quarter) . . . . .	245
18. Local Level Citizen's Advocacy by Type of Advocacy and Sub-System (Study Sample) . . . . .	251
19. Comparisons of Proportions of Problems for Overall GBO Activity with the April-December 1970 Sample Periods and the Study Sample . . . . .	252
20. Jurisdictional Structures and Types of Community Organizations upon which Demands were Placed by the GBO's by Community Value-Allocating Sub-System . . . . .	255
21. Types of Jurisdictional Structures with which the GBO's Interacted by Type of Advocacy . . . . .	256



## LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure		Page
1.	Types of Citizen's Advocacy . . . . .	50
2.	Governor's Branch Offices Organizational Structure . . . . .	126
3.	Percent of City Population which was Black in 1970 for the 13 Cities in which GBO's were Located . . . . .	131
4.	Location of GBO's in Relation to Poverty Areas (Philadelphia) . . . . .	136
5.	Location of GBO's in Relation to Poverty Areas (Pittsburgh) . . . . .	137
6.	Executive Directive No. 32 . . . . .	442
7.	DPW Bulletin No. 668 . . . . .	443
8.	GBO Problem Card . . . . .	444
9.	GBO Referral Postcard . . . . .	444
10.	"Throw-away" Outreach Leaflet, Philadelphia . . . . .	445
11.	GBO "Throw-away" Outreach Leaflet . . . . .	446

## ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This dissertation began with a desire to bring to a wider audience the character and accomplishments of one non-punitive response to the urban violence of the late 1960's. I was a participant in some of the activities surrounding the response of the state of Pennsylvania to the threat of violence directed against "the system" by black people, and observed many of the events reported herein. I was particularly intrigued by one aspect of the state's response: the twenty-one storefront "branches" of the Governor's Office which were placed in Pennsylvania's ghetto neighborhoods in 1967.

Observation of the Governor's Branch Office program over an extended period of time suggested that there were important theoretical insights to be extracted from their experience. The Governor's Branch Offices (GBO's) were established in the state bureaucracy, but were ideologically and operationally anti-bureaucratic. The GBO's were an arm of state government, but they pursued action at all levels: state, local, regional and federal, and in both public and private sectors. The GBO's refused to restrict their activities to any one area of community value, becoming involved in welfare, health, housing, education, transportation and a variety of other areas. The Governor's Branch Offices acted primarily on behalf

of disadvantaged individuals who needed public services, but they were also active in demanding broader changes in policy, procedure, law and regulation. In fact, the diversity of activities of the Governor's Branch Offices seemed to defy systematic analysis. The fact that the GBO program was an operating program which seemed not to fit into any of the major theoretical niches, however, presented a challenge for research. Moreover, the efforts of the people in Pennsylvania to seek a creative response to urban discontent was in consonance with my personal ideology. I was thus inspired to seek an appropriate theoretical frame-of-reference upon which to base a dissertation on the Governor's Branch Offices.

In discussions with Dr. Charles Nixon, chairman of the doctoral committee, it became apparent that a descriptive study would be inappropriate for a dissertation, the reason being that there was no well-developed body of literature to which such a study would contribute. Thus, it seemed most appropriate to identify a research project which would examine one particular aspect of the program, or to explore the interactions of the Governor's Branch Offices with a traditional political actor, or to detail their activities in one area such as employment or housing. The most appropriate literature seemed to be a growing number of works on the ombudsman. I received considerable support in this direction from Dr. W. W. Vosburgh of the Bryn Mawr Graduate School of Social Work and Social Research. In addition, a few telephone conversations and a brief encounter with Dr. Stanley Anderson of the Institute of



Governmental Affairs at the University of California at Berkeley, provided additional support for this approach. I was moving in this direction when Dr. Nixon suggested that I talk with Dr. Harry Scoble about the dissertation. It was from this encounter that the present work emerges. I thus wish to thank Dr. Nixon for staying with me through several changes in orientation and for finally getting me together with Dr. Scoble.

Harry Scoble subsequently agreed to work with me as chairman of the dissertation committee. His reaction to a first draft was that I should try to identify more precisely the political-governmental problem to which the study is directed, and to narrow the analysis to a manageable topic for a dissertation. His extensive comments led me to extend the problem setting beyond the immediate events of the 1960's and to go beyond the ombudsman literature into broader structural problems of modern society. He also led me to focus analysis on dimensions of access and responsiveness in modern society. I thus owe considerable thanks to Harry for shepherding me through the period when the theoretical framework and analytic convention were being developed. His suggestions and critical comments provided the direction and impetus required to complete the work. As the manuscript began to emerge, he involved Dr. John C. Ries as co-chairman of the dissertation committee. Dr. Ries was particularly helpful in encouraging me to develop more fully the model of analysis and to explicate it in the main body of the text. In addition, I wish to thank Dr. Jerome Cohen for critical reading of drafts.

It was from their advice and comment that this manuscript emerged.

It is appropriate to note here that this is a study of the interactions of one program (the GBO's) which was part of a broader plan; this is not a study of the overall response of the state of Pennsylvania to the threat of urban violence. The Governor's Branch Offices were designed to provide a channel for the demands of disadvantaged people on the socio-political structures of Pennsylvania. As originally conceived, this study was to be part of a broader evaluation of the Governor's Branch Offices which would have provided data on the general impact of the GBO's on the larger community, and on the people with which they interacted. The dynamics of research and funding, however, were such as to preclude the implementation of the broader evaluation plan. Thus, this study is specifically restricted to consideration of the Governor's Branch Offices as one channel of political demand; it seeks to determine whether the GBO's were able to provide access to the political system for specified classes of demands, and whether they were able to precipitate responsive actions on the part of organizations and agencies which had the authority to take action.

It is also important to state at the outset that the methodology which emerged from an extended series of events was primarily participant observation supplemented by several complementary approaches. Thus this study is primarily a view from the inside and can be considered as only one perspective on the events reported herein. Within these parameters, it is suggested that the

study of the Governor's Branch Offices provides a highly useful document for it locates the incipient study of citizen's advocacy in several general trends in modern political systems, it presents a model for analysis and a typology of citizen's advocacy, and it provides insights into the nature and operation of one successful program. Thus, the study should prove to be a useful document for theoretician, researcher and practitioner alike.

Concerning my involvement in the research setting and the opportunity to observe and gather data on the events reported herein, I wish to thank Dr. W.W. Vosburgh for introducing me to the Governor's Branch Offices, and for many interesting and insightful discussions as we tried to launch the overall evaluation of the GBO's. Thanks are also in order to Mr. Raymond Crenshaw, and Mr. F. Clinton McKay of the Governor's Branch Offices central staff for a general education regarding the nature and operations of the GBO's and for helping me to secure access to much of the documentary and case-record information used in the study. Thanks also to Mr. William Conway and Mr. Robert Leighty for providing an extensive education on the inner-dynamics of the Pennsylvania bureaucracies, and for the opportunity to become involved with the GBO's. Credit for a considerable amount of the success of the participant observation is due to these friends and colleagues.

Finally, the entire project could not have been completed without the advice and support of Dr. Daniel Katkin and Dr. Larry Gamm of the Division of Community Development of The Pennsylvania

State University. I count them as two of my closest friends and colleagues. Along with Mr. James Trost, they provided much advice and counsel during the toughest stages of analysis and writing. In addition, Ms. Janet Essman provided considerable aid in typing and editing of drafts, and shared the final typing with Ms. Sandra Wager. Most of all, I wish to thank Donna Hyman for support--material, psychological and spiritual--over a period of many, many years.

## VITA

February 15, 1939--Born, Milton, Pennsylvania

1957-1961--U.S.A.F.

1961-1963--B.A., The Pennsylvania State University

1964-1965--Teaching Assistant, Department of Political Science,  
The Pennsylvania State University

1965--M.A., Department of Political Science, The Pennsylvania  
State University

1965-1968--NDEA, (Title IV), Fellowship, Department of Political  
Science, University of California, Los Angeles

1968-1972--Management Research Associate, Department of Public  
Welfare, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

1972--C. Phil., Department of Political Science, University of  
California, Los Angeles

1972-present--Assistant Professor, Division of Community Development,  
The Pennsylvania State University; and, Faculty Associate,  
Center for Human Service Development

1975--Ph.D., Department of Political Science, University of California,  
Los Angeles

## PUBLICATIONS

VOSBURGH, W.W., and HYMAN, DREW W., "Advocacy and Bureaucracy: The  
Life and Times of a Decentralized Citizen's Advocacy Program,"  
Administrative Science Quarterly, (Winter 1973), pp. 433-448.

HYMAN, DREW W., and KATKIN, DANIEL, A Fundamental Dilemma of American  
Society: The Case of Delinquency Prevention and Control Systems  
in Pennsylvania, (an area survey for the American Public Welfare  
Association, University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania  
State University, 1973), monograph.

HYMAN, DREW W., and POWANDA, CATHERINE, The Pennsylvania Governor's  
Action Center, University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania  
State University, Center for Human Services Development, Report  
No. 50, (October 1974), monograph.

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Citizen's Advocacy and Political Responsiveness  
in a Polycentric Political System

by

Drew Walton Hyman

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

University of California, Los Angeles, 1975

Professor Harry M. Scoble, Chairman

This study explores the issue of whether formalized citizen's advocacy programs have the potential to provide political access and responsiveness for individual citizens and unorganized interests. A grounded theory of citizen's advocacy is presented followed by a case analysis of one such organization: The Governor's Branch Offices in Pennsylvania. The Governor's Branch Offices (GBO's) were established as part of the response by the authorities in Pennsylvania to the urban racial crisis of 1967. The GBO's are conceptualized as a "dialectical organization" which had a mandate to utilize the direct authority of the Governor's Office to "make the system respond" to the demands of disadvantaged, in particular black, people in Pennsylvania. To these ends, neighborhood advocacy offices were placed in twenty-one ghetto neighborhoods as advocates for the demands of individuals and interests.

The setting of research is one of those "rare occurrences in politics [when] spontaneous demands pour forth in the form of uprisings, jacqueries, or other manifestations of discontent that are genuinely

unorganized and premeditated . . ." Black people in America had suffered hundreds of years of domination and racial violence against them. This condition was accompanied by the convergence of several trends which have accompanied modernization in the U.S.: (1) the publicization of more and more aspects of community life, (2) the bureaucratization of most community structures, (3) increasing politicization of the citizenry and concomitant demands by unorganized interests for participation, and (4) a trend toward accumulation of control in a strategic elite which is primarily accessible by and responsive to the demands of large organizations. The case study of the Governor's Branch Offices provided the opportunity to examine the role of citizen's advocacy organizations in confronting some of the structural problems which are seen as emerging from these trends.

Four concepts--political system, political actor, political access and political responsiveness--are utilized to construct a model for analysis and to develop a typology of citizen's advocacy. Citizen's advocacy is defined as third-party intervention in the political system in order to gain access to and precipitate responsive actions of political structures on behalf of the demands of two types of political actor (individuals and unorganized interests).

Three types of citizen's advocacy are described. Case advocacy involves seeking access to and the responsiveness of the service networks of the political system (rule-application). Class advocacy involves seeking access to and the responsiveness of the policy (rule-making) structures of the polity. Legal advocacy involves access to

and responsiveness regarding the adjudicatory arenas of the polity in both judicial and administrative structures (rule-adjudication).

The analysis of the Governor's Branch Offices is based on a field research project which was carried out over a five-year period. A combination of participant observation, interviews with key informants, document and file analysis, analysis of program statistics, and case record analysis was utilized to provide data on the GBO's. The multi-method approach allowed for triangulation of information from the several sources. In the judgment of the researcher this approach provided a richness of data and observation typically unavailable with more reactive or episodic studies.

During the initial phases of research it became apparent that the political system in which the Governor's Branch Offices operated was highly polycentric. In such a polity, authority (and hence decisional autonomy) is highly diffracted into thousands of multiple, frequently competing, often overlapping jurisdictions which divide, shift and coalesce according to the exigencies of the moment: the many actors participate in a series of simultaneous games wherein each act is a move in a number of simultaneous games. The usual approach in such situations is to restrict analysis to one level of action, to one function, to one type of demand, or to one organization (that is, to treat the system as if it were monocentric). It was considered desirable, however, for this study to explore the entire range of activities of the GBO's. Consequently, an analytic convention was developed which allows analysis of a political system characterized by a polycentric order.



During the four-year period of research, the Governor's Branch Offices served as an authoritative channel for the demands of individual citizens on the structures of the political system. To these ends, the GBO's sought allocations of values (case advocacy), special rules or waivers (class advocacy), or intervened in conflicts between citizens and authorities (legal advocacy). The GBO's also undertook a broader advocacy role in that the problems in law, policy, procedure or regulation which were revealed by the many individual demands were aggregated into demands for broader changes in political structures. Thus the Governor's Branch Offices were not only a channel for individual demands, but they also aggregated these demands into broader issues in order to precipitate changes in the structures of the political system.

The study suggests that the Governor's Branch Offices provided a considerable degree of access and precipitated the responsiveness of a variety of political sub-systems, at several system levels, and in both public and private sectors. Thus the GBO's were an authoritative channel of political demand. It is concluded that formalized citizen's advocacy programs have the potential to represent the demands of individual citizens and unorganized interests to the political system, and thus to provide a mechanism which can address several structural barriers which are inherent in the modern polity. It is also suggested, however, that considerable research is required concerning the role and effect of citizen's advocacy in the political system before more definitive judgments can be made regarding the ultimate potential of citizen's advocacy programs to make political systems more accessible and responsive to the people.

## CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

"Never has government been so responsive!" These words encapsulate the sentiment of many people associated with one of the more innovative citizen's advocacy programs of the late 1960's--the Governor's Branch Offices in Pennsylvania. The Governor's Branch Offices (GBO's) were local-level citizen's advocacy offices placed in twenty-one ghetto neighborhoods in the cities of Pennsylvania.<sup>1</sup> The mandate of the GBO's was to provide access to "the system" and to assure that system structures were responsive to poor people in general, and black people in particular.<sup>2</sup> Established in July 1967 when riots were sweeping through many U.S. cities, the GBO's were the keystone of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's response to the threat of racial violence.

The research on which this study of the Governor's Branch Offices is based was carried out over a five-year period. A field research project utilizing a combination of participant observation, interviews with key informants, document and file analysis, analysis of program statistics, and case record analysis was utilized to provide data on the GBO's.<sup>3</sup> In addition, the intensity of participant observation, the author's growth and development during the extended period over which the research was conducted, and developing theory in several fields provided for a continuing dialectic between conceptualization, application in program, and reality-testing. The result is an attempt to integrate the study of citizen's advocacy into several bodies of

literature, to refine important concepts of access and responsiveness, and to develop an operational typology for the analysis of formalized citizen's advocacy programs.<sup>4</sup>

This study views the Governor's Branch Office program as an experiment in political change which sought to utilize a formalized citizen's advocacy program to provide access to and to assure the responsiveness of the polity for certain unorganized individuals and interests. The study of the GBO's thus provides an opportunity to examine one of the more salient issues of our time. It represents one of the first experiments in citizen's advocacy in this country. It predates the report of the U.S. Riot Commission which recommended the establishment of such programs at the city level. Moreover, the GBO's represent one of the few programs of its sort established to date by the state level of government.

The setting of the experiment is one of those "rare occurrences in politics [when] spontaneous demands pour forth in the form of uprisings, jacqueries, or other manifestations of discontent that are genuinely unorganized and unpremeditated . . ." <sup>5</sup> Black people as a class, had suffered hundreds of years of domination and racial violence against them.<sup>6</sup> This condition was accompanied by the convergence of several trends which have accompanied modernization in the U.S.: (1) the publicization of more and more aspects of community life, (2) the bureaucratization of most community structures, (3) increasing politicization of the citizenry and concomitant demands by unorganized interests for participation, and (4) a trend toward accumulation of control in a strategic elite which is primarily accessible by and

responsive to the demands of large organizations.<sup>7</sup> One resultant of the convergence of these factors was the emergence in the Post World War II era of black people as an unorganized class of individuals and interests who had a considerable number of unresolved demands on the political system. The 1960's represent a period in which large numbers of people in this disadvantaged class were increasingly restive and whose frustration was manifest at times in violent, anti-system behavior.<sup>8</sup>

The urban unrest which swept the nation in 1967 was thus a period of stress on the political systems of the nation. In Pennsylvania the situation was defined by the Governor and his staff as resulting from certain problematic aspects of the polity. They postulated that socio-political dysfunctions, which were leading to alienation and unrest in the nation and had led to violence elsewhere, threatened to erupt in riots and destruction in Pennsylvania as well. Easton notes that in such cases, "the outputs of [a political system] may be of a negative character, rejecting or suppressing the demands entirely."<sup>9</sup> The response of the authorities in Pennsylvania did not take this form. Rather, Governor Raymond Shafer and his staff attempted to respond to the grievances of black people as legitimate demands on the polity. The actions they took were intended to integrate black people more fully into the socio-political structures of the polity.

The acts of these particular officials to the threat of mass violence may be unique. Many observers, however, contend that the nature of contemporary society is such that ad hoc demands from individuals and unorganized interests may become more frequent and that increased repression is inevitable.<sup>10</sup> Other observers call for the

development of new institutions to assure a more accessible and responsive polity thus preventing excessive degrees of social control from becoming necessary.<sup>11</sup> This paper is about an experiment with one such new institution.

The Governor's Branch Offices were the bellwether of the response of the authorities in Pennsylvania to the threat of racial violence in the summer of 1967. As a formalized citizen's advocacy program, the Governor's Branch Offices were one part (albeit the keystone) of a broader state effort to mobilize community structures to deal with the unresolved grievances and demands of poor, in particular black, people in Pennsylvania. The remainder of this chapter will place the GBO's in the perspective of the Commonwealth's response. Chapter 2 will present a model for the analysis of citizen's advocacy programs. This model is based on the concepts "access" and "responsiveness" which are discussed more fully in the second chapter. The field research project and the methodologies utilized to provide the data upon which the study is based, are discussed in Chapter 3.

The GBO's were established at a time when attempts to develop formalized citizen's advocacy programs to combat some of the structural problems of the administrative state were (as they still are) in the formative stages. The programmatic response of the authorities in Pennsylvania in establishing the Governor's Branch Office program provides an opportunity to examine one such contemporary experiment in an action situation. The nature of the GBO's and how they operated as a black people's advocate is presented in Chapter 4. The types of problems

people brought to the GBO's and the types of access and responsiveness which the GBO's provided for individuals is detailed in Chapter 5.

The GBO's also undertook a broader advocacy role in that the problems in law, policy, procedure or regulation which were revealed by the many individual problems were aggregated into demands for broader changes in political structures. Thus the Governor's Branch Offices became not only a channel for individual demands, but also aggregated individual demands into broader issues and took action to precipitate changes in the structures of the political system. In this way, the GBO's served as a window on the administrative structures of the polity for the Governor and his cabinet. Citizen problems and complaints were used as indicators of system malaise upon which the political authorities could act in their attempts to make "the system" more responsive and accountable.<sup>12</sup> The activities of the Governor's Branch Offices in this area, to be called citizen's advocacy for interests, are discussed in Chapter 6. The final chapter, Chapter 7, will be a discussion of the general trends in the contemporary polity to which this study is directed and the role of citizen's advocacy programs in making government more accessible and responsive through utilizing citizen's advocacy programs, and in precipitating creative socio-political change.

#### The Origin of the GBO's

The events which gave rise to the creation of the Governor's Branch Offices occurred in July 1967. Riots had erupted in a number of the largest cities across the nation; there were portents of similar outbreaks in several areas of Pennsylvania. The situation was defined as an extreme crisis by state governmental authorities, for they

recognized that the nature of their action (or inaction) could prove crucial in preventing violence or in precipitating riots and destruction.<sup>13</sup>

Attuned to prevailing knowledge on the causes of riots during the 1960's, Governor Raymond Shafer and his staff defined the situation as the failure of society, in particular the political system, to deal effectively with pressing social problems. They held the viewpoint of the War on Poverty that various sub-systems in American society had failed to provide reasonable access to the promises of the American way of life.<sup>14</sup> In particular, a significant portion of the crisis was attributed to the failure of public programs to reach a large, alienated mass of disadvantaged people in the inner cities. This failure, in turn, could be traced to existing service systems which were relatively inaccessible and unresponsive to the needs and desires of poor and/or black people.<sup>15</sup>

The people who came to dominate the deliberations on how the state should respond to the crisis can best be described as liberal intellectuals and professionals with a desire to be radical.<sup>16</sup> Their search for an approach was therefore dominated by a desire to attack the roots of poverty and racism in the long-run, and a commitment to search for a nonpunitive, humanitarian alternative to deal with the immediate threat of violence. Within a few days several key decisions were made.

The cause of unrest, as defined by these officials, was alienation rooted in lack of achievement of the promises of the "American way of life." The forces of modernization, racism, and "the revolution of rising expectations" had combined to cause large numbers of people to expect more while, comparatively, they were achieving less. Resulting

feelings of disappointment, rage, and powerlessness were being acted out in the form of riotous, anti-system behavior.<sup>17</sup>

In a major public pronouncement, which had been carefully designed to initiate the strategy outlined below, Governor Shafer told the people of Pennsylvania that "the same conditions that have fostered violence elsewhere exist in our state." And that, "it is no longer enough just to believe in the rights of people or just to talk about the rights of people. Each of us must now commit himself to act . . ."18- The intention of the Governor was to put both private and public sectors of the community on notice that they would be expected to bear a portion of the burden of ameliorating the conditions in the ghettos.

As the situation might be expressed in terms of Rose's ideal-type conceptualizations of the causes of poverty, the Pennsylvania policy makers accepted the theory that the events were caused primarily by a "dysfunctional socio-political system" i.e., the relative deprivation of the ghettos results from dysfunctions in the larger social structure.<sup>19</sup> In this model the behavior patterns of disadvantaged people are viewed neither as manifestations of deviant values nor as evidence of personal pathologies, but rather as normal adaptations of people to frustration at being prevented from attaining the aspirations they derive from the larger society. Key aspects of this orientation are:

The structural position and subsocial behavior patterns of the poor stem from historical and contemporary situations which generally involve lack of access to the political and economic systems, systematic racial discrimination, ineffective social institutions, and other factors which also prohibit rather than facilitate full participation in the larger society.<sup>20</sup>

The perceived remedies for this situation are institutional change, specifically: (1) alteration of community structures to



guarantee the poor equal access to social and economic sub-systems, and (2) alteration of the political system to provide increased power for the poor vis-a-vis the institutions instrumental in their lives.<sup>21</sup>

Access to political power was achieved by the appointment of a young black man, Dr. Thomas W. Georges, Jr., as "riot czar," and of Mr. William Nagel as Executive Secretary of the Council for Human Services, a super-cabinet level organization under the Governor. These two men were given direct responsibility for determining the strategy and tactics of the Commonwealth's response to the crisis. (They were, therefore, in an authoritative position vis-a-vis all human services-related departments, including the state police.) The ideology of these two men, combined with their positions of authority, assured that there were advocates for poor and black people in the highest offices of the Commonwealth.

The first public announcement of the Commonwealth approach to the crisis was a major policy statement by Governor Shafer. He stated that his policy was to attack the root causes of violence and not the people who were acting out their frustrations at societal injustices. His speech was carefully designed to make it clear that he expected the private sector to bear major responsibility for alteration of social and economic structures in the Commonwealth. Thus community structures and the state government were both being called upon to respond:

. . . As Governor I have the opportunity to attack and ease some of these problems [which fostered violence]--and I have taken action. However, I want you to know that while we are all in this together, the main thrust must come from you, the people.

. . . Mr. Employer, only you can end discrimination where it exists in your business; only you can open your training programs to all people.

Mr. Industrialist, only you can move sections of your operation into areas of little or no employment.

Mr. Labor Leader, only you can end discrimination where it exists in labor unions.

Mr. Landlord, only you can make the right to decent housing a reality. Mr. Innkeeper, only you can guarantee the availability of public accommodations to all.

Mr. Investor, only you can guarantee that your companies will incorporate your beliefs about the dignity of man.

And to the congregation of all the religious faiths I would say: You cannot avoid your responsibilities for insuring every citizen his God-given rights.

Without this total commitment on your part, there is little your Government alone can do to prevent violence.<sup>22</sup>

The Governor backed these words with actions designed to get the private sector, state government, and other levels of government to act. At the state level a conference on minority employment was convened where direct influence was applied to representatives of major interests. Action was taken to provide jobs--skilled and unskilled--in many state institutions. Landlords, real estate agencies, and various levels of government were contacted to deal with the housing situation. The Governor and his representatives also met with the mayors of major cities to assure cooperation between state and local government. There was concomitant action by the Governor and his staff to mobilize a priority effort to gain private and public support for utilization of war on poverty programs to provide for development of deprived urban areas.<sup>23</sup> These actions were taken with the realization that the development of new service systems, provision of new housing, and development

of industry for new jobs, are relatively long-term propositions. At the same time, there was a need for speedy ameliorative responses if the immediate crisis was to be resolved without violence.

Black People's Advocates for the Immediate,  
Specific Response

Although the Governor placed a large part of the responsibility for action on other structures in the community, he did not excuse or defend the public sector. He attributed a large part of the crisis to the failure of public programs to reach a large, alienated mass of disadvantaged people in the inner cities. Governor Shafer traced this failure to patterns in existing service systems which made them relatively inaccessible to poor and/or black people and which were perceived as being largely unresponsive to them. He called upon his staff to develop a program for making community institutions responsive to the interests of black people.

Increased power for the poor vis-a-vis the institutions instrumental in their lives was approached by appointing a black man to authoritative control of both political and service access points of the political system. As was mentioned above, Dr. Georges had been appointed "riot czar." He was also given the portfolios of two major state-level departments--the Department of Health and the Department of Public Welfare. This action put Dr. Georges in direct executive control of two departments which were simultaneously the main source of services for ghetto residents and a main point of contention.<sup>24</sup> Any effort at organizational reform would have to affect these departments among others.

A first action suggested by Dr. Georges and his staff was the establishment of a series of independent advocacy offices. These offices were to be staffed primarily by black people and operated under the control of a black man. They were to be immediately accessible to ghetto residents, independent from the bureaucracies, and imbued with the authority to act in the name of the Governor. The Governor announced the establishment of these "Governor's Branch Offices" in the same major policy statement quoted above.

I have ordered the opening of branches of my own office in key neighborhoods throughout the State. Through my own representatives I will act as advocate for those people who are ready, willing and able to assert and exercise their rights to a place in the mainstream of social and economic life . . .

From this beginning will come a structure of human services which will hurdle unnecessary obstacles and delays. These offices will respond quickly to the real needs of people.

. . . I have instructed these offices to use my name and my authority to assure people of speedy access to services to which they may be entitled. . . . I am talking about a unique, brand new approach to the operation of government.<sup>25</sup>

These Governor's Branch Offices were to serve as access and control points to both the service and political systems of the state. Staffed primarily by black people, they were linked directly to the authority of the chief executive. The Governor also communicated immediately and formally with all agencies under his jurisdiction. Executive Directive No. 35 officially established the GBO's and put all government agencies on notice that a word from a GBO was a command from their chief executive.<sup>26</sup>

The purpose of these Branch Offices is to obtain for me direct communication with citizens living in areas where the greatest tension exists between government and people.

. . . My offices are under orders to address themselves vigorously, in my name, to the swift elimination of arbitrary and unnecessary delays in the provision of services to legally entitled persons. . . . Sound judgment, quick action, and respect for human dignity must prevail over procedural detail. A continuing and constantly renewed stress on courtesy, prompt service, and a scrupulous regard for the full rights and entitlements of citizens of this Commonwealth will assert our commitment to excellence in serving all of the Commonwealth's citizens.

The GBO's as a Formalized Mechanism  
for Citizen's Advocacy

The assumption of the Governor and his staff in establishing the Governor's Branch Offices as the keystone of the Commonwealth's response to the crisis was that a large part of the problem was occasioned by the lack of effective linkages between (1) services already available in the billion dollar human service network of the state and (2) disadvantaged people in the urban ghettos. A significant portion of the thousands of human service organizations in the state was either under the administrative control of the Governor, or was in some degree amenable to his authority as chief executive and head of his party. Moreover, there is evidence that many bureaucracies at both state and local levels were beset by problems of fragmentation, inaccessibility, and ineffectiveness.<sup>27</sup> In addition, black people tended to perceive government agencies as antagonists and as unresponsive to their needs and demands.<sup>28</sup> This aspect of the Governor's strategy came to be defined first as a need to open communications for a disadvantaged class of citizens to the various levels of bureaucracy,<sup>29</sup> and secondly, to identify areas where the various systems had been so structured that there were gaps and barriers to the provision of service.<sup>30</sup> It was also

determined that a new mechanism was required which could mobilize the relatively unresponsive service agencies and which would also command the confidence of black people. This aspect of the Governor's response to the crisis came to be defined as "making the system work for black people." A new anti-bureaucratic<sup>31</sup> type of organization emerged in the form of Governor's Branch Offices located in twenty-one ghetto neighborhoods throughout the state.<sup>32</sup>

The Governor's statement--"I am talking about a unique, brand new approach to the operation of government."--was not merely rhetoric. The Governor's Branch Offices were assigned the responsibility for providing two levels of advocacy, each comprised of a specific type of access and a specific type of responsiveness.

The first level of advocacy, citizen's advocacy for individuals sought to provide access for individuals and responsiveness to their immediate problems. Located in storefronts in the black community, the GBO's were to provide the first level of advocacy by intervening with the bureaucracies on the part of individuals in: (1) receiving problems and complaints from individuals, (2) creating a linkage to provide access to an appropriate agency in one of the several human service systems, and (3) prodding the agency into a responsive stance. This first level of citizen's advocacy was later translated into a policy paper which stated the function as:

An [citizen's] advocate 'pleads for,' 'defends,' 'supports,' 'comes to the aid of,' or 'intercedes in favor of,' a person or group.

. . . The citizen's advocate does not provide a direct service: he is the means by which one person or group is able to obtain something to which he has a right from an agency or group which is not fully carrying out its mandate.

. . . The citizen's advocate does whatever is necessary to assure that correct action is being taken--but does not take the action himself.<sup>33</sup>

The last of these operating principles contains the phrase "does whatever is necessary," which gave rise to a second level of citizen's advocacy.

The second level of citizen's advocacy, citizen's advocacy for interests, was directed toward what was called "system change"<sup>34</sup> through providing access to and precipitating the responsiveness of the various arenas of the political system for changes, both general and specific, in system structures. In this context, the experience of the Governor's Branch Offices with the various sub-systems of the polity was used to identify gaps, barriers, or undesirable "patterns" in law, service, policy or procedure. This information, in turn, was used to precipitate remedial action and was thus an "input" to the political system.

The dual advocacy role of the Governor's Branch Office program is reflected in two additional operating principles:

The citizen's advocate is a catalyst: he may be the catalyst between a person needing service and a service agency or between a system malaise and the policymaker.

The citizen's advocate is the person who requires a mandated action or reaction to occur: he may intervene in normal procedures where necessary to get a desired result; he may require action when none would otherwise be forthcoming; he may investigate, gather facts and present them to decision-makers for their action to correct undesired conditions.<sup>35</sup>

The effect of this aspect of the Governor's program was to create a new demand channel which bypassed traditional gatekeepers in the executive agencies, political parties, interest groups, and socio-economic elites.<sup>36</sup> In this way, issues were communicated directly to people in the Governor's Office who then assumed the responsibility for

seeking the required changes in law, service, policy, or procedure. The GBO's can therefore be seen as attempting to bypass the gatekeepers of the political system, what Easton terms one of the "rare occurrences in politics."<sup>37</sup> In that it was intended by the authorities that the GBO's would do this, this program may be regarded as even more unique. The GBO's represented an attempt to prevent the outputs of the political system from being negative in character. They were an attempt to transform radically the political system by institutionalizing a formalized citizen's advocacy program as a new, permanent actor in the polity.

The function of the GBO's was thus to serve as a multi-level linkage agent which sought to provide access to and the responsiveness of: (1) the service networks of the polity at any level of organization necessary to get action, which will be called case advocacy, (2) the policy and rule-making structures of the political system through a new, direct channel which afforded effective access to a class of citizens with little traditional power (and little access), which will be called class advocacy, and (3) the adjudicatory arenas of the political system in both judicial and administrative structures, which will be called legal advocacy. The use of the terms access and responsiveness, their relationship to the various types of political structure, and the types of political actor which the GBO's sought to represent are discussed more fully in the following chapter. The next chapter concludes with the presentation of a typology of citizen's advocacy which is based on these concepts. This typology, in turn, is used in the remainder of the paper as a framework for analysis of the activity of the GBO's as an advocate for black people.



## Chapter 1: Notes

<sup>1</sup> Webster's preferred definition of "advocate" is: "One who pleads the case of another, as before a tribunal or judicial court." "Advocacy" is an "act of advocating, pleading for, or supporting." A citizen's advocate is one who pleads the cause of a citizen, and is used here to indicate intercession for and support of citizens vis-a-vis bureaucracies and the other structures of the political system. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, 2d ed., (Springfield, Mass.: G.C. Merriam Co., 1953).

<sup>2</sup> Carmichael and Hamilton define "the system" from the black power perspective: "By system we have in mind the entire American complex of basic institutions, values, beliefs, etc. By structures, we mean specific institutions . . . which exist to conduct the business of that system . . . Our view is that, given the illegitimacy of the system, we cannot then proceed to transform that system with existing structures." This view was shared in part by key policy-makers in Pennsylvania to the extent that they set out to create a new structure, in the form of the Governor's Branch Offices, to serve as a steering and control device for transforming the existing structures of the system to make them more accessible and responsive to the demands of black and other disadvantaged people. The fact that the GBO's were indeed to be different, and that they were to be an instrument of change for black people is underscored by the fact that they became a focal point for conflict between their black progenitor, Dr. Thomas W. Georges, Jr. and white social service professionals. Dr. Georges adamantly refused to make any changes in the GBO's which would tend to co-opt them into the existing social service network of the state, even to the point of refusing to consider closing one office which received hardly any visitors, (located in a fairly rural area) on two grounds: (1) the GBO's were the embodiment of a promise to black people that there was indeed a new, permanent structure, not a palliative for a long, hot summer--closing one would be viewed as betrayal of a promise and would undermine any changes in efficacy that might have occurred; and (2) to make one concession to the "rationalist" bureaucratic arguments of the white liberal professionals would be like the first crack in a dike and soon the entire structure would be washed away. Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton, Black Power, (N.Y.: Random House, 1967), pp. 2-10.

<sup>3</sup> See Chapter 3 for a discussion of the methodology used for the study.

<sup>4</sup> Chapter 2 discusses these concepts in more detail and presents the typology for analysis of citizen's advocacy, however, a few words on their use are appropriate here. "Access" is defined as the probability that a political actor can obtain the "attentive interest of the

relevant decision makers" in situations where the actor perceives an interest is at stake. Harry M. Socble, "Access to Politics," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 1, (1968), pp. 10-14. "Responsiveness" is defined as the efficiency with which the political system processes an input, and is (in principle) measurable in terms of time (response-time) and success (resolution).

These concepts will be described as continua in relation to two other concepts, political actor (individuals, collectivities, interest groups), and the political system itself (from needs and wants, to demands and issues, through conversion, output, and implementation). These distinctions are necessary here, for it will be seen that the goals of the GBO's were to provide high degrees of access and responsiveness for several types of actors at several points of the political system.

In addition, the phrase "formalized citizen's advocacy programs" is intended to convey the idea of (1) a formal organization, (2) with a manifest function, (3) of advocacy for citizens, viz. the pursuit of access and responsiveness as developed more fully below. This phrase is used advisedly to contrast formal approaches to citizen's advocacy with traditional ideas that the functions occur informally, or as latent functions, of other institutions (e.g. the separation of powers, pluralism, representative democracy, elections, professionalism, etc.).

<sup>5</sup>David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, (N.Y.: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), p. 89.

<sup>6</sup>There are several works on violence in America which suggest that racial violence before W.W. II, was generally, but not entirely, by whites to keep blacks "in their place." After W.W. II, racial violence became increasingly a reaction by blacks against the established order. See, for example: Willard A. Heaps, Riots U.S.A.: 1765-1970, (N.Y.: The Seabury Press, 1970, rev.ed.); J.T. Headly, Pen and Pencil Sketches of the Great Riots, (N.Y.: Arno Press and The New York Times, 1969); Joseph Boskin, Urban Racial Violence in the Twentieth Century, (Beverly Hills, Ca.: Glencoe Press, 1969); Rodney F. Allen and Charles H. Adair, Violence and Riots in Urban America, (Worthington, Ohio: Charles A. Jones Pub. Co., 1969); Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, Violence in America, Vol. 1, Staff Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, (June 1969).

<sup>7</sup>These are issues which transcend the scope of this paper. It is suggested, however, that they encapsulate some of the broader causal factors of the events described herein. The roots of these statements can be found in the works of Marx, Weber and Durkheim, Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, (first published in 1893), (N.Y.: Free Press Edition, 1964); is concerned primarily with the consequences of increasing specialization and differentiation in society. He notes that for society to modernize, these processes will necessarily occur, making individuals more interdependent and also dependent on community solidarity. Such a situation gives various segments of society a degree of autonomy and authority vis-a-vis the others. And the more

segmented society becomes, the more authority will be divided among the various specialized structures. He also suggested that "organic solidarity" and hence the social fabric will be threatened if: (1) some segment fails to do its function; (2) some structure or class seeks to dominate others; or (3) the necessary linkages between segments do not exist. In all three cases, the results will be either domination and exploitation or revolts and civil war. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, (N.Y.: The Free Press, 1964); wrote about the same time with a focus on organization. Weber suggested that modernization will be accompanied by the development of rational-legal organizations to carry out the mandates of society. These bureaucracies will gain an autonomy of their own and may militate toward stability but could also be a resistant force against change. Moreover unless controlled by an outside force, they could become a dominating group. Karl Marx suggested a historical tendency toward publicization (socialization) of community life. This would be manifest in domination by classes, first the private bourgeoisie class, then the publicized representatives of the proletariat. Karl Marx, excerpt from "A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy," in Lewis S. Feuer, ed., Marx & Engels, (Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday & Co., Inc.) Ch. II, pp. 42-47, contains Marx's summary of his political sociology.

Together these three writers tend to suggest that modernization will be accompanied by publicization, bureaucratization, and threats of domination by self-interested classes. The contemporary manifestation of these trends is discussed in many works including: Michael Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964); Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959); Charles S. Hyneman, Bureaucracy in a Democracy, (N.Y.: Harper & Bros., 1950); Peter Woll, American Bureaucracy, (N.Y.: W.W. Norton & Co., 1963); Robert Dahl, After the Revolution, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970); Henry Jacoby, The Bureaucratization of the World, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), and others listed in the bibliography.

The concern with domination by factions in the U.S. is documented by Madison in Federalist No. 10. More recently, David Truman, The Governmental Process, (N.Y.: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), pp. 522-523 suggested the possibility of interest group pluralism developing into "pathogenic politics" whereby large organized interests dominate the policy to the detriment of unorganized classes, and interests. The contemporary existence of this condition is suggested by: Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism, (N.Y.: W.W. Norton, Inc., 1969); The Politics of Disorder, (N.Y.: Basic Books, Inc., 1971); Grant McConnell, Major Economic Groups and National Policy, The American Round Table (October 1958); Private Power and American Democracy (N.Y.: Knopf, 1967); Philip M. Stern and George deVincent, The Shame of the Nation, (N.Y.: I. Obolensky, 1965); Suzanne Keller, Beyond the Ruling Class, (N.Y.: Random House, 1963); and John C. Ries, "Interest Group Power and American Democracy," in Werner Z. Hirsch and Sidney Sonenblum, eds., Governing Urban America in the 1970's, (N.Y.: Praeger, 1973), pp. 63-76. (These and other sources are also cited in the bibliography.)

<sup>8</sup>Recent discussions of ghetto riots in the late 1960's as acts of political violence which support this statement include: Robert H. Binstock and Katherine Ely, eds., The Politics of the Powerless, Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop Publishers, Inc., 1971); Harlan Hahn, The Political Objectives of Ghetto Violence, American Political Science Association, (1969 annual meeting), monograph; Joe R. Feagin and Harlan Hahn, Ghetto Revolts: The Politics of Violence in American Cities, (N.Y.: The Macmillan Co., 1973); Robert M. Fogelson, Violence as Protest, (Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday & Co., 1971).

Several articles which attempt to differentiate riot and non-riot cities by the overall socio-political characteristics are somewhat inconclusive suggesting perhaps that the underlying conditions existed in most cities with concentrations of black people: Brian T. Downes, "Social and Political Characteristics of Riot Cities: A Comparative Study," Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 49, (Dec. 1968), pp. 504-521; William F. Ford and John H. Moore, "Additional Evidence on the Social Characteristics of Riot Cities," Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 51 (Sept. 1970), pp. 339-348 and Brian T. Downes, "A Critical Re-examination of the Social and Political Characteristics of Riot Cities," Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 51, (Sept. 1970), pp. 349-360.

Stanley Lieberson and Arnold R. Silverman, "The Precipitants and Underlying Conditions of Race Riots," ASR, Vol. 30, (Dec. 1965), pp. 887-898, found violence "much more likely to occur when social institutions function inadequately, or when grievances are not resolved, or cannot be resolved under the existing institutional arrangements."

Joseph Boskin, "The Revolt of the Urban Ghettos, 1964-67," The Annals (March 1969), pp. 1-15, found a high level of support among black people (demonstrated in both attitude and action) for violence against the institutions which most epitomized "the system." "Significantly, the two institutions which represented the white establishment, the police and the businesses were singled out for attack. Largely ignored were libraries, schools and civic buildings."

Finally, Howard Shuman and Barry Gruenberg, "Dissatisfaction with City Services: Is Race an Important Factor?", in Harlan Hahn, ed., People and Politics in Urban Society, Urban Affairs Annual Reviews, Vol. 6, Sage Publications, (1972), pp. 369-388, suggest that it is not clear that riot areas (in 1967 riots) differed socio-economically from the rest of the city. Once race is held constant, however, disorder areas "do differ in level of dissatisfaction with city services . . . for the black sample."

Shuman and Gruenberg also note that black people in the Pennsylvania cities which they surveyed, Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, showed similar dissatisfactions to those in riot cities in other states which had riots (except Newark which differed from both riot and non-riot cities).

These findings tend to support the perceptions of Governor Shafer and his staff that they did have a volatile situation on their hands, and that dissatisfaction with the polity was a major probable cause.

<sup>9</sup> Easton, op.cit., p. 89.

<sup>10</sup> See Chapter 2 below. Also, William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society, (N.Y.: The Free Press, 1959), p. 53; James S. Coleman Community Conflict, (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1957; and T.B. Bottomore, Elites and Society, (N.Y.: Basic Books, 1965).

<sup>11</sup> Several works discussing alternatives include: Herbert Kaufman, Administrative Decentralization and Political Power, American Political Science Association, (1968 annual meeting), monograph. Kaufman sees the trend toward increasing demands by new interests for access and responsiveness reflected in the increasing use of ombudsmen, citizen complaint bureaus, administrative decentralization, community control, and various mechanisms for direct citizen participation. Edgar Shor, Administrative Representation for the Under-Represented, American Political Science Association, (1972 annual meeting), monograph, suggests public interest citizens groups. Daniel Goldrich and Joseph A. Kremers, From the Corporate State Through Vietnam to the Developmental Community, American Political Science Association, (1972 annual meeting) reiterate these suggestions and add "dialectical organization," and the community citizenship foundation to the alternatives. Theodore Lowi, (1969), op.cit. suggests juridical democracy or non-delegation of authority to the bureaucracy. Another suggestion comes from the proponents of participatory democracy. And, "whistle blowing," wherein people within the system take it upon themselves to expose corruption and wrongdoing, is discussed by Charles Peters and Taylor Branch, Blowing the Whistle: Dissent in the Public Interest, (N.Y.: Praeger, 1972). In addition the many works on the ombudsman which are cited in the bibliography provide insight into this option and its several variants. Some of the problems with existing controls--separation of powers, due process, executive and legislative checks, the courts, political parties, and elections are discussed in: Charles S. Hyneman, Bureaucracy in a Democracy, (N.Y.: Harper & Bros., 1950); and Felix A. Nigro, Modern Public Administration, 2nd ed., (N.Y.: Harper and Row, 1970).

<sup>12</sup> Ezra S. Krendel, "A Case Study of Citizen Complaints as Social Indicators," IEEE Transactions on Systems Science and Cybernetics, Vol. SSC-6, (October 1970), pp.265-272; and Ira Katznelson, "Antagonistic Ambiguity: Notes of Reformism and Decentralization," Politics and Society, Vol. 2 (Spring 1972), pp. 323-333, suggest the problems and complaints brought to advocacy programs might be used in this manner.

<sup>13</sup> Gordon Misner, "The Response of Police Agencies," The Annals, (March 1969), pp. 109-119; and Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riots, Violence in the City--An End or a Beginning?, (December 2, 1965), suggest that the policy of political authorities is perhaps a determining factor.



<sup>14</sup>Joseph Kershaw, Government Against Poverty, (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1970); and John C. Donovan, The Politics of Poverty, (N.Y.: Pegasus 1967) contain analyses of the War on Poverty.

<sup>15</sup>Governor's Commission, op.cit. and Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, (N.Y.: The New York Times Co., 1968), (also called the U.S. Riot Commission).

<sup>16</sup>Tom Wolfe, Radical Chic, presented a vivid description of the prevailing mood among liberals.

<sup>17</sup>Hahn, (1969), op.cit., also Richard A. Berk and Howard E. Aldrich, "Patterns of Vandalism during Civil Disorders as an Indicator of Selection of Targets," ASR, Vol. 37, (October 1972), pp. 533-547; Connery, op.cit., and U.S. Riot Commission Report, op.cit., Ch. 4.

<sup>18</sup>Raymond Shafer, The Honorable, speech, (July 1967), from the files of GBO's.

<sup>19</sup>Stephen M. Rose, The Betrayal of the Poor, (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1972), Ch. II.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 27.

<sup>21</sup>This approach is differentiated from both (1) individual and cultural change, and (2) nationwide change in the economic system, as discussed by Rose, ibid, Ch. II. The same interpretation of causes and recommended actions was adopted by the Governor's Commission op.cit., and the U.S. Riot Commission, op.cit.

<sup>22</sup>Shafer, op.cit.

<sup>23</sup>From various documents of the files of the Governor's Council on Human Services.

<sup>24</sup>The Department of Public Welfare administered or supervised the public assistance, medical assistance, social services, child welfare, mental health, mental retardation, food stamps, youth services, youth corrections, services for the aging and day care programs. The Department of Health had public health, drug and narcotic control, comprehensive health planning, chronic disease hospital, maternal and child health, and visiting nurse programs.

<sup>25</sup>Shafer, op.cit.

<sup>26</sup>Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Executive Directive #35, (July 1967).

<sup>27</sup>The current Secretary of Public Welfare, Helene Wohlgemuth, in her first address to the State Board of Public Welfare (1971), stated: "The sporadic and uneven development of Pennsylvania's human services over the years has come about piecemeal, in response to varying stimuli: economic and social crises, pressure group demands, and the incentive of Federal matching funds for specific programs. For each crisis a new 'remedy' has been contrived, and around each 'remedy' an entirely new bureaucracy to provide services. . . . Each new structure envisions a full array of services dedicated primarily to its specific clientele. Planning services for a categorically defined clientele, each program creates a new eligibility requirement, a new funding pattern, a new set of criteria, and an exclusive fellowship of 'specialists' to administer, design, and supervise the delivery of 'specialized' services. The result is a chaotic patchwork for program pieces, rather than a coherent pattern of services. . . . I believe that the 'non-system' administered and funded under various Departments of State and County government, does not make maximum utilization of the monetary and personnel resources available. Nor is there any effective mechanism for coordination of the 'non-system' to effect a rational delivery of services to the people who need them."

A variety of studies on the provision of human services to people in Pennsylvania document the fact that such a system exists: i.e., Pennsylvania Citizens Association, Report to the 1956 Commission on Governmental Reorganization, (1956); Governor's Committee, Report of the Governor's Committee on Merger of the Departments of Welfare and Public Assistance, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, (February 1959); State and Local Welfare Commission, A Reallocation of Public Welfare Responsibilities, (May 1963); Vocational Rehabilitation Planning Commission, The Comprehensive Vocational Rehabilitation Plan for Pennsylvania, Vol. I, (December 1968); Community Services of Pennsylvania, To Better Serve the People, (January 1969); Joint Legislative-Executive Task Force on Human Services, Human Services: A Report to the Governor of Pennsylvania, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, (1970). On the federal level proposed changes in the social service sections of the Social Security Act, as well as the proposed Allied Services Act seek to move the human services of the nation toward a more rational, less categorical, and more accountable system of service provision.

<sup>28</sup>Gideon Sjoberg, Richard A. Brymer, and Buford Farris, "Bureaucracy and the Lower Class," in Virginia B. Ermer and John H. Strange, Blacks and Bureaucracy, (N.Y.: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1972), pp. 159-170 presents a discussion of this perspective.

<sup>29</sup>Harold Wilensky, Organizational Intelligence, (N.Y.: Basic Books, 1967), p. 45ff, has a discussion of the relationship between hierarchy and communications.

<sup>30</sup>The U.S. Riot Commission, op.cit., after exhaustive study nationwide came to similar conclusions: ". . . Negroes, like people in

poverty everywhere, in fact lack the channels of communication, influence and appeal that traditionally have been available to ethnic minorities within the city and which enabled them--unburdened by color--to scale the walls of the elite ghettos of an earlier era. The frustrations of powerlessness have led some to the conviction that there is no effective alternative to violence as a means of expression and redress, as a way of "moving the system." More generally, this result is alienation and hostility towards the institutions of law and government and the white society which controls them . . . (p. 205.)

Several developments have converged to produce this volatile situation. First, there is a widening gulf in communications between local government and the residents of the erupting ghettos of the city. As a result, ghetto residents develop a profound sense of isolation and alienation from the processes and programs of government. This lack of communication exists for all residents in our larger cities; it is, however, far more difficult to overcome for low income, less-educated citizens who are disproportionately supported by and dependent upon programs administered by agencies of local government. Consequently, they are more often subject to real or imagined official misconduct ranging from abrasive contacts with public officials to arbitrary administrative actions.

Almost by definition . . . the typical ghetto resident has complicated social and economic problems which often require the services of a whole variety of government and private agencies. At the same time, he may be unable to break down his problem in ways which fit the complicated structure of government. Moreover, he is often unaware of his rights and opportunities as they exist under public programs and unable to develop the necessary guidance from either public or private sources." (pp. 284-85.)

<sup>31</sup>Orion F. White, Jr., "The Dialectical Organization: An Alternative to Bureaucracy," In Ermer and Strange, op.cit., pp. 149-164, discusses a non-bureaucratic type of organization. Elihu Katz, and S.N. Eisenstadt, "Some Sociological Observations on the Response of Israeli Organization to New Immigrants," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 1, pp. 113-133, describe a "debureaucratized" organizational structure. Goldrich and Kremers, op.cit., comment on White's suggestion to the effect that dialectical organizations are an alternative to bureaucracy.

<sup>32</sup>It should be kept in mind that Pennsylvania has over 2500 governmental units, but it will be shown that the twenty odd GBO's were located to be accessible to most disadvantaged black people in the state.

<sup>33</sup>Drew Hyman, Toward the Advocacy Program, Department of Public Welfare, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, (September 1971), a policy paper prepared for the Governor's Office.



<sup>34</sup>"System change" is used herein to mean changes within system structures, not a major redistribution of power or revolutionary transformation of political regime or economic system. This is the usage of the phrase by participants in the events described in this work, is consonant with Rose's typology, and is manifest in reform and adaptation variants of political change.

<sup>35</sup>Hyman, op.cit.

<sup>36</sup>Easton, op.cit., (1965), pp. 86-96, discusses gatekeeping.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., pp. 88-89.

CHAPTER 2: ACCESS AND RESPONSIVENESS: FOUNDATIONS FOR AN OPERATIONAL  
MODEL FOR THE ANALYSIS OF CITIZEN'S ADVOCACY PROGRAMS

Four concepts (access, responsiveness, type of political structure, and type of political actor) will be used to locate citizen's advocacy programs, in particular the Governor's Branch Offices, in a field for inquiry and to explicate the relationship of such programs to the political system.

ACCESS is, most simply, admission of a latent demand into the political system. Access may vary from nil or minimal,<sup>1</sup> through nominal and effective access to privileged access.

RESPONSIVENESS is the efficiency of the political system in converting demands to outputs and can be stated in terms of time and effectiveness. Responsiveness varies from recognition but no response, through cooling out,<sup>2</sup> and business as usual, to immediate response (i.e., immediate conversion of a demand to an output).

POLITICAL ACTOR Actors in the political process may include individuals, latent or quasi-groups (interests), solidary groups or collectivities, and organizations (interest groups, bureaucracies, firms and political parties).<sup>3</sup> Actors may be either demand partisans or authorities.

POLITICAL SYSTEM OR POLITY The political system can be seen as a continuous process of decision-making from the generation of latent demands through input and conversion, including decision, application, and/or adjudication, to output and value allocation. For purposes of this study, the polity is separated analytically by function into several strata or levels--input side, policy structures, service structures, adjudicating structures, and output side.

These concepts will be used to explicate the role of the Governor's Branch Offices in gaining access for individuals and interests to both the inputs and the outputs of the political system.<sup>4</sup>

Likewise, they will be used to provide a framework for describing the attempts of the GBO's to obtain the responsiveness of various socio-political structures of Pennsylvania for disadvantaged people.

"Access" can be measured by answering the following three questions: (1) Who is or is not gaining access? (2) To which portions of the polity? (3) And for what reason is access sought? Access exists when a demand enters the polity. Consequently a measurement of access is simply an indication of whether demands get inside the polity and where. Thus, the existence of access, while prerequisite to any consideration of conversion of demands to decisions does not necessarily lead to successful decisions or action by the political system.

That a demand comes to the attention of decision-makers merely means that an issue exists and will be considered in some way by the authorities. Consequently, a measurement of access is not an indication of whether demands, once inside the political system, will be responded to in the manner desired by the initiator. (The Watergate affair is a case example in which an actor who possessed the greatest degree of access, the President, could not be assured of the responsiveness of subordinates such as two special prosecutors.) If, therefore, inquiry is directed also to questions of whether, when and in what form outputs are likely to occur, it is necessary to consider a second type of phenomenon--the responsiveness of political structures in converting demands to outputs.

"Responsiveness" is measurable in terms of the processing time and the effectiveness of political structures in the conversion process (from the viewpoint of the initiator of the demands). Considerations of responsiveness begin the moment access occurs and end when conversion ceases.

The remainder of this chapter will discuss more fully the meaning of access and responsiveness, the nature of the structures of the political system, and the several types of political actor. These concepts will then be used to define a typology of citizen's advocacy-- case advocacy, class advocacy, and legal advocacy. The typology will be used in the remainder of the study to describe the actions of the Governor's Branch Offices in their efforts to make the socio-political structures of Pennsylvania responsive to the demands of poor, and in particular black, people in several communities in Pennsylvania.

#### Access and Gatekeeping: The Two Faces of the Boundary of the Polity

Access, for present purposes, can be operationalized most precisely as the admission or entrance of a want, need, desire, or expectation into the political process.<sup>5</sup> Access occurs when an event in the environment of the polity is recognized by an authoritative political actor who perceives the event as a demand for action and subsequently enters it into the political process. The phenomenon of access is thus an interactional event between environmental actors and political authorities.<sup>6</sup> The former make decisions about whether to try to inject latent demands into the political system. The participants who support a latent demand will be called "demand partisans," or simply "partisans."<sup>7</sup> Authorities, acting as gatekeepers, decide whether or not to recognize or give access to latent demands. Thus access and gatekeeping can be seen as two faces of the boundary of the polity, and the pattern of access events can be said to define the parameters of the input side of the political system.<sup>8</sup>

Kornhauser defines access as all "the ways in which non-elites impinge on elites, and the net effect of these influences on the conduct of elites."<sup>9</sup> It is important to recognize that access becomes an issue only when a certain class of events occurs in the socio-political environments of the polity which are responded to in certain ways by authoritative political actors. The wants, needs, desires, expectations, etc., of citizens do not automatically become demands. Demands are created only as a result of "identifiable, observable behavior on the part of a person or group."<sup>10</sup>

Wants do not appear on the political scene as demands in some mysterious or inexplicable way. Members of the system must do the converting. They must give voice to a want in such a way as to indicate that they feel it ought to be handled through the formulation of binding decisions. Every demand will, therefore, have a concrete, and in principle, determinable point of entry into a system through some member of a group.<sup>11</sup>

Access requires that demand partisans seek to approach or gain admittance to the polity in order to satisfy latent demands, and that such wants come to what Scoble calls the "attentive interest of the relevant decision-makers."<sup>12</sup> Considerations of access do not involve questions of whether a demand will become an output (although this is the ultimate objective) for these are issues of conversion and of power.<sup>13</sup>

To be meaningful and useful for systematic research, the concept of access must be clearly distinguished from the concept of power. Access should be regarded as the measurable (in principle) probability that if the members of a group or its leaders perceive an interest affected by a future authoritative decision, the group can obtain the attentive interest of the relevant decision makers. Access thus describes a continuum of behavioral situations: at the one end, the group has no access, (and no power) regardless of whether it perceives an interest or not; in the middle, if the group perceives an interest, it can act--it has effective access; at the other end--the maximum preferred goal of all interest

groups--the group has privileged access. Privileged access can be defined as the probability that authoritative decision-makers automatically take a group's interests into account.<sup>14</sup>

The parameters of access, on the one hand, fall short of considerations of conversion, and on the other they must be defined to mean more than just awareness by gatekeepers of the latent demands of environmental actors (for the alternatives of admitting or excluding the wants remain). For access to occur the awareness of appropriate authoritative actors must be attentive in the sense of "observation with a view to action," and characterized by interest in the sense of "being influenced by," and "leading to a decision to participate in advantage, profit and responsibility."<sup>15</sup>

Moreover, systematic measurement of access will require a demonstration that at least the following prerequisite conditions exist: (1) events in environmental sub-systems of the polity can be shown to lead to the occurrence of latent demands in the form of unfulfilled wants, needs, expectations, etc.; (2) partisans of various interests in the polity desire to have these latent demands fulfilled through community structures; (3) these facts come to the attention of actors in authoritative roles or positions in the society; and (4) these "gatekeepers" take an interest in making a demand on community political structures for the satisfaction of the wants through authoritative community action.<sup>16</sup>

Furthermore, if it can be shown that the latent demands of partisans in the environment of a polity are converted into actual inputs (demands on socio-political structures) by actors in, on the boundary of, or in the communications channels utilized by political actors, it can be assumed that access exists. It is asserted, therefore,

that once the existence of the prerequisites has been documented, access can be measured as the voicing of a demand by an authoritative actor with an intent that action occur to meet the demand. It is not necessary to demonstrate that the want will be satisfied, for results or outputs are encompassed in the concept of responsiveness (to be discussed below).

It has been stated that the existence of access, while prerequisite to consideration of a demand by the authorities, does not automatically lead to decisions or actions. This distinction between taking an interest in a problem (access) and actually doing something about it (responsiveness) has not been clearly made in traditional literature. Discussions of access have been oriented to analyses of elite behavior. Recently the focus of some scholars has turned to the examination of elite-mass interactions and questions have been asked about what elites do not do, as well as about what they do. For these reasons it is appropriate at this point to discuss the several types of political actors--whether they be demand partisans or authorities.

#### Access for Whom? Types of Political Actors

Access has been defined most simply as the admission or entrance of demands into the political process. Access occurs as the outcome of certain, potentially measurable, interactions of actors in the political community. In simple societies, small communities, face-to-face groups, committees, etc.--that is in situations where political roles are scarcely distinguishable from membership--there tends to be "maximal diffusion of the capacity to convert wants to demands."<sup>17</sup>

Easton states that in such situations everyone has access and cultural restraints bear the burden of limiting the creation of demands.

There are no structural barriers to anyone voicing a demand and, in fact, in these societies each adult member tends to be his own gate. This is what gives all life in small non-literate societies an intense and overriding political character seldom if ever achieved in structurally more differentiated societies.<sup>18</sup>

Where structural differentiation prevails, gatekeeping--the capacity to grant or deny access--tends to fall to the incumbents of specialized roles. Traditionally, in such situations, access was attained either through membership in elites or through participation in the selection of elites. Kornhauser's statement that "access requires competition among elites, for only in this manner can there be guaranteed both multiple choices and open channels of communication" is a reflection of this viewpoint.<sup>19</sup>

More recently the rise of interest group pluralism has led to the addition of external group pressures as factors which impinge on political outcomes via the actions of interest groups which seek to gain access to, and influence the behavior of authoritative decision-makers. The works of such writers as Bentley, Truman, and Latham reflect this approach.<sup>20</sup>

Most recently, writers such as Coleman,<sup>21</sup> Eisenstadt,<sup>22</sup> Kornhauser,<sup>23</sup> and Easton,<sup>24</sup> suggest that the processes of modernization, democratization, and massification in contemporary societies have been accompanied by the expansion of access points to include mass pressures which are manifest as general pressures from non-elite interests or classes, or as ad hoc demands on decision-makers.

A major recent development in civil politics generally has been the increase in the number of points at which an



administration is available to public demands. ...These movements operate by mobilizing a previously apathetic mass and demanding responsiveness from an administration at those points in the decision-making process which have heretofore been shut off from public pressure. The phenomenon is an old one, which before the advent of the mass media, occurred only in small, homogenous societies.<sup>25</sup>

If access is taken to include all ways in which influence is exerted by demand partisans to convince authorities that they should admit latent demands into the political system, all of the following must be considered as means to access: (1) selection of elites, (2) membership in elites, (3) interest groups pressures, (4) solidary group (interests) influences, (5) direct mass pressure, (6) indirect mass pressure through the media and public opinion, and (7) individual pleas of demand partisans to incumbents of authority roles. Consequently, when considering questions of political access, it is appropriate to classify political actors as being any of the following: individuals, interests and classes (quasi-groups), solidary groups, and organizations such as bureaucracies, political parties, firms and interest groups-- any of which may be either demand partisans or authorities.

This approach is necessary for this study because the case under consideration, the GBO's, provides an opportunity to examine access for non-elite individuals and interests in contemporary society. The GBO's were established by the authorities in Pennsylvania to provide a new dual demand channel whereby: (1) the latent demands of black individuals which were previously blocked by existing structures could gain access to the structures of the polity, and (2) these demands could be aggregated into specific issues on behalf of the entire collectivity to precipitate changes in law, policy and procedures of the socio-political structures of the community.

To this point the main focus of discussion has been on access. Access describes a motivating state of affairs of a decision to act. It signifies that an authoritative actor has been mobilized with an intent to act or to seek action by others. The granting of access for a demand means that an issue has been created and will in some way be presented to authorities for action, for such is the central meaning of access. Consequently, the moment access is granted attention immediately turns to the flow of the demand through the conversion process to a decision (or nondecision). When this latter phenomenon is the central concern of inquiry, it is necessary to utilize an additional concept, responsiveness, to describe the facts of the conversion process.

#### Responsiveness as Differentiated from Access

Access describes the process by which a demand enters the political system; responsiveness describes the process by which it gets out. Responsiveness, for present purposes, can be operationalized most simply as the effectiveness with which a demand is processed through the structures of the political system. Considerations of responsiveness begin the moment a demand enters the political process and continue until the issue is decided and/or action is or is not taken.

The phenomenon of responsiveness is thus an interactional event within the structures of the political system which results in an output to the environment. Measurement of responsiveness entails two considerations: (1) timeliness--how quickly is the decision or action forthcoming?<sup>26</sup>; and (2) effectiveness--how satisfactory or successful is the response from the viewpoint of the initiator of the demand? Thus,

as access can be said to describe the boundaries of the political system on the input side, so responsiveness describes the parameters of the output side of the polity.

Kornhauser states that "responsiveness . . . is the central meaning of access."<sup>27</sup> Responsiveness is determined by all the interactions of political actors relative to the conversion of an issue or demand, and the net effect of these interactions on the ultimate output. Responsiveness, as the efficiency of relevant structures in processing a demand, thus describes a continuum of behavioral occurrences: at one end, the demand is immediately defeated, and at the other end, it is immediately satisfied; throughout this continuum are varying degrees of delay and modification, including symbolic gratification, "cooling out," "business as usual" and cooptation.<sup>28</sup>

The parameters of responsiveness begin with access and fall short of determinations of the impact of outputs on the environments. For responsiveness to be assessed, a demand must have entered the political system and must be processed through system structures to a point of resolution. The measurement of responsiveness then requires the demonstration of at least the following preconditions: (1) entry of a demand into the political process by an authoritative actor with a level of intensity and direction of preference;<sup>29</sup> (2) commitment of resources by the initiating authority; and (3) subsequent interaction between incumbents in relevant political structures directed toward resolution of the demand.

In considering the responsiveness of political structures, the conversion variables for output are: (1) determination of the access point; (2) the nature of the demand--does it contemplate large or small

allocations of resources? What is its symbolic content? (highly charged or not, positive or negative); (3) the nature of the gatekeeper initiating the demand (influence, position, and other resources); (4) intensity and commitment of resources by the gatekeeper; (5) the strategy and route chosen (determines backing, size and intensity of opposition, and number of decision points); (6) timing--the relationship to other simultaneous "games" of the moment; (7) reactions of other actors (positive and negative plus intensity); and (8) the number and complexity of interactions.<sup>30</sup>

Furthermore, if it can be demonstrated that demands have entered the political system through a particular point, that resources have been applied toward processing the demand, and that outputs of a given nature subsequently occur, then the responsiveness of the political system to the demands can be stated in terms of time-in-process and results. That is, it is possible without prejudicing the analysis, to make the simplifying assumption that if the prerequisite conditions have been met, and an action can be shown to have occurred, inferences may be made about the responsiveness of the political system without necessarily having traced all of the above conversion variables. Moreover, if the structures of the political system which were active in particular cases are known, it is possible to make inferences about such identifiable sub-systems and thus to illuminate further the nature of the political system. The next section discusses the political system as the concept is used herein for analysis of citizen's advocacy programs.

## The Political System: Simultaneous Games and Multiple Arenas

The conventional model of the political system depicts a continuous process of decision-making from the generation of latent demands by actors in the community, through input of demands to the authorities, to conversion of the demands into authoritative decisions and allocations of values for the community.<sup>31</sup> The products or outputs of this system are the decisions and actions of authorities and may be functionally stated as rule-making, rule-application and rule-adjudication.<sup>32</sup> This general model of the political system provides a framework for analyzing certain classes of events in the real world and for indicating their interrelation in producing certain subsequent effects on community life. The model has proven to be most useful for analyses of singular events or of the operation of single structures. Such analyses allow events to be traced through the system as if the functions are discrete phenomena and occur in sequential order.<sup>33</sup>

It is generally agreed, however, that in the modern political system, authority, and hence decisional autonomy, is highly diffracted into multiple, frequently competing, often overlapping jurisdictions. For example, in the polity of Pennsylvania the structures for the authoritative allocation of values have evolved over several hundred years in response to various historical crises or events. The result is an anomalous pattern of socio-political structures in the community whereby authority is divided by: (1) community value sub-system--such as health, employment, housing, transportation, education, justice, commerce, etc., (2) level of jurisdiction or locality--township, city, county, state, borough, region, federal, neighborhood, association, or corporation,

and (3) sector--public, voluntary, quasi-public, or private. The result is a polity which is characterized by thousands of separate, competing jurisdictions which divide, shift and coalesce according to the exigencies of the moment.

Michael Polyani, and more recently Vincent Ostrom, characterize such a political system as "polycentric."<sup>34</sup> A polycentric political system is one where the many actors, each possessing a degree of decisional autonomy (jurisdiction) "participate in a series of simultaneous games and where each act has the potential for being a move in simultaneous games."<sup>35</sup> Such a situation pertains in Pennsylvania because the socio-political structures are highly differentiated by value, sector and locality. The process of decision-making and action, therefore, occurs in what Emery and Trist call a "turbulent field environment" which is characterized by continual shifts in the roles and relationships among actors.<sup>36</sup>

Consider, for example, the provision of services to poor and disadvantaged people in Pennsylvania in situations where the state government, through the Department of Public Welfare, has some authority, but in most cases, shares considerable portions of the responsibility (and hence authority) with other spheres of influence. Cash assistance or cash supplements are provided through sixty-seven county boards of assistance administered by the State Department of Public Welfare. There are also federal food stamps; and surplus food is (was) distributed through a Department of Agriculture program. In addition, there are thousands of private charities and religious organizations which share a portion of the responsibility, as well as work supplement programs through other departments and certain types of educational

scholarships designed to meet this need as well. Employment and vocational rehabilitation services are required for people on cash assistance but are provided through two separate bureaus of the Department of Labor and Industry. The Department of Public Welfare, however, administers a Commonwealth Careers program which provides jobs in state institutions, and a Neighborhood Youth Corps program for young people. Additionally, there are many private employment services as well as direct contacts with employers which allocate this value. Furthermore, most social service agencies also consider employment services as part of their mandate. Social services are the responsibility not only of the sixty-seven state administered county boards of assistance but also of the sixty-seven separate county administered child welfare agencies (which are only "supervised" by the Department of Public Welfare), and the sixty-seven juvenile probation offices established by counties for which there is only minimal state contact. Moreover, there are thousands of social service agencies in the "voluntary sector" under the aegis of private charities, religious organizations, Health and Welfare Councils, United Funds, and professional associations. These organizations may or may not fall under state regulations or guidelines, and may or may not receive public funds. In the area of housing and living conditions, the "market" provides the main structures for allocation although there are various agencies regulating building and real estate transactions, and there are various levels of public health and building inspections. Public housing is typically provided by local housing authorities with some state regulation and federal funding. Homes for the aged, blind and disabled are a shared responsibility between private market, county, state and voluntary sectors although the Department of

Public Welfare generally has licensing responsibility. Housing is also considered a social service by many social service agencies. (Those administered or supervised by the Department of Public Welfare are no exception.) Mental health and retardation services are provided through thousands of private medical entrepreneurs for which the state has licensing responsibility. The state also operates thirty-four institutions for the mentally ill or mentally retarded through the Department of Public Welfare, forty-two community mental health programs are administered by sixty-seven variously divided counties subject to the regulations and annual approval of a plan by the Department of Public Welfare and federal regulations. Many "county" MH/MR programs also receive direct federal aid. Medical services for poor people (under sixty-five years) are primarily an individual responsibility provided through entrepreneurs, however, payment is available through the Department of Public Welfare under its version (Pennsycare) of federal medical assistance (Medicaid). The nature and quality of service is determined by thousands of individual medical practitioners or clinics. Medicare, the federal program for older citizens is regulated by the Pennsylvania Department of Health, although the Department of Public Welfare may make supplemental payments through the Pennsycare program. County nurses and regional well-baby clinics are Department of Health programs. However, the Department of Public Welfare operates ten state-owned general hospitals and administers the federal Hill-Burton hospital construction program.<sup>37</sup> While extremely complex, this example actually presents a simplified account of the organization of some services available to people in Pennsylvania. In fact, these are but a few of the programs listed in the Catalog of State Services to Individuals



issued in 1968 "toward providing more effective services to the disadvantaged citizens of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania." (Bollens states that Philadelphia and Pittsburgh each contain between 500 and 1000 different governmental jurisdictions.)<sup>38</sup>

This rather extended illustration serves not only to depict the multiplicity of jurisdictions which pertain in the polity under consideration, and into which the Governor's Branch Offices were thrust as a steering and control mechanism, but also to point out that it is public policy that these conditions exist. Consequently, these conditions and their ramifications are political issues, and must be confronted at some point by people who desire to understand and explain the nature of the political system.

The diffraction of authority by value and level, and the blurring of the distinction between public and private sectors is a notable phenomenon of American life which presents increasing barriers to effective program administration, service delivery, policy making and political analysis alike.<sup>39</sup> For the social scientist who seeks to analyze and understand the dynamics of such a political system, the existence of thousands of differentiated value-allocating sub-systems, each with its own rationality, its own interest, its own goals, and its own constituency to protect it, presents formidable barriers to analysis. As Gamson notes, in such systems, "every member of the system may be an authority on at least some set of decisions although these decisions may vary greatly in importance for the system."<sup>40</sup> Moreover, in such situations everyone is a "potential partisan" for some decisions or actions making it extremely difficult to create distinctions which are neatly amenable to analysis.<sup>41</sup> Commenting on this phenomenon, Talcott

Parsons states:

When subvalues are institutionalized as such, they, in turn, legitimate substitutions which, in turn, are differentiated in relation to the structure and situation of the sub-system in question, and of the requisite categories of roles within it. Thus, we would have variations in mode of legitimation, in the statuses of role-performers within the system, in their situations, and in the institutionalization of sanctions.

In these terms every sub-system within the society has its patterns of authority because on its own level every sub-system has political functions and differential political responsibility. But these will differ for different types of sub-systems within the society, by the various criteria by which authority patterns can and do vary.

. . . When, therefore, the whole ramified structure of institutions in a society and its sub-systems is looked at, it is a differentiated hierarchy of permissions, prescriptions, and prohibitions . . . .<sup>42</sup>

This phenomenon of an order which gives the appearance of chaos is not a new characteristic of American public life. Alexis de Toqueville commented on the phenomenon as early as the 1830's.

The appearance of disorder which prevails on the surface leads one at first to imagine that society is in a state of anarchy; nor does one perceive one's mistake till one has gone deeper into the subject.

. . . Written laws exist in America, and one sees the daily execution of them; but although everything moves regularly, the mover can nowhere be discovered. The hand that directs the social machinery is invisible.<sup>43</sup>

Confronting such a situation with a desire for rigorous, quantifiable analysis, political scientists have usually adopted the convention of restricting analysis to singular events or single strands of the wider web of political events. While this "harmless convention"<sup>44</sup> has allowed the development of a large body of quantified research, it has also tended to perpetuate the image of the political system as being a monocentric entity, or what Polyani terms a "deliberate" or "directed" order.<sup>45</sup> This image of political reality has been beneficial in that it has provided a convention which has

allowed the development of a large body of partial truths about political behavior; on the other hand it has tended to obscure the image of the broader political reality.<sup>46</sup>

One result of the almost universal use of this convention is a tendency among scholars to avoid studies which would force confrontation with the alternate image. When they are faced with the requirement to deal with the phenomenon, they tend to interpret the existence of fragmentation of authority and overlapping jurisdictions as irrational, chaotic, and not amenable to systematic analysis. In response to such observations, Ostrom states:

Presumably a truly chaotic state of affairs would not persist over time unless a Grand Randomizer were available to "maintain" a chaotic "order." Furthermore, a truly chaotic state can hardly be evaluated by performance criteria such as efficiency or responsiveness. For a polycentric political system to exist and persist through time, a structure of ordered relationships would have to prevail, perhaps, under an illusion of chaos. If such a structure of ordered relationships exists one might assume that specifiable structural conditions will evoke predictable patterns of conduct.<sup>47</sup>

Recall Carmichael and Hamilton's characterization of "the system" as the entire American complex of basic institutions, values, beliefs, etc. "By structures, we mean specific institutions . . . which exist to conduct the business of that system. . . . Our view is that, given the illegitimacy of the system, we cannot then proceed to transform that system with existing structures." It was precisely this system, a vast amorphous assemblage of norms, rules, and structures, into which the Governor's Branch Offices were thrust as a new structure with a mandate to make "the system" work for black people. The GBO's were not afforded the luxury of dealing with one series of organizations, one of the differentiated hierarchies, one level, or even one function performed

by structures of the socio-political system. They were to hear the problems, requests and complaints of black people, and to confront "the system" in whatever ways were available to them in order to precipitate action toward resolving the demands. The GBO's were thus given the mandate to take actions which could, in principle, lead them to confront practically all aspects of "the system."

These facts presented the researcher with several choices for analysis of the Governor's Branch Offices as an experiment in political reform. On the one hand it would be most convenient to adopt the prevailing convention and choose for analysis a single event, function, locality or organization with which the GBO's had interactions. This alternative would have proven to be easiest, quickest and most amenable to current techniques. But it would have prevented other than speculative consideration of the relationships of citizen's advocacy programs to the broader environment and the overall polity. In retrospect, this was perhaps the most rational alternative; however, the immediacy of participant observation combined with the richness of the experience it provides and the values of the researcher to militate against this approach.

The other alternative was to adopt a convention which allows the operationalization of a political system characterized by a polycentric order. Such a political system is one where many elements, each with a sphere of authority, participate with others in ordering relationships and where each actor acts with a degree of independence of other elements.<sup>48</sup> Polycentric political systems typically present difficulties for analysis, for most actors are involved in multiple

arenas, and as mentioned above, each actor participates in a series of simultaneous games and each act is a move in a network of simultaneous games.<sup>49</sup> Consequently, predictive inferences cannot be made which apply to all units of analysis (actors) across all decision-making arenas.

Ostrom postulates that predictive inferences can be made, however, where particular arenas can be specified and multiple arenas can be conceptualized as a series of simultaneous or concurrent games, and where structural conditions expose the sets, or classes, of individual decision-makers involved to similar strategic calculations.<sup>50</sup> This approach was adopted and is accomplished by specifying "arenas" of behavior and then constructing simplifying categories which allow the behavior of the thousands of entities to be analyzed in terms of:

(1) classes of events in the political environment, in particular classes of demands in relation to the different arenas, and (2) the measurable reactions of classes of authorities in the system and its sub-systems to the specific events, in particular events of access and responsiveness to the demands of the citizen's advocate.

This analytic convention is based on two assumptions already introduced: (1) since all behavior is based on decisions and acts of actors, all individuals, interests, and organizations can be considered to be mini-political systems, and (2) all political functions, rule-making, rule-application, and rule-adjudication, occur simultaneously (rather than separately or sequentially).<sup>51</sup> The result is a model of the political system where demands and supports (inputs) are continuously processed through the structures involved in all three political arenas or strata (called the service arena, the policy arena and the

adjudicative arena). The policy arena is defined as those roles and interactions of system actors which allow them to decide whether or not to make or change policies, procedures, laws, or rules. They process demands for new rules, or for modifications of existing rules. The service arena is concerned with the application of general rules to particular cases. This arena consists of the roles and interactions which process demands for the allocation of existing rights and entitlements to specific actors. The adjudicatory arena is concerned with resolving disputes between actors about existing interpretations or applications of rules. This arena involves those roles and interactions which are oriented to processing demands for mediation or adjudication of conflicts concerning the application of rules for individuals or classes of individuals. All authorities are involved (to a degree) in all three arenas, and a decision to place a demand on "the system" requires a strategic calculation of which arena to activate as well as calculation of the prerequisites of access and responsiveness.<sup>52</sup>

Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly for this study, the authorities of the political system which perform these functions exist in a variety of value-allocating sub-systems, at many levels of jurisdiction, and in several sectors. It is suggested that such is not the case in monocentric political systems (and in analyses which view the political system as monocentric), and that in such systems, gatekeeping, and hence considerations of access, is fairly straightforward. The gates and the gatekeepers are few, and power and authority in the system is hierarchical and stable over time; therefore, actors know where to go and what to expect. Polycentric political systems, on the other hand,

present quite a different picture. The structure is amorphous, functions are not well differentiated, authority and power are widely distributed throughout various levels and structures, and the configuration shifts constantly ("kaleidoscopic" seems to be an appropriate label). Furthermore, in monocentric systems, rule-making, rule-application and rule-adjudication functions are relatively distinct and fixed in certain organizations (e.g., legislatures, chief-executives and courts). In polycentric systems, the presence of decisional autonomy at all levels gives a measure of influence vis-a-vis the others and allows for blurring of functions.

When such a situation obtains, the decision about access is complicated by the requirement to decide not only whether satisfaction of a want requires a new rule, application of existing rules, or adjudication of a dispute over application of rules, but also which way to enter the system and how to proceed. Thus a situation is presented where every actor making a demand must make a complex strategic calculation of the prerequisites for access, as well as consideration of which community value sub-system to utilize, the jurisdiction and sector upon which to place the demand, and the arena to activate in order to anticipate a responsive result (output).

Thus actors in polycentric political systems who seek (and those who make) authoritative decisions concerning the allocation of community values may move vertically up a chain-of-command toward higher authority, but there is also the option at any point of going across (or being shunted) horizontally to other structures or sub-systems. For example, at the local level it is possible to enter an agency "gate"

and move up the line to supervisors, directors, bureau heads, etc. It is also possible to choose a variety of other gates for entry, and in pursuing a decision, to move horizontally to another agency or organization. Moreover, bureaucrats in one organization or level, if appealed to, may do likewise; and this can occur all up the line. Even chief executives often seek to shift responsibility to other chief executives (governors to mayors or the president, for example), to the legislature, or to the court. In such a situation, it is not feasible (or appropriate) to focus analysis on one specific decision-maker, one function or even one level. Rather, it is suggested that analyses of how the political system does, or does not, respond to classes of demands should seek to observe the operation of how sets of authorities, in any subsystem, jurisdiction or sector, react to a given class of demands. For purposes of analysis, therefore, the present convention does not assume constancy of the actors in the games or the level of analysis; rather the classes of inputs, outputs and actors constitute the units of analysis. The use of this convention in the present study will be explicated more fully throughout succeeding chapters.

It is appropriate to note that this approach has long been recognized as legitimate by authorities in the field. Political scientists, however, have tended to respond to these facts much in the manner of David Easton who states that "for our immediate purposes this distinction and other intra-structural differences among the authorities of a system may be glossed over."<sup>53</sup> The case under consideration, however, required the researcher to confront the polycentric political system and to consider the nature of its structures, for it was necessary to characterize, at least in a gross manner, the intra-structural properties



of the overall political system in order to explicate the relationship of the Governor's Branch Offices to the myriad sub-units of the political system.

The present analytic convention allows each of the different strata of the political system to be identified as separate "arenas" of political behavior each producing different classes of outputs. It is then possible to consider the behavior of "the system" and various value-allocating sub-systems in processing identifiable demands, or classes of demands, through these arenas by focusing on the "games" of access and responsiveness (to be operationalized as the three types of citizen's advocacy). The result is a characterization of the overall political system in terms of measurable outcomes of behavior toward certain types of demands from specified types of actors. Furthermore, it is suggested that this approach allows the analysis of the behavior of the GBO's in relationship to the overall political system to be plumbed without having to trace their behavior through any one organization or to restrict analysis to any one type of input actor or to single chains of the output functions as is typically required with the usual convention.

The study of the Governor's Branch Office program provided an opportunity to utilize this approach for the GBO's were directed to provide access and responsiveness for several types of actors to several arenas of the polity. The GEO's interacted with any, or all, of the various differentiated jurisdictions of the polity. The documentation of access and the responsiveness of the structures of the polity to the demands placed upon them by the GBO's will allow the characterization of the response of the political system, and its sub-systems as well, to a

particular class of individuals and interests in the community. The next section of this chapter presents a typology of citizen's advocacy which is based on the four concepts discussed to this point: access, responsiveness, political actor and political system, and which will allow analysis of the interactions of the GBO's with "the system" utilizing the analytic convention outlined above.

### A Typology of Citizen's Advocacy

A citizen's advocate has been defined as one who pleads the cause of a citizen, and is used herein to indicate intercession for and support of citizens vis-a-vis the socio-political structures of the community. Gatekeeping is the process by which latent demands gain or are denied access to the structures of the political system. Responsiveness is the efficiency with which authorities process demands to outputs. Political actors are individuals, interests, or groups: they may be either demand partisans and/or authorities. Finally, the political system under consideration is polycentric and can be characterized by three analytically different political strata or arenas.

Citizen's advocacy programs are posited, therefore, as formalized organizations designed to provide a channel for access and a mechanism to stimulate the responsiveness of political structures, particularly for unorganized, disadvantaged, or otherwise excluded interests and individuals. A typology of citizen's advocacy functions based on the various types of political actors and the several political

arenas is contained in Figure 1. The nature and types of actions involved in each cell of the table are the subject of later chapters.

Figure 1: Types of Citizen's Advocacy

ACTOR	POLITICAL ARENA		
	Service	Policy	Adjudication
Individuals	CASE ADVOCACY	CLASS ADVOCACY	LEGAL ADVOCACY
Interests	CASE ADVOCACY	CLASS ADVOCACY	LEGAL ADVOCACY

Case advocacy involves seeking access to and the responsiveness of the service arenas of the community, that is, intercession for individual citizens or interests toward gaining allocations of values in specific cases. Kahn, in a discussion of social service policy in the United States comments that

a so-called service network without provision for entry and channeling would obviously not deserve the designation, nor could it function effectively. Yet--for lack of adequate conceptualization and organization--many of the social services leave access to happenstance.<sup>54</sup>

As a result, many agencies control the size and nature of their case-loads by discreet referral routines. Many individuals, lacking the information, mobility, determination, and resources to search for receptive programs, are effectively denied services to which they are entitled. Others suffer considerable indignity, shuffling from agency

to agency, and inordinate delays before getting to the right agency--  
if they ever do.

The task of assuring access has become most urgent in recent decades, as program proliferation and increase of entitlement have not necessarily been followed by organizational realignment. Only an extremely well-informed citizen [or group] understands fully his rights and entitlements and the organizational machinery to be dealt with in gaining access to them.

Because the educated and the more affluent are more likely to know about or to have the ability to find out about services, there are those who would give priority to access services for the very poor. Others cite universal need. . . . One specific form of the issue refers to the creation of special services for blacks, Indians, Puerto Ricans, Mexican Americans and others who have suffered particular discrimination.<sup>55</sup>

Case advocacy also involves action to deal with some of the problems of the bureaucratic state such as: clearing up bureaucratic delays, providing information, advice and steering to the array of services in the community, and continual follow-up to assure suitable responses from service structures. The goal of case advocacy is, therefore, to intercede with service structures wherever appropriate on behalf of people who cannot, or will not, cope with the service arenas.

Class advocacy involves seeking access to and the responsiveness of the policy arenas of the political system for changes in law, policy, regulations, program and procedure. Class advocacy typically affects all people of a class or group, although there are many instances where exceptions are granted for individuals or special interpretations of the rules for special individual situations. Citizen's advocacy programs, to the extent that they receive the direct, unbiased, latent demands of citizens, provide a window through which specific

malfunctions in system structures, gaps in responsiveness, or weak points in program and procedure can be detected. Having identified such areas for system change, the linkage of the citizen's advocate with authorities provides a channel for access to the policy structures required to precipitate change.

It has been pointed out that such mechanisms may be meaningful avenues for providing continuous expression of a wide variety of dissent which may not be able to be expressed effectively through competing elites or interest groups.<sup>56</sup> These mechanisms may result in creative changes which avoid some of the more violent actions of citizens resulting from unresponsive system structures.

If a regular procedure of dissent can be built into a system of authority . . . . Then the system can drain off in small everyday disputes the hostilities and dissatisfactions which otherwise accumulate and break out into controversy.<sup>57</sup>

Class advocacy does not replace other forms of conflict such as competing elites, pressure groups, mass pressures, etc., but can add another potential mechanism to the repertoire available to the citizens of modern states as channels for making demands known and pursuing system responsiveness.

Legal advocacy involves seeking access to and gaining the responsiveness of the adjudicatory arenas of the political system. At first blush, legal advocacy would seem to be the perquisite of lawyers and the courts. There is, however, a wide range of administrative regulation and administrative law which embraces a large part of the "substantive law" of the land, into which the courts rarely venture except when major questions of process are raised.<sup>58</sup> There is

consequently, a vast array of adjudicatory decisions which are typically under the complete authority of bureaucratic agencies. For example,

Woll states:

Regardless of legal provisions governing administrative procedure and judicial review, the environment of decision-making gives the agencies virtually complete discretion. . . . Because of the dominant position of the informal administrative decision-making process very few cases, relatively speaking, reach the courts. Individuals and groups use the informal process because it is less time-consuming and expensive, and does not result in straining relations with the agency too much. Further, very little publicity is given to informal proceedings; therefore, many business interests that consider good will an important asset prefer this form of adjudication because the public need never know that they have been involved in illegal or questionable activity of any kind. The same factors that keep private parties away from the formal hearing process result in limiting judicial review. The courts are available, but all too frequently taking a case to them is self-defeating. Moreover, the courts themselves have adopted doctrines of review that give the agencies maximum discretion.<sup>59</sup>

Citizen's advocacy programs can provide aid to citizens in probing the propriety of administrative judgments as well as in playing a para-legal role in securing interpretations of regulations, policy, procedure or even law for individuals and groups. Such programs are also sources of information and advice on the rights and entitlements of individuals. Steering to legal services programs for civil matters also provides access for poor people to more formal adjudicatory processes.

The traditional ombudsman function of hearing grievances of individuals and carrying out investigations toward seeking redress for agency judgments or inappropriate denials of service is also a legal advocacy function. In addition, the identification and precipitation of class action suits or challenges to existing laws through the courts,

such as the one mentioned below, and others documented in subsequent chapters, provide involvement for citizen's advocacy programs in legal advocacy for entire classes of demand partisans as well as for individuals.

### The GBO's and Citizen's Advocacy

Governor Shafer directed the establishment of the Governor's Branch Offices in order to provide a citizen's advocate for poor, and in particular, black people in the ghetto areas of Pennsylvania. The mandate of the GBO's was to range the boundaries of Pennsylvania's socio-political structures and to intercede as appropriate on behalf of this disadvantaged collectivity. To these ends, the GBO's were instructed to act with the authority of the Governor's Office and the head of one of the two major political parties in the state. The intent behind this action was to establish a new demand channel for a collectivity which previously had little or no access, and for which the system showed little responsiveness. This demand channel extended directly into the Governor's Office and was intended to deal with what were identified as some of the dysfunctions of the modern polity.

The GBO's are, therefore, posited as a steering and control mechanism<sup>60</sup> which was injected into the existing political domain<sup>61</sup> with the responsibility for aiding certain disadvantaged actors to gain access to and receive the responsiveness of a wide variety of political structures in Pennsylvania. The several types of citizen's advocacy, all of which the GBO's performed to some degree, are described by the concepts: case advocacy, class advocacy, and legal advocacy. These

concepts will also be used to characterize citizen's advocacy programs in general.

The adoption of an analytic convention which views the political system as a two-way continuum of the three output functions is important for this study for the Governor's Branch Offices had a clear mandate to penetrate all of the political arenas and to utilize all forms of citizen's advocacy as appropriate to gain the responsiveness of "the system" for individuals and/or interests. Moreover, in some situations all arenas, all types of citizen's advocacy, and several types of actors were potentially involved. For example, in one case a visitor to the GBO had been denied public assistance based on a residency requirement. The options available for use were: (1) to seek financial aid from the service structures such as churches or charitable agencies, or a one-time public assistance grant for travel to the previous state of residence, (2) to seek changes in the residence policy through the policy structures of the Department of Public Welfare and the legislature, or (3) to challenge the constitutionality of the residency requirement through the courts. In this particular case, options (1) and (3) were both used by the GBO's and eventually resulted in a Supreme Court decision which eliminated all residency requirements for public assistance nationally.

A comparable set of options was also available when the GBO's were presented several cases where young women had been refused public housing because they had illegitimate children. While public housing authorities in Pennsylvania are typically local authorities, and thus not under the administrative authority of the Governor, it was



discovered that three of every five members of local housing authorities were appointed by Governor Shafer's majority Republican party. In these cases, political influence was subsequently applied resulting in the abolishment of the policy of excluding unwed mothers from public housing in a number of Pennsylvania's cities.

Experiences such as these demonstrated that "the system" could be responsive if prodded in the right places; they also served to illuminate areas where structures were not responsive. Additional cases of the operation of the Governor's Branch Offices as an advocate for black people in relation to the various structures of the political system are presented in later chapters. These two examples are presented here solely to demonstrate that the GBO's ranged the boundaries of the political system, that they provided several types of citizen's advocacy for a disadvantaged collectivity, that issues of access and responsiveness in each situation may be different, and that the categories developed herein as units for analysis should prove useful for analysis of citizen's advocacy programs.

It is also suggested that viewing the experience of the Governor's Branch Offices as an experiment in reform aimed at making government more accessible and responsive, has value beyond any contribution it may have made to containing violence in the ghettos of Pennsylvania in the late 1960's. The problem of dysfunctions in socio-political structures, in particular bureaucracies, is not new. The increasing bureaucratization of all areas of life, however, combined with modern bureaucratic complexity, variations among citizens in knowledge, understanding and initiative in knowing of and exercising rights and entitlements, and tendencies toward biased availability and

responsiveness of system structures, means that these dysfunctions of the political system are more pervasive daily. In fact, many observers fear that resulting problems for citizens may reach the point where isolated acts of delay, unresponsiveness and inaccessibility, etc. become systemic, leading to a general loss of confidence in "the system" and subsequent decay and resulting repression by the authorities in the face of continuous or sporadic demands for change.

Many writers have pointed out that both historically and in conditions such as pertain in the modern polity, the expected consequences of inaccessible and unresponsive political structures are ultimately: (1) the development of built-in procedures which allow for the expression of grievances and dissent, or (2) violence--either in the form of sporadic and irrational outbursts but not organized opposition, or revolt and overthrow of the authorities--and/or repressive violence by the authorities.<sup>62</sup> Hyneman, commenting on the consequences of inefficient and unresponsive political structures in contemporary society has observed:

As inefficiency mounts, the size of the bureaucracy and the cost of government increase. As size of the bureaucracy increases, the difficulties in controlling it become greater. As the cost of government goes up, the possibility of undertaking additional desirable programs is diminished.

Too much inefficiency too long continued may even undermine our entire democratic system. No government will long be tolerated by an intelligent and free people if it consistently fails to do the things the people want it to do. When they get all out of patience with reform movements and repair jobs that leave them without the kind of government they want, the people may be induced to turn their government over to someone to run it for them, without assurance that they can take it back.<sup>63</sup>

One viable alternative in the face of such dire warnings is to search

for and experiment with mechanisms designed to assure access, responsiveness and creative change of the socio-political structures of the community.

This study suggests that the Governor's Branch Offices were one such attempt to institutionalize a formalized citizen's advocacy program as a new actor in the polity. More specifically, this study will serve to show first of all that the establishment of the GBO's was more than just a time-buying crisis response; they were an attempt to institutionalize a new type of actor in the polity. To these ends, the GBO's were a dialectical organization which ranged the boundaries of the political system with a mandate to "make the system work" for certain individuals and interests who were members of a disadvantaged class of citizens. Secondly, the GBO's were a formalized citizen's advocacy program which actually provided several types of political access and several types of political responsiveness for certain poor, and in particular black, people in the ghetto neighborhoods in Pennsylvania whose interests they were authorized to represent. Finally, the experiences of the GBO's in their encounters with "the system" can be postulated as a disaggregation of what is variously called "alienation," "lack of efficacy," "discontent," and the "revolution of rising expectations," into: (a) specific latent demands on the advocacy-for-individuals level; and (b) reaggregation of these latent demands into demands for what was called "system change" at the advocacy-for-interests level. Thus, the description of the operations of the GBO's and their interactions with the various structures of the polity will help to reveal the nature of the spectrum of day-to-day

nondecisions which individuals and unorganized interests otherwise encounter as they seek to have their latent demands considered by the political system.

These are issues which probe the specific nature and quality of many acts of many system structures. For these reasons, and for reasons dictated in part by the nature of the research setting itself, the approach and methodologies used to document the operation of the Governor's Branch Offices were primarily qualitative although considerable effort was exerted to provide quantitative support for specific portions of the study. The following chapter on the research setting and methodologies utilized to study the GBO's will put these comments in perspective and will explain the evolution of the research as it was conditioned by the evolution of the Governor's Branch Office Program itself.

## Chapter 2: Notes

<sup>1</sup>Harry M. Scoble, "Access to Politics," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 1 (New York: MacMillan Co., 1968), pp. 10-14.

<sup>2</sup>Erving Goffman, "On Cooling the Mark Out," in Warren G. Bennis, et.al. Interpersonal Dynamics, (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1964), pp. 417-430.

<sup>3</sup>Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. 173-182, discusses latent and manifest interests respectively as bases for quasi-groups and interest groups. William A. Gamson, Power and Discontent, (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1968), p. 35, suggests solidary groups as a third kind of group: "solidary groups, then, are neither quasi-groups nor interest groups but something in between. They are collections of individuals who think in terms of the effect of political decisions on the aggregate and feel that they are in some way personally affected by what happens to the aggregate." Both of these writers as well as David Easton, The Political System, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1953), pp. 186-187, and David Truman, The Governmental Process, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1953), pp. 14-43, discuss such types of political actors.

<sup>4</sup>David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), p. 71, speaks of demands as arising from wants. "The factors that shape demands, we earlier saw to be such ideas and attitudes as expectations, opinions, motivations, ideologies, interests and preferences. In order to be able to refer generically to this aggregate background of attitudes and ideas out of which demands arise, I shall henceforth describe them as wants." The term will be used similarly herein, and the term "latent demands" will be used to indicate a step closer to the political system for such phenomena.

<sup>5</sup>Inputs to the political process are demands and issues. Outputs are authoritative statements of goals, rules, policies, procedure, allocations of values, adjudicatory decisions and other authoritative actions which are sanctioned by the polity.

<sup>6</sup>Gamson, op.cit., p. 21, states: "The authorities are those who, for any given social system, make binding decisions in that system. If

authority is decentralized and diffuse, every member of the system may be an authority on at least some set of decisions although these decisions may vary greatly in importance for the system." For present purposes authorities include street-level bureaucrats, supervisors and management personnel as well as legislators, executives and judges.

<sup>7</sup>Gamson, ibid., p. 2 and pp. 21-37, uses the term "potential partisans" to signify "that set of actors who, for a given decision, are affected by the outcome in some 'significant' way." As used herein, however, the term "demand partisans" or simply "partisans" is used to mean partisans of a demand at any and all stages of the political process from latent demand through conversion. It is felt that this use of the term is preferable to the alternatives "demanders" or "supplicants" both of which have disagreeable connotations for this writer. For the sake of simplicity, however, it will be appropriate to refer to "citizens" or "people."

<sup>8</sup>Easton, op.cit., p. 98, describes gatekeepers as those actors who stand "athwart the demand channels" at the points of entry to the political system. Gatekeepers determine which of whose wants are likely to be converted to demands, when, and with what intensity. Gatekeeping, as the "other face of power" is the capacity to erect, or stand behind, barriers to access. Bachrach and Baratz, Power and Poverty, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), make it clear that the gatekeeping function is perhaps the most critical point in the political process. The capacity to exclude certain demands from consideration (non-decision-making) may be more powerful in some cases than that of actual decision-making. Jon Van Til, "Becoming Participants: Dynamics of Access Among the Welfare Poor," Social Science Quarterly, pp. 344-365, after review of the literature on barriers to access, postulates seven possible barriers: (1) sub-cultural barriers, (2) problems in goal setting, (3) adaptation, (4) group integration, (5) ideology, (6) institutional nondecisions, and (7) overt defeat. The first five of the barriers are primarily inherent in the factors associated with demand partisans, the sixth is primarily a function of gatekeeping. The last barrier, overt defeat, is described by Van Til as a barrier to access (with qualifications); however, for present purposes this barrier along with Bachrach and Baratz' (op.cit.), barriers of modification, administrative, and limited or no enforcement will be viewed as barriers to responsiveness.

<sup>9</sup>William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society, (New York: The Free Press, 1959), p. 53.

<sup>10</sup>Easton, op.cit., p. 85.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

<sup>12</sup>Scoble, op.cit., pp. 10-14.

<sup>13</sup>Bachrach and Baratz, op.cit., p. 44, presents a classic discussion of denial of access. "A nondecision, as we define it, is a decision that results in the suppression or thwarting of a latent or manifest challenge to the values or interests of the decision-maker. To be more nearly explicit, nondecision-making is a means by which demands for change in the existing allocation of benefits and privileges in the community can be suffocated before they are even voiced; or kept covert; or killed before they gain access to the relevant decision-making arena; or, failing all these things, maimed or destroyed in the decision-implementing stage of the policy process." Most nondecisions are accomplished by denial of access although some occur as a result of delay, maiming of demands or denial of values in the conversion process.

<sup>14</sup>Scoble, op.cit., pp. 10-14.

<sup>15</sup>Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, 2d. ed.

<sup>16</sup>It also follows that refusal of authorities to consider, or even to perceive latent demands for which the preconditions of access have been met, for whatever reason, conscious or unconscious, are from the broader perspective decisions that access shall be denied. This fact sets the stage for measurement of nondecisions, both latent and manifest.

<sup>17</sup>Easton, op.cit., p. 91.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid.

<sup>19</sup>Kornhauser, op.cit., p. 55. See also T.B. Borromore, Elites and Society, (New York: Basic Books, 1959), for a discussion of circulation of elites, the current trend toward more rapid movement of individuals into and out of elites, the increasing numbers of masses in elites, and the assertion that elites will increasingly identify themselves with the masses. Also, Suzanne Keller, "Beyond the Ruling Class--Strategic Elites," in Celia S. Heller, Structured Social Inequality, (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1969), pp. 590-624, discusses the decline of ruling classes, the rise of differentiated elite structures and the emergence of highly differentiated "strategic elites" drawn from all classes and encompassing many sectors and levels of society. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), discusses the pluralist interest group view of writers such as Bentley, Truman and Latham, that organized groups have power and access. Olson makes a case for consideration of latent group and class interests as



candidates for access as well. (pp. 126-129).

<sup>20</sup> Arthur F. Bentley, The Process of Government, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1908), David B. Truman, The Governmental Process, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955).

<sup>21</sup> James S. Coleman, Community Conflict, (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1957), Kornhauser, op.cit., pp. 53-57, and Easton, op.cit., pp. 86-93.

<sup>22</sup> S.N. Eisenstadt, Modernization: Protest and Change, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), esp. Chapter 1.

<sup>23</sup> Kornhauser, op.cit., pp. 53-57.

<sup>24</sup> Easton, op.cit., pp. 86-93.

<sup>25</sup> Coleman, op.cit., pp. 15-16.

<sup>26</sup> Stuart S. Nagel, "Measuring Unnecessary Delay in Administrative Proceedings: The Actual versus the Predicted," Policy Sciences, Vol. 2, #1 (1972), discusses ways of systematically measuring the time administrative proceedings consume.

<sup>27</sup> Kornhauser, op.cit., p. 55.

<sup>28</sup> Philip Selznick, "Foundations of the Theory of Organization," ASR, Vol. 13, #1 (February, 1949), pp. 33-35; also, Bachrach and Baratz, op.cit., p. 206, speak of "cooptive participation," a related concept.

<sup>29</sup> Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron B. Wildavsky, Implementation, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), pp. 113-124.

<sup>30</sup> Pressman and Wildavsky, ibid., discuss "delay" as a function of three actor variables and three system variables. Actor variables are (1) direction of an actor on an issue--Is he for or against? (2) intensity of preference--High or low? (3) resources--Is he strong or weak? And how much is he willing to commit? System variables are: (1) the number of decision points; (2) the number of participants at each point; and (3) the intensity of their preferences. Using these categories it would be possible to say that for access to occur, the gatekeeping authority must be positive in preference, and may be high or low in interest and resources, (the degrees of the latter two variables determining degrees of access). Other actors in the system would have the same variables, but affect responsiveness because



direction may be either negative or positive and lead to cooperation or conflict. If the system variables are all cooperative, high degrees of responsiveness (but perhaps with some delay) would be expected. If conflict occurs, the delay and results would be much more difficult to predict. Responsiveness would be the net outcome of the number of decision points and the number and type of participants at each point plus the time each takes to process the decision or to take action.

<sup>31</sup>David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis, (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1965); also his A Systems Analysis of Political Life, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965); William C. Mitchell, The American Polity, (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962); also Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, Power and Poverty, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 54.

<sup>32</sup>See, Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., The Politics of the Developing Areas, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 3-64; also H.V. Wiseman, Political Systems, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Pubs., 1966), pp. 134-171.

<sup>33</sup>Gamson, op.cit., p. 32.

<sup>34</sup>Michael Polyani, The Logic of Liberty, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951); and Vincent Ostrom, Polycentricity, American Political Science Association, (1972 Annual Meeting), paper.

<sup>35</sup>Ostrom, op.cit., p. 6.

<sup>36</sup>F.E. Emery and E.L. Trist, "The Causal Texture of Organizational Environments," in M.B. Brinkerhoff and P.R. Kunz, eds., Complex Organizations and their Environments, (Dubuque, Iowa: W.C. Brown, Co., 1972), pp. 268-281. The authors describe four types of environments which have varying consequences for the organizations in which they operate and for analysis of organizational behavior. (1) the "placid, randomized environment" is one where organizations can exist adaptively as single, and quite small, units; (2) the "placid, clustered environment" tends to find organizations growing in size, "becoming multiple and tending towards centralized control and coordination"; (3) the "disturbed-reactive" environment, unlike the first two which are relatively static, is dynamic. "It consists of a clustered environment in which there is more than one system of the same kind, i.e., the objects of one organization are the same as, or relevant to, others like it. Such competitors seek to improve their own chances by hindering each other, each knowing the others are playing the same game"; and (4) the "turbulent field" environment is dynamic in a second respect in that the dynamic properties arise not only from the interaction of identifiable component systems but from the field

itself. . . . The turbulence results from the complexity and multiple character of the causal interconnections. Individual organizations, however large, cannot adapt successfully simply through their direct interactions." Norton Long's, "The Local Community as an Ecology of Games," The Polity, (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1962); and his, "Community Decision-Making," Community Leadership and Decision-Making, University of Iowa Extension Bulletin No. 842, also illuminate the dynamics of such situations.

<sup>37</sup> Annual Public Welfare Report, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Public Welfare, (1968); also Robert Morris, "Welfare Reform 1973: The Social Services Dimension," Science, Vol. 181, No. 4099 (10 August, 1973, pp. 515-533), discusses the various types of overlap, duplication, fragmentation, etc., which characterize the provision of social services in this country.

<sup>38</sup> Catalog of State Services to Individuals, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Community Affairs, (1968). The document weighs almost five pounds and has more than 400 pages. Incidentally, from the present perspective, the Governor's Branch Offices are listed first in the document and are indicated as the only service administered directly by the Governor's Office. Also, John C. Bollens, "Overlapping Governments" in Hirsch and Sonenblum, Governing Urban America in the 1970's, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), pp. 85-96.

<sup>39</sup> See, for example, the two volumes on application of systems techniques to budgeting: Fremond J. Lyden and Ernest G. Miller, Planning, Programming, Budgeting: a systems approach to management (sic), (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., First Edition, April 1968; Second Edition, 1972). Also three volumes of the Annals on the development of social indicators: Thorstein Sellin, ed., Social Goals and Indicators for American Society, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. I, May 1967, Volume II, September 1967. Richard D. Lambert, ed., Political Intelligence for America's Future, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, (March, 1970). The Robert Morris article, op.cit., is illustrative of the situation in the human services nationally. And two documents on the situation in Pennsylvania depict the situation there: Human Services, Report to the Governor of Pennsylvania by The Task Force on Human Services, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, (October, 1970); and a Report to the Governor of Pennsylvania by the Task Force on Reorganization: Corrections, (September, 1970).

On the blurring of the public/private distinction, see, Robert Dahl, After the Revolution, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), pp. 116-130; Henry Jacoby, The Bureaucratization of the World, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), E.L. Kaner, tr. and Alfred Kahn, Social Policy and Public Services, (New York: Random House, 1973), p. 21, states that when services are rendered under

"other than market criteria," that is, when society has determined not to deprive individuals of allocations of values because of inability to provide it by individual effort or pay out of earnings or wealth, the service ceases to be private. Provision of a service by other than market criteria conveys "the idea of a societal obligation or conviction about the importance of access to the benefit." Talcott Parsons, Structure and Process in Modern Societies, (1960), pp. 194-195, comments that when private agencies incorporate to undertake "socially significant functions in the context of large scale organization which involves complex property relations and organization of personnel with many different types of competence . . . this is essentially a delegation of public authority to a private group, which, in exchange for the privileges of incorporation, places it in a position of fiduciary responsibility for which it is publicly accountable. It is, of course, notable that extension of the corporate form beyond the governmental and ecclesiastical spheres on a considerable scale is a relatively recent thing."

<sup>40</sup>Gamson, op.cit., p. 21.

<sup>41</sup>Gamson, op.cit., pp. 32-37.

<sup>42</sup>Talcott Parsons, Structure and Process in Modern Societies, (New York: The Free Press, 1960), pp. 193-194.

<sup>43</sup>Alexis de Toqueville, Democracy in America, as quoted in Ostrom, op.cit.

<sup>44</sup>Gamson, op.cit., p. 32.

<sup>45</sup>Polyani, op.cit.

<sup>46</sup>An attempt to move beyond one or two-level analyses is contained in the "trifocal" approach utilized by Harry Scoble, Ideology and Electoral Action, (San Francisco, Calif.: Chandler Publishing Co., 1967). And the need to develop models for multi-level analysis is discussed in James N. Rosenau, Linkage Politics, (New York: The Free Press, 1969). Edward Banfield, Political Influence, (New York: The Free Press, 1961), documents a similar situation in Chicago where "congeries" of thousands of governments are united through an informal political machine. The Governor's Branch Offices may be considered an attempt to provide a similar rationalizing organization in a polycentric political system.

<sup>47</sup>Ostrom, op.cit. p. 2.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid. Ostrom states that in such an order the basic units of

analysis can be individuals, business firms, legislatures, political parties, public or private agencies, classes, interests, or nation-states. This list is consonant with the types of political actors mentioned above.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., p. 6; also Long, op.cit.

<sup>50</sup> Ostrom, op.cit., p. 6.

<sup>51</sup> See, Gamson, op.cit., p. 21; Ostrom, op.cit., p. 4; Easton (1965), op.cit., pp. 213-214. It is also recognized that Gabriel Almond's seven-function analysis of the political system adopts this viewpoint. Indeed, Almond holds that all political structure is multi-functional, although in different degrees in different systems. When he comes to the point of discussing the various output functions, however, Almond slips into the prevailing convention and discusses specific institutions, not the characteristics of "whole systems" as they perform the functions (as he presumably set out to do). It is the author's belief that the proposed convention will allow such analyses to occur, and, moreover that the approach promises to be fruitful in illuminating some characteristics of polycentric political systems.

<sup>52</sup> Easton, op.cit., pp. 213-214, states: "The authorities, as defined here, may be divided into two strata or they may be ranged on a continuum of which the strata represent alternative ends. At one end of the continuum, we would place those authorities who have acquired the primary responsibility for making decisions at the most inclusive level of the system and hold the broadest discretion for doing so. At the other end we would find those occupants whose range of discretion is considerably less and the scope of whose authority is considerably narrower . . . . In a hierarchically organized political system, one stratum would be nominally superior to the other although in actual practice, . . . and to some extent in all modern political systems, the lower stratum may at times unobtrusively dominate or sharply delimit the authority of the upper one through a variety of subtle means.

. . . The judicial branch in modern systems tends to stand somewhere in between these two strata depending upon the kind of powers it exerts in the system. But regardless of the kind of strata that do exist, and their interrelationships in terms of dominance and subordination, their importance to us, conceptually, is that all types of occupants are included within the concept "authorities" as it will be used here. Even though in an organizational or structural analysis or for certain kinds of ethically oriented inquiries, it would be vital to elaborate and make use of the differentiation in strata among authorities, for our immediate purposes this distinction and other intra-structural differences among the authorities of a system

may be glossed over."

In addition, Carl J. Friedrich and Taylor Cole, Responsible Bureaucracy, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1932), pp. 11-12, state: "On the one hand there is the distinction between legislative and administrative functions, and on the other there is the distinction between legislative and administrative agencies (or authorities). Reflection suggests that the essential notion for distinguishing legislative from administrative functions may be found in the theoretical distinction between general and specific decision, i.e., between setting norms and taking measures." Friedrich and Cole state that the two functions can be separated analytically, but in reality, "the two are aspects of the same process of deciding in group life, as in the life of the individual human being. After this distinction has been made, the distinction between legislative and administrative agencies (or authorities) becomes a matter of convenience based upon so-called "pure" matter of fact . . . since no body of men has been in fact limited to either of our two functions, nor to any other one function as defined by various writers . . ."

<sup>53</sup>Easton, supra., the preceding note.

<sup>54</sup>Alfred J. Kahn, Social Policy and Social Services, (New York: Random House, 1973), pp. 50-51. The terms "case advocacy" and "class advocacy," as used herein are similar to Kahn's use of the concepts in his discussion of "access as a service."

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., p. 31.

<sup>56</sup>Coleman, op.cit., p. 16.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid.

<sup>58</sup>Peter Woll, American Democracy, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1963), p. 52, states that "adjudication" refers to the specific disposition of a case and controversy, and may be contrasted with such terms as "law-making" or "rule-making" that involve the formulation of general standards applicable to an entire community. These definitions are general; hence, they are always subject to qualification in particular circumstances."

<sup>59</sup>Ibid., p. 64.

<sup>60</sup>Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government, (New York: The Free Press, 1966), esp. Chapters 5 and 9. Deutsch distinguishes between communications engineering and power engineering. "Power engineering . . . transfers energy which then may produce gross



changes at its place of arrival. In the case of power engineering, these changes are in some sense roughly proportionate to the amount of energy delivered. Communication engineering transfers extremely small amounts of energy in relatively intricate patterns. It can produce sometimes very large changes at the point of arrival, or in the "receiver" of the "message," but these changes need in no way be proportionate to the amount of energy that carried the signal, much as the force of a gun shot need not be proportionate to the amount of pressure needed to set off the trigger."

Almond, op.cit., maintains that political communication is the crucial boundary-maintenance function, the control, regulation or performance of which can regulate the input functions independently of interest groups and elite membership. It can "regulate the regulators" and thus is crucial in determining whether elites will or will not (can or can not) be responsive to the masses.

In the Pennsylvania situation, Governor Shafer did use power engineering in those actions designed to create new or revised service systems, and in actually delivering services; however, action was also taken to provide an information and control mechanism in the form of the Governor's Branch Offices to guide and direct the structures of the community. The function of the GBO's was thus to provide the appropriate linkages between individuals and/or interests and the appropriate structures in the community.

<sup>61</sup>See, Rita Braitto, Steve Paulson, and Gerald Konglan, "Domain Consensus: A Key Variable in Interorganizational Analysis," in Brinkerhoff and Kunz, op.cit., pp. 176-192 for a discussion of this concept. Also Victor Thompson, Organizations in Action, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967). Stephen Rose, op.cit., discusses the domain consensus of Community Action Programs, which is similar to that into which the GBO's were thrust. Norton Long's op.cit., description of the community echoes Toqueville's comments of a century and a half ago: "Who Governs? . . . quite literally nobody. The system after a fashion runs. Nobody runs it."

<sup>62</sup>E.J. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels, (New York: W.W. Norton Co., 1959), contains an interesting historical treatment of several forms of violence within systems. Craine Brinton, Anatomy of Revolution, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1938), discusses several major revolts and revolutions. Feagin and Hahn, op.cit., give an account of political violence in American history and a discussion of contemporary riots in the 1960's as political phenomena, as does David Boesel and Peter H. Rossi, eds., Cities Under Siege: An Anatomy of the Ghetto Riots, 1964-1968, (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1971). Peter K. Eisinger, "The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities," APSR, Vol. 67, No. 1, (March, 1973), pp. 11-28, supports the thesis of Hobsbawm, Brinton and others that violence tends to occur when a group perceives itself cut off from realizing

its goals, and societal control (and repressive violence) is eased. "Protest is a sign that the opportunity structure is flexible and vulnerable to the political assaults of excluded groups. As such, protest signifies changes not only among previously quiescent or conventionally oriented groups but also in the political system itself." See also, Coleman, op.cit., p. 16, Lieberman and Silverman, op.cit., p. 897, and Chapter 1, Notes 6 & 8, supra., pp. 19-20.

<sup>63</sup> Charles S. Hyneman, Bureaucracy in a Democracy, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), pp. 34-55.

### CHAPTER 3: THE RESEARCH SETTING AND METHODOLOGY

This study of the Governor's Branch Offices is based on a four-year period of field research which extended from September 1968 to September 1972. Four conventional methods were used to provide data: (1) participant observation, (2) interviews with key informants, (3) document and file analysis, and (4) analysis of program statistics and case records. Final analysis of the data took place during the two-year period from September 1972 to September 1974. For the major portion of the period of field research (September 1968 to March 1972) the researcher was an employee of the Office of Planning and Research, Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare. During the analysis phase (April 1972 to date) the researcher was an Assistant Professor at The Pennsylvania State University.

The Office of Planning and Research (OPR) was located in a suite of offices immediately adjacent to the GBO Coordinator's Office. Both OPR and the GBO Coordinator shared a portion of the Health and Welfare Building in the capitol complex in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, in which the offices of the Secretary of Public Welfare, Dr. Thomas W. Georges, the Executive Deputy of Public Welfare, and the Deputy Secretary for Management were located. This physical location and the position of the researcher combined to provide a high degree of access to these key officials, who were responsive to the demands of this study.



The Office of Planning and Research (OPR) was established in 1965 to be the key policy and program staff arm of the Secretary of Public Welfare, a fact which explains its privileged location and entree to the top eschelons of state government. The formal role of the researcher during the period was as a Policy and Research Associate in OPR. The informal role of the researcher as a graduate student researching a dissertation was also known to the people of the Department. This dual capacity provided unusual opportunities for research since it allowed the researcher to slip into either role-- responsible member of a staff office of the Secretary or inquiring researcher--as appropriate to the occasion.<sup>1</sup>

The research setting and the circumstances of the research, in the final analysis, dictated a field research project.<sup>2</sup> This combination of factors in turn was also conducive to a multimethod approach which provided a richness of data and observation typically unavailable with more reactive or episodic studies.<sup>3</sup> In the judgment of the researcher the opportunity to participate in and observe events as they occurred in and surrounding the evolution of the GBO program provided a level of verstehen unattainable with other methods.<sup>4</sup> The functioning of the researcher in an interested role also allowed the development of a familiarity, trust, and confidence between the researcher and many of the people who later became key informants when the more reactive interview method was also utilized. As a result, much information of an "off the record" or "not for quotation" nature was revealed which would most likely have been withheld from a more detached researcher.

The position and personal relationships which characterized the researcher's role were later conducive to the granting of unrestricted access to the documents and files of the Governor's Branch Offices, and the GBO files of the Secretary of Public Welfare, the Council of Human Services, and the Office of Planning and Research. Finally, the employee role legitimized access to case-record data otherwise unavailable to most researchers under the "confidentiality" policies of the Department of Public Welfare in Pennsylvania, and the Federal Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

The field research approach combined with the length of time over which data was gathered provided a situation wherein conceptualization was continually tested and refashioned in light of both empirical reality in the field and emergent theoretical developments in social science. The field research approach also dictated that strategies and methods be adopted which would provide the most meaningful information given the context of inquiry.<sup>5</sup> What emerged was a multimethod approach the value of which was demonstrated in analysis; it allowed for the eventual emergence of a key linkage<sup>6</sup> between several strains in both the field and in theory, for complementarity of data, and for reduction of biases through triangulation.<sup>7</sup>

The first three methods utilized--participant observation, document and file analysis, and interviews--all tended to suggest for example, that the GBO's had failed to become institutionalized and that their effectiveness in case advocacy had declined over a four-year period.<sup>8</sup> Analysis of case record data by the researcher, however, suggested that this process may not have been as extensive as presumed

for both volume and effectiveness on a large number of cases analyzed were seen to rise during the latter years of the program. (See Chapter 5.) These facts led the researcher to return again to the field for further interviews and documentary data eventually leading to reformulation of some of the preliminary conclusions about the GBO's.

In the judgment of the researcher, participant observation was the most fruitful and heuristic of the four methodologies utilized. It is the source of a large part of the data and conclusions which follow. It fostered a continuing dialectic between theory, method, and fact without which the grounded theory and typology of citizen's advocacy outlined in the previous chapter most likely would not have emerged. The information obtained from interviews, documents, files, case records and quantitative analysis serves primarily to corroborate, illuminate, or check information gained through discussions with informants, informal interviews, or direct experience. These latter types of data were most important, however, in documentation of points for presentation herein. In addition the multimethod approach proved invaluable in supporting facts or correcting errors and biases which would have obtained had a single approach been utilized.

#### The Research Setting

The twenty-one ghetto-based, walk-in GBO's were in existence from July 1967, through September 1971. (They were phased out as part of a plan to establish a statewide program utilizing legislative home-office advocates combined with the establishment of a statewide toll-free hot-line to the Governor's Office. This was to be the

expanded, statewide citizen's advocacy program of the succeeding governor, Milton J. Shapp.) The researcher was on site from September 1968 through April 1972 and periodically since that time. The research setting afforded the opportunity to observe and to participate in a considerable portion of the activity of the GBO Coordinator's Office. The Coordinator's Office was related to the local GBO's as follows. Each local Governor's Branch Office functioned as a citizen's advocate (as defined herein) for the neighborhood in which it was located. Local Governor's representatives were empowered to range the socio-political structures of the community horizontally and vertically (often to a Secretary of a state-level department) as required to solve a visitor's problem. If a local Governor's representative could not precipitate action to resolve a problem of a visitor, a "Coordinator" was available in the state capitol in Harrisburg to carry the issue to higher authority.

The office of the GBO Coordinator had direct access to Dr. Georges (including a direct door into his office) and to Mr. William Nagel, Executive Secretary of the Council for Human Services (a super-cabinet-level body consisting of the secretaries and selected deputy secretaries and commissioners from all human services related departments). William Nagel functioned as the Governor's man, acting in the name of Governor Shafer. He was particularly effective in knowing and using the "pressure points" in the party, other levels of government, and major interest groups.<sup>9</sup> The GBO Coordinator thus had direct entree to people who could, and did, act in the name of the Governor. He was only one step away from the Governor if the Governor's attention became necessary as was frequently the case.

The GBO Coordinator's Office was also the center for all action concerning the nature and operation of the GBO's. The Coordinator participated in all matters of policy relating to the overall Commonwealth response to urban tensions (of which the GBO's were but one part). It was the locus of all information and decision-making on policy, program, administration, and procedure relating to the GBO's. The GBO Coordinator's Office was also the structure responsible for handling the more difficult individual advocacy problems (Chapter 5). The Coordinator articulated most of the advocacy-for-interests issues raised through the program (Chapter 6). In addition, the debureaucratized nature of the GBO's program (Chapter 4) was such that the Coordinator's Office was the locus for decision-making and the repository for all information on operational procedure, administration, case records, documents, training, and personnel issues related to the GBO's.

It was to the GBO Coordinator's Office that the participant observer role afforded major access. Participant observation, therefore, provided for observation of the internal dynamics of the program, and later, as trust was established, to the files, records, documents, and informants upon which this study is based.

#### A Key Event for Entry and Choice of Method

A series of events prior to the entry of the researcher on the scene were in part instrumental in setting the scene for research and were critical factors in later dictating the methodologies which were appropriate. In August 1967, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

applied to the federal Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) in Washington for \$1.5 million to support the GBO program. This grant was to be the first OEO support of a state-level anti-poverty program and was attended by great fanfare including a well-publicized visit to Pennsylvania by Sargent Shriver. One of the "strings" attached by OEO was a requirement for an evaluation component to the program.

Local Community Action Programs and interest groups generated considerable opposition to the service aspects of this proposal, however, for they suggested that only they could be the advocates for poor people. To them, the proposal for a state government operated Community Action Program represented a sell-out to "the system." The dynamics around the proposal are peripheral to present concerns; it is important to note that as the proposal emerged from Washington what remained was a half-million dollars to be used for an evaluation of the GBO's.<sup>10</sup>

Dr. Georges and the GBO Coordinator's staff were displeased with the idea of spending a large amount of money on evaluation when people in the ghetto needed direct aid. Several proposals for an external evaluation were received, however, and they were evaluated by a group of officials including program office, OPR, and GEO staff. The conclusion of the reviewers was that the proposals showed a lack of understanding of the problems and conditions of black people, a naiveté about the purposes of the GBO program, and in some cases, the capability of the organization to carry out an acceptable program of research was questioned.<sup>11</sup> All informants who had knowledge of these transactions related it as a "bad" experience which subsequently led

to a decision that the evaluation of the GBO's would be in-house-- carried out by the Office of Planning and Research--if at all. This experience reinforced the belief of many people associated with the GBO's that dollars should be spent on services to poor people, not on research. As a result, the entire \$500,000 of OEO money was later returned to Washington unspent.<sup>12</sup>

The researcher entered the scene after the decision was made that the evaluation would be in-house, but before the \$500,000 approved by OEO for an evaluation was returned to Washington. Thus, when the researcher was interviewed for a position in OPR, there was great anticipation that OPR would soon initiate a thorough evaluation of the GBO's. It was agreed that if the researcher took the position, he would be assigned to the evaluation when it occurred--one spinoff of which could be data for a dissertation.

The formal evaluation of the Governor's Branch Offices never occurred. It had been anticipated that a model for evaluation such as has been explicated by Suchman, Hyman and Wright, and Greenberg would have been used.<sup>13</sup> Surveys of community residents and of visitors to the GBO's were anticipated. There would have been a series of controlled interviews with the Governor's representatives, with the staff of agencies to which visitors were sent, and with various other state and local officials.<sup>14</sup> There would have been both opportunity to do original research and adequate data for a dissertation.

The possibility that the formal evaluation might never occur, however, was always apparent. For this reason, a second strategy utilizing a field research approach was maintained. The research

setting and the position of the researcher were also conducive to the use of several unobtrusive or nonreactive methodologies.<sup>15</sup> The researcher did not bide time waiting for funding and approval of a controlled evaluation, but rather conducted a separate field research project utilizing available techniques which could yield the most meaningful data.<sup>16</sup> While the fact that the formal evaluation of the Governor's Branch Offices never occurred meant that data on broader community impact was not made available, it was possible to pragmatically shift primary emphasis to the data and methodologies at hand. Thus, this study does not seek to document the effect of the GBO's on the people they served nor the outcome of their actions on the broader political system. Rather, this is a participant observation study of the nature and operations of the GBO's as a quasi-experiment in citizen's advocacy. The data presented herein is, therefore, primarily a view from the inside although considerable efforts were made toward maintaining an objective analysis.

#### The Participant Observer Role

The researcher was first of all assigned to, or included in, all technical assistance and consultation by the Office of Planning and Research to the GBO's during the period of research. This staff role provided for a great deal of contrived observation free of the biases (control effects) introduced by a perceived observer.<sup>17</sup> Throughout the period of participant observation, however, the researcher maintained a dual profile: formally as an employee of the Office of Planning and Research, informally as a doctoral student doing a dissertation.<sup>18</sup>



As an employee of the policy and research staff arm of the Department, the researcher was privy to information and discussions not typically available to outside researchers. Thus, the employee role afforded an unusual depth, intensity and scope of information. During the entire period, however, all parties were aware of the intention of the employee to write a dissertation on the Governor's Branch Offices. This researcher role permitted pursuit of information often beyond that afforded to employees. It became possible to move into and out of these roles easily, even in single encounters. Collegial and personal relationships developed with various key participants in the events surrounding the evolution of the GBO's. In fact, there was a tendency for the volume, scope and complexity of information to become overwhelming. Ultimately it became necessary for the researcher to withdraw to an external setting for the data to be sifted, weighed and reorganized before final analysis.

The role of the researcher in providing technical assistance and consultation to the GBO's provided several advantages: (1) It led to periodic attempts to get the formal evaluation approved including several drafts of the research design. This activity kept the research idea alive and the interest level of the researcher high. At one point the evaluation would have been approved by the GBO Coordinator but was delayed by Dr. Georges since it was not politically desirable at the time. On another occasion, preparation of yearly budget proposals for the Department commanded the time of the researcher and other OPR staff members who would have been involved. (2) Participation as an informed consultant in discussion of the need for and

development of policy and program changes in the GBO's provided a continuing stream of "insider" data. (3) Attendance at periodic training sessions for the local Governor's representatives allowed frequent interaction with local level staff. (4) Members of the GBO Coordinator's staff usually introduced the researcher to visitors and interest group representatives (e.g., Welfare Rights Organization) which afforded opportunities to hear viewpoints other than those of the central office. (5) Technical assistance on tasks such as re-design of the problem card used by local offices, development of a questionnaire and procedure for a follow-up survey and training of local workers in its use, design of an interview schedule for a survey on discrimination referrals, were opportunities to acquire a practical working knowledge of many phases of GBO operations. Together these activities provided a thorough grounding in the nature, operations and development of the Governor's Branch Office program.

The position in the Office of Planning and Research also afforded another excellent opportunity. Work assignments required the researcher to develop an understanding of the spectrum of programmatic aspects of the Department and the larger fields and social situations with which the GBO's interacted. (The consultation and technical assistance to the GBO's involved only a portion of the work of the researcher during the period.) For example, the development of a goal-oriented, integrated program structure for the Commonwealth's new Planning-Programming-Budgeting System involved staff work with bureau chiefs, office heads and deputy secretaries. This project then evolved into attempts to develop output measures

of PPBS program elements, and later in conversion of manpower and budget allocations to the new format.

The researcher also became the primary OPR staff member to work with the several program offices toward development of a computer-based management information and evaluation system. This assignment encompassed Commonwealth programs for social services, mental health, mental retardation, medical assistance, and public assistance. One aspect of this assignment was frequent contacts with local agencies and with other departments. In the last year of employment by the Department, the researcher also served as staff to a joint executive/legislative task force to develop a department of human services. Work also proceeded within the Department on the design of an integrated human services delivery system, another project in which the researcher was involved.

These types of experiences and involvement are important to this study because they required frequent interaction with deputy secretaries, commissioners, and bureau chiefs about the goals, structure and operations of most of the human services in Pennsylvania. The contacts illuminated and provided direct experience in trying to find ways to cope with many of the problems of "the system": categorical or biased eligibility, fragmentation, incrementalism, overlap, unresponsiveness, delay, etc. Most importantly, from the present perspective, these activities afforded the opportunity to probe the relationship of the GBO's to many parts of "the system" and to gauge the reactions of workers and officials to the GBO's. It is suggested that the participant observer role, therefore, afforded the researcher

the knowledge and insight of a privileged participant while avoiding the disadvantages of complete immersion in the role.<sup>19</sup>

### Emergence of the Qualitative Methodology

During the first two and a half years of research, the researcher accumulated as much information on the GBO's and the events surrounding their operation as became available. In this period a large amount of data was acquired from discussions with informants, informal interviews, interaction with colleagues, acquisition of pieces of data through the consultation and technical assistance role, probes to various officials in the course of other duties, routine access to OPR files, and through the scouring of newspapers and the rumor-mill on capitol hill. During this period there was the continuing anticipation that a formal evaluation would occur. The researcher would therefore have access to "hard" data for a quantitative study of the GBO's supplemented by the data from other sources. As the third year commenced, the GBO's seemed to be on the decline, and the hopes of the researcher for involvement in such an evaluation began to wane. This change in orientation occurred despite the verbal promises from the GBO Coordinator and the Director of OPR that an evaluation would indeed soon be approved. They reasoned that since Governor Shafer could not constitutionally succeed himself, information of an evaluative nature would be required to inform (and presumably convince) the new Governor about the nature and effectiveness of the program. Three years in a bureaucracy, however, seem

enough to enable a reasonable man to know the probable outcome of relative timing, volume of other demands, and priority of evaluative research relative to preparation of budgets, policy statements, crisis management, plans, and politics. Emerging from this situation a decision was made to shift the research strategy toward explicit, primary reliance on the more qualitative types of information which were available, and data which could be acquired with little reliance on the operational decisions of others.

This decision did not come easily. The methodological biases of the researcher militated toward reliance on more linear-type research design, reactive measures, and quantitative analysis. It was clear, however, that the GBO experience represented an important series of events, analysis of which should be made available to a larger audience. The shift in strategy thus occurred pragmatically, in response to events in the research setting, and were accompanied by a determination to seek out by whatever means available the facts of the GBO experience.<sup>20</sup>

The strategy which emerged was to place increased reliance on participant observation, and to use the advantageous position which had been established over the multi-year period to: (1) gain access to documents, files and records, and (2) obtain interviews with key informants who had been associated with the establishment and operation of the GBO's. Permission to scour the archives of the Office of Planning and Research was secured almost immediately. In addition, several OPR employees who had been involved in the establishment of the GBO's made their personal files available. A list of key

informants was drawn up and a format and questions for interviews developed. During the next few months, although other duties commanded much of the researcher's time, every opportunity was taken to pursue this strategy including the obtaining of several initial interviews.

It turned out that this strategy was most appropriate. Newly elected Governor Milton Shapp announced in several speeches his intention to bolster the GBO program and to make it a personal part of his regime. The situation called for a policy paper and recommendations. There was neither sufficient time nor resources available for a formal evaluation. The researcher sought and was assigned to work on a policy proposal for the new governor. Access to the complete files of the GBO's, the GBO files of the Secretary of Public Welfare, and the appropriate files of the Council for Human Services was subsequently obtained. Interviews were scheduled with key informants. Plans for extracting information from case records were formulated, and coding of relevant data commenced. During this period it was clearly understood by the researcher and his superiors that the task at hand was to gather information in order to advise the new governor, and also that the data which became available could be used for research purposes.<sup>21</sup>

There were several strategy sessions about the new program during Spring 1971. The policy paper was finalized and sent to the Governor's Office in September 1971.<sup>22</sup> Interviews and extraction of information from the archives of the GBO's were continued by the researcher through Spring 1972. The final interviews, several

follow-up interviews, computer analysis of central office case records, and final integration and analysis of data were carried out after the researcher left Harrisburg in April 1972. Thus, the participant observation phase of the research ended with the departure of the researcher from the research site. The use of several other methodologies occurred simultaneous to the participant observation and continued after that phase of the project was terminated. These other methodologies are described in the sections which follow.

#### Formal Interviews with Key Informants

Interviews with key informants supplemented other research materials, i.e., participant observation, document and file analysis, analysis of case records and program statistics. The purposes of formal interviews were first of all, to provide an accurate narrative of major events surrounding the establishment of the Governor's Branch Offices, and to elicit facts attendant to their origin, direction and operation. Secondly, the interviews were used to seek additional information on the objectives of the authorities who initiated them. This information would also serve to confirm or deny participant observation data on manifest and latent goals. It would also illuminate the nature and interactions of the conflicting factions which coalesced around different goals. Third, the researcher tried to learn more about how the GBO's operated: whether they really were debureaucratized, and whether the GBO staff was perceived by others as being as maverick as they themselves believed. Fourth, information was sought on how all of these factors came together in practice and

in the performance of case advocacy, class advocacy, and legal advocacy. Finally, interviews were used to probe the attitudes and opinions of key figures about the functioning of the GBO's, to determine the agendas of the key figures themselves and the agendas of various other organizations and actors in the polity. All in all, the purpose of the interviews was: (1) to either corroborate or call into question evidence from other sources, (2) to determine the roles and relationships of key actors to the GBO's, (3) to discover and probe the dynamics of conflict in and around the GBO's and the actions they precipitated, and (4) to reveal information not previously uncovered.

Focused interviews were conducted with four types of key informants:<sup>22</sup> (1) The "potentates" of the GBO program.<sup>23</sup> These people are the people in authority--the people responsible for policy and management of the GBO program. (2) The peripheral-potentates of the event. This is a group of high-authority officials and professionals who are external to the GBO program but because of their position and interest were able to affect the program either positively or negatively. (3) The experts--several people who are authorities in related fields such as human services, bureaucratic management, and advocacy, and who were involved in or aided the GBO program. (4) The functionaries--the middle and lower-level operatives including GBO workers and their counterparts in agencies with which they dealt. Thus, the informants were selected to elicit responses both pro and con, of official and expert, of superior and subordinate, and there were people in each of these classes who were internal as well as external to the Governor's Branch Offices.



Interviews were scheduled so as to first get information from people in each of these classes of informant, and then to move on to others--always seeking balance among the categories. This approach allowed the interviewer's technique to develop and sharpen, and also for queries to be refined. There was a continual sampling from various classes of informant as a means for providing balance. In several cases it was appropriate to return for follow-up interviews as additional questions were formulated or newly discovered facts required cross-checking. Thus, most interviews, especially, the later ones, tended to have specific items to be pursued within the general categories of questions outlined above.

The approach used to prepare for an interview was to first discover as much about the informant as possible--his employment function and responsibility, locus in the organizational network, orientation to the GBO's and human service programs in general, participation in the establishment and operation of the GBO's (if any), and his alignment with various factions within the political structures. Thus, it was possible to anticipate certain reactions, and to avoid offending questions which might put the informant on the defensive (except as specifically desired to elicit subjective responses). The participant observer role was invaluable in this preparation process.

The participant observer role afforded the opportunity for job-related interactions with most of the people who were interviewed. Thus, the interviewer had prior acquaintance with the informants, was aware of some of his preferences and biases, and was able to roughly categorize him into the classes of informant outlined above. There

were a few exceptions to the familiar role, for some people had moved on to other jobs. For example, one was an under-secretary of HEW in Washington, another a dean in a school of social work, another legislative staff in California, another head of a health and welfare council. These latter people were known to co-workers and colleagues from whom information on the involvement and position on departed participants could be drawn. This "homework" paid off. The interviewer could explain the purposes of the interview in terms directly meaningful to the informant. Since most of these people were busy executives, the interviewer could proceed directly to the core of the interview without undue concern for background information. This approach also tended to establish the interviewer more as an informed and interested colleague than as a naive outsider expressing himself in academic abstractions. In many cases the experience came to be more like a working session rather than a one-way conversation.<sup>24</sup>

The canons of the focused interview procedure as described by Merton, et.al., Madge, and Sellitz, et.al. were followed.<sup>25</sup> Respondents were asked to recall the program and their involvement. Questions were then aimed at eliciting the information desired as the informant afforded the opportunity. This procedure was used in order to minimize reactive measurement effects.<sup>26</sup> Questions varied from unstructured queries at the beginning of the interviews to semi-structured as required to elicit information in the desired areas. Questions designed to elicit hostile or defensive responses were reserved to the latter part of the interview unless the informant showed an inclination to move into these areas. Completeness of scope was achieved by directing the informant toward the aspects of the GBO experience outlined above.

Following recommended techniques for focused interviews, the interviewer tried to avoid a formal atmosphere and tried to create a relationship wherein the interviewer was perceived as seeking the benefit of the knowledge and experience of the expert, potentate, or worker. The fact that the purpose of the interview was to inform an immediate policy process for the incoming Governor, as well as a research objective, tended to contribute to establishment of this atmosphere. The fact that people were willing, even anxious, to talk is indicative of their interest and involvement in both the GBO's and the interview itself. This high level of interest tended to obtain whether the informant was for or against the GBO's as they were constituted.

In the actual conduct of the interviews, once the preliminaries were over it was important to establish confidence and rapport with the informant. There was also a need to establish the informant's interest in the interview and to jog his memory to stimulate recall of earlier events. Several initial approaches were tried. The most useful approach was to begin by asking a question about their initial involvement, and to generally discuss how the GBO's were started and why. The "homework" mentioned above proved to be invaluable in formulating questions which indicated the interviewer's interest in the informant; this in turn, seemed to stimulate the informant's interest in the interview. Moreover, as the events surrounding the establishment of the GBO's were vivid and dramatic, this approach tended to allow easy initial recall. A successful beginning, in turn, established the informant's confidence in his ability to respond and kindled interest

in the conversation. This initial approach was also used to probe questions on the latent and manifest interests of the informant and various people with which he was acquainted. It also tended to stimulate recall of other facts.

Unless the informant tended to move into one of the desired categories of question, the next direction was to discuss the personal experiences of the informant more specifically--his role, opinions, and relationships with others. This approach was found to be more useful by both Heard, and Dollard in their researches.<sup>27</sup> Next the interview was directed toward a discussion of the pro's and con's of the GBO's, conflicts and rivalries, or operations--depending on the tenor of the conversation. From this point it was up to the interviewer to be alert for opportunities to probe the more controversial and conflictual aspects of the GBO's. It was important in these areas to avoid closing off candid responses. The option of discussing methods of service delivery and GBO operations, of returning to a topic of previous interest, or of following up on lines of information opened but not completed were used to sustain the informant's interest until all (or as many as was feasible) of the desired topics were probed.

There was only one case where the informant remained aloof and refused to open up. However, his attempts at evasions did produce several new insights into sensitive issues, and his willingness to discuss personalities rather than policy or program clarified some of the interpersonal and ideological dynamics among the participants. With one exception, the same pattern discussed by Heard obtained.<sup>28</sup>

That is, the higher the position of the individual, the freer he was to talk. More "off the record" comments came from potentates than from workers. Lower level staff tended to be more evasive, with one exception. After Governor Shapp announced the phaseout of the GBO's, workers had a lot of emotion to get off their chests and/or they wanted to let someone know that their job had been an important one.<sup>29</sup>

One interesting phenomenon did emerge in efforts to discuss the utility and effectiveness of the GBO's. Informants tended to polarize in their interpretation of the meaning of the GBO's. One faction described them as an ombudsman-citizen's advocacy program--the objectives being to make a dysfunctional system work. They tended to view this as an important and valuable task. Another faction perceived the program as just another information and referral agency to the social services of the community. These groups tended to come out pro and con respectively and to end up on opposite sides of the non-social-worker/social worker professional ideological, policy, and program dispute. Moreover, citizens who had been to, or who knew someone who had been to a GBO for presentation of a latent demand tended to fall in the former group, and people without direct experience with the GBO's in the latter faction.

In all but a few cases the informants were willing to allow a tape recorder to be used with the understanding that off-the-record comments would remain so. Permission to use the recorder was requested as early as possible in the preliminaries. If the informant appeared uneasy about the recorder at any time during the interview, it was

conspicuously stopped. If permission was granted for use of the recorder, it was started, placed in an inconspicuous place, and then ignored. A minimum of note-taking was also used. Notes were used by the interviewer to record items for follow-up later in the interview, to make note of particularly important points, and to obtain information which would be useful before the tapes were transcribed. In addition, it was found that note-taking at strategic points could be used as a stimulus to encourage the informant to elaborate or continue a particularly valuable avenue of information. Immediately after the interview, the recorder was checked to determine the extent to which the interview had been recorded. In some cases background noises or the voice quality of the informant prevented the recording of audible remarks. In addition, lengthy interviews were not completely recorded because one-hour tapes were used; it was not deemed desirable to interrupt an interview for "technical" reasons. The procedure was then to make notes from memory of the main points of the interview, especially any portions not recorded. The interviewer would then "debrief" into the recorder, recalling as much of the substance of the interview as possible. This procedure was also used for interviews where the recorder was not used. Tapes, and/or notes, were then transcribed, reviewed for points for follow-up or new questions to be probed, and then filed for later use as required.

#### Unobtrusive Measures: Documents, Files and Episodic Case Records

Several forms of unobtrusive or nonreactive methods of observation were used during the course of research.<sup>30</sup> As mentioned

above, the archival documents and files of several offices were made available to the researcher. These files contained the running record of the activities of the GBO's and of their interactions with other actors in the polity. They also contained episodic records in the form of the problem cards which were filled out for each problem or complaint, separate files of the cases handled by the coordinator's office, and several batches of the postpaid referral postcards which visitors were asked to complete and mail to the Governor's Office. These sources provided a great deal of material on the nature and operation of the GBO's. The information they contained also provided for cross-verification of data from other sources. It was also extremely useful for documenting facts which emerged from other methodologies. All in all, the unobtrusive measures completed the data base required for triangulation of method and data.<sup>31</sup>

During the entire period of research, the researcher had access to files in the Office of Planning and Research. In the course of technical assistance and consultation to the GBO Coordinator, several portions of the GBO files also became available during this period. Finally, when the decision was made that the field research aspect of the study was to be the dominant approach, access was sought and permission granted to the complete files of the GBO's and to the GBO files of the Secretary of Public Welfare and the Council for Human Resources.

As soon as access was granted, the researcher made a brief survey of the files to ascertain their contents. A "floorplan" was then constructed which indicated the contents of each drawer or cabinet.

A schedule of priorities for reviewing their content was drawn up and the entire content of the files was then systematically reviewed by the researcher. As the information in the files was reviewed, notes were taken or copies made according to the convenience of the researcher. Since reproduction facilities were available, many documents were copied and placed in the files of the project for later use as appropriate.

The files on the GBO's contained extensive documentary information including: (1) statements, including those prepared for both internal and public use, of several secretaries, GBO coordinators, and the Governor, on the mission, rationale and goals of the GBO's; (2) a chronology of events, tasks, assignments for the entire state government during the weeks when riots were expected (prepared for internal use only); (3) correspondence with other agencies about various matters; (4) speeches of the Governor, Secretary Georges and others; (5) all official bulletins and memoranda relating to the GBO's; (6) forms, procedures and the structure of the program; (7) outlines and materials used in training sessions; (8) financial and budgetary data; (9) operating statistics; (10) personnel files; (11) pattern analyses and "trends" on housing, employment, discrimination, public utilities, government reorganization, tension handling and control, etc.; (12) a file of newspaper accounts of GBO activity from the department's clipping service; (13) all problem cards from local offices for 1970-71 (earlier cards had been sent to storage); (14) reports on various aspects of the program and other miscellaneous documentary evidence. These documents and reports in



the GBO archive provide a primary source of information on what happened during the four years of the GBO experiment. In general, this information provided data not otherwise available and it served as a documentary window on data gathered from other sources.<sup>32</sup> It led to the discovery and documentation of most of the case advocacy issues discussed in Chapter 6, for informants tended to recall only the most dramatic or frustrating system change incidents. The documentary information was used in triangulation with other sources of data and vice versa.

#### Systematic Extraction of Data from Episodic Records

In addition to the largely descriptive information which was extracted from the archives of the GBO's and related offices, several sources of quantified data were obtained. They are: (1) statistical records compiled by the OPR for the use of the coordinator and other officials; (2) a random sample drawn from 23,650 problem cards covering the period 4/1/70 to 12/31/70; (3) systematic analysis of case records of a large number of the problems handled by the coordinator; (4) an undetermined sample of returned postcards; and (5) analysis of personnel records. This information will be used in Chapter 5 to provide a quantified descriptive map of the individual advocacy activities of the GBO's. It will explicate the types of problems people brought to the GBO's, the range of steering organizations, and levels of responsiveness.

Statistical reports prepared by OPR contain quantified data on the numbers and types of latent demands brought to the local GBO's. This information originated from the visitor who wrote his problem or complaint on the "problem card." The problem card was then used by the local Governor's representative as a working document for his citizen's advocacy activity. All problem cards were forwarded daily to the central GBO coordinator's office. When action on a case was complete, the information on the cards was coded according to GBO location, date, problem, and manner of handling under the supervision of Mr. William Conway, Office of Planning and Research. This information was then transferred to code sheets, punched on hollerith cards, and later tabulated for periodic statistical reports. This data originated as a written statement of the visitor. The coding, processing and analysis was carried out by professional statisticians essentially external to the GBO operation. The information is therefore considered to be reliable and will be used to describe the nature, relative volume, and priority of demands brought to the GBO's by disadvantaged citizens.

Secondly, a random sample of problem cards for the period April 1970 to January 1971 was drawn by the researcher to provide information on the types of referral agencies and the specific nature of problems. One aspect of the debureaucratic policy of the GBO operation involved a decision that workers would not have case records to fill out which would occupy their time. As a result there was no systematic reporting made on contact agencies, follow-up, or resolution. (Later in the operation of the GBO's the researcher was involved in a

sub-project to redesign the problem card and to develop a follow-up procedure based on sampling techniques. These latter types of information would have then become available. The procedure was never fully operationalized by the GBO's.) The GBO representative did indicate on the problem cards, however, the agencies to which (s)he provided advocacy services. A systematic probability sample was drawn using standard randomizing techniques.<sup>33</sup> Data on referral agencies and a brief description of the problem was then extracted from the sample cases. This information will be utilized (1) to provide a descriptive picture of the range of organizations and scope of operation of the GBO's; (2) to characterize the nature of the operations of the GBO's in their interactions with the polycentric political system; and (3) to provide typical, illustrative examples of demands brought to the GBO's.

Third, during the search of the GBO files, several cabinets were located which contained complete case records of a large number of problems handled by the GBO coordinator's office during the central years when F. Clinton McKay and M.L. "Tank" Banner, were coordinators (Fall 1967 through 1970). There were over a thousand folders, each containing the complete record of a problem handled by the central office, including a record of the various actions taken in processing and a written statement of the final action taken. These represent the most difficult cases. They are the ones that the local level Governor's representatives found needed a higher level of clout, and which could not be resolved by the coordinator with a simple phone call. They yielded data which can be used to characterize the responsiveness

of "the system" to the case advocacy activities of the central office. Each of these files was reviewed and the following data was systematically extracted: GBO location, date of initiation of the case, date of final action, major problem code, disposition agency, and results. The difference between the initiation and completion date was then computed to create one responsiveness variable: "response-time." The researcher also compared the request of the visitor with the final action taken to determine whether the action was successful or not. This information was used to provide a second responsiveness variable: "resolution." It is recognized that this information is not representative of the activity of the GBO's. Quite to the contrary, it represents the universe of the most difficult strata of problems presented to the GBO's. Statistical analysis of the response of "the system" to these cases can, however, provide a formative picture of the responsiveness of the various system structures to the activity of the GBO's and seek to discover the variation of responses to different types of demands. In addition, trend analysis is used to probe the question of whether the GBO's were able to be institutionalized. (Common statistical techniques--correlation, analysis of variance and trend analysis--were used. The particular statistical operations are detailed later with the presentations of data.)

Finally, there was also a large number of the referral postcards in the files. The information they contained was tabulated to provide some indication of the local-level success rate. The use of these cards is discussed in Chapter 5. The cards were used to introduce the visitor (by name) to the agencies (by name) as referrals

from the GBO. The agency representative was required to sign it and return it to the visitor. The visitor, in turn, was asked to check one of three boxes "that will best explain to the Governor what happened when you went to the agency named on the card." The other side of the card was addressed to Governor Shafer. Postage was prepaid. The visitor was instructed to drop the card in the mailbox. Technically, these cases represent an accidental sample and no claim will be made of their representativeness of the population served by the GBO's. The data which results, however, does provide some quantitative evidence about how people felt after their episode with "the system."

#### A Note on the Quantified Data Presented Herein

Most of the data upon which this study is based comes from participant observation, interviews and documentary evidence. This study must, therefore, be considered qualitative in structure, exploratory in intent, and heuristic in outcome. A significant effort was put forth, however, to gather quantitative data of several types partly in response to the dominant methodological expectations of contemporary social science but primarily as an aid in presentation of the findings to others. It is the nature of field research that this be the case. The need to react pragmatically and openly to changing conditions, developmental analytic processes, and inconsistencies in data is a primary advantage of the field research approach.<sup>34</sup>

The effort to provide quantified illustrations of some of the main points, however, was additionally useful for during analysis several new insights into the operation of the GBO's emerged which required the researcher to reformulate his thinking about the later experiences of the GBO's. Consequently, the multimethod approach in allowing for triangulation of several sources of data, and for use of some quantified information which might otherwise have been discarded, provided invaluable insights for the study.

The effort to produce quantified data also proved worthwhile in another respect. Remember that the GBO's never systematically used the information available to seek to detect patterns or trends for class advocacy. (Other researchers found the same to be the case with other executive ombudsmen.<sup>35</sup>) In the attempts to determine how the available data might be expeditiously utilized, the researcher was forced to set out the parameters of what he would like to have. Consequently, when approached by the director of the successor program--the Governor's Action Center--a theoretical as well as methodological paradigm was at hand. Subsequent developments have led to a joint project between the University and the Governor's Office which encapsulates reliable, statistically valid information on problem, agency, type of caller, location, action, response-time, and resolution, for all problems presented to the Governor's Action Center. This data is, in turn, being systematically analyzed for patterns and trends which become defacto demands on the political system. Thus, the nascent effort in the GBO case provided the impetus for the development of a grounded key and emerging method. The advocate next time--the new

statewide Governor's Action Center--is providing the opportunity to measure and test their efficacy.

### Chapter 3: Notes

<sup>1</sup>The utility of this role is supported by Riecken's review of the literature on this type of observation. "The conclusion, then, of most commentators on the role of complete participant, i.e., covert observer, is that for the vast majority of studies the observer is well-advised to structure his role in such a way as to include explicitly the concept of researcher." In addition, Kahn and Mann, building on procedures explicated by Merton (1947), and Festinger (1948), and cited by them, discuss the advisability of dual or multiple entry for situations such as those encountered by this study. "The term dual or multiple entry emphasizes the necessity for the researcher to gain access to a research site by two or more paths simultaneously. . . . Multiple entry is a way of taking into account certain organizational complexities--particularly the overlapping vertical authority structure of some organizations. . . . The researcher thus must be concerned not only with the [horizontal] relationship between two such vertical situations . . . but must also take account of the successive hierarchical levels and their interactions. The procedure we will present here recognizes the 'multiple-layeredness' of organizations and the demands which this characteristic makes on the researcher." Henry W. Riecken, "The Unidentified Interviewer," in George J. McCall and J.L. Simmons, Issues in Participant Observation, (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1969), pp. 39-45; also, Robert Kahn and Floyd Mann, "Developing Research Partnerships," in ibid., pp. 45-52.

<sup>2</sup>Leonard Schatzman and Anselm L. Strauss, Field Research, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973), provide an overall presentation of issues and strategies in field research. One note on the use of the term, however, "field research" as depicted by this study is differentiated from "field experiment" wherein the researcher manipulates a variable in the field, and from ex post facto "field studies," as described by Fred Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research, (N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1965), Ch. 21; and Leon Festinger and Daniel Katz, Research Methods in the Behavioral Sciences, (N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, Inc., 1953), Chs. 2, 3, & 4.

<sup>3</sup>Eugene J. Webb, Donald T. Campbell, Richard Schwartz and Lee Sechrest, Unobtrusive Measures: Nonreactive Research in the Social Sciences, (Chicago: Rand, McNally & Co., 1966), for example, state: "Today, the dominant mass of social science research is based upon interviews and questionnaires. We lament this overdependence upon a single, fallible method. Interviews and questionnaires intrude as



a foreign element into the social setting they would describe, they create as well as measure attitudes, they elicit atypical roles and responses, they are limited to those who are accessible and will cooperate, and the responses obtained are produced in part by dimensions of individual differences irrelevant to the topic at hand. But the principal objection is that they are used alone." (p. 1). A more recent work, by Norman Denzin, The Research Act, (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1970), also provides a good discussion of alternate research strategies, the use of unobtrusive measures and of strategies of triangulation of several types of data,

<sup>4</sup>Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, (London: Collier-Macmillan Limited, 1964), tr. by Talcott Parsons and A.M. Henderson, Ch. 1, "The Fundamental Concepts of Sociology," provides the most original discussion of verstehen research.

<sup>5</sup>Schatzman, op.cit., for example, comment on the somewhat eclectic but heuristic nature of field research. "Linear thinking methodologists usually tell us that the choice of a research method will or should logically follow the formulation of a researchable problem. Indeed, this seems entirely logical, considering that a way of solving a problem usually follows its conceptualization. Yet, cannot the process be the other way around? In graduate training methodology is taught equally with theory, but it is not unusual to find students developing methodological skills and preferences some time before developing theoretical ones. Considering the emphasis upon instrumentation, we find many students becoming methodologists in their chosen fields, and in later years we find them searching for problems that are amenable to favored research procedures." (p. 4). "These images do not fit the field researcher. He claims no antiseptic distance and noninterference from outside influence. When he enters the field, he does so with his skills and consequently with many of the situations, processes and perspectives--indeed methodological biases--that link him with models of work and thought long since established in former training institutions and modified by experience. Also, when he enters the field, he maintains his links to institutions of current employment and association. Probably he is linked to kin and friendship groups which may affect him and his work through their mutual investment and obligations. Thus, both the field (or object within it) and the researcher are inextricably linked to other 'fields' and social situations--any or all of which impinge upon his research. Indeed the researcher may consciously use these as resources, as we shall point out in later chapters." (pp. 2-3). Also see: Peter M. Blau, "The Research Process in the Study of the Dynamics of Bureaucracy," in Hammond, Sociologists at Work, (N.Y.: Basic Books, 1964), pp. 16-49; and Alexander Heard, "Interviewing Southern Politicians," APSR, Vol. 44 #4, (1950), pp. 886-896.

6

Schatzman, op.cit., Ch. 7, and passim, describes the process as one where concept and method arise from the requirements of the problem being studied, rather than vice versa. The researcher approaches the field with an understanding of several theoretical and methodological sub-fields. The problem at hand is to wrestle with all until a linkage or key emerges which flows from the data. "More important to him than 'nailing it down' is 'linking it up' logically, theoretically and empirically to other findings or discoveries of his own."

7

See, for example, Webb, op.cit.; Hammond, op.cit.; and Denzin, op.cit., Ch. 11-12. The basic theme of these works is the use of triangulation, that is, the combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon. Denzin, for example, suggests that participant observation combine survey interviewing, document analysis, direct observation, and observer participation for optimum results. Similarly, he defines utilization of unobtrusive measures as involving multiple data approaches.

8

In fact, several observers (including the author) previously have stated these same conclusions: William W. Vosburg and Drew Hyman, "Advocacy and Bureaucracy: The Life and Times of a Decentralized Citizen's Advocacy Program," ASQ, (Winter 1973), pp. 443-448; Dean Mann, "The Governor's Branch Offices in Pennsylvania," in Alan Wyner, ed., Executive Ombudsmen in the United States, (University of California, Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies, 1973), pp. 233-278, and several documentary communications from Acting Secretary of Public Welfare, Joseph Adlestein, and later Secretary of Public Welfare, Helene Wohlgenuth, to Governor Shapp. Contacts with informants in Governor Shapp's office have revealed that such information was instrumental in the decision to phase-out the Governor's Branch Offices. This was an act which feedback from the field, citizen reaction and other developments in the political system soon suggested was an error and a replacement program was instituted in the form of a statewide toll-free hot-line program called the Governor's Action Center.

9

"Pressure points" is the term used by Mr. Nagel to describe his activities. His functioning in this role is also supported by several knowledgeable informants.

10

GBO Archive: From files of the GBO's and OPR including the original proposal, copies of letters and correspondence, and copies of the final OEO award.

<sup>11</sup> From informants who had been involved in the review process, review by the researcher of the proposals which were contained in the files, and written reviews also contained in the files of OPR.

<sup>12</sup> Discussions with GBO staff on this issue revealed a concern that a naive or simplistic evaluation would eventually lead to undesirable changes in or elimination of the GBO's as a black people's advocate. There was also a belief that some elements in state government, in particular liberal social-work professionals, were out to convert the GBO's into an information, referral and intake mechanism for social service programs. In fact, this latter model was the paradigm around which at least one evaluation proposal was developed. Therefore, the decision against evaluation was, in part, intended to be protective of the citizen's advocacy role of the GBO's.

It is interesting to note, however, that the next governor, Milton J. Shapp, after several speeches indicating his determination to make the GBO's an integral part of his office, shifted his plans in favor of "home offices for legislators" to serve as "ombudsmen". The GBO's were then phased out over a six-month period during which the funds for legislative home offices went to a salary increase for legislators. A source in the Governor's Office has subsequently stated in the presence of the researcher that the elimination of the GBO's was soon recognized as an error. It occurred, then, that even as the GBO's were being closed, the plans for their statewide successor program were being finalized. It also became clear to the researcher during discussions with the present governor's staff, that had the type of documentary and statistical information revealed by this study (and which would have emerged from an evaluation) been readily available, the Governor's Branch Offices would still be in operation and with greater support than they had received from a governor since their first year of operation.

<sup>13</sup> Edward A. Suchman, Evaluative Research: Principles and Practices in Public Service and Social Action Programs, (N.Y.: Russell Sage, 1967); Herbert H. Hyman and Charles R. Wright, "Evaluating Social Action Programs," in Lazarsfeld, Sewell and Wilensky, eds., The Uses of Sociology, (N.Y.: Basic Books, 1967), Ch. 27; and B.G. Greenberg, "Evaluation of Social Programs," and other readings in Francis G. Caro, ed., Readings in Evaluation Research, (N.Y.: Russell Sage Foundation, 1971), pp. 155-174.

<sup>14</sup> GBO Archive: OPR Proposal (from the GBO files of OPR).

<sup>15</sup> "An unobtrusive measure of observation is any method of observation that directly removes the observer from the set of interactions or events being studied. Public archival documents represent one major class of unobtrusive measures; the conditions that lead to

their production are in no way influenced by an intruding sociological observer." Denzin, op.cit., p. 260; See also, Webb, cp.cit.

<sup>16</sup> Schatzman, op.cit., p. 8, states: ". . . where others may shrink from inquiries of this kind, the field researcher is prepared to invent method on the spot; this he does without qualm although with consideration of issues related to reliability and validity. Thus, having opted for problems best studied up close, in the field, he views techniques--indeed whole methods--not only according to the generalized requirements of science but also to the requirements of his research problem and the properties of his particular research situation. For him scientific method is not a prescriptive set of acts handled in the foreground of activity; rather it is a philosophical mandate to render empirically the relation between himself as observer and the observed event."

<sup>17</sup> Melville Dalton, "Preconceptions and Methods in Men Who Manage," in P.E. Hammond, ed., Sociologists at Work, (N.Y.: Basic Books, 1964), pp. 50-95, discusses the pro's and con's of participant observation suggesting that the "established circulator" role which was maintained by the researcher for this study is in many cases able to provide for insights, confidential data and access to files that a "peripheral formalist" never reaches. M.W. Riley, Sociological Research: A Case Approach, (N.Y.: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1963), p. 72, agrees that this method may be used to reduce the control effect, but "on the other hand, the covert observer may find complete immersion in the system, and subsequent likelihood of a biased viewpoint, more difficult to avoid." It is suggested that the semi-detached role plus multimethod triangulation as used to control bias herein would tend to mitigate such effects.

<sup>18</sup> For discussions of strategies and approaches to participant observation see: George J. McCall and J.L. Simmons, Issues in Participant Observation, (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1969), passim., especially Riecken, "The Unidentified Interviewer," pp. 39-44; and Kahn and Mann, "Developing Research Partnerships," pp. 45-55, for discussions of the covert observer and the benefits of dual or multiple roles.

<sup>19</sup> Riecken, op.cit., advises the complete participant, the covert observer, to structure his role so as to include explicitly the concept of researcher. Kahn and Mann, op.cit., cite the advantage of "multiple entry" as used by this study, whereby the researcher is able to gain access to the research site by two or more paths simultaneously. Riley, op.cit., suggests that a semi-detached role such as used by this study can be highly effective in providing in-depth knowledge combined with a viewpoint which is detached enough to be creatively critical. Finally, the unobtrusive and interview methods provided additional checks on bias.

<sup>20</sup> Schatzman, op.cit., p. 7, states, "method is seen by the field researcher as emerging from operations--from strategic decisions, instrumental actions and analytic processes--which go on throughout the entire research enterprise."

"We are quite aware of another methodological tradition which regards method as 'extant' prior to research. . . . According to this perspective, scientific method is embedded in prepared design and in analytic processes performed 'after the data are in.' Yet one need not juxtapose this view against the other; if the research process can be thought of as beginning with a rough idea and ending with the publication of refined ideas, then it can be shown that similar, if not identical, processes are performed in all modes of original research, differing mainly in the sequence of their occurrence. In field research a refashioning of design must go on through most of the work."

<sup>21</sup> Governor Shapp's decision to phase-out the GBO's occurred when this strategy was in the early stages. As will be explained more fully in later chapters, it was also decided that some form of advocacy program was required in the Governor's Office. Therefore, the research process outlined herein was allowed to continue leading to several policy papers and several strategy meetings with members of the Governor's immediate staff. Moreover, as mentioned above, it soon became apparent to them that the decision for elimination of the GBO's should not have been so precipitous. Although efforts began immediately to create a replacement program, it was two full years before the Governor's Action Center began operations (July 1973). At that time, the new director of the Governor's Action Center (GAC) was advised to seek the advice of the author, now an Assistant Professor at The Pennsylvania State University. Subsequent contacts eventually led to a project, through the Center for Human Services Development, to develop a computer-based information system to serve the new program. The ultimate objective of this project is to determine whether the citizen complaints and problems presented to a citizen's advocate can be utilized to provide external, unbiased indicators of organizational and social conditions in the political system. This project is testing the ideas developed herein. The project provides much of the type of quantitative data on individual advocacy which was not produced by the GBO's. This data is used to generate a wide range of information on "trends" and "patterns" for use in what was called "system accountability and change" action.

<sup>22</sup> For a discussion of the use of the focused interview see: John Madge, The Tools of Social Science, (N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1965), Ch. 4; Merton and Kendall, "The Focused Interview," AJS, Vol. 51, (1946), pp. 541-557; Merton, Fiske and Kendall, The Focused Interview, (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1956); and, Clair Sellitz, Marie Jahoda, Morton Deutsch, and Stuart W. Cook, Research Methods in Social Relations, (N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart & Winston), Ch. 7.



<sup>23</sup>Madge, op.cit., pp. 156-165, discusses three types of informant--potentates, experts, and people.

<sup>24</sup>Madge, op.cit., pp. 156-162.

<sup>25</sup>Madge, op.cit.; Merton, op.cit.; Selltitz, op.cit., all describe non-direction, specificity, range, depth, and personal context.

<sup>26</sup>Webb, op.cit., Ch. 1; and Denzin, op.cit., Ch. 6, both discuss threats to validity introduced by interviewers and the use of unstructured interviews as one compensatory approach. Also, Merton, op.cit., discusses this issue. Techniques used to minimize bias include cross-comparison of responses between informants, the use of non-directive interviewing techniques, and verification of informant data from case records, documents and statistical analyses. The covert observer role was most helpful here as well.

<sup>27</sup>Alexander Heard, "Interviewing Southern Politicians," APSR, Vol. 44 #4, (1950), pp. 886-896, found this approach most valuable, as did, J. Dollard, Caste and Class in a Southern Town, (N.Y., 1937). It is also suggested that prior acquaintance, the "homework," with interviewees and interaction in several other employment-related tasks enabled the interviewer to have prior knowledge of the biases of informants and thus to avoid more superficial and defensive responses.

<sup>28</sup>Heard, op.cit.

<sup>29</sup>There were plans for structured interviews with the local GBO workers. However they would have occurred in this highly charged atmosphere. It is considered that these events would have so distorted the responses that this aspect of the study was discarded. Consequently, the staff which was interviewed was exposed to essentially the same format as for other key informants. These interviews were purposefully kept more unstructured--allowing them to tell their story in their way. In addition, information was extracted from the personnel files to provide additional data on the local GBO workers.

<sup>30</sup>Denzin, op. cit., and Webb, op.cit., both provide discussions of the nature and use of unobtrusive measures.

<sup>31</sup>Denzin, op.cit., Ch. 12.

<sup>32</sup>Selltitz, op. cit., pp. 316-330.

<sup>33</sup>Isidor Chein, "An Introduction to Sampling," in Sellitz, op. cit., pp. 509-545; also, John H. Mueller and Karl F. Schuessler, Statistical Reasoning in Sociology, (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, Co., 1961), Ch. 11.

<sup>34</sup>Schatzman, op.cit., p. 8, states, "As a methodological pragmatist, the field researcher concerns himself less with whether his techniques are 'scientific' than with what specific operations might yield the most meaningful information. He already assumes his own honesty, rationality, and scientific attitude; therefore, he is not ready to concede in advance the superiority of certain types of 'instrumentation' over his own abilities to see and to make sense of what he sees. He is certainly aware of selectivity in human perception and of the probability of bias, but he does not view 'objective' or 'consensually validated' techniques as being free of these limitations either."

<sup>35</sup>Alan Wyner, et. al., Executive Ombudsmen in the States, (Berkeley, Ca.: Institute of Governmental Studies, 1973); and Eric A Nordlinger, Decentralizing the City, (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1972).

## CHAPTER 4: THE GBO'S AS A DIALECTICAL ORGANIZATION

### The Importance to this Study of Characterizing the GBO's as "Dialectical"

It has been suggested that the Governor's Branch Offices were a unique and interesting experiment in governmental reform. More specifically, it has been stated that the GBO's constituted an anti-bureaucratic "dialectical" organization with a mandate to represent the interests of certain disadvantaged, in particular black, people to the lowest and to the highest levels of the polity. These conclusions emerged primarily from participant observation and were later corroborated with other sources of information.

During the four-year period of observation, it was clear that while the GBO's were technically "in" the system, they were not "of" the system. The Governor's Branch Offices were administratively located in the Department of Public Welfare; they were also a direct authoritative arm of the Governor's Office. The GBO's were funded by a combination of state and federal welfare funds, but they did not function according to welfare regulation and procedure. Many of the original GBO staff were ex-welfare workers, but their mandate was to challenge their former colleagues. All positions were under the civil service merit system; staff selection, however, stressed attitude and orientation over "objective" criteria. The GBO Coordinator's Office was located in the Health and Welfare building on the capitol complex in Harrisburg;



local branch offices were located in storefronts and placed away from existing bureaucracies. Thus, despite some trappings of bureaucracy, it was apparent that in both the nature of their operations and the character of their organization, the Governor's Branch Offices were very different from the rest of "the system." In addition, the setting and conduct of research put the researcher in a position to observe and interact with many other bureaucratic organizations at several levels of operation simultaneously with observation and interaction with the Governor's Branch Offices. From this continuous juxtaposition of the GBO's in direct contrast with "the system," it became clear that the GBO's were different in: (1) the nature of their authority and the way they used it, (2) their goal-oriented rather than process-oriented approach to tasks, (3) their organization structure and relationships to various structures and levels of the system, (4) the location and the character of the offices themselves, (5) the staffing patterns and the characteristic thinking of the Governor's representatives, and (6) their debureaucratized operating principles. It is important to describe the radical nature of the GBO's before detailing their activities in providing the three types of citizen's advocacy outlined earlier, for it is from their dialectical nature and their relationship to the authority of the Governor's Office that the qualitative difference in their activity emerges.

On the surface, the GBO's may have looked like almost any other storefront, helping organization. It was clear to the people who established them, however, that the new organizations had to be different from the typical governmental organization. If the GBO's were

to help calm the immediate crisis, and then to stimulate permanent changes within the structures of "the system," they had to engage in conflict on behalf of disadvantaged people and to produce atypical results. The term "dialectical organization" was selected carefully to characterize the GBO's as being conflict-oriented and anti-thetical to the usual governmental form of organization--bureaucracy--for a prime objective for their establishment was to provide a viable, alternative channel of access to "the system."

The suggestion that it is necessary to conceptualize, and perhaps try to structure, dialectical organizations as an alternative to bureaucracy comes from Orion F. White, Jr. His suggestion has been reiterated by Goldrich and Kremers. All three authors suggest a need to examine the dialectical organization as an alternative approach to dealing with some of the dysfunctions of bureaucracy which are mentioned by Merton, Gouldner, Thompson, Lipsky, Crozier, and others. Martin King Whyte's discussion of the Maoist challenge to legal-rationalist bureaucracy is also suggestive of the characteristics of a non-Weberian bureaucratic organization. Essentially, this study views "dialectical organization" as the conceptual opposite of bureaucracy in terms of authority, goals, structure, organization, location, staffing, client relations, and operating procedures.<sup>1</sup>

If bureaucracy and dialectical organization are conceptualized as ideal-type opposites, then bureaucracy is characterized by highly structured roles which are articulated in hierarchical layers of authority, while a dialectical organization tends to have multi-functional roles and authority is available to all levels according to functional

necessity. Communication in a bureaucracy is essentially vertical and downward, compared to a more horizontal and upward flow in a dialectical organization. Bureaucracy tends to be process-oriented with latent stability goals; it values self-preservation of the organization at the expense of manifest goals. A dialectical organization is goal-oriented and pragmatically uses any feasible means to the desired end. Staff orientations in a bureaucracy stress the performance of specific tasks and little more ("to get by"), whereas staff of a dialectical organization strive to do whatever is necessary to move the organization toward the desired goals. Thus, bureaucracy is ideally reflective of its legal-rational authority base, while dialectical organization tends to be flexible and charismatic.

In addition to these internal characteristics, it is also suggested that bureaucracy differs from dialectical organization in terms of relationships with clients. A bureaucracy tends to treat clients as subordinate to the bureaucrat, while a dialectical organization relates to clients as equal to or superior to the organization. Furthermore, it is inherent in their nature that bureaucracies relate to clients in terms of legal-rational criteria or professional specialties; dialectical organizations, on the other hand, view clients in more holistic terms. Thus, a bureaucracy requires clients to fit its rules and regulations, while a dialectical organization seeks to make "the system" responsive to client needs. Moreover, bureaucratic relationships with the client are basically impersonal and "impartial"; the dialectical organization, however, risks personal relationships and sees itself as the partisan of the client. Finally, bureaucracy invests

the organization's resources in the client in a qualified fashion, the dialectical organization seeks to utilize available resources to meet client needs. Thus, in terms of organizational principles and relationships with clients, bureaucracies will tend to be conservative and defensive of the status quo, while dialectical organizations will respond to existing contradictions and strains in "the system" in a change-oriented manner.

This chapter suggests that the Governor's Branch Offices were a dialectical organization. The sections which follow describe some of the immediate factors attendant on the establishment of the GBO's, several aspects of their organization and operation which are characteristic of dialectical organizations, and how the GBO's operated in providing a channel of access to "the system" and precipitated its responsiveness for disadvantaged people.

#### The Establishment and Authority of the GBO's

Governor Raymond Shafer was inaugurated in January 1967. As might be expected, the early months of his administration were devoted to an orderly transfer of authority from the previous Governor, William Scranton. Some cabinet posts were re-assigned and assessments of the many programmatic areas were made. As summer approached, it became apparent that the nation was in for a "long-hot summer." An increasing level and volume of violence occurred in many U.S. cities. The number of disorders by month was: March (1); April (4); May (11); June (16); July (103); and decreasing into August and September.<sup>2</sup> In Pennsylvania, there was an incident in Philadelphia in May, and two in July; there

were also two incidents in Erie, one in New Castle, and one in Pittsburgh.<sup>3</sup>

As in the rest of the nation, the members of Governor Shafer's cabinet were divided on how to respond. Liberals argued for attacking the root causes of poverty, racism, and injustice. A "law and order" faction supported a more para-military approach.<sup>4</sup> The full dynamics of the conflict between these two factions are not known to the researcher, nor are they the object of this study. What is important for present purposes is the fact that on July 1, 1967 Governor Shafer announced the resignation of Secretary of Public Welfare Max Rosen amid rumors that a black man from Philadelphia, Dr. Thomas W. Georges, Jr. would be appointed as his successor.<sup>5</sup>

On July 12, 1967, Newark, N.J. exploded into violence. Riots then broke out in a number of other New Jersey cities on succeeding days. Across the border in Philadelphia and other Pennsylvania cities, groups threatened similar actions. Thirteen cities in Pennsylvania had been identified by authorities as potential riot areas--three of these cities experienced incidents in July.<sup>6</sup> On July 14, Governor Shafer announced the appointment of Dr. Georges as both Secretary of Health and Secretary of Public Welfare.<sup>7</sup> Within the cabinet, the battle of strategies continued with the liberal position augmented by a black man who held the portfolios of two cabinet-level departments. Liberals argued that the law and order approach had not prevented violence elsewhere. In fact, analyses of previous riots (e.g., Watts in 1965) suggested police actions had precipitated incidents. The liberals argued for a chance to try a different, non-punitive approach which emphasized the prevention and containment of riots.

On Tuesday morning, July 25, Governor Shafer assigned to Dr. Georges the chief responsibility for developing and implementing a plan to prevent civil disturbances, to defuse tension areas, and to map out the Commonwealth's strategy if riots did occur.<sup>8</sup> The liberals were thus given a chance to develop and implement a non-punitive approach to the prevention and containment of violent civil disobedience.<sup>9</sup>

As outlined in Chapter 1, there were three key elements of the plan which emerged. First, Governor Shafer made a public policy statement announcing that his policy would be directed toward alleviating the causes of urban unrest and initiating the many activities in the private sector mentioned in Chapter 1. Secondly, there would be a program to "move the system" for disadvantaged people by applying pressure from the bottom up while also identifying specific barriers or problems within "the system." This information, in turn, would precipitate pressures from the top down for changes in policy, procedure, law, or regulation as appropriate, (i.e., both ends of the system would be addressed). The instrumentality for implementing this aspect of the plan became the Governor's Branch Offices. It is this one aspect of the broader program to which this study is oriented: the GBO's were the keystone of the broader reform plan.

The third aspect of the plan was a non-punitive contingency plan in case riots did break out. This part of the plan emphasized saving of lives and containment of violence. The Governor would proclaim a state of emergency. He would announce that he did not "consider it in the public interest to embark on a punitive police action against

the citizens in the disordered parts of the city." He would also announce that the disordered areas were to be cordoned off, state police and military forces were to refrain from aggressive action, and that first aid, sanctuary, and immunity would be provided for anyone who left the area. The plan also called for disbursements of emergency cash grants and rehabilitation of riot areas after violence died down. This third part of the plan was never needed. There were no riots in Pennsylvania in 1967.<sup>10</sup>

Whether the acts of the Governor, Dr. Georges and his staff contributed to the conspicuous absence of riots in Pennsylvania is open to argument. The Governor's acts came at the peak of nationwide violence. Although tensions remained high in Pennsylvania as elsewhere, there was a nationwide decrease in the number of violent incidents after July.<sup>11</sup> Perhaps the actions in the private sector would have occurred anyway, for such was the national trend. One thing which does stand out from these events is the fact that when the summer was over, Dr. Georges was in control of a \$1 million citizen's advocacy network which reached directly into the highest executive office of the state (as well as the head of two departments whose portfolios he held). The twenty-one, ghetto-based Governor's Branch Offices were staffed primarily by black people, under orders to use the authority of the Governor's Office to prod the primarily white community structures to be responsive to the demands of disadvantaged people in the ghettos of Pennsylvania. Thus the GBO's were conceived in an atmosphere of conflict; they were designed, structured, staffed and operated in a manner which was intended to confront problems in traditional

socio-political structures; their mandate was to engage "the system" on behalf of black people. The GBO's will thus be explicated as an anti-bureaucratic, or "dialectical" organization.<sup>12</sup>

The specific nature and operation of the Branch Offices was the outcome of the activity of a small group of planners and decision-makers operating in an atmosphere of crisis. Wilensky suggests that in such situations, "a 'hasty' decision made under pressure, may, on the average, be better than a less urgent one."<sup>13</sup> The crisis in 1967 impinged upon the Governor, Dr. Georges, and their staffs provoking rapid and decisive action and compressed the planning and implementation process to a few days. These planners were primarily liberal reformers.<sup>14</sup> Many were new to state government. They were imbued with social and behavioral science critiques of "the system." They had used the crisis to get the authority to act. These people were true advocats in the sense suggested by Downs, for they believed that their actions were preventing riots and destruction, and that they constituted a spearhead for ameliorating some of the conditions of disadvantaged people.<sup>15</sup> Understanding the fact that this orientation gave a major stimulous to action is important here, for it suggests how the GBO's came to emerge as an organization which was totally different from other structures of the system. Thus, these events provide a specificity, a direction, and a responsiveness which made the usual steps in governmental decision-making stand out in sharp relief.<sup>16</sup>

The decision to establish the GBO's was made on Tuesday, July 25, 1967. On Wednesday morning Dr. Georges' staff began to define how the GBO's would operate, and the Governor announced the "opening of



branches of my own office in key neighborhoods throughout the State."<sup>17</sup> On Thursday, initial plans for the GBO's were reviewed and the decision was made to implement the plans. Arrangements for staff were initiated. By Friday evening, several locations were established. On Saturday and Sunday, activity continued with thirty to forty people working. On Monday, July 31, the Central Coordinator's Office was established and phones, furniture and equipment installed. The training session for GBO representatives was also held on Monday. On Tuesday, August 1, 1967, at 7:00 a.m., Dr. Georges visited the Harrisburg GBO.<sup>18</sup>

Within a week, twenty-one disadvantaged communities in Pennsylvania had a direct link to all Commonwealth services and to the Governor's Office. Posters and leaflets were distributed in ghetto neighborhoods, radio spots were broadcast, and signs were placed in buses, subways and public buildings. It was this action, and the volume of activity which the GBO's handled in the next few weeks which led one veteran of politics and government to recall, "Never was government so responsive."<sup>19</sup> The remainder of this section will discuss the authority of the GBO's as a dialectical organization which was intended to provide access to the system for certain disadvantaged people and to prod the structures of the political system into being more responsive.

Governor Raymond P. Shafer officially delegated authority to the Governor's Branch Offices to function as his personal representatives in the ghettos of Pennsylvania. An executive order directed all Commonwealth agencies, boards, commissions and authorities to provide immediate access and a quick response to all orders from the GBO's.

This is to advise you that this week I am opening Governor's Branch Offices. A list is attached. The purpose of these Branch Offices is to obtain for me direct communication with citizens living in areas where the greatest tension exists between government and people. . . . Successful operation of these offices commands the highest priority attention from you and your employees.

I am directing you to advise all employees of the creation and purpose of these branches of the Governor's Office. Immediate attention must be afforded by all line units to requests and referrals originating from them.<sup>20</sup>

The Governor's directive was in turn transmitted to all employees of these agencies with particular instructions from their Secretaries or Directors. For example, the human service agencies of the state (including health, mental health, social services, children's services, services to the aging, services to youth and youthful offenders, and public assistance) were ordered by their secretary:

. . . You are expected to assure yourself and me that your office is responsive to the referrals emanating from the Governor's Branch Offices. I intend to be certain that there are no practices or attitudes within the programs of this Department that restrict or thwart their purposes and thus add to the tension that exists in our cities. Our citizens must be assured courtesy and prompt service, with scrupulous regard for their rights and entitlements. <sup>21</sup> This is the basic condition of employment in this Department.

Many departments immediately instituted new procedures and established new policy to put the Governor's command into effect. The Bureau of Employment Security, for example, established new policies to respond to both the Governor's Branch Offices and to the Governor's campaign with the private sector (mentioned in Chapter 1). BES Bulletin #1295 (August 1, 1967), states in part that:

In the event orders are referred to local offices by Governor's Branch Offices, such orders shall be marked "GBO" and handled on a priority basis. Orders received from private employers as a result of the Governor's campaign shall be handled similarly.<sup>22</sup>

These acts are documentary representations of the investment of the authority of the Executive Branch of government in the Governor's Branch Offices. They are themselves highly unusual and direct for political, and especially bureaucratic, communiques. They could, however, have been symbolic. The statements might have been designed as "cooling mechanisms" to manipulate the powerless and angry into feeling that change was at hand.<sup>23</sup> Consider, however, that these were internal documents for state employees, and were not publicized in the media. Several sections to follow contain direct evidence that as the summer cooled, the GBO's were being consolidated, enhanced, and institutionalized. The most significant system change (citizen's advocacy for interests) actions occurred at a time when a symbolic response would have been winding down. What these acts do seem to represent then is the transfer of authority to the Governor's Branch Offices.

#### A Note on the Authority of the GBO's

The authority of the GBO's is somewhat unique for they possessed the capability to wield, and did wield, all three types of Weber's ideal types of authority. As branches of the Governor's Office, they shared the legal-rational (bureaucratic) authority of the Chief Executive of the state.<sup>24</sup> Their authority did not end here, however, for the Governor also communicated to the political party structure that the GBO's were acting for him as head of the party. The local GBO's could thus call upon local party chairmen, sheriffs, and other elected political figures. Members of the Governor's Cabinet represented many of the holders of power in the Republican party, and

were made directly available to the Coordinator's Office and to Mr. William Nagel, Executive Director of the Council for Human Services. As political appointments in Governor Shafer's Cabinet, these men wielded the authority of both executive departments and high officials in the political party.

The Governor's assignment of Mr. William Nagel to handle the day-to-day political operations relative to the GBO's placed this man in a position somewhat analagous to that of the chief lieutenant or the head of a traditional political machine---pressuring, arm-twisting, wheedling, cajoling, as appropriate. Nagel himself indicated that his primary talent is a knowledge of the political "pressure points," an ability to judiciously use them, and a determination to do so. Thus many of the referrals to the Central Office of the GBO's were appeals to use the traditional authority of the party to counter legal-rational or bureaucratic resistance from local or state officials. (Specific examples of actions will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.)

Finally, the GBO's were the recipients of the charismatic authority which is attendant to a crisis as well as that associated with high officials and respected offices.<sup>25</sup> The urgency of the actions of the Governor, and the crisis atmosphere in the nation and the state called for a relaxation of the rules. The GBO's were thrust into this situation as an emergency intervention. They were granted the flexibility and freedom to command community structures which is associated with charisma emanating from a crisis or disaster. However, the GBO's never withdrew as the crisis abated. When September came, the issue was to consolidate and to institutionalize. Thus the crisis provided an

opportunity to enter the organizational domain; the actions of Dr. Georges and others as the crisis abated were to assure that they would remain there.<sup>26</sup>

Another source of charismatic authority is the office of the Governor himself. Weber speaks of "office charisma" (amtscharisma) which attends high offices. He also suggests that charisma is a transferable quality. Thus whether or not the Governor, or Dr. Georges, were charismatic individuals is not important. The Governor had charisma as the incumbent of the position and was able to transfer it.<sup>27</sup>

A final observation on the authority of the Governor's Branch Offices is that they used all three types of authority in a charismatic manner. That is, whatever authority they possessed, was used directly. The GBO's did not pander to legal-rational hierarchy and procedure nor did they defer to the tradition and principles of the party.

The primary goals of the Governor's Branch Office Program are to present an institutional challenge to the existing . . . establishment . . . to document the need for specific reforms . . . to act as the visitor's advocate . . . and make coherent those services already available and intended for the use of the people.<sup>28</sup>

As advocates for disadvantaged people, the GBO's used all of their authority charismatically in a change-oriented manner which is antithetical to the principles of the other two types of authority. Hence, the application of the term "dialectical organization" to the GBO's emanates first and foremost from their use of authority.

In short, the GBO's wielded the various types of authority as necessary, when necessary, in pursuit of results. If a local

governmental official was reluctant to respond to the GBO's as an arm of the Governor's Office, he might well expect a call through the political party network which was stimulated by Mr. Nagel. Many agencies, especially local and private organizations over which the state had no legal-rational jurisdiction, responded to the name of the Governor's Office. An official identification card carried by the GBO representatives reinforced this charismatic effect. And, of course, a large number of bureaucratic officials and workers could be reached through the legal-rational structures of the Executive.<sup>29</sup> It is expected, therefore, that the GBO's would be able to command the "attentive interest" of a wide variety of agencies and organizations at many levels of the polity.


Thus, it can be seen that the initiating events, the nature of authority, and the functions of the Governor's Branch Offices tend to support the assertion that they were indeed different, that they were anti-bureaucratic, and that they were intended as a governmental reform. It remains to be seen how these facts were put into operation. The next section of this chapter will discuss the debureaucratized organizational structure, specific aspects of the location of offices, the staffing patterns, the training and orientation of the GBO representatives, and the nature of the operational procedures of the GBO's. These latter sections reinforce the assertion that the GBO's were an attempt to introduce a new permanent organization into the polity, and that they were anti-bureaucratic in nature and dialectical in character.

Organizational Structure, Location, Staffing, Ideology  
and Operational Principles of the GBO's

Debureaucratized Organizational Structure

The structure of the Governor's Branch Offices was deliberately kept simple--debureaucratized.<sup>30</sup> There were no supervisors, no directors, and there was a minimum of layering between the local governor's representatives and the Governor. The direct and debureaucratized nature of the GBO structure is also underlined by the fact that the communications flow was deliberately planned to be horizontal and upward, i.e., horizontal at any level of the system to the structures of the community, or upward to higher authority as necessary to get results. This procedure stands in direct contrast to the downward vertical flow which is typical of bureaucracies.<sup>31</sup> Figure 2 illustrates the organizational structure of the GBO's.

Figure 2: Governor's Branch Offices  
Organizational Structure



Formally there were two layers of organization between the Governor's representatives and the Governor. In practice, however, Mr. William Nagel functioned as Governor's Man for a considerable period thus reducing the de facto layering to a single level, (i.e., a call to the Executive Secretary of the Council of Human Services was, in effect, a call to the Governor). The minutes from one meeting of the Council indicate that in the first six months of operation, Mr. Nagel and his staff handled over 1000 cases in this way.<sup>32</sup> The nature of their operations and the cases they handled are described in the following chapter.

The debureaucratized nature of the GBO structure is also manifest in the fact that there were no layers of functional specialization, supervision, and management. Functionally, each level performed identically as citizen's advocate and proceeded toward the resolution of cases in practically identical fashion. The differences among levels arose only from their location, the types of problems they were asked to handle and their proximity to the locus of authority. Thus the local offices would forward to Harrisburg those cases which needed Harrisburg action or which were encountering too much resistance at the local level for prompt resolution. Often the action of the Central Office was to contact the local service agency which was not responding in order to apply any additional clout it could supply; the Council for Human Services Office was often called upon for similar types of action. Thus all levels of the structure were heavily involved in citizen's advocacy for individuals. The local level of operation served as a first line of attack and a screening mechanism. More difficult cases



were escalated to the Central Office at the discretion of the local representatives for direct intervention from the state capitol.

(Chapter 5 details the operation of the GBO's in providing citizen's advocacy for individuals.)

All levels were also involved in identifying areas for what was called "system change" (citizen's advocacy for interests). The individual problem card had a section where the local representative could tell the Coordinator--"Looks like a pattern or trend to be investigated." A "patterns committee" in the Coordinator's Office took particular notice of this information. The Central Office also made continual searches of problem cards, reviews of statistical information on the nature and types of problems brought to the GBO's, and reviews of the complaint and referral postcards sent in by citizens. The postcards also gave GBO visitors the opportunity to bring policy demands directly to the attention of the authorities. The personalized, subjective character of the program was even evident here. For example, when asked what the specific decision-criteria were for identification of "patterns" or "trends," one informant responded, "All I know is that I'll know one when I see one." (The extent and nature of "system change" actions precipitated by the GBO's through these several means of identification are detailed in Chapter 6.)

One characteristic of a large proportion of the original cadre of local representatives (described below) was their knowledge of public assistance and social services regulations and procedures. When executive directors of various agencies "volunteered" the workers who were to become the GBO representatives, they thought they were

getting rid of agitators and troublemakers. Little did they know that these same people would be assigned responsibilities which would put them in a position to interpret regulation, policy, and procedure from a position external to the service agency, and in the name of the Governor. Likewise the continual intervention of the Coordinator's Office and the Executive Secretary of the Council of Human Services in interpretation of policy and regulation without regard to hierarchy and bureaucratic procedure became a source of friction and conflict at the higher levels of the system. Thus the GBO's may be unique in providing a regularized, external structure for citizen's advocacy relative to the substance of administrative law, practice, and policy.<sup>33</sup>

Another aspect of debureaucratization which is associated with the GBO's is manifest in the fact that supervision of local workers was deliberately kept informal and remote. The central officer was called a "Coordinator," not a Deputy Secretary, Commissioner, Director, Office Head, or Chief (as is the case in the Pennsylvania bureaucracies). The Coordinator functioned primarily as a consultant, counselor and co-worker for the more difficult problems, or for problems which required intervention in the capitol. There were no supervisors in the early GBO. If the local representative had questions or problems, he called the Coordinator's Office in Harrisburg. In addition, every few weeks one of the Assistant Coordinators would visit the local office to discuss operations, procedure, and policy, and to reinforce the advocacy attitude of the workers. This arrangement, which came to be called "telephone supervision," was explicitly designed: (1) to give the workers the feeling that they were trusted


and that the Governor had enough confidence in them as individuals to carry out their duties without a bureaucratic overlord; (2) to put the direct responsibility for local action on the GBO representative--he was the person with the authority to command change or to call upon the direct application of authority from the Central Governor's Office, itself; and (3) to convince the citizen that: "Here is the person I want to talk to (not his supervisor)." <sup>34</sup> Thus, both the structure of authority within the GBO organization and between the GBO's and "the system" exhibited dialectical characteristics.

#### Location: Were the GBO's Really Ghetto Storefronts?

The Governor's Branch Offices were located in twelve of the thirteen cities in Pennsylvania with populations of 50,000 or more, in several smaller cities (which were just across the border from the city of Youngstown, Ohio), and in Aliquippa, near Pittsburgh. There were concentrations of black people in these localities. When the black population of the smaller cities is added to that of the twelve larger cities which had GBO's, over 915,000 of the 1,016,500 black people in Pennsylvania had GBO's in their community. Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, which together contained 75 percent of the total black population of the state, had ten of the twenty-one GBO's located in various ghetto neighborhoods. The map in Figure 3 indicates the locations of the GBO's and the percentage of the city population which was black.

Data from the 1970 census compared with earlier censuses also shows that there was an increasing concentration of black people in the cities of Pennsylvania. For example, the thirteen cities in Pennsylvania with populations over 50,000 contain 82.3 percent of the

Fig. 3: PERCENTAGE OF CITY POPULATION WHICH WAS BLACK IN 1970  
FOR THE THIRTEEN CITIES IN WHICH GBO'S WERE LOCATED



o Governor's Branch Office  
 \* City data not available. These figures are based on county data, and city concentrations are higher.  
 % Percent of city population which is black

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Advance Report, PC(V2 - 40 General Population Characteristics Pennsylvania - February 1971: Table V.

91.2% of the state's total black population resides in the Philadelphia and Pittsburgh SMSA's. These same SMSA's contained 52.9% of the state's white population in 1970.

black population of the state compared to 23.0 percent of the white population. (The 12 SMSA's contain 97.6 percent of the black population and 91.4 percent of all other nonwhite people in the state.) Moreover, urban racial concentrations increased between 1960 and 1970--all thirteen cities proportionately lost whites and gained blacks. In addition, the white population of Pennsylvania increased only 2.7 percent between 1960 and 1970 compared to an increase of 19.2 percent for the black population. (Comparative figures for the U.S. as a whole are 11.8 percent for whites and 20.3 percent for black population.) Compared to a large part of the rest of the nation, Pennsylvania was becoming blacker, faster. Table 1 lists the race characteristics for the cities in Pennsylvania with 50,000 or more and the percent change between 1960 and 1970.

Within the cities in which they were located, the GBO's were sited to be immediately accessible to poor, in particular black, people. Criteria for selecting sites were that they be located in a black poverty area and in a well-traveled part of the community. The most favorable site was found to be a combination business-residential neighborhood in or near the heart of the ghetto. Most of the areas where GBO's were located had no or few social services available in the neighborhood. Where it was found that services were available, e.g., in one case an OEO Neighborhood Assistance Agency was one block away, the GBO was relocated. (See Appendix I: Evaluation of the Location and Staffing of the GBO's [February 1968].)

The initial locations of the GBO's were selected in a very short period of time. These decisions were based primarily on the

Table 1  
Race Characteristics for Cities with 50,000 or More  
Population-Pennsylvania (1970), and % of Change 1960-1970

City (*GBO)	Total No.	Black		Other (Nonwhite) No.	Other (Nonwhite) %	Percent Change 1960 to 1970			
		No.	%			Total	White	Black	Other
THE STATE	11,793,000	1,016,514	8.7	39,663	0.3	4.2	2.7	19.2	214.5
TOTAL	3,325,550	836,123	25.1	21,697	0.7	-5.8	-12.9	21.5	186.6
*Philadelphia	1,943,609	653,791	33.6	16,101	0.8	-2.7	-12.9	23.5	177.9
*Pittsburgh	520,117	104,904	20.2	2,933	0.5	-13.9	-18.0	4.2	180.1
*Erie	129,231	8,577	6.6	274	0.2	-6.7	-8.6	28.9	207.9
*Allentown	109,527	1,980	1.8	300	0.3	1.1	-0.2	165.8	194.1
*Scranton	103,564	854	0.8	224	0.2	-7.1	-7.4	18.4	433.3
*Reading	87,643	5,744	6.6	246	0.2	-10.7	-13.1	37.7	331.6
*Bethlehem	72,686	1,363	1.9	310	0.4	-3.6	-4.4	34.4	160.5
*Harrisburg	68,061	20,911	30.7	389	0.6	-14.6	-27.5	38.5	285.1
*Altoona	62,900	802	1.3	107	1.0	-9.4	-9.6	1.5	236.4
*Wilkes-Barre	58,856	937	1.6	111	0.2	-7.4	-7.8	17.1	282.8
Lancaster	57,690	4,266	7.4	259	0.4	-5.5	-9.0	66.1	331.7
*Chester	56,331	25,469	45.2	189	0.3	-11.5	-27.6	44.6	186.4
*York	50,335	6,525	13.0	254	0.5	-7.6	-12.4	37.5	669.7

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Advance Report PC(V2) - 40 General Population Characteristics, Pennsylvania - February 1971: PC(1) 40B, Pennsylvania 1960, Table 28

judgment of black DPW workers, local executives of state agencies, and on discussions with the leaders of black organizations in the several cities. The first six months of operation were devoted primarily to operation and development of a functioning organization. In January 1968, the question of whether the GBO's were located most advantageously was addressed, and a study was conducted to see if any should be closed or relocated. Utilizing the above criteria on location, the relationship of the site to poverty areas and other services, statistics on volume of visitors to date, per annum costs, assessments of staff performance, and general experience during the first six months, a judgment was made on the overall effectiveness of each office.

The recommendations of this study for retention, relocation or closing of the various offices are summarized in Table 2. Most GBO's were located in combination business-residential neighborhoods, three were in business areas, and six were in residential areas. Five of the latter offices were relocated, and one was closed. One GBO in a business area was retained (Altoona), one was closed, and one re-located.

These evaluations were based primarily on the judgment of GBO workers, therefore, a separate procedure was used to cross-verify this information. Maps of Philadelphia and Pittsburgh were prepared using SYMAP techniques and 1970 census data. The darker shadings indicate poverty areas. The exact location of the GBO was pinpointed by locating the address in the census tract. The maps on the following pages suggest that the evaluations by the GBO staff were generally sound (Figures 4 and 5).


Table 2: Recommendations of the Study of Location and Staffing of GBO's (February 1968), and Actions Taken.<sup>35</sup>


Recommendation	# of GBO's	Action Taken
Retain	11	all retained
Relocate	6	five relocated
Close	2	two closed
Open	4	four opened
Create Mobile GBO	1	one mobile unit

Note: The total is 24, however the timing of actions was such that there were only 21 in operation at any one time: hence the statement that there were 21 GBO's (which was used by the GBO people). Narrative statements on each office are reproduced in Appendix I.

For present purposes, this information tends to suggest two conclusions. First, the GBO's were located so as to be optimally available to disadvantaged black people who were not being serviced by community structures. The locations of the GBO's are in direct contrast to most other state services which tend to be located for the convenience of white middle-class workers, not their clients (a fact which also led the GBO's to provide a large number of visitors with transportation in the form of bus or taxi fare, or state cars). Secondly, it supports the conclusion that the GBO's were intended to be permanent. Rather than being closed down in January 1968, plans were made which were then implemented, for enhancing the program. The decisions on location which were made in the heat of the crisis in July generally stood the test of more leisurely, cooler assessments in January. In addition, the commitment for a continuing presence of the







Governor's Office "in your own neighborhoods," and "easy to get and easy to use"<sup>36</sup> was affirmed and strengthened. Thus the GBO's were not a summer, crisis-response program, but rather they were the keystone of an approach to broader changes within the system. The staffing patterns of the GBO's which are discussed next also support this conclusion.

#### Staffing the Dialectical Organization--Radicalized Workers

The people who designed the Governor's Branch Offices were aware of the fact that the character of the original cadre of workers would be perhaps the most crucial variable in determining the success or failure of the GBO's. The lodgment of the program within state government meant that there was a large pool of workers from which to draw, and the urgency of the situation suggested that existing staff be reassigned until more permanent arrangements were made.<sup>37</sup> The planners also intended, however, that the GBO's should become a radical departure from preexisting programs of state government.<sup>38</sup> Translating this dilemma into reality required the selection of a dedicated cadre of state employees who knew the system, were critical of its deficiencies, who could be expected to enter conflict situations skillfully on behalf of black people, who understood ghetto life and who could gain the confidence of ghetto residents.

The core of the original cadre of Governor's representatives was comprised of "volunteers" from state agencies. The individual workers were identified first of all by calling upon local human service agencies--in particular the state-administered County Boards of Assistance--and requesting supervisors to provide the names of

people, primarily black people, who were critical of programs, who were known as "agitators," and who tended to give their co-workers and supervisors a lot of "static." Workers who lived in or near tension communities and who were known to residents were favored. (This process began on Thursday, July 27, 1967.)

These workers were then contacted, the program explained to them, and they were asked to "volunteer" for the GBO program. The workers who could be persuaded to take the assignment, and who seemed appropriate in this brief interview, were then asked to come to Harrisburg for a training session to be held on July 31, 1967. At all times they retained the option to transfer back to their old position should they so desire. They were also promised that the GBO's were intended to be permanent new organizations, not just a temporary crisis-related action. Fifty-two (70%) of the original 75 local-level workers were recruited in this manner. Over half of them (56%) were public assistance workers from state-administered County Boards of Assistance, 15 percent were formerly clerical workers from state agencies, and 15 percent were drawn from other professional or managerial positions. (See Table 3.)

The recruitment of the remainder of the original group continued through the succeeding weeks until the full complement of 75 local workers was achieved. The search for the latter part of the original group focused on finding black residents of the neighborhoods in which GBO's were located. This action was consistent with a relatively new trend to utilize "indigenous workers" in working with the poor.<sup>39</sup> Education and previous employment history were downplayed

Table 3: Percentage Distribution of GBO Workers by Previous Employment (1967-1971)<sup>40</sup>

PREVIOUS EMPLOYMENT	1967			1968	1969	1970	1971
	Transferred	Hired	Total Orig. Complement	Hired in (year)			Total
Laborer, Sales, Svc.	6%	13%	8%	23%	17%	9%	36%
Clerical-Secretarial	15	52	27	14	9	9	23
Health/Social Svcs.	0	0	0	14	48	74	28
CBA Asst. Technician	6	13	8	0	9	0	4
CBA Caseworker	50	13	39	5	0	9	0
Other Prof. & Mgr.	15	9	13	45	9	0	0
Other	8	0	5	0	9	0	10
Total	100%	100%	100%	101%	101%	101%	101%
N	52	23	75	22	23	23	53*

Note: Totals other than 100% result from errors due to rounding.  
\*Data on some workers was not available.

in favor of people who exhibited an ability to take an advocacy stance and to be aggressive in dealing with official agencies. Training and knowledge of the intricacies of the various agencies and programs would be on-the-job. A new civil service classification designed purposefully for such use, Human Service Aide, was available and allowed people to be hired off-the-street, if appropriate, as actually occurred on several occasions.

A description of the "minimum experience and training" for a GBO worker called for "direct experience with the problems of persons living in culturally, socially and economically disadvantaged communities."<sup>41</sup> In addition, the GBO representative had to be an individual "who is basically action-oriented," "can relate to unjust causes [and] has espoused the causes of justice in community life."<sup>42</sup>

Criteria used for selection of GBO representatives called for individuals who

. . . have the courage and determination to follow through with action necessary to resolve an issue once it has been brought to their attention, even though such actions or causes might be unpopular.

. . . requires specific intervention as an advocate on behalf of the client at the highest level necessary to affect change.

. . . acts on behalf of a person or group of people in order to fulfill the needs of the person or group by supporting their cause and working to produce the change within an agency or institution.<sup>43</sup>

These criteria were maintained throughout the entire history of the Governor's Branch Offices. For example, the trend toward hiring indigenous people who were not "tainted" by a professional socialization experience is evident in Table 3 above. Only 8 percent of the original complement of the GBO's were from the first category of "previous employment," while 36 percent of the final complement were from this category. The trend is also evident in the civil service job classifications of the GBO representatives. Fifty-eight percent of the original group were caseworkers or social workers compared to 23 percent of the final cadre in 1971. These figures stand out in contrast to the shift toward the Human Service Aide (H.S. Aide) class which did not require professional experience or college education. (See Table 4.) The trend is most evident in the proportion of workers hired (not transferred) in 1967. The trend continued throughout the program.

That a high proportion of local black people (and in some neighborhoods, Spanish-speaking) should staff the GBO's was also a

Table 4: Entry Classification of GBO Workers by Year 1967-1971<sup>44</sup>

Classification	1967		Total	1968	1969	1970	1971
	Transfer	Hired		Hired in (Year)			
H.S. Aide I	2%	9%	4%	5%	48%	48%	14%
H.S. Aide II, III	8	48	20	23	17	30	33
Asst. Tech. Trainee	6	4	5	5	0	0	14
Asst. Tech I, II	8	4	7	9	9	0	6
Caseworker, S.W.	58	17	45	5	0	13	23
Other	19	17	19	55	26	9	5
Total	100%	99%	100%	102%	100%	100%	100%
N	52	23	75	22	23	23	79

desired objective of the planners. Thirty-seven percent of the group which transferred from other agencies in July 1967 were white, however, 91 percent of the remainder of the original complement were black. Aggressive males were particularly desirable (the original group was 57% male). Table 5 illustrates the continual increase in the proportion of minority group representatives in the Governor's Branch Offices.

Table 5: Percentage Distribution of Racial Characteristics of GBO Workers (1967-1971)<sup>45</sup>

Race	1967			1968	1969	1970	1971
	Transfer	Hired	Total	Hired in Year			Total
White	37%	9%	48%	14%	17%	9%	11%
Black	62	91	71	73	78	78	84
Spanish	2	0	1	14	4	13	5
Total	101%	100%	100%	101%	99%	100%	100%
N	52	23	75	22	23	23	79

Thus, from the beginning the GBO representatives were primarily black people. The original Governor's representatives were also identified as people who were known to challenge their former superiors, were identified as "agitators," and who were known for their



criticism of "the system." They were people who were likely to be aware of ghetto conditions, and therefore would be empathetic with the problems people would bring. While many were skeptical about the job they were being asked to perform, they were people who when imbued with the authority of the Governor's Office and "turned loose" would be most likely to prod and massage the system. The training sessions which they attended were designed to convince them that they had the direction and support of the Governor to act in this manner.

#### The Characteristic Thinking of the Governor's Representatives

The first training session for GBO workers was on July 31, 1967, one day before the GBO's opened for action. (The second training session was held on August 15, 1967.) The objective of the training session was to impress on the workers the belief that they did act in the name of the Governor, and that their task was citizen's advocacy in the most assertive sense of the term. In one of the first sessions, Governor Shafer himself outlined his commitment to and involvement in the program. He described conditions in the cities and in the "well-nigh impenetrable" bureaucracies as "intolerable." Then he told them what he wanted their role to be.

First, many of you are from casework agencies, yet the path ahead cannot be that of the traditional caseworker. You no longer offer the usual services--public assistance, counseling, child welfare, etc. You no longer work for a social agency. You work for me.

It follows, therefore, that you will no longer be part of (or therefore defender of) the welfare system, or the employment security system, or any other system. You are now an advocate for the person who comes into the Governor's Branch Offices with a problem. In a real way we are his 'ombudsman.' It is your job to help him locate and receive those services which he needs and is eligible for. You are spokesman for the person who has not been able, up to now, to articulate his problem or his need.



. . . You will, I am sure, elicit responses from the poor that have just not been forthcoming. But more important the poor will elicit responses from the Commonwealth which have not heretofore been forthcoming. Your path will lead you toward insuring that the person who visits your office knows his rights concerning state services. It has been said that 'unknown, unasserted rights are no rights at all.' Your job is to help the poor to know their rights regarding government services and to assist them. The General Assembly provides hundreds of millions of dollars each year to help people toward a better life. Unless people know about the services, unless the agencies make them truly understandable and accessible, these programs fail in their high purpose.<sup>46</sup>

The training sessions were developed and directed under the guidance of Dr. Joseph Adlestein, a psychiatrist, and several members of his staff.<sup>47</sup> The training of the Governor's representatives was designed to weed out and scare off the faint-hearted, and to disabuse the skeptical of ideas that the GBO's were to be a symbolic response. The training was deliberately direct and fast-paced. For example, following the Governor's speech (5-10 minutes), the GBO Coordinator presented the job "in stark terms, using truth in a context of reverse psychology."<sup>48</sup> Then he would state:

If anyone doesn't think he can handle this, he is absolutely free to leave right now with no questions asked. We won't have time to train anybody to do an acceptable job, we'll have to rely on luck with recruitment. I want you to know that if you can't cut it after you get into the GBO, you'll simply be quietly replaced, with no recriminations from us, and sent back to your old job. While you're in the GBO, you'll be working for an outfit that has thrown away the rule book, and you'll be expected to throw away your rule books. . . . You'll have to be willing to make enemies of your old colleagues and people like them, when it comes to a show-down between them and the people you'll be serving in the GBO . . . [and on in this vein for about 10 minutes].<sup>49</sup>

This anti-bureaucratic, anti-system mood was maintained throughout the training which also included: (1) a psychiatric expert to explain how a worker can get most fully in tune with the citizen's problem; (2) brief presentations on the services available, problems

to be expected from various agencies, and who to call upon for quick action; (3) the presentation of, and small group interactions around, actual action situations with continual focus on citizen goals; (4) explanation of how to deal with professionals and bureaucrats and the use of the referral post-card; and (5) a presentation of the procedures and rules on wages, hours, etc. ("You don't leave your post until you're relieved by the next watch, or until what has to be done gets done.") The last item was followed by a statement by "this tough chairman" which was designed to disabuse the worker of any ideas that these administrative vestiges of bureaucracy were important:

You'll get about a page of printed explanation of what you've just heard. We don't have time for any questions today. If you start running into problems, or you have questions, keep notes on them in your desk at the GBO, and when you've had enough experience to make them into intelligent questions--in about a week--we'll see to it that somebody comes to you to talk about them. Right now, that's all for administrative details.<sup>50</sup>

This was the nature of the GBO representative's introduction to the program. Chosen as people who were known for criticism of bureaucratic policies, red-tape, and procedural run-around, the orientation had the goal of jarring them out of any habits they may have acquired through experiences in their communities or as employees of bureaucratic agencies. The tough talk by high officials was designed to prove to the skeptics, and they all were, that the clout of the Governor's Office was in fact behind them, and that their task was to get results. This orientation was also reinforced by the operational principles of the GBO's which are described in the next section.

## Operating Principles Rather than Procedures

The GBO representatives operated without files, without typewriters, without notebooks, case records or any of the administrative paraphernalia which is associated with modern organizations. The offices themselves were located in storefronts. They were equipped with nondescript, used furniture in order to give an unpretentious, stripped-down impression.<sup>51</sup>

Four people were assigned to each office allowing for overlapping shifts of two workers. Two shifts allowed the GBO's to be open for long hours, typically 7:30 A.M. to 10:00 P.M. (later reduced to 8:30 P.M.)--longer if there was work to be done, visitors in the office, or tension in the community. One worker was always in the office. The other was free to accompany visitors to agencies, attend to transportation, visit in the neighborhood, perform outreach functions, or to attend to other outside details of local operations.

The operating procedures, or the lack of them, established by the GBO's were also intended to place primary focus of the worker on his advocacy function. As a matter of design, the usual bureaucratic characteristics of detailed rules, explicit duties and authority, written records, precedent routine and uniformity of actions were honored in the breach rather than the observance. Several times, the researcher was present in training sessions when local GBO representatives asked for guidance about particular GBO guidelines or certain challenges to policy or procedure of other agencies. When the question probed to determine the limits of advocacy behavior, the GBO

Coordinator's response was always to the effect that the worker must continue any action which could reasonably get a successful response to a citizen's demand, but that "If you are caught, I'll deny that I ever said so and back you to the hilt otherwise."

Instruction and knowledge of the procedural guidelines upon which the representatives were to act was accomplished through training sessions, contact with other GBO workers, and the telephone supervision concept mentioned above. On some occasions, written material was sent to the local workers. They were instructed that after reading this material, to throw it away. Only a few items of instructional material were to be retained.

The full extent of the "paperwork" of the GBO representative was a 5" by 8" "Problem Card" which was completed for each visitor. All problem cards were mailed to the Central Coordinator's Office in Harrisburg at the end of each day. There was also a "referral card" and a "complaint card" which visitors were asked to mail directly to the Governor after indicating any information they wished to have forwarded to the state capitol. This is all the paperwork which was asked of, and which was available to, the GBO representative. Even this was removed by visitors or the mailman at the end of the day. The remainder of the work of the Governor's representatives was in helping people. (Appendix II contains reproductions of these cards.)

When a citizen (called "visitors" not "clients") presented a request to a GBO representative, he or she was asked to write the problem on a problem card, or the GBO representative would write it-- whichever procedure seemed most comfortable to the visitor. There were

strict instructions that "the problem, stated by the visitor, is to be recorded on the card, with no additions by the representatives."<sup>52</sup> This procedure was designed to assure anyone else who worked on the problem (e.g., the Coordinator's Office or the Council on Human Services) that the problem as conceived by the visitor, not a restatement by a worker, would be foremost at all times. From this information, the worker then made the "Initial Action Decision"<sup>53</sup> (1) to refer the visitor to a community agency, (2) to forward responsibility for action to Harrisburg, or (3) to handle the problem within the local GBO (a non-referral).

Referrals were made to other local agencies if the visitor had a problem or request which could be handled by a local agency. The GBO representative typically called the agency to make arrangements for the visitor, often would accompany the visitor to the agency, provided transportation or other facilitative aid as appropriate, and gave the visitor one of the referral post-cards. The referral post-card was an "order" from the GBO, it contained the Governor's request for service to be delivered, the seal of the state and Governor Shafer's signature. The referral agency's name was written in by the GBO representative. The worker at the agency was under orders to sign the card and return it to the visitor. Spaces were provided for the visitor to indicate the nature of treatment received from the agency. The visitor was then asked to place the card, which was stamped and addressed to Governor Shafer, in the nearest mailbox. This procedure was designed to provide service access for the visitor and to put the agency on notice that the Governor expected a responsive result. If

visitors reported problems in securing service to the local GBO, additional follow-up either locally or centrally was undertaken.

The criteria for local representatives to call upon additional help from the capitol in Harrisburg were that: (1) the local GBO had determined that local agencies were unresponsive to the activity of the local GBO, and "all local authority levels have been exhausted and no resolution achieved,"<sup>54</sup> (2) the visitor was "grossly abused by a government or private service or enforcement agency or has been directly subjected to discriminatory practices,"<sup>55</sup> (3) the problem could not be solved because of existing policy which must be waived or changed, (4) no service exists in the community, or (5) the GBO worker was uncertain on how to proceed. (In all cases, the representative filled out a problem card, and would usually call Harrisburg while the visitor was present.)<sup>56</sup> The GBO representative would typically make any calls necessary to supply the information or advice in the presence of the visitor. In addition, prepaid, addressed postcards to Governor Shafer were available for people to write directly to the Governor.

Thus the GBO's were constructed to be an authoritative, anti-bureaucratic "gatekeeper" to the structures of the political system. Before proceeding to the data on the activities of the GBO's, however, it is appropriate to first consider the factors involved in deciding the access point (gate) upon which to place demands for they contain any implicit process-model of the dynamics of political responsiveness.

## GBO Interactions with "The System": Gatekeeping and the Prerequisites for Access and Responsiveness

The analysis of the Governor's Branch Office program as a dialectical organization is interesting and worthwhile in its own right. For present purposes, however, this chapter serves to establish a basis for analysis of the activities of the GBO's as an authoritative political actor which was capable of providing access to and stimulating the responsiveness of community structures for certain disadvantaged individuals and interests. The people who designed the GBO program were aware that the GBO's would have to command the attentive interest of community structures if they were to be able to get the socio-political structures of the system to respond to the people who brought their demands to the Governor's representatives. And if the GBO's were to identify trouble spots in the structures of the polity in order to precipitate changes in law, policy, program, or procedure, they also required access to the policy arenas of the polity.

Early in the planning stages of the GBO's it was determined that the ordinary structures of the polity could not be model for the new program. It was assumed that a large portion of the problems with which the GBO's were to deal emanated in part from existing forms of socio-political structures. The initial attack, therefore, was on orientation, structure and authority with an emphasis on simplicity and directness. Once these decisions had been made, other decisions on location, staffing procedures, and even furnishings for the offices followed. The result was a program wherein almost every feature was designed to be the opposite of the usual bureaucratic organization.

Thus, the first radical challenge to the system was the establishment of the GBO's an authoritative gatekeeper to "the system." The second challenge was the organization and manner of operation of the GBO's which was essentially conflict-oriented with an emphasis on results rather than on procedures. The instructions of the Governor to the GBO's that they must range the boundaries of the political systems in search of the appropriate resources to resolve the latent demands of disadvantaged individuals placed them athwart the boundaries of the political system. The GBO's were, therefore, in a position to place demands on a wide variety of organizations and agencies. The decision on where and how to place a demand on "the system" was highly complex and constitutes perhaps the most critical aspect of GBO activity.

#### Gatekeeping Decisions and the System

The needs, problems and complaints presented by citizens were latent demands on the political system. The conversion of these "wants" into demands involved decisions by the Governor's representatives on the nature of the demand, determination of where and how to place the demand on the system, and the arena of action which would most likely lead to a responsive result. Consequently, the perception and definition of the demand by the GBO representative, and the subsequent strategy of action constituted a critical boundary function (gatekeeping) in the political system. This situation existed in polity under consideration because, as explained earlier, the sub-systems for value allocation are not structured hierarchically; responsibility is typically divided among a variety of sub-systems,



structures, sectors, and levels. It is suggested that in such a situation gatekeeping involves not only the determination of whether a demand should be admitted into the system but also where and in what direction it should be injected. In fact, consideration of the acts of the GBO's reveals that they addressed the gatekeeping function in a dual manner which corresponds to the "two faces of power" as outlined by Bachrach and Baratz.<sup>57</sup> From the citizen perspective, one "face of gatekeeping" is the decision to admit or deny entry for a demand-- what has been called "access" to politics. From the system perspective, another "face of gatekeeping" is what might be called "demand management" or selection of the point of access with a view to precipitating responsive action. There were four calculations of demand management/ access which were made by the GBO representatives in determining where and how to place a demand on the polity.

One gatekeeping decision involved a decision as to which of the community value sub-systems upon which to place the demand. A large percentage of the problems brought to the GBO's presented a situation where the demand might well be placed on a variety of alternative sub-systems. Take, for example, the complaint of a citizen that her apartment was rat-infested and she could not afford to move her family to higher-quality housing. This latent demand could be defined as the domain of at least four different community value sub-systems:

- (1) Housing--i.e., locating new housing at a similar cost to the rat-infested apartment, or getting the landlord to take care of the problem;
- (2) Public Health--i.e., vector control for the apartment, or perhaps the entire neighborhood;

(3) Income Maintenance--i.e., securing additional income in order to allow the individual to move (assuming suitable alternative housing was available); or

(4) Legal--i.e., court action if there was violation of a lease or law.

Secondly, each community sub-system presented an array or "set" of organizations among which responsibility for action is dispersed. A calculation as to the most appropriate structure or agency jurisdiction to which to assign responsibility was required. Alternatives typically include the public, voluntary and private sectors as well as national, state, and local levels in each sector. (Public, for example, might involve federal, state, county, local government, boards, authorities, or commissions.) To continue with the housing example above, the following are but some of the alternative organizational jurisdictions which exist in each of the sub-systems in the polity under consideration:

(1) Housing: a public housing authority, private rental agent, or direct contact with landlords by the GBO representative;

(2) Public Health: a state public health department, a local public health agency, a community action program vector control project, or a private exterminator;

(3) Income Maintenance: public rent supplements, private charities, FHA or other publicly supported loans, state public assistance, or perhaps job retraining or placement from public or private sources.

(4) Legal: action by a state or local code enforcement agency, legal action by private lawyers or publicly supported legal aid, or legal advocacy by the GBO representative.

The range of alternatives in this second area varied from locality to locality, and according to the particular need and situation of the people who presented latent demands. Thus, unlike a typical

street-level bureaucrat whose job requires only the knowledge and application of the entry and processing criteria for one particular agency, the GBO representatives needed to be familiar with a wide variety of jurisdictional structures, their capabilities and criteria for service delivery.

A third aspect of the gatekeeping strategy involved the arena of the political system into which to inject the demand: this decision is reflected in the three types of citizen's advocacy. Case advocacy in the above example would involve securing the allocation of a community value to which the person was entitled such as public housing, public code enforcement, or the services of a public health department. Class advocacy would involve seeking special rules or waivers such as might be required to get admitted into public housing if the citizen were on the borderline of eligibility, or getting priority service from a code enforcement or public health agency. Legal advocacy, in addition to the possibility of securing the services of a lawyer, could involve direct intervention by the GBO representative with landlords or service agencies in order to secure favorable interpretations of law, policy, or regulation where the agency use of discretion was not responsive to the needs of the citizen. Thus, it can be seen that the Governor's representatives undertook the task of negotiating the entire network of the political system on behalf of individuals; this phenomenon represents quite a different function from that of staff of street-level bureaucracies.

A final calculation required of the GBO representative relates to the capability of "the system" to generate a responsive

result. In particular, the choice of strategy for resolving a latent demand involved knowledge as to which sub-system and its set of agencies or organizations had resources available (or which could be diverted through GBO intervention) to meet the demand, whether the individual was eligible to receive the services, and whether the GBO itself had the power or authority to provide access and precipitate a responsive result. The fact that the GBO's relied to a large part on state agencies is most likely reflective of the reality that, as instruments of the Governor's Office, they had comparatively direct authority only over state agencies.

Consideration of the possible permutations and combinations of these variables makes it clear that even at the most micro-level of action, the political system was highly polycentric, that the system at any point consisted of a complex array of simultaneous games each of which changed from moment to moment, and wherein a move in one had the potential of being a move in and being affected by others. The data which is presented in the following two chapters will show that the GBO's provided a channel of demand for disadvantaged individuals to a spectrum of community value sub-systems, at several levels of the polity, and that they stimulated increased responsiveness of a wide variety of agencies and organizations for disadvantaged individuals. Thus, the Governor's representatives calculated intuitively the prerequisites for access and responsiveness for each demand which they placed on the structures of the political system.

## Documenting the Prerequisites for Access and Responsiveness

The GBO's were imbued with the authority of the Governor's Office and were directed to receive the latent demands of poor, and in particular black, people in order to assure their access to "the system" and to seek to precipitate a responsive resolution of the demands. The role of the GBO's, their authority, and their relationship to community structures was such that an order or request from a GBO can be seen as sufficient to establish the "attentive interest" of the organization or agency in question. That is, the voicing of the latent demand of a citizen by the GBO's with the intent that action occur toward meeting the demand is an act of access. Thus, an order or communication by the GBO's to an organization or agency in the community on behalf of a citizen is, for analytic purposes, an act of access. Documentary evidence on (1) individual latent demands, and (2) the subsequent action of the GBO's toward meeting the demands are "facts" of access for which data was available and is presented below. It also follows that the aggregation of such information into analytic categories, or classes, can be used to characterize the volume, nature, levels, and types of access provided by the Governor's Branch Offices; thus, a basis is provided for documenting the activity of the GBO's in providing a wide variety of access to the structures of the polity for disadvantaged individuals in the ghetto neighborhoods in Pennsylvania.

The responsiveness of community structures to the demands of the Governor's Branch Offices, however, was, and shall remain, a controversial issue. Administrators and executives of various

agencies pointed to the volume of people whom they received from the GBO's and the special procedures and modes of treatment which were instituted as evidence of the responsiveness of their organization to the demands of the GBO's. The GBO's replied with assertions that rates of resolution were not high enough (i.e., there may have been an increase in responsive processing but not enough successful results). The bureaucracies responded with pleas of inadequate resources, constraints in law and policy, high workloads and difficult job situations, and contradictory public and political pressures. The GBO's, in turn, countered that the bureaucracies were insensitive, unprepared to work with ghetto residents, incompetent, resistant to change, and racist. This dialectic continued throughout the history of the GBO's and was manifest in action and reaction on the individual and system change levels of action.

Information was available to satisfy the first five prerequisites for the measurement of responsiveness: (1) the access point, (2) the nature of the demands, (3) the nature of the gatekeepers, (4) the commitment of resources, and (5) the strategy and route chosen. While further documentation of responsiveness of the community organizations presented the challenge of each being a separate research project in itself, information on the remaining five prerequisites for the measurement of responsiveness was, in principle, available: (6) timing of the demand in relation to other "games" of the moment, (7) the reactions, positive or negative, or other actors which were involved, (8) the number and complexity of interactions, (9) the time-in-process for each of the various demands,

and, (10) the ultimate resolution of the demand. The ideology of the people who commanded the GBO program, however, intervened to prevent the systematic accumulation of information on the last five factors of responsiveness. Specifically, the decisions that no formal evaluation would be made and that there were to be no detailed case records of local-level activity (as discussed in earlier chapters) precluded the systematic acquisition of such information.

There is, however, sufficient information on several aspects of the program (in particular, documentary material on several "system change" actions, and complete case-records on some of the most difficult individual-level demands) to provide a basis for inferences about the probable responsiveness which was precipitated by the GBO's. Thus, in the discussion which follows access and responsiveness are not entirely distinct, rather the activity of the GBO's on behalf of disadvantaged people will be presented in terms of the three types of citizen's advocacy--case advocacy, class advocacy and legal advocacy--each of which involves acts of access and responsiveness. Where data is available which allows responsiveness to be documented separately it will be presented in order to provide a quantified formative picture of this concept as separate from access.

The following chapter will discuss the nature of the demands placed on the system by the GBO's for individuals. The overall volume and type of access will be explicated and the responsiveness of various political sub-systems and the agencies within them will be documented. This analysis of the citizen's advocacy activity

of the GBO's on behalf of individuals will be followed by a chapter detailing some of the efforts of the GBO's to precipitate changes within the system on behalf of interests. What emerges is a picture of a formalized citizen's advocate, the Governor's Branch Offices, which provided effective access for a large number of disadvantaged individuals to a wide variety of community structures at several levels of the political system. The response of community structures to these two levels of citizen's advocacy was not uniform. Rather, as might be expected in a polycentric polity, there was variation in responsiveness from structure to structure, and from problem to problem. While definitive data of a quantitative nature is not available to evaluate system responsiveness in all of the various arenas, there is adequate information at hand to suggest that the Governor's Branch Offices were indeed able to precipitate higher levels of access and higher levels of responsiveness of community structures for the people whose demands they represented than these people had heretofore experienced.



## Chapter 4: Notes

<sup>1</sup>See, for example: Orion F. White, Jr., "The Dialectical Organization: An Alternative to Bureaucracy," Public Administration Review, (January, 1969), pp. 32-49. Also, Robert K. Merton, "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality," in R.K. Merton, Reader in Bureaucracy, (New York: The Free Press, 1952), pp. 361-371; Alvin W. Gouldner, "Red Tape as a Social Problem," in Merton, ibid., pp. 410-418; William Howton, Functionaries, (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971); and Daniel Goldrich and Joseph A. Kremers, From the Corporate State, Through Vietnam to the Developmental Community, American Political Science Association, (paper presented to the 1972 Annual Meeting), pp. 21-22. In addition, Gideon Sjoberg, et.al., "Bureaucracy and the Lower Class," Sociology and Social Research, (April, 1966), pp. 325-337, discusses the relationships of bureaucracy to lower-class people and the concomitant reinforcement of societal class-status relationships. Some of the pressures on bureaucracies which contribute to these conditions are discussed in Michael Lipsky, "Street-Level Bureaucracy and the Analysis of Urban Reform," and in Steven A. Waldhorn, "Pathological Bureaucracies," both of which are reprinted in Virginia B. Ermer and John H. Strange, Blacks and Bureaucracy, (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1972), pp. 171-184, and pp. 184-191. Michael Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 195ff, discusses the "vicious circle" in organizations which tends toward "stable rigidity" and resistance to change with resulting unresponsiveness to clients or external political leadership. See also, Martin King Whyte, "Bureaucracy and Modernization in China: The Maoist Critique," ASR, Vol. 3802, (April 1, 1973), pp. 149-153.

<sup>2</sup>The Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, op.cit., p. 114.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., pp. 159-160. None of the Pennsylvania events were classified as "disorders" or "riots" by The Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence (see Note 6 below).

<sup>4</sup>One informant reported that the commissioner of the state police had stated that he and the state police "could take care of anything those people could do." This fact was related as part of a statement that confrontation of the issues raised by the GBO's led to change in orientation, even in one of the more law and order members of the cabinet. Almost a year later, upon returning from the site of disturbances in Pittsburgh on the night Martin Luther King was assassinated, the commissioner is reported to have admitted this fact in a cabinet meeting. He then pointed to each human service cabinet member indicating their responsibility--"you to get jobs, you housing, you end discrimination, you economic development, etc."

These facts were also documented by an internal memo of the GBO Coordinator's Office which indicated that "Col. McKetta, by his current attitude, is recognizing that the police are a symbolization of white power," and also that this change in attitude had been demonstrated in behavior, for the memo also noted that "the police and national guard action in Pittsburgh was to use the minimum amount of force required." Source: Memorandum, F. Clinton McKay to Dr. Thomas W. Georges, Jr., "Agreement between the Governor's Action and the Kerner Report," (April 19, 1968).

<sup>5</sup>Harrisburg Patriot News, (July 1, 1967), Rosen had been Secretary of Public Welfare under the previous Governor, William Scranton, and his replacement does not necessarily reflect on his capacity to head up the department. In fact, Governor Shafer later had occasion to call upon this man to head a joint Executive-Legislative Task Force to consider the establishment of a unified department for all human services in the state.

<sup>6</sup>GBO Archive: Various memoranda from the GBO archives regarding cities with "tension areas," (July 1967). Information on incidents and riots was obtained from: Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence, Civil Disorder Data Clearinghouse, Brandeis University, Waltham, Mass., "U.S. Race-Related Civil Disorders, January-June, 1969" (mimeo) also a content analysis of three Pennsylvania city newspapers.

<sup>7</sup>Harrisburg Patriot News, (July 14, 1967).

<sup>8</sup>GBO Archive: From an extensive series of memoirs of a key participant in the events. Beginning on Tuesday, July 25 (the first day Detroit began to burn), these documents provided a detailed chronicle of meetings, decisions, assignments, etc., through August 15, 1967.

<sup>9</sup>The usual "civil emergency" plan of states and cities is centered around the police and national guard. It typically concerns the mobilization and application of the "legitimate force" of government. The police and national guard organize, select strategies and direct the response. Human services serve ancillary functions, primarily after an incident. Such was the case before the events immediately preceding the establishment of the GBO's. The approach of policy-makers in Pennsylvania in July 1967, reversed the order of priority, placing primary emphasis on social and economic factors and human services--the para-military functions of the state were ancillary and subordinate.

The plan went so far as to have separate civilian "state-to-cities" liaison officers (most of whom were cabinet-level officials) and lawyers (most of whom were appointed Deputy or Assistant Attorneys General) who were assigned to work with local governmental

officials and police departments. These "Governor's personal representatives" would also be the principal communications link for orders between the Governor and the police and national guard in the field. Source: Pennsylvania State Police, Special Order 67-110, August 3, 1967; and memoirs of a key participant, op.cit., as well as several interviews and other documentary evidence from the GBO Archive.

<sup>10</sup>GBO Archive: Several documents, including a "Draft Proclamation," which constituted the civil disorder plan, (July, 1967).

<sup>11</sup>See studies on the number and extent of violence in the Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, op.cit.; and Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence, Riot Data Report, all issues.

<sup>12</sup>See Note 1, above.

<sup>13</sup>Harold L. Wilensky, Organizational Intelligence, (New York: Basic Books, 1967), p. 76.

<sup>14</sup>Nor did the people who prepared this plan, and who designed the GBO's identify themselves as bureaucrats. If any appellation is to be attached to them, they would most likely be labelled liberal social reformers and social and behavioral scientists. Most of them were new to governmental bureaucracy; they were part of the wave of new people who flooded government in the mid-1960's to wage the "War on Poverty." Their characteristic thinking can perhaps best be described as liberal with a desire to be radical. Their interest was not so much to defend and maintain "the system," but to attack and change it. For example, Dr. Georges is now a professor at Temple University, Mr. Herbert Winston, the first GBO Coordinator, is Asst. Dean of the Temple School of Social Work. The Executive Deputy Secretary of Public Welfare, Mr. Norman Lourie, is a well-known figure and innovator in the field of social work both nationally and internationally. Mr. Robert K. Leighty, Director of the Office of Planning and Research, was a community organizer and was known for his work with the Greater Chester Movement, a grassroots organization in Chester, Pa. Mr. Tom Joe, was an independent consultant working for the Department at the time, is now an Undersecretary of HEW in Washington, D.C. Dr. William W. Vosburgh was, and is, a Professor of Social Research at the Bryn Mawr Graduate School of Social Work and Social Research. Dr. Joseph Adlestein, psychiatrist, was Deputy Secretary of Mental Health and Mental Retardation--actively involved and committed to the GBO's, he is known for his development of one of the first decentralized, statewide Community Mental Health programs in the U.S.--which is in its own right a program of structural change aimed at community-level responsiveness. Mr. Steve Brody, and Mr. Elias Cohen both held high positions in the Department of Public Welfare, were active in the establishment of the GBO's, are now

professors at the University of Pennsylvania, School of Community Medicine. Mr. Robert K. Rosenberg, then a recent graduate of the School of Social Work at Bryn Mawr, is now legislative staff in California--he continues his citizen's advocacy activity through legislative casework. Mr. Carlos Baldini and Mr. Samuel Fresa were caseworkers for the Department and have since become the head of a voluntary health and welfare council and executive director of a County Board of Assistance respectively. Mr. John Jones, Mr. William Conway, and Mr. William Overton were in the central office of the Department at the time, and remain there in higher positions. There were others involved in the planning and implementation of the GBO's. Of all of them, only the last three mentioned above, and Mr. Norman Lourie, remain in the Department of Public Welfare. Thus it seems accurate to characterize these people as generally not being bureaucrats either in their prior experience or subsequent career choices.

<sup>15</sup> Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967), p. 107ff.

<sup>16</sup> See, for example, Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron B. Wildavsky, Implementation, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1973); John C. Donovan, The Policy Makers, (New York: Pegasus, 1970); and Ira Sharkansky, The Routines of Politics, (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, Co., 1970), which provide some recent discussions of policy-making and implementation in the U.S. during the period under consideration.

<sup>17</sup> Governor Raymond Shafer, speech, (July 26, 1967).

<sup>18</sup> GBO Archive: "Civil Disorder Timetable" (Undated but covering the events under consideration here).

<sup>19</sup> Mr. William Nagel, interview.

<sup>20</sup> Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Governor's Office, Executive Directive No. 35, (July 31, 1967). See Appendix II for the full text of this document.

<sup>21</sup> Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Public Welfare, Bulletin No. 668 to all office, bureau and division heads, institutional superintendents, county, regional and district offices, (July 31, 1967).

<sup>22</sup> Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Labor and Industry, BES Bulletin #1295 (August 1, 1967). This directive was a rather extensive document which established new procedures, criteria for intake and processing, special forms, etc. for the use of local offices.

<sup>23</sup>"Cooling mechanisms" are discussed by Erving Goffman, "On Cooling the Mark Out," in Warren G. Bennis, et.al., Interpersonal Dynamics, (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1964), pp. 417-430. "Manipulation" as a form of power is discussed by Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, Power and Poverty, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970).

<sup>24</sup>Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Catalog of State Services of Individuals, Bureau of Economic Opportunity, (1968), p. 100.1, has as its first entry the following: "Program: Governor's Branch Offices. Legal Authority: Executive Directive No. 35, (July 31, 1967), Administrative Agency: Governor's Office." (See Appendix II for full details of this listing.)

<sup>25</sup>Weber notes, in "The Sociology of Charismatic Authority," that leadership in times of "psychic, physical, economic, ethical, religious, political distress . . ." has a charismatic foundation. (Gerth and Mills, From Max Weber, [New York: Oxford University Press, 1958], p. 245.) While Weber generally seems to characterize charisma as attached to individuals, he frequently refers to its ability to be passed to groups and organizations--as in religious organizations or value-oriented movements. It is suggested that such is the probable phenomenon relative to the GBO workers and their infatuation with their program. Moreover, it is also conceivable in this age of the corporate individual that such an "individual" might well be the object of charisma. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 361, 366-367, 369.

<sup>26</sup>For example, a memorandum of September 18, 1967 from Dr. Georges to The Honorable Joseph J. Kelley, Jr., Secretary to the Governor, stated: "The Governor's Branch Offices are a year-round operation. There has never been any suggestion that they are temporary. The most recent office, at 431 West Girard Avenue in Philadelphia, was opened on September 5th. This is certainly not indicative of a summer program. . . . The Offices, which were opened with the aid of personnel temporarily assigned from other agencies, are now being staffed with their own assigned personnel selected from appropriate job classes. All positions in the Branch Offices are under the merit system--and therefore non-partisan in nature."

Soon after this letter was written, on October 4, 1967, a meeting between Dr. Georges, Mr. Nagel, Mr. McKay, and others decided that "the Governor's Branch Offices will concentrate on the lower 20% of the economic need group, concentrate on discrimination at any level of economic need, and concentrate on problems of state human services systems and other human services systems . . ." The minutes of the same meeting indicate that a "patterns committee" would meet once a week to determine "system change" (interest advocacy) issues, that most of the GBO representatives had been



formally transferred to the GBO payroll, that several GBO's should be relocated, that the establishment of permanent outside signs for the GBO's was approved, and other activities related to continued hiring, development of statistical reports, etc. All of these actions indicate that the decisions and actions of key actors supported consolidation and institutionalization of the GBO's. (Minutes: Meeting of October 4, 1967, from the GBO Archive.)

<sup>27</sup>Weber, (1947), op.cit., p. 363; also Edward Shils, "Charisma, Order, and Status," ASR, Vol. 30, (April 1, 1965), pp. 199-213.

<sup>28</sup>GBO Archive: Memorandum from the GBO Coordinator's file, (undated, circa. Fall 1967).

<sup>29</sup>This statement is not to assert that the authority of the GBO's was unlimited. Banfield speaks of limiting factors on a political machine as emanating from several sources including its more informal character, and the highly diverse nature of the polity with multiple, competing jurisdictions, and occasionally resistant or maverick individuals. The GBO's too were subject to such factors which tended to circumscribe their effectiveness. See, Edward Banfield, Political Influence, (New York: The Free Press, 1961).

<sup>30</sup>See also, Elihu Katz and S.N. Eisenstadt, "Some Observations on the Response of Israeli Organization to New Immigrants," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 5, (1960), pp. 113-133.

<sup>31</sup>Michael Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 252-255; Amitai Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations, (New York: The Free Press, 1961), pp. 137-141. The public assistance program in Pennsylvania, for example, had at least five layers between the local worker and the Secretary, and several layers of supervisory and directive staff within each of these layers.

<sup>32</sup>GBO Archive: Governor's Office, Council for Human Services, 1967 Activity Report, (February, 1968).

<sup>33</sup>As mentioned in Chapter 2, the courts deal primarily with process. Substantive law and adjudication have traditionally come under the aegis of administrative structures themselves. See, Peter Woll, American Bureaucracy, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1963), Ch. 3, for a discussion of this issue.

<sup>34</sup>In the last year of the program, supervisory personnel were designated. This occurred partly because the merit system was based on ranks as a means for higher salaries and promotions, and partly

because of the larger percentage of neighborhood people in the program required training and other types of help in the more immediate proximity. The role of these supervisors was more of a local coordinator, rather than a director or manager in the usual sense.

<sup>35</sup> GBO Archive: "Review of GBO Program," (February 20, 1968). The data on actions taken was extracted from various other documents in the GBO documentary archive.

<sup>36</sup> Shafer, op.cit., (July 25, 1967).

<sup>37</sup> William W. Vosburgh and Drew Hyman, "Advocacy and Bureaucracy," Administrative Science Quarterly, (Winter 1974), pp. 433-448, suggest that the decision to lodge the program within state government was made on several grounds: legitimacy--the ability to mobilize authority quickly; knowledge--mastery of the technicalities of welfare-state service agencies; reform--a desire to re-educate persons within the bureaucratic structures; and exigencies--available funding, staff, appointment of the black cabinet member, Dr. Georges, to Public Welfare, and the availability of the group of unbureaucratized social planners mentioned above.

<sup>38</sup> It should be noted that there was disagreement between several factions of planners over what the "radical program" would be. In particular, one group which coalesced around social work interests desired the creation of a multi-service intake mechanism for all human services--such an instrument would give them control over significant aspects of case direction and management of other programs--i.e., mental health and health. The other group, associated with Dr. Georges, wanted to and did, maintain the GBO's as an advocacy organization external to the several service networks.

<sup>39</sup> Frank M. Lowenberg, "Social Workers and Indigenous Nonprofessionals: Some Structural Dilemmas," Social Work, Vol. 13, (July 1966), pp. 65-71, discusses some of the issues and the use of neighborhood residents in service programs.

<sup>40</sup> GBO Archive: Source--Paragraph extracted from personnel files of the GBO's.

<sup>41</sup> GBO Archive: Memorandum, "Position Classification: Governor's Branch Office Representatives," (November 10, 1970). These criteria were not found by the "merit" system to warrant a separate classification series. The principles they present, however, represent the criteria used by the classification their qualifications would warrant.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> GBO Archive: Source--data extracted from personnel files of the GBO's.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> Raymond Shafer, Speech to GBO representatives, (August 15, 1967), italics added.

<sup>47</sup> Dr. Joseph Adlestein was then the Deputy Secretary for Mental Health and Mental Retardation. He had been brought into state government to dismantle the old custodial mental health system and to establish a new comprehensive community mental health and retardation program. The information herein on training was related, in part, by Dr. Adlestein in an interview. This information was independently corroborated by several other informants, and by documentary evidence, portions of which are cited herein.

<sup>48</sup> GBO Archive: "Action and Conceptual Outline for GBO Worker's Orientation Session," (mimeo-undated).

<sup>49</sup>Ibid.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid. An indicator that this orientation statement was successful is attested to by the fact that the workers refused to supply a few items of demographic information even though the original problem card instructed them: "The following information would be useful, but do not question the visitor to get it. If it comes out of the discussion of his problem and you remember it, then use it." (Data requested included marital status, employment status, race, sex, age, size of family.) When in the course of technical assistance to the GBO's, the researcher suggested that this information might be extremely useful in future planning and in evaluating the response of agencies to GBO referrals, one assistant coordinator responded, "Down in the Ghetto, this is exactly the kind of jive I'm always up against. It turns me off. It's just like all the other places and we can't have it here or nobody'll come in." His view prevailed.

<sup>51</sup> In one case a GBO was located in a former real-estate office. This office was described in the evaluation of GBO locations discussed above as "too plush," giving rise to considerations of relocation.



<sup>52</sup>GBO Archive: Memorandum, F. Clinton McKay, Coordinator, to all GBO's, (August 8, 1968).

<sup>53</sup>GBO Archive: "Criteria for Processing GBO Cases--Local GBO Procedures and Decision Criteria," (mimeo--undated).

<sup>54</sup>Ibid.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid.

<sup>57</sup>Bachrach, op.cit.

## CHAPTER 5: CITIZEN'S ADVOCACY FOR INDIVIDUALS

To this point the focus has been on certain problematic aspects of the modern polity. In particular, inherent structural problems arising from trends toward publicization and bureaucratization of many areas of community life have been pinpointed. The urban violence in the United States in the late 1960's has been cited as one possible outcome of structural barriers to political access and responsiveness; a general decline in support and efficacy in the broader polity is another. Earlier chapters suggested that one response to these trends is a search for access and responsiveness mechanisms. The widespread development of citizen's advocacy programs is cited as a noteworthy thrust in this direction.

The previous chapter described the development and operation of one particular experiment in citizen's advocacy--the Pennsylvania Governor's Branch Offices (GBO's). The GBO's were described as a dialectical organization which was designed to counter some of the problematic aspects of the polity. This chapter, and the next, will present data on several dimensions of GBO activity in order to explicate how this citizen's advocate provided a channel of demand on the political systems of Pennsylvania. During these discussions it is important to keep the broader events in perspective, and in particular to bear in mind that the present objective is to explore certain dimensions of how the citizen's advocate did, or did not,

provide access to the political system, and whether it developed the capability to precipitate the responsiveness of socio-political structures for certain individuals (this chapter) and for interests (the following chapter). For these reasons, and in the interest of keeping the paper in manageable proportions, the conflicts which emerged in response to GBO activity are not described in detail. A brief postscript concerning the various dimensions of conflict which the system engaged with the GBO's is included later in order to keep these presentations in perspective.

The next section of this chapter focuses briefly on the overall dimensions of GBO activity. Then analysis turns to consideration of the dynamics at the local level on behalf of individuals:

- (1) attention is focused first on the things the GBO's did themselves,
- (2) and then on the demands the GBO's placed on other structures of the political system. In each of these areas analysis is directed, in turn, to the three types of citizen's advocacy for individuals:
  - (a) individuals who needed rules applied on their behalf;
  - (b) individuals who needed special rules or exceptions to rules;
  - (c) individuals who needed to obtain favorable interpretations of rules (i.e., case, class, and legal advocacy respectively).

Following these sections on local-level citizen's advocacy for individuals, the nature and variety of demands which were escalated to the central level will be explicated. These were demands which could not be resolved by the local-level Governor's representatives. In the final section of this chapter, attention shifts from the GBO's as a channel of access to questions of the responsiveness of the system to the demands of

the GBO's. Three responsiveness variables--response time, citizen satisfaction, and final resolution--will be addressed. The objective in these sections is to explicate the activities of the GBO's (according to the model outlined above) by presenting data on the demands they placed on "the system" on behalf of disadvantaged individuals.

During these discussions it will become apparent that the activities of the Governor's Branch Offices, and the demands they placed on the structures of the polity, were incredibly complex; and that they involved attempts at resolution of a broad range of demands in collaboration (and often in conflict) with a broad range of community sub-systems, and within these a variety of organizations and agencies. Furthermore, throughout their efforts on behalf of individuals, the people who directed the GBO's were constantly on the alert for specific problems in the structure and operation of "the system." Such problems as were identified could take the form of undesirable staff attitudes in a variety of agencies, operational procedures, policies, or even laws which created barriers to resolution of the demands of disadvantaged people. Changes here could affect a broad range of individuals. The following chapter (Chapter 6) is on this latter aspect of GBO activity--the efforts to identify specific areas for what was called "system change" and to precipitate change action; this latter aspect of GBO activity is termed herein "citizen's advocacy on behalf of interests." The final chapter, Chapter 7, and a brief postscript, will return to the broader concerns within which this study is directed, and will place the development of formalized citizen's advocacy programs such as the GBO's in the context of the events and trends outlined earlier.

## Overall GBO Activity

The immediate thrust of the GBO operation is to locate and assign, as quickly as possible, responsibility for responding to the human service needs of the poor within the existing service system, and if necessary, to bring the influence of the Governor's Office to bear on expediting the discharge of that responsibility.

It was not the intent in establishing the GBO's to build a structure of organization based on a preconceived solution to problems. Rather the intent was to establish a streamlined, highly responsive and flexible instrument which could act quickly at all levels to pinpoint problems, evaluate alternative approaches, and generate appropriate action.<sup>1</sup>

--GBO Policy Statement (October 1967)

The most striking fact which emerged from review of the recorded problems and complaints which people brought to the Governor's Branch Offices is that they all represent genuine, albeit varied, demands on the political system. Jobs, housing, financial aid, health and social services were mainstay problems. Getting streets cleaned, garbage picked up, rat control, housing inspections, applications for student loans, stays of eviction, investigation of late or lost paychecks, bites from police dogs, corrections of poorly fit protheses, transportation to medical services and copies of proposed legislation were all legitimate types of demands which were addressed regularly by the GBO's. Data on the volume and types of demands brought to the GBO's was archived and tabulated periodically by the Office of Planning and Research. This information describes quantitatively the parameters of access which the GBO's provided for individuals. Tables 6 and 7 summarize the dimensions of overall GBO demands on "the system" which will be explicated in the remainder of this chapter. This information confirms several observations about the character of

citizen's advocacy which emerged from participant observation, document and file analyses, and interviews.

Table 6: GBO Access Levels--Four-Year Totals

	N	%
Local-Level GBO	67,406	86.3%
Central-Level GBO	10,633	13.7
Totals:	78,039*	100.0

\*Not withstanding duplication, this volume of demands would be equivalent to one out of every 2.5 black Pennsylvania households, or one out of every six black individuals.<sup>2</sup>

First of all, Table 6 depicts the relative proportion of local and central levels of action for the four-year period. It shows that most of the citizen demands were handled at the local level, but that a considerable number required escalation to the Governor's Office in order for effective access to occur. The next two sections of this chapter discuss the character of GBO activity on these two levels.

Secondly, within the overall totals there was considerable variation in the types of citizen's advocacy required to provide effective access and the community structures upon which demands were placed. Table 7 depicts the three types of citizen's advocacy and the relative proportion of demands which were placed on various community value sub-systems. It provides, in effect, a quantitative overview of the variation in citizen's advocacy according to community value sub-system. The following section considers the character and

handling of these demands by the GBO's and explicates by case example the varied patterns of access in the polycentric political system. This data documents the potential of an external citizen's advocate to intervene in the political system on behalf of individuals.

Table 7: Citizen's Advocacy Activity of the GBO's by Type of Advocacy & Community Sub-System (August 1, 1967-July 3, 1971)<sup>3</sup>

Community Value Sub-System	N	Column Total	Type of Advocacy			Row Total
			Case	Class	Legal	
Employment	20,858	26.7%	97%	1%	2%	100%
Housing	12,162	15.6	73	8	19	100
Financial	12,932	16.6	93	0	7	100
Medical	1,175	1.5	86	13	1	100
Police/Legal	4,918	6.3	27	2	71	100
Education	786	1.0	75	4	21	100
Community Health	1,361	1.7	0	100	0	100
Complaints	4,648	6.0	76	21	3	100
Family or Marital	764	1.0	100	0	0	100
General	18,435	23.6	100	0	0	100
Total: 78,039		100.0%				

Source: GBO Archive--derived from statistics in the monthly Summary Report on GBO Activities, (August 1, 1967-July 3, 1971).

#### The Study Sample

The only quantitative data kept by the GBO's was that on numbers and types of problems from which the parameters of GBO activity described above were drawn. Reasons for this have been discussed elsewhere. Thus there was no systematic information in the archive

on agency of referral, follow-up and resolution. Furthermore, the typology of citizen's advocacy was not developed until after most of the data on the GBO's had been gathered. For these reasons, a study sample was drawn from the 15,102 problem cards for the period April through December 1970. Information from this study sample provided additional data on the local-level activity of the GBO's, in particular, the manner of handling and referral agencies.<sup>4</sup>

The April through December 1970 time period was chosen for several reasons. First, the problem cards from the early years had either been routinely disposed of or were in storage awaiting disposal and were thus unavailable. Secondly, a general decline in central office handling, and a decline in the proportion of problems which were referred to other agencies for action were observed as trends in the overall data. Third, the aggregate data on the advocacy activity of the GBO's on behalf of individuals suggests that they reached and sustained a higher level of service to the neighborhoods in which they were located in 1970, three years after their establishment, than at any time since the initial crisis period in the summer of 1967. Thus, the study sample was in part intended to provide information on the nature of GBO activity toward the end of the four-year period, and to provide quantitative support for inferences about the institutionalization of the program.

The analysis of data from the sample was designed to explicate local-level GBO demands on the political system along the following dimensions: (1) the proportion of problems which were handled solely by the GBO's compared to those demands which the GBO's



assigned to other agencies for action (to be called "GBO only," and "referrals"); (2) within these two major categories, the three types of citizen's advocacy were identified; (3) and there were further break-downs to identify: (a) the range of community sub-systems upon which the GBO's placed demands, and (b) the range of jurisdictional structures to which the GBO's went for resolution of the demands. These dimensions of GBO activity are discussed next.

### Local-Level GBO Activity

Most of the demands (86.3%) which were placed on the political system by the GBO's were handled at the local level in one of two major ways: the Governor's representatives could take action themselves to resolve the demands, or they could refer the problem to another agency. In this section these two main types of handling will be explicated, and, more specifically, the case, class and legal advocacy in each will be described. In the following analysis, "GBO only" refers to those demands which the GBO's undertook to resolve themselves, and "referrals" is used to identify those demands which the GBO's assigned to other agencies for action.

Table 8: Local-Level Citizen's Advocacy by Action Jurisdiction and Type of Advocacy (in the Study Sample)

Action Jurisdiction	Overall Sample		Type of Advocacy			Row %
	N	%	Case	Class	Legal	
GBO Only	450	44.6%	75.1%	14.7%	10.0%	99.8%
Referrals	556	55.2	84.7	3.8	11.5	100.0
Total:	1006	99.8	80.3	8.6	10.8	
N=1009 (msg data=3)						

As depicted in Table 8, information from the study sample on local-level GBO activity suggests that the majority of the cases involved demands for action by other agencies or organizations in the polity (55.2% of the cases).<sup>5</sup> The records also show that the GBO's came informally to provide a variety of substantive services themselves: direct employment, housing placements, interpreters, transportation, and counseling, for example. This group of cases, labeled "GBO only," represent 44.6% of the cases in the sample. It will be seen in this section that people came to use the GBO's increasingly for situations which required personalized attention, for help where there were gaps in community services, and for advocacy-type interventions with a wide spectrum of organizations.

#### Local-Level "GBO Only"

##### Overview

Table 9 indicates that three-fourths (75.5%) of the "GBO only" demands were for case advocacy, 14.6% were for class advocacy, and 9.4% were for legal advocacy. The nature of citizen demands which constitute each of the types of citizen's advocacy are discussed below. It will become clear that in this group of cases the Governor's Branch Offices interacted directly with citizens and agencies without recourse to the authoritative intervention of other agencies in order to meet the demand of citizens. (Other agencies may have been contacted, but the demand of the citizen was most likely met by the direct action of the GBO itself.)<sup>6</sup>

Table 9: "GBO Only"--Local-Level Handling by Type of Advocacy

Citizen Demand	Type of Advocacy			Row Total
	Case	Class	Legal	
Information Only	40.2%	0.4%	3.6%	44.2%
Advice and Aid	7.1	0.4	1.1	8.6
Opinion	1.1	4.9	0.0	6.0
Transportation	9.6	0.0	0.0	9.6
Direct Service	4.7	0.0	0.0	4.7
Complaint State Public	3.1	3.8	1.3	8.2
Complaint Local Public	1.3	3.6	0.4	5.3
Complaint Private	3.1	0.7	2.2	6.0
Follow-up	3.3	0.4	0.4	4.1
To Harrisburg	2.0	0.4	0.4	2.8
Column Total	75.5	14.6	9.4	99.5 N=450

"GBO Only": Case Advocacy

The majority of case advocacy actions which involved the "GBO's only" consists of personalized services, the provision of alternative services to that provided by bureaucracies, and various forms of advice and aid. Review of the problem cards upon which Table 9 is based reveals first of all that even in the group of cases which were coded "information only," the GBO's provided valuable services to the people in the communities in which they were located (40.2% of the group). For example, the GBO's developed listings on jobs and housing, and in this manner, provided services which are essentially the same as are available through some employment and

housing agencies. Another portion of the "information only" cases involved investigations of lost, missing or delayed paychecks (e.g., unemployment compensation, public assistance or payroll), as well as delayed licenses, scholarships, or applications for various other types of service. Thus the GBO's provided direct steering to available community resources or intervened for citizens where some mix-up or delay in receiving service was at issue.

Also in the "information only" category, the study sample contained cases where visitors were provided advice on eligibility for such programs as veteran's benefits, educational loans, civil service tests, entrance to college, military enlistment, and retirement. Here the Governor's representatives afforded ghetto residents a friendly, personalized environment wherein they could learn of available services, anticipate the process of application which they would encounter in the street-level bureaucracy, and gain a preliminary opinion on the probability of being eligible for the service. At the same time, the GBO worker could inform the person of his rights and entitlements from the agency. Equipped with this knowledge the ghetto resident could approach the street-level bureaucracy prepared to answer questions which would be asked, knowledgeable about what to expect and the probable outcome, and thus more prepared to challenge any inappropriate use of discretion by street-level bureaucrats. Finally, if the particular bureaucracy which the visitor had in mind was inappropriate, the Governor's representative could suggest immediately the alternative resources which would more likely meet the latent demand.<sup>7</sup> Thus the GBO's provided a valuable outreach and entry service to a wide spectrum of community agencies.

The second category listed in Table 9 indicates that about one out of ten "GBO only" cases represents a direct request for personalized advice or aid. Visitors often requested direct help in applying for services at another agency--scholarships, taxes, civil service, etc. The GBO's provided copies of forms for various services--job training, educational loans, grants for housing, and public employment, for example. Most importantly, the Governor's representatives could be called upon to fill out the often complicated applications and to inform the person what additional material--birth certificate, driver's license, wage statements, etc.--would be required in the course of securing a service. In many cases in this category the Governor's representatives provided direct aid in the form of counseling on personal problems or problems with another individual or organization. For example, the sample contained cases where the GBO representatives provided intervention with a school on a problem with a teacher, help with local tax problems, aid in filing a grievance with a labor union, and help with a marital problem. Several times the Governor's representatives were called upon to explain pending legislation to a visitor or to secure copies of legislative bills for them. In this way, the Governor's representatives aided disadvantaged people in coping with some of the perplexing complexities of "the system." (This group of cases represented 7.1% of the "GBO only" case advocacy.)

Transportation was another personalized service which was often provided directly by the GBO's. Since a limited number of state cars were provided, the GBO representatives often used their own cars

or paid for bus or taxi fare from a small petty cash fund. The sample reveals that the situations where transportation was provided to visitors were typically to a doctor, other medical service, or to another referral agency. There were also several cases where the GBO's aided in pickup and delivery of furniture, in moving, or in seeking new housing. The sample also included one case of transportation to a private charitable organization for aid, and two of emergency transportation to a hospital after suicide attempts. (These cases represented 9.6% of the "GBO only" case advocacy.)

The GBO's also provided a variety of direct services in non-routine or personalized situations usually where no program existed in the community, or existing agencies were remote or unresponsive to the demand. The study sample included several consumer problems involving banks and car leasing which were resolved successfully through intervention by the Governor's representative. Many people were placed directly in employment and apprentice programs by the GBO's (a direct placement is considered different from the provision of information from a listing). In several cases a GBO provided emergency food. There were a number of instances where the Governor's representatives provided help with funerals, and in one case actually made the funeral arrangements. Another direct service provided frequently by GBO's was interpreters to accompany visitors to service agencies, the County Board of Assistance or a hospital, for example. Perhaps the most dramatic case in this group involved a weekend suicide attempt by a mental health outpatient. The Governor's representatives first provided transportation to the

emergency ward of the local hospital. The hospital provided medical treatment and then discharged the person refusing to take further responsibility. The psychological clinic where the person was an outpatient was not open, and no one could be contacted. The GBO representatives stayed with the person throughout the weekend and until they were confident that there would not be a second suicide attempt. Thus in approximately one case out of twenty (4.7% of the sample), the Governor's Branch Offices provided a direct service to individuals which was most likely unavailable otherwise.

The remainder of the local-level case advocacy which was coded "GBO only," involved registering opinions (1.1%); complaints about public or private agencies which were handled by the Governor's representatives themselves (7.5%); and follow-up on problems not resolved the first time the visitor came to the GBO (3.3%). The remaining 2.0% were forwarded to the Central Office in Harrisburg and primarily involved problems with paychecks (Vietnam veterans bonus, public assistance, disability insurance), or complaints about discrimination or treatment by a state agency which could not be cleared up to the satisfaction of the local GBO. Thus the record suggests that as case advocates, the GBO's afforded citizens allocations of values where there were gaps in existing services, where individuals could not locate or negotiate the existing network of services, or where the individual's situation required a degree of personalized help which might not be forthcoming from a bureaucracy.

### "GBO Only": Class Advocacy

Class advocacy for individuals constituted 14.6% of the local-level demands which were handled solely by the GBO's. Over half of these cases (8.1% of the "GBO only" total) represented complaints about the policies or procedures of state or local public agencies or organizations in the voluntary or private sectors (complaints about the quality of treatment received were classified as case advocacy). There were a variety of actions taken by the GBO's toward resolution of these problems. Typically, the Governor's representative would contact the agency against which a grievance had been voiced seeking clarification of information about the policy in question, and would then proceed toward securing exceptions for the particular individual, or would try to get the policy itself changed if deemed appropriate by the GBO. Examples of such demands which were contained in the sample include complaints about housing authority maintenance, sanitation policies, and rent change policy of a local housing authority. Other class advocacy cases involved challenges to the hiring-firing policy of a private firm, the food stamp policies of state government, state public assistance regulations, the policy on disconnection of public utilities for nonpayment of bills, and labor union policies on black apprentices.

There was a second group of class advocacy problems also handled by the GBO's themselves (4.9% of the total sample), which involved citizen opinions on legislation-in-progress in Harrisburg. In these cases, the GBO's received the opinion or complaint of the citizen, tried to answer his/her questions or sought answers from



Harrisburg, and then relayed the information to the Governor's Office. The complaints in this group of problems tended to center on specific issues and were often contained within a limited period of time. These blocs of calls can be said to constitute ad hoc interest group inputs to the political system. There were three large groups of these cases in the sample. In May 1970, there was a large number of people who protested cuts in general assistance allowances. In June 1970, there was a group of requests to the GBO Coordinator from people in one area of Pittsburgh for the establishment of a new GBO in their neighborhood. In July 1970, there was a large number of protests against proposed major raises for legislators. This information was forwarded to the Governor's Office and served as a source of information to the Chief Executive on the sentiments and opinions of ghetto residents; in this way the GBO's indicated a potential for serving as a window on the political mood of ghetto residents and as an indicator of the current issues which were most meaningful to them.

Thus the record on class advocacy for individuals reveals that the Governor's representatives interacted with a wide variety of sub-systems and organizations. To these ends, the GBO's were active in seeking special rules, exceptions to established policy, or changes in law, policy or regulation on behalf of disadvantaged individuals.

### "GBO Only": Legal Advocacy

As soon as the GBO's opened, it became apparent that there would be considerable demand for legal advocacy, that is, interventions with various organizations and agencies on behalf of ghetto residents where there was a conflict in interpretation or application of law or policy. At first, serious consideration was given to placing lawyers directly in the Governor's Branch Offices. In view of the developing OEO Legal Services Program in several communities, a decision was made to utilize such programs as much as possible; thus a large number of legal advocacy issues were referred to local legal services agencies. The data on the activities of the Governor's representatives reveals, however, that a considerable number of legal advocacy problems were addressed by the GBO's themselves, and that in their own fashion the Governor's representatives served an important para-legal role for the communities in which they were located.

Approximately one out of ten (9.4%) of the "GBO only" cases in the sample was classified as legal advocacy. The Governor's representatives were not lawyers, nor did they have training in the law. They did possess, or came to possess, considerable knowledge of the policies and regulations of many agencies. The GBO's, therefore, provided advice, information and interpretation on matters of policy and regulation, and in many cases actually adjudicated disputes between citizens and agencies. The breakdown of the sample of legal advocacy problems showed that 4.7% involved the provision of legal advice, information and direct aid, 3.9% involved interventions with state or local public agencies or private agencies in disputes over

interpretations or applications of legal rules, and the remaining 0.8% involved follow-up on previous problems.

Examples of legal advice and aid in the sample include consultation on rent withholding and union grievance procedures, aid for a prisoner in a local jail, bail problems, and advice concerning the rights of people on probation. Interventions on behalf of disadvantaged people in disputes about legal rules included several cases where electricity had been shut off by electric companies, problems over interpretations of lease provisions, interpretations of welfare regulations, rent problems, telephone company policy, discrimination in housing, and one case of intervention on behalf of a reporter in a situation where a state department had refused to allow access to public records. Thus the GBO's provided direct legal advocacy on behalf of individuals in situations where legal services were otherwise nonexistent or unavailable, or in situations where adjudicatory action could be taken without calling upon professional lawyers.

#### "GBO Only": Comments, Interpretation

The analysis of the local-level "GBO only" action on the demands of disadvantaged people suggests that the Governor's representatives provided a valuable advocacy and generalized helper role in their communities. They did this in a way that provided a personalizing element for disadvantaged individuals in a political system which is increasingly specialized, dominating and impersonal. Review of the problem cards reveals that people came to use the GBO's

to fill the gaps or deficiencies of other programs, for personalized help in coping with some of the complexities of the modern state, and as an appeal mechanism with a variety of bureaucracies. Thus it is suggested that the dialectical organization, the formalized citizen's advocate, developed the capacity to provide a linkage and rationalizing element--a secondary level of interaction--between individuals and "the system." In this way the GBO's came to fill some of the needs of individuals identified earlier in the works of Merton, Gouldner, Sjoberg, and others. It is also suggested that the people in the communities served by the Governor's Branch Offices learned to use the GBO's primarily when they had problems with "the system," and not just when they wanted a service from a particular community agency. The next section details the citizen's advocacy activity of the GBO's where referrals were involved--many of which also seem to be non-routine requests, or third-party mediation in requests for help in getting access to a service system or for help where provision of services had been denied.

### Local-Level Referrals

#### Overview

In addition to the direct resolution of citizen demands described above, the Governor's Branch Offices performed an authoritative linking role to the many networks which constitute the polity. In this role the GBO's provided a mechanism for overcoming some of the structurally-generated barriers between disadvantaged people and the socio-political structures of the community. Merton, for example,

notes the structural pressures on bureaucrats for "formal and impersonal treatment when individual, personalized consideration is desired by the client."<sup>8</sup> Herbert Gans also found that lower-class people typically relate to others in a more personal manner; consequently, they face a greater gulf when they approach middle-class bureaucrats who tend to administer rules according to impersonal, universalistic norms. The dialectical organization of the GBO's provided an intermediate, personalizing link between such people and the bureaucracies and at the same time provided an authoritative mechanism to get the message to the bureaucrats that they should take particular notice of certain individuals.<sup>9</sup>

It was seen in Table 7 that the GBO's placed demands on a variety of value-allocating sub-systems of the polity.<sup>10</sup> The study sample (and overall data) reveals that the most frequent demands were placed upon the sub-systems responsible for housing, employment and financial aid (20.7%, 13.8%, and 17.8% in the study sample respectively). Complaints about treatment from, or the policy or regulations of various public or private, state or local, agencies represented an additional 9.9% of the cases; police and legal problems were involved in 8.3% of these cases, and community health in 2.6% of the overall sample. The lowest areas of citizen demand (which incidentally were expected by the Governor and his staff to be the highest) were medical problems (1.5%), family or marital problems (1.5%), education (1.6%). Further breakdowns of these categories reveal wide variation in specific demands and in the agency jurisdiction which was assigned responsibility for responding.

Table 10: Local Level Referrals by Type of Advocacy and Jurisdictional Structure (Type of Agency) of Final Action<sup>11</sup>

Action Jurisdiction	Column Total	Type of Advocacy			Row Total
		Case	Class	Legal	
Local Unit of a State Level Department	24.7%	88.8%	4.0%	6.4%	99.2%
Local Governmental Agency	7.1	81.7	7.0	11.3	100.0
Private or Voluntary Agency	10.7	88.9	1.9	9.3	100.0
Local Anti-Poverty Agency	3.4	97.1	0.0	2.9	100.0
Local Legal Service Agency	5.1	47.1	2.0	51.0	100.1
Local Office of Federal Agency	2.6	92.3	3.8	3.8	99.9
Problem Indicated but no Action Recorded	1.6	75.0	12.5	12.5	100.0
Total	55.2	80.3	8.6	10.8	N=556

As depicted above (Table 8), well over half (55.2%) the local-level citizen's advocacy represented demands on other structures of the community (referrals) for allocations of values, special rules, or adjudications. Table 10 provides a breakdown of this class of demands by jurisdiction and type of advocacy. Within this group of cases, the GBO's relied first of all upon state agencies where the authority of the Governor was most direct (24.7% of the time). The GBO's did not hesitate, however, to place demands on other jurisdictions. Thus, they called upon the private sector 10.7% of the time, local governmental bodies 7.1%, local legal services programs 5.1%, local

anti-poverty organizations 3.4%, and a local office of a federal agency was called upon to respond in 2.6% of the demands. These figures provide a quantitative picture of how the GBO's placed demands on a wide variety of political jurisdictions on behalf of disadvantaged citizens. The next three sub-sections comment first upon the special character of GBO case advocacy, and then explain the nature of class and legal advocacy where "referrals" to other jurisdictions were involved.

#### Case Advocacy Referrals: Direct Intervention with "The System"

Case advocacy with the structures of "the system" involved primarily a communications and control function, but one which was supported by the authority of the Governor's Office and implemented through the advocacy stance of the Governor's representatives. Table 10 indicates that in 80.3% of the cases the GBO's provided an authoritative linkage between people who tended to be estranged and alienated from interaction with bureaucracies, and the bureaucracies of "the system." The nature of these case advocacy demands is fairly straightforward--jobs, housing, financial aid, medical services, aid with personal problems, etc.--but the problems of identifying and activating the appropriate resource are not. Thus this section on case advocacy by the GBO's focuses on: (a) the complexity of the decision about which sub-system or structure upon which to place demands and (b) the variety of organizations and agencies upon which the GBO's placed demands for case advocacy.

In view of the fact that the system under consideration is highly polycentric, the sub-systems for value allocation were themselves

highly diverse and fragmented. In the macro-view, the sub-systems of the polity which allocate most community values are amorphous and diverse with wide variation among constituent agencies in terms of service availability, eligibility requirements, policies, staffing, eligibility, etc. Moreover, each organizational entity within the sub-system is assigned, or is allowed to operate in, its piece of the organizational domain. Thus the task of matching up the needs and situation of an individual with a resource in "the system" is often a time-consuming and complex task. The mandate of the GBO's was to search for an appropriate match between citizen need and community resource, and then to place an authoritative demand on the resource to meet the need.<sup>12</sup> Thus the manifest objective of case advocacy vis-a-vis referrals to other agencies was to secure allocations or re-allocations of services and entitlements for the people who brought their needs to the Governor's representatives. (A latent objective, to be discussed later, was to convey the message to the bureaucracies that the new policy announced by the Governor was indeed in effect.)

Review of case records on the program shows that many of the case advocacy problems required the Governor's representatives to go beyond simple referrals and required a creative meshing of a variety of community resources. Take, for example, the case of Miss L. recorded in the GBO archive. She presented the GBO with a request for financial aid:

9/8/67 - Approximately 2 p.m., 20-year old Miss L. came to the Governor's Branch Office. She was fired from her job as cashier at a small delicatessen. Unsuccessfully she looked for work until today (Friday) when the rent was due. [She was] unable to raise rent money. Mrs. P., manager of the hotel told her



to be out by noon. We talked unsuccessfully with Mrs. P. We called friends and relatives of Miss L. until 5 p.m., but were unable to get a room for her to stay. The YWCA was also called for a possible room. In the meantime, we were also calling trying to get a job placement immediately for her.

We were able to convince a Mrs. M., of the Broadway Restaurant to hire her for two weeks to help in her desperate situation. She was to start at 12 midnight. Miss L. was still penniless, homeless and apparently afraid. I went with her in my car to the hotel about 5:45 p.m. to get her clothes. Mrs. P. felt very sorry and gave Miss L. carfare and lunch. I took her home with me to where my wife had prepared food. At 11:30 p.m. my wife took Miss L. to work, leaving her belongings with us until 1 a.m. the next day. Saturday I called Public Assistance and took her down for an emergency homeless fifteen day grant of \$45.50, continuing our search for adequate housing. I was able to get her into Father Divine's Hotel. The Hotel Manager was very happy to know about the Governor's Branch Office, and wants to send people for help.<sup>13</sup>

This case, although coded (1) local-level action, (2) financial aid, (3) referral to the local office of a state agency, and (4) case advocacy, actually involved citizen's advocacy interactions with several private businesses, a voluntary social service agency, and the local office of a state agency. This demand for case advocacy for financial aid actually led Miss L. to receive employment, financial aid and housing--all within twenty hours. She also received direct personal attention for immediate needs from the Governor's representative. Thus it is recognized that while the data presented herein is highly complex, the necessity to reduce such complex interactions to codable, categorizable units tends to obscure the full complexity of GBO interactions with "the system."

Consider also GBO case advocacy on a fairly typical housing problem. Mrs. J. complained to the GBO of poor housing conditions, requesting a new apartment. The housing authority indicated that no public housing was available. Unsatisfied with this response, the

Governor's representative was able to get the local housing inspector to declare Mrs. J's existing house unfit for habitation (legal advocacy). Then the Philadelphia Housing Authority was contacted and Mrs. J. was given top priority for a three-bedroom house (case advocacy). The GBO representative did not stop here, however, for the woman needed aid in moving and in making the transition to the new quarters. Further efforts by the GBO resulted in the city of Philadelphia paying the first month's rent, and the state paying moving expenses through the County Board of Assistance (55% federal matching funds). Thus this request which was coded (1) local-level action, (2) housing, (3) referral to local public authority, and (4) case advocacy, actually involved access to and the immediate responsiveness of three local public agencies and one local office of a state agency. Both case and legal advocacy were involved; and Mrs. J. received both housing and financial assistance.

These cases are not the most complex which were reviewed. They represent the average in complexity and need. There were thousands which were more involved; each would take several pages to relate. There were also thousands which involved simple, direct referrals where agencies were assigned responsibility and the GBO's had little further contact unless the citizen returned with a complaint. The examples do illustrate, however, the essence and inner dynamics of the case advocacy activities of the Governor's Branch Offices where referrals to other agencies were recorded; and they point out the capability of an external organization to serve as a linkage and control mechanism to the entire network of organizations and agencies in the polity.

In terms of the pattern of demands for case advocacy which the GBO's placed on the political system, the data in Tables 7 and 10 (and supplemental tables in the footnotes) suggest first of all, that the Governor's representatives were indeed searching community structures for appropriate and responsive organizations; second that patterns of demand shifted from problem to problem and sub-system to sub-system; third, that they constituted a channel of demand to state and local, public and private agencies of various jurisdictions; and fourth, that the GBO's provided all three types of citizen's advocacy in these areas. Thus it seems appropriate to conclude that the GBO's were more than an information and referral agency for they also took on the task of assuring access and of prodding the agencies into a responsive stance. Furthermore, the GBO's were more than a multi-service intake unit for state social service agencies because they sought to use their authority to mobilize all available resources, public and private, federal, state and local toward meeting the demands of the people whose interests they represented.<sup>14</sup> As Dr. Georges told the coordinator's staff:

our primary commitment is to goals and not to methods, bold experimentation with alternative approaches is clearly called for.

Each existing resource, so long as it is effective, be it a Community Action Agency, a Health and Welfare Council (sic), a mental health center, a public assistance office, or a public or private health facility, etc., must be utilized to the fullest for its strengths and experience.<sup>15</sup>

Breakdowns of the data in the above tables reveal that within each community value sub-system, a variety of referral agencies were utilized. Moreover, the pattern varied among the various sub-systems. In analyzing the data in the study sample, for example,

sixteen different categories of agency were utilized to aggregate data on referrals (there were also many different agencies under these categories which provided the services).<sup>16</sup> The wide variety of GBO interactions is revealed by the fact that most of the sixteen different categories were utilized for each of the community value areas.

All but three agency categories were used for demands related to employment. In particular, the major part of employment problems went to the local office of a state agency with the Bureau of Employment Security accounting for 41.1%, the Civil Service Commission 4.3%, county boards of assistance 1.4%, the Human Relations Commission 1.4%, and other state agencies 1.5%. Interventions with local government on employment problems occurred in 3.0% of the employment cases, voluntary social service agencies in 2.1% of the cases, private profit organizations 9.1%, local anti-poverty organizations 7.7%. Although the patterns of demand varied, a similar variety of interactions occurred in the other value allocating sub-systems. The interactions on housing, for example, revealed that twelve of the sixteen categories of referral agency were used. Local government and local housing authorities accounted for the largest proportion of referrals (a total of 25.9%); these were followed by local anti-poverty organizations (9.4%), private profit-making organizations (7.2%), and a large portion was handled by "GBO only."

This diverse pattern prevails in the other areas as well. Financial need used thirteen categories of referral with local offices of state bureaucracies and voluntary social service agencies as major resources. Medical services, on the other hand, shows only four

categories of referral used, with equal demand on voluntary social service and private medical practice organizations followed by local governmental agencies. In the case of police and legal demands, ten categories of referral agencies were contacted, with major emphasis on legal service agencies (34.5%), followed by local government, state government, and interest group organizations. Community health and safety, on the other hand, utilized only three categories of referral with local governmental agencies receiving the majority of these demands. (Although the numbers of problems in the study sample in each of these breakdowns are too small to provide definitive statistics, some of the breakdowns are reported in the footnotes in Table 20.) Thus it seems not unreasonable to conclude that the GBO's provided access to a wide spectrum of community values and jurisdictions toward meeting the demands of poor people for allocations of values to which they were, by law and policy, entitled.

Class Advocacy Referrals: Special Rules or Challenges to Policy or Regulations on Behalf of Individuals

Case advocacy was defined above as the process of securing allocations of values under existing rules; class advocacy for individuals is the process of intervention with various structures of the political system on behalf of individuals in situations where resolution of a citizen's demand requires (1) granting of special exceptions to the rules, or (2) seeking new or revised rules in order to meet the demand of a particular actor.<sup>17</sup> Of the local-level demands which the GBO's placed on other structures, 8.6% (of the study sample) were class advocacy for individuals.

In addition, class advocacy also had a latent function of re-educating the bureaucracies on how to do their job, especially as related to disadvantaged people. Specifically, Dr. Georges and the GBO's were committed to the Welfare Rights Organization (WRO) principle of service as a right and entitlement for all who qualified.<sup>18</sup> Thus the people who designed and authorized the establishment of the Governor's Branch Offices were aware that there were institutional factors at the lowest (and the highest) levels of the system which worked against optimum delivery of services to poor people. It is important to recall here that the GBO workers were under the mandate to instruct the bureaucracies on policy, its interpretation and application. The statement was made by Governor Shafer in one of his first talks to the GBO workers that:

It is sadly true that some state workers have institutional and sometimes personal reasons for not communicating with the poor. They have been, for example, a part of the 'system' and must therefore identify with the system rather than with the client. This can cause him to close his ear to the poor person who seeks help.<sup>19</sup>

Furthermore, the Governor told the GBO representatives: "Your path will lead you toward insuring state services. It has been said that unknown, unasserted rights are no rights at all. Your job is to help the poor to know their rights regarding government services and to assist them."<sup>20</sup> The Governor was clear as to his intent in placing this mandate on the GBO representatives: "Your work will make our programs work--in short you will help make a new and more responsive government."<sup>21</sup> Thus class advocacy for individuals had a dual function of providing an institutional challenge to the

existing establishment to achieve the maximum delivery of services under existing law and policy, and of educating the thousands of workers in the various bureaucracies about the new general directives of the Governor, Dr. Georges, and other cabinet members in specific situations.

There is considerable variation in the pattern of class advocacy as revealed in Tables 7 and 10. In fact, the variations in types of value-allocating sub-systems, jurisdictional structures, and public-private sector interactions for class advocacy are not unlike those which obtained in the previous section. Thus the statistics of the sub-breakdowns are not detailed here, for the present objective is to demonstrate that the GBO's provided three types of citizen's advocacy to many aspects of the political system. The remainder of this section will describe briefly the practice of class advocacy for individuals where demands were placed on other agencies and will present several illustrative examples of this type of citizen's advocacy.

Class advocacy for individuals vis-a-vis the structures of the polity usually began with a complaint about a policy or regulation of an agency. Subsequent investigation by a GBO in many cases revealed a confounding policy or regulation which prevented the agency from providing the service. In such situations the task of the Governor's representative was to convince the agency to waive the regulation on the grounds that the individual situation represented an exception for which a special treatment was justified, or in the case of delays because of procedural barriers, special procedures were

requested. There were many cases in employment, for example, where the GBO's were able to convince employers to waive age or educational requirements for a job or apprenticeship program. Such actions are, in effect, the creation of a special rule for the individual. In housing there were instances of rent in public housing remaining constant when the existing policy was for an increase if the financial situation of the individual improved. There were many instances of intervention with landlords to get stays of legal eviction orders without changes in the situation of the rentor. (In some cases the precedent established on behalf of an individual was later translated into more general policy changes and thus represented class advocacy on behalf of an interest--to be discussed in the next chapter.) The following examples of class advocacy for individuals were all extracted from GBO records (those marked \* precipitated general policy changes and also fall under class advocacy for interests).

--A late application for a college scholarship was processed after GBO intervention.

--A complaint that after a number of trips to the vocational rehabilitation agency, the individual learned that the agency could not act on his problem until after January because of budgetary difficulties. The GBO got same-day action through waiver of procedures and policy on such cases.

--A high-school dropout who was allowed to return to school.

\* Stolen public assistance check: the policy of the Department of Public Welfare was to refer the reported loss to the Department of Revenue for investigation. It would be several weeks until a duplicate check was issued during which the person went without funds. The GBO got same-day action for one individual, and after many similar demands occurred, obtained a change in policy to expedite replacement of all lost or stolen checks.



- College waiver of the entry fee for one individual.
- A one-time public assistance grant for transportation to California to allow a young man to enter Los Angeles City College.
- The phone company waived the required deposit fee for a woman whose son had frequent asthma attacks which required immediate contact with medical services.
- A case of a community college which waived the tuition of a college freshman after his scholarship from a "Negro Education Emergency Drive" expired.
- \* Several cases of special emergency checks for one-time public assistance grants led to eventual change in policy making such aid routinely available.
- Several cases wherein utility companies were convinced to grant exceptions to the rule that users must pay back bills and a large deposit to resume service. Deposit waived, and back bills were paid in monthly installments.
- A case where the license of a truck driver was suspended because of non-payment of a judgment from a claim on an earlier accident. The GBO secured return of the driver's license.
- \* A case where a state employee complained about the policy of withholding the first paycheck for new employees; this was an impossible situation for a person with no credit or reserve. Following GBO intervention, the secretary of her department replied that "the check should arrive by the time this letter gets there." This case also led to a general change in policy.

All of the class advocacy cases represented in the statistics included herein are situations such as these where the GBO representatives found it appropriate to press for special rules, exceptions to the rules, or special procedures for individuals. Many of the situations they represent are not particularly unusual, nor are the results unique. Everyone is familiar with such situations where a legislator, relative, friend, minister, or influential person performed such a mediatory role. Not everyone knows where to find such a person,

however, and there are few generalists. The GBO's were generalists. They were available all the time. It is from this combination of facts that the significance of the data emerges.

#### Legal Advocacy Referrals: Intervention in Administrative Justice

Woll aptly points out that there is but a narrow, perhaps only semantic dividing line between situations which result in an exception to a rule, create a special rule for a particular actor, get incremental but significant changes of a rule (all of which are termed "class advocacy"), and adjudication of a dispute or conflict over interpretation or discretionary application of a rule--which is termed "legal advocacy."<sup>22</sup> For present purposes, the distinction between the two types of advocacy has been set out to distinguish class advocacy, as action toward securing an exception to or change in the rule (even if only for one individual), from legal advocacy which is action to represent an individual (or group) when there is a conflict with authorities over interpretation or application of rules in specific situations. Thus, legal advocacy may involve: (1) intervention on behalf of an individual to appeal an administrative decision, (2) provision of advice or information about law and policy especially with regard to the rights and entitlements of the individual, (3) access to regular legal processes as in the courts.

In the first type of situation, the GBO's assumed the role of legal advocate for citizens vis-a-vis the administrative structures of the community. In this way, the Governor's representatives provided an external source of appeal for administrative processes

which usually remain entirely within the purview of administrative agencies. In the second case, the GBO's served many people by providing advice on rights and entitlements, and in interpreting policy and regulations to visitors. In this area they also found it appropriate to draw upon other sources of legal advocacy such as Welfare Rights Organizations, labor unions, or legal services organizations--in such situations a referral would be made. In the third area, access to regular legal processes, the typical action would be to call upon a local legal services program, or in some cases private lawyers or public defenders.

Legal advocacy was an important technique of the GBO's for denials of services often emerged from routines or principles in agencies which established exclusionary or restrictive applications of law or policy. For example, the Public Welfare Code in Pennsylvania makes the Department of Public Welfare responsible for providing the "minimum level of health and decency for all the needy and distressed" in the Commonwealth. But application of this law was such that the old, "deserving poor" maxim was influential and fewer than a third of the people below the poverty line were on assistance. Traditional biases against poor people and black people, plus public and legislative pressure to keep the assistance rolls down militate toward restrictive application of regulations, or even systematic misapplication of revised regulations. Typically, the bureaucracy is the maker, the applier and interpreter of the rule. If the bureaucrat's decision is that an applicant is not eligible, the decision is for all practical purposes, final. The Governor's Branch Offices provided an external

third party which could, and did, intervene and interpret policy to the bureaucracies on behalf of citizens. In this way, legal advocacy often led to the provision of services to individuals which would otherwise have been precluded by existing interpretation or application of policy and regulation. At the same time, the GBO's conveyed the message to bureaucrats on how to interpret the regulation in the future.

Take for example, a rather unusual case but one which is illustrative of the extent to which the GBO's pursued their advocacy role. This is the case of a woman with two children who came to the GBO requesting financial aid. The woman was not legally (90 days) a Pennsylvania resident. She had been receiving unemployment compensation from the state of Indiana. Her unemployment compensation from Indiana had been interrupted because of illness and would not resume for several weeks. Before coming to the local GBO, she had been to the Bureau of Economic Security (BES), which had sent her on three job referrals none of which led to jobs. She then went to the County Board of Assistance for public assistance where she was told that she was not a Pennsylvania resident, and since she had been receiving unemployment compensation from the state of Indiana, she was not eligible for public assistance in Pennsylvania. She then went to the GBO for help.

After being presented with the above facts, the local GBO representative conferred with the central GBO Coordinator's Office about a particular section of the Public Assistance Manual. They agreed that in accordance with the manual, "since U.C. is pending, the

woman seems to have a plan for self-support and therefore should be eligible for P.A. [public assistance]."23 The Coordinator's Office consequently talked directly with the director of the local County Board of Assistance, advising him of the interpretation of the regulations as they applied in this case. The local GBO representative was then advised of these facts, and a referral was made to the local CBA. The woman was granted public assistance until other resources were available. It is highly unlikely that this outcome would have occurred had the external citizen's advocate not been available.

An important part of legal advocacy also involved the creative meshing of laws and programs from several different sources. Many times such action allowed for the resolution of the latent demands of disadvantaged individuals which would have been improbable otherwise. Recall the example of a housing problem which was cited in a preceding section. While the GBO representative responded to a demand for a new house, the resolution of the demand actually required the GBO to interface the policies and personnel of three different local organizations and one state organization. Lack of any of these sources, or mis-timing of the sequence of responsiveness could well have led to an unresponsive final outcome. Thus, in order for the person to be granted priority, the housing inspector had to declare the old house unfit prior to the application for housing. These two events were prerequisite to the rent payment by the city. All three events were then requirements for eligibility for the special one-time moving grant--which was justified for the health of the children, i.e., to remove them from unfit and unsanitary housing. It

was the willingness, the ability and the mandate to undertake such actions that was perhaps a significant factor in inducing agencies to respond to the demands of the GBO's, for the ultimate bureaucratic weapon--control of administrative discretion--could now be challenged.

In the sample of local-level GBO cases, 10.8% were legal advocacy. Of these cases, 41.3% were handled by the GBO only, 14.7% by a local office of a state agency, 7.3% by a local governmental agency, 9.2% by private sources, 0.9% by anti-poverty agencies, 23.9% by legal services agencies, and 0.9% were referred to a federal agency (for 1.8%, a problem was indicated but no action was recorded).

Major legal advocacy issues in employment related to discrimination in hiring, promotion, job assignments or dismissal. In housing the major problems were discrimination in the sale or rental of a house, evictions, or legal differences with landlords or rental agencies regarding contracts or leases. There were many cases where public utilities shut off service (e.g., gas in the winter) because of arrearages in debts and the companies required payment plus large deposits to reinstate service. The GBO's in many of these cases challenged the propriety of the service being shut off, leading to restoration of service (legal advocacy), and enabling special arrangements to be made for gradual payment (class advocacy for individuals).

The action alternatives open to the GBO's were generally:

- (1) to go directly to the private employer, landlord, business or agency involved;
- (2) to refer the case to a state agency (for example discrimination complaints to the Human Relations Commission);
- (3) to call in an interest group, professional organization or labor union;

or (4) to refer the case to a legal service agency. In cases of consumer fraud, the GBO's would go directly to the business against which the complaint had been made, or if a pattern was involved they would call in the state consumer protection agency. Other problems requiring legal advocacy ranged from marital problems, (divorce or separation) to problems with police, probation, or parole agencies. Additionally, it was not always clear how best to proceed, for the situations which were presented to the Governor's representatives were often complicated and frequently involved a variety of agencies. Thus the GBO representatives routinely calculated intuitively the dynamics of responsiveness.

Take for example, a case on September 27, 1967. At 10:20 a.m., the Executive Director of a Community Action Program (CAP) phoned the GBO about a family with eight children which was in the process of being evicted from their home. At the moment of the call, the sheriff and a moving van were in front of the house. The CAP had made arrangements through FHA for a new home which would not be ready for several months. Mr. L., who was being evicted, would not pay the rent on the present house until the landlord took care of existing sanitary problems and code violations. Mr. L. was on supplementary public assistance. The GBO called the director of the County Board of Assistance who, while responsible for social services (one of which is securing adequate housing) said that nothing could be done. Likewise, a call to the County Child Welfare director revealed that he, too, was unable to do anything about interim housing, but would take "last-resort steps to protect the children if they have no place

to go." The GBO worker then called the President of the Board of County Commissioners who said he would contact the sheriff and other local officials. At 11:45 a.m. the County Commissioners Office indicated that on the advice of her attorney, the landlord had agreed to stay the eviction (total time one hour and twenty-five minutes).

One interview with a Human Relations Commission staff member revealed a possible reason for some of the "GBO only" legal advocacy cases. In cases of discrimination in housing, employment, etc., the Human Relations Commission in Pennsylvania is bound by law to a formal investigation, hearings and adjudication through the courts. In most instances of discrimination, it is an extremely time consuming and difficult task to build and prosecute a case for the law and the rules of evidence and procedure are designed to give the defendant (in this case, the offending employer or landlord) the benefit of the doubt. Thus, there was a low percentage of GBO referrals to the Human Relations Commission which resulted in successful action; this, in turn, led to increasing GBO retention of responsibility. The HRC worker revealed a belief that the GBO's could often be successful in discrimination cases for "they could get an employer or landlord to back down through threats and guts" when the HRC worker was hamstrung. He revealed that, in fact, he often referred cases to the GBO if it was apparent that the evidence required to support a particular case in court was not available.

In handling the wide variety of such cases in this manner, the Governor's Branch Offices demonstrated a competence and ability to maneuver and negotiate the intricacies of legal advocacy on behalf of individuals.



### Local-Level Referrals: Comments, Interpretation

The analysis of the local-level "referrals" as authoritative demands on "the system" by the GBO's reveals a diverse complex of community value sub-systems, each of which is composed of a variety of organizational jurisdictions. Review of the data on the GBO's suggests that the citizen's advocate developed competence to negotiate the spectrum of sub-systems and provided access for poor people. This information suggests that, in addition to providing an authoritative linkage agent for allocations of community values, the citizen's advocate had the potential for providing unorganized individuals an influential mechanism for dealing with ambiguities and conflicts in "the system." Furthermore, in that they were responsible primarily to the elected chief executive, the GBO's appear to have been useful in conveying the changing policies of the Governor directly to the street-level bureaucracies, thus rendering unambiguous communications which may otherwise have been obfuscated by several layers of bureaucracy. The next section on the demands which were escalated to the Central Office GBO provides further evidence of the authority which the GBO's could command on behalf of disadvantaged individuals.

### Central Office GBO Action

#### Authoritative Support for Demands on the GBO's

The Governor's Branch Offices were not unique in recognizing the kaleidoscopic character of the service systems in the modern polity. In recent years, workers in various organizations have struggled with an increasing programmatic diversity.<sup>24</sup> Typical

responses have been to create multi-service centers or information and referral agencies. Nordlinger's review of efforts in these areas suggests, however, that while these alternatives may prove valuable in making bureaucracies internally more efficient, they tend to be inadequate where the types of structural barriers and unresponsiveness which have been cited herein exist.<sup>25</sup> Essentially, information and referral programs have little authority to command action from various agencies, and multi-service centers are embedded in the bureaucracies themselves.

Cloward and Elman's study of a neighborhood service center established under the Mobilization for Youth program in New York City is a good example. The Stanton Street Center which they studied began in 1966 with a primary goal of liaison between poor people and agencies by providing "specific and practical advice on problems of health, housing, welfare, education and employment."<sup>26</sup> The workers in the New York experiment, however, "soon found that they had to take sides in a continual dispute between their clients and the street-level bureaucracies. When they refused to do so, their clients abandoned them."<sup>27</sup> Moreover, Cloward and Elman found that:

one of the advocate's most demanding tasks was to serve notice on his opposite number within the welfare bureaucracy that he was prepared to move a notch further up the hierarchy if justice was not tendered on the present level.<sup>28</sup>

In the case under consideration, the GBO's began with the advocacy role, knowing full well that their job was to enter conflict with "the system" on behalf of disadvantaged people. Furthermore, the GBO's were ordered to take such a stance with all structures of the polity. Their anti-bureaucratic structure was designed to facilitate

this in that the local Governor's representative could either move up the various hierarchies, themselves, or call upon authorities in the state capitol as required. Recall that toward assuring that the various bureaucracies would be responsive to GBO demands, Governor Shafer put the bureaucracies on notice that a word from a Governor's Branch Office representative was a command from the Chief Executive. He announced publicly and in official bureaucratic communications:

My offices are under direct orders to address themselves vigorously in my name . . . Immediate attention must be afforded by line units to requests and referrals originating from them.<sup>29</sup>

The Governor then appointed Dr. Georges as his "personal representative in this matter;"<sup>30</sup> he assigned the Executive Secretary of the Council on Human Services to "expedite the handling of immediate inter-departmental matters."<sup>31</sup> He assigned a cabinet officer to be his "state-to-city liaison" for each of the cities which contained GBO's. Choice of men for these latter assignments was based on the criterion that the cabinet officer had "good connections with the local government" in that city.<sup>32</sup> In this way the top executives of major state-level bureaucracies were given a direct interest in the success of the GBO's, a channel was provided to local governments through the party network (for cabinet officers were political appointments), and the GBO's had available several sources of authority to back up their demands.

The full meaning of the Governor's words that "sound judgment, quick action, and respect for human dignity must prevail over procedural detail"<sup>33</sup> became clear as agency after agency received direct calls from the office of the Governor or a cabinet member about the problems

and complaints of disadvantaged individuals who had come to the GBO's. These GBO "central office" actions put teeth into perhaps one of the most demanding and crucial aspects of citizen's advocacy--continuing and persistent challenges to inappropriate or misapplications of administration discretion.

#### The Volume and Variety of Central Office Demands

The data on overall GBO activity indicates that approximately 13.7 percent of all problems were escalated to Harrisburg (Table 6). The statistical reports, however, contain no breakdown of the central office handling by problem or referral agency, nor were there possibilities of creating a breakdown by type of advocacy. In addition, the number of central office cases in the study sample was too small to provide adequate or reliable breakdowns. There was some information contained in the GBO archive, however, which suggests that the range and diversity of central office activity was not unlike that which obtained at the local level. For example, the Council for Human Resources made a tabulation of the 873 problems which were escalated to the Central Office between August 29 and September 15, 1967 (see Table 11). Moreover, review of case records and interviews with people who were active in the GBO's suggests that a large proportion of the central office problems involved agencies which were not under state jurisdiction (private or local governmental), or which required the intervention of the top levels of the various bureaucracies in Harrisburg. Another bit of evidence that the central office demands were as diverse as those at the local level is contained in a communication from the GBO Coordinator to the local GBO representatives

Table 11: Central-Office GBO Referrals by Problem Type  
(August 20 to September 15, 1967)

Problem Type	N	%
Public Assistance	202	23.1%
Housing	140	16.0
Employment	73	8.4
Legislation	53	6.1
Legal Services	50	5.7
Education	40	4.6
Discrimination	37	4.2
Employment Conditions	35	4.0
Roads and Streets	35	4.0
Medical	25	2.9
Personnel Problems (State Government)	22	2.5
Banking and Financial	18	2.1
Motor Vehicles	15	1.7
Recreation	13	1.5
Mental Health/Mental Retardation	12	1.4
Public Utilities	11	1.3
Liquor Control Board	10	1.1
Federal Problems	10	1.1
Police	10	1.1
Child Welfare	9	1.0
Professional Licensing	8	0.9
Insurance	8	0.9
Vocational Rehabilitation	7	0.8
Aging	4	0.5
Small Business	3	0.3
Miscellaneous	23	2.6
	N=873	99.8%

Source: This information, contained in a report to the Governor from the Executive Secretary of the Council for Human Services, was tabulated before the statistical reporting categories for regular reports were developed, and is therefore not translatable directly into parallel categories.

in September 1967:

It is interesting that the problems which you are getting and referring to Harrisburg cut across both the private sector and government. Furthermore, they cut across all levels of Government--Federal, State, County, Local.

When the visitor comes out of your office, he doesn't care which part of society--public or private--state or local--should solve it. He just wants help--period!

So the Governor's Branch Offices get problems over which the Governor has little direct control. This doesn't mean we can try any less hard. It just means we have to try in less direct ways. We can't just call a private individual or the Federal government and insist he do something. We have to ask, persuade, and where we can--cash in our chips.<sup>34</sup>

Finally, analysis of a systematic sample of central office cases in the next section on responsiveness suggests as great a variety obtained here as at the local level. (See, for instance, Tables 12 and 13 below.) Consideration of central office handling is perhaps most important in demonstrating and underscoring the investment of the authority of the state in the actions of the Governor's Branch Offices. In addition, data to be presented in the following section on responsiveness in a systematic sample of one aspect of central office handling also suggests that the Central Office was active in many value-allocating sub-systems, at all levels of the polity, and in all three types of citizen's advocacy.

#### Criteria for Escalation to the State Capitol

The primary criterion for escalation of a demand to Harrisburg was simply that the local GBO representative decided that a higher level of intervention was appropriate. The lower levels of the GBO structure had the discretionary authority to determine when, and in

what circumstances, the higher levels were called into action. As described in the previous chapter, a problem was typically escalated to Harrisburg: (1) if local agencies were stalling or were otherwise unresponsive, (2) if the local GBO could not locate an appropriate service in the community either because there was none there or the local representative did not know of it, (3) if the demand of the visitor could not be resolved because of an existing policy which had to be waived or changed, and (4) in instances of "gross abuse by government or private service or enforcement agency or has been directly subjected to discriminatory practices."<sup>35</sup>

Demands which were escalated to the central level were divided between the GBO Coordinator's Office and the Executive Secretary of the Council for Human Services. Formalized criteria were never established, however, for determining which of the citizen demands were handled by each office. In fact, several informants in the Coordinator's Office stated that for a considerable period the Executive Secretary typically showed up early in the morning and made some of the decisions personally, the remainder were made by the GBO Coordinator's staff.

Perusal of a large number of records and interviews revealed that: (1) central GBO handled most problems where some department of state government had jurisdiction, and (2) the Council for Human Services handled those problems which "transcended departmental jurisdiction," i.e., required the application of "political" as differentiated from "bureaucratic" authority. The 1967 activities report to the Governor of the Council states that the Council had "pressed for

resolution of over a thousand serious complaints." Thus the Council can be said to have handled approximately one-fourth of the 2421 demands which were escalated to the Central Office, leaving the balance for the GBO Coordinator's Office.

#### Examples of Central Office Action

Central office cases tended to be those which were more difficult and complex. Often the state did not have direct jurisdiction to act, but the people who were associated with the GBO's used whatever means available toward seeking resolution of the problems of individuals. The meaning of these statements is most appropriately explained by summarizing actual cases. There was one case, for example, where a mother had put a daughter with two illegitimate infant children out on the street to fend for themselves. The Coordinator reports, "We stayed on the phone until we got an agency in Philadelphia to do something 'NOW!'" (case advocacy). In another case, a black man was found hanging in a police station in Philadelphia. The local authorities called the act a suicide and declared the case closed. The black community, however, demanded an investigation. The GBO Coordinator's Office called upon the state Attorney General, a Deputy Attorney General, the local District Attorney, and the Governor--all on a Saturday--and got an immediate investigation of the incident (legal advocacy). There was another situation where twelve men could be given jobs on the following day if they could obtain driver's licenses. Typically, this was a many week process. The Coordinator's Office got the state Bureau of Motor Vehicles,



the State Police and the Department of Health to collaborate. In twelve hours the men had driver's permits, physical examinations, driver's tests and were issued licenses. They all reported to work the following day (case advocacy). Another case occurred in Chester where a man reported that his family was to be evicted from the housing project the following day. The situation was causing unrest in the area. The GBO Coordinator called upon the Deputy Secretary of Urban Affairs, Department of Community Affairs, to intervene with the project manager. No eviction occurred, and a planned demonstration was cancelled (class advocacy).

Many cases were more complex, time-consuming and difficult. The GBO Coordinator reported that there were some cases where "often a little formality is more effective." Such cases were documented more fully and a written memorandum would be sent to the secretary of the appropriate state-level department. A copy of the original problem card was attached and a report of the outcome was requested. Concerning this class of demands, the GBO Coordinator told the local representatives, "We have been getting exceptionally good cooperation. This we expected. The Governor directed cooperation."<sup>36</sup> For example, there was the case of thirteen families in R.D. 2, Scranton Patch, Wilkes-Barre, whose water was to be shut off because of a broken water pipe. The broken portion of the pipe was on private property. No one would assume the responsibility for repairs. Neither the City Department of Health, the water company, nor other local authorities would act. The city of Wilkes-Barre finally suggested to the

people that they contact the Governor's Branch Office. The first action secured by the GBO Coordinator's Office was the agreement that the water would not be shut off. Then, after several prods by the GBO, the state Public Utilities Commission took action and later reported that while not obligated by law to repair or replace the pipe, the water company had made repairs at its own expense (class advocacy).

In another case, a visitor complained that the local school board had eliminated special classes for the retarded in the local community. The children who were affected would have to travel sixty miles each day to another school. It took the GBO Coordinator's Office thirty-two days to get the school board to make a decision to keep the classes in the local community and to obtain space locally (class advocacy).

In another situation, a woman complained that her husband was eight months in arrears in support payments for her daughter. She complained that two different county courts were involved, and that her husband was now living in a third county jurisdiction. Moreover, she had just learned that after nine months her case was not yet even listed on the court docket. She complained to the Governor, "At this point I am totally confused, in desperate need of financial help, and my six-year-old is in dire need of clothing and dental care. Where does one turn to get some action on a matter such as this?" The Council for Human Services called upon the sheriff of her home county. The following day a warrant was issued.

By noon, the authorities in Philadelphia county, 150 miles away, were called and the following day the husband had been put in jail. Subsequent arrangements with the husband's attorney led to an agreement that current payments would be resumed and installment payment of arrears would be made. At last contact with the Council, payments had already started to arrive (legal advocacy).

Not all of the demands of the Central Office led to successful resolution. For example, the files contain the case of a woman who complained of improperly fit dentures for which she had paid \$300. The dentist said that he would make another set only for an additional \$500. The Council called in the state Attorney General and the Bureau of Consumer Protection in the Department of Justice, and the state Dental Commission and Examination Board. The result was a determination that the case constituted "a civil matter," which was not under the jurisdiction of any law or agency. The dentist had turned the matter over to his liability insurance company so the only recourse of the woman would be to go to court in a civil suit (legal advocacy).

Another case involved complaints of overzealous use of police dogs by one metropolitan police department. There were several cases of young people being slashed and bitten. In one case, a reporter covering an incident was attacked and bitten. Several state-level departments, local government, and private interest groups were called upon over a period of several months. The final result was complete failure to resolve the use of dogs. The case concluded

by citing the lack of any external jurisdiction over local police forces (to be discussed in the system change chapter below).

#### GBO Central Office: Comments Interpretation

It seems reasonable to conclude that the Central Office of the GBO structure provided the sources of authority which were required to make the GBO's a fairly effective channel for demands on the political system. As was the case with the local-level GBO's, the central office authorities ranged the boundaries, levels and structures of many political sub-systems on behalf of disadvantaged citizens. Thus, the data reported herein suggests that the GBO's, as a formalized citizen's advocacy program, developed the capability to represent the interests of disadvantaged individuals to the highest and to the lowest levels of the political system. In this way, the Governor's Branch Office program provided a new, effective channel for demands on the polycentric political system. The access which resulted could be used by individuals toward seeking the responsiveness of all three analytic functions of the political system--case, class and legal advocacy. It has also been asserted in this study that access, even effective access, is but an indication of the injection of a demand into the political process. Consideration of case examples in this section, however, introduced the element of processing toward results. It is suggested that if the full character of the political system is to be probed, it is necessary to examine the responsiveness of socio-political structures to the demands. The next section of this study will examine the issue of the responsiveness

of the political system to the demands which were placed upon it by the GBO's on behalf of disadvantaged individuals.

### System Responsiveness and the Governor's Branch Offices

To this point, the primary emphasis has been on demonstrating that the Governor's Branch Offices, as a citizen's advocate, were able to provide access to a wide spectrum of political sub-systems for individuals in a disadvantaged collectivity. It has also been stated repeatedly, and in fact documented in case examples, that the GBO's had an overriding concern with responsiveness; that is, they sought to precipitate action which was prompt and courteous and which led to successful results.

This study suggests that for the cases which the local GBO's handled themselves ("GBO only"), a high proportion, perhaps most, had a speedy, successful resolution. In addition to participant observations by the researcher, there are several other sources of support for this conclusion. First, many of the problem cards in the sample contain indications of resolution--the person was placed in a job or housing, the decision of an agency over a matter of policy was reversed, an eviction stayed, etc.; and since all problem cards were mailed to the Central Office each evening, action on these cases was completed promptly (i.e., in one day). Secondly, there was a low proportion of cards in the study sample (4.1%) which indicated that the visitor returned to or contacted the GBO for a "follow-up." (As cards were mailed in each day, if the visitor returned the next day

or later, a new problem card was filled out and the problem was marked "follow-up.") Thirdly, if a problem could not be handled quickly by a local GBO, the representative would either refer the problem to another agency or escalate it to the Central Office for action. Thus it seems reasonable to conclude that for almost half of the cases handled by the GBO's (44.6 percent of the sample), resolution was for the most part quick and favorable.<sup>37</sup>

A primary goal of the GBO's, however, was to provide access for individuals to precipitate the responsiveness of other organizations and agencies in "the system." The number and varieties of access were documented above; the following sections are concerned with the responsiveness of other agencies to the demands of the GBO's. The next section describes three responsiveness variables and sources of data followed by two sections which discuss the responsiveness of "the system" to the demands of the GBO's.

#### Responsiveness Variables and Sources of Data

Three dimensions of responsiveness will be discussed in this section: (1) response-time, (2) citizen satisfaction with GBO action, and (3) resolution. Response-time is simply the length of time it takes to process a demand from initiation to a final decision. The question at hand concerns the issue of whether the citizen's advocate proved useful in stimulating prompt action, and in cases of delay, proved able to cut through layers of red tape. Citizen satisfaction with the GBO's is basically an indication of users judgments of the quality of their encounters with the Governor's

representatives; this variable also has overtones of issues of support and political efficacy. Resolution is the ultimate measure of responsiveness. It describes the parameters of the political system by indicating to whom the system is responsive, for what, and in what ways. Consideration of data on these variables will suggest the degree to which the GBO's successfully represented the demands of individuals to the political system.

Concerning data sources, it was stated in Chapter 3 that for reasons inherent in the Governor's Branch Office program, itself, and the circumstances surrounding the evolution of this study, it was not possible to set out systematic measurements of the prerequisites for responsiveness. The multi-method approach to research, however, provided for the acquisition of several types of data on responsiveness: participant observations, interviews with key informants, documentary evidence including consumer mail responses and survey data, and episodic case records. Individually, conclusions drawn from these sources would be highly speculative. Triangulation of the various bits and pieces of data, however, yields a cumulative picture of the responsiveness of many organizations and agencies to the demands of the GBO's.

In addition, there was a group of fully-documented case histories from which it was possible to systematically extract information on responsiveness. This latter data represents a small, systematic sample of GBO central office cases which additionally reinforce conclusions drawn from the other sources. These cases are taken to represent what were perhaps the most difficult to resolve:

central office class and legal advocacy;<sup>38</sup> conclusions drawn from this data must be considered in light of these facts. Data was extracted from these case histories which allows systematic analysis of GBO activity on five variables. First, two responsiveness variables were calculated for each case:

RESTIME (response-time): The time required for the system to respond to the demand was calculated as the time-lapse from initial entry of the demand into the system (date of problem presentation), to the date of final action (whether it be positive or negative), i.e., RESTIME is the temporal difference between input and output, and constitutes the total conversion time.

ACTION: The final resolution of the case (output) from the point of view of the citizen, i.e., a determination of whether the final action by the system actually resolved the demand ("action favorable"), or whether the final action was unsuccessful ("action unfavorable") from the point of view of the citizen who presented the latent demand. (When the variable "ACTION" is discussed below, it will represent the percent of demands which were favorably resolved for the citizen.)

These two calculated variables were used in conjunction with two system variables:

PROBLEM: representing the value-allocating sub-system of the polity, and the set of community structures which are responsible for allocating the values on which the demand was made.

AGENCY: representing the actual organization of state government upon which the demand was made, and which was responsible for conversion of the demand to an output.

Finally, a third calculated variable was created in order to test hypotheses about changes over time in the other two calculated variables (RESTIME and ACTION), i.e., hypotheses about institutionalization and the establishment of the GBO's in the organizational domain. The third calculated variable is:



INTIME or QUARTER: representing the quarter of operation of the Governor's Branch Office program, i.e., Quarter 1= the first three months of GBO operation (July-September 1967), etc., throughout the four-year period.

In the next section, data on these variables will be used in conjunction with other types of data on responsiveness to characterize the response-time and quality of response of community agencies to the demands of the GBO's, followed by a section on the resolution of GBO-initiated demands on the system.

#### Response Time: Quality of Treatment and Citizen Satisfaction

On the response-time variable, all indications are that the structures of the community responded more quickly to the demands of the GBO's than would otherwise have obtained. First of all, agencies had been put on notice by the statements of the Governor and other officials to respond quickly. In view of the fact that the entire community was aware that these statements were an authoritative directive for action to deal with the urban racial crisis in 1967, it would be expected that at least a temporary increase in response-time would occur. Secondly, this pressure to produce a more rapid response was translated into a direct, daily, prodding from the newly-established Governor's Branch Offices. The settling-in of the GBO's in the autumn of 1967 when the heat of the crisis had dissipated, was intended to (and the data on access gives sufficient evidence to believe that they did) maintain and increase the pressure on agencies to respond quickly to and with consideration for the rights and dignity of poor, in particular black, people. The low percentage

or problem cards indicating a need for follow-up action again underscores the likelihood that these statements are accurate.

Additional evidence supporting these judgments is contained in periodic tabulations of the information on the referral postcards to the Governor. (These were the franked postcards which citizens referred by the GBO's to another agency for service were asked to fill out and mail to the Governor after their episode of service demand was complete.) The information on these postcards also reflects user response and satisfaction with his/her episode with GBO entry into the system. Two tabulations are reported below; neither can be certified as systematic, so they must be considered accidental samples, but they do constitute the best available information.

The first tabulation of the referral postcards was made by the Office of Planning and Research, Department of Public Welfare (OPR), in September 1967. The second was made by the researcher during the course of this study. OPR reports that "ninety-one percent of all the people who mail the referral postcards to the Governor state that they were treated well by the agency to which you made the referral."<sup>39</sup> (A comparison of case statistics with the OPR data reveals that only about half of the people who were referred to other agencies returned the postcards [1,376 of 2,745], so the representativeness of this sample is open to interpretation. This is, however, a high rate for a mail survey.) Secondly, there was a large number of the referral postcards in a file box in the GBO

Coordinator's Office in 1972 when the search of the GBO Archive was carried out. These cards spanned the entire period of GBO operation and included all problem areas. An administrative officer of the GBO Central Office reported that they represented a "random sample" of the postcards received in the Governor's Office, drawn prior to disposal of the bulk of the cards (as required by state regulations concerning retention of documentary material).<sup>40</sup>

Tabulation of the responses from these cards by the researcher reveals a rate of user satisfaction with GBO referrals similar to that of the 1967 tabulation by OPR, although the rate is a bit lower suggesting the infatuation period of the 1967 crisis may well have led to a higher level of response. Specifically, the tabulation of these cards revealed that 79.6 percent of the people who responded reported that the "agency wanted to help and did all they could for me"; 10.5 percent said the agency did not seem interested in helping; 2.5 percent said that the agency "made things difficult or made me feel uncomfortable."<sup>41</sup> These tabulations suggest that the vast majority (over 75 percent) of the people whom the GBO's referred to other agencies, and who were disposed to mail in their responses to the Governor, experienced a prompt and courteous response.

Furthermore, many people were additionally motivated to put personal messages, pro and con, on these cards to the Governor. Frequent positive comments included, "excellent and courteous," "referral to a job," "exceptionally helpful," "did help me," "satisfied completely," ". . . are helping me and are very nice people." It is also interesting that negative comments, while less

frequent, spanned the entire range of agencies--state and local, private and anti-poverty. For example, specific referral agencies which received negative ratings included: Legal Aid Society, Housing Authority, BES, Harrisburg State Hospital, Volunteers of America, Community Legal Services, Neighborhood Legal Services, the Salvation Army, and the Urban League. Thus, the information from these two samples of referral postcards supports the assertion that the people who entered the system through the Governor's Branch Offices most likely encountered a responsive orientation in the street-level bureaucracies to which they were referred.

Another source of information on responsiveness is contained in two follow-up surveys carried out by the GBO's under the technical assistance of the Office of Planning and Research. The first was a survey of employment referrals in Pittsburgh, conducted in March 1968. The second was a general survey of all discrimination complaints, conducted in 1969. These two surveys were designed and carried out under the direction of Dr. W.W. Vosburgh, Professor of Social Research at the Bryn Mawr Graduate School of Social Work and Social Research; consequently, it is felt that the data from these surveys has a reasonable probability of accuracy and reliability.

In the March 1968 employment survey in Pittsburgh, approximately 95 percent of the referrals to the Bureau of Employment Security reported satisfaction with: (1) length of time they had to wait, (2) the help provided in filling out applications, (3) the interview time allotted, and (4) questions asked concerning the visitor's background and work readiness.<sup>42</sup> This information

tends to support the feedback from the referral postcards, and increases the probability that they contain reliable information.

In 1969, the GBO's, again with the technical assistance of the Office of Planning and Research and Dr. W.W. Vosburgh, conducted a survey on all discrimination complaints. This survey utilized formal, structured questionnaires which were administered by black neighborhood residents (AFDC mothers) who were trained by Dr. Vosburgh and OPR. On the questions of citizen satisfaction with the action of the Governor's Branch Offices, 82 percent of the respondents were satisfied because they felt that the GBO's really tried to help them. Eleven percent were not satisfied because they felt that the Governor's Branch Offices did not have enough power to work on the problems. Seven percent did not choose to comment.<sup>43</sup> Moreover, if a similar problem were to come up in the future, 61 percent stated that they would return to the Governor's Branch Office, and another 15 percent would go to the agency to which the GBO's originally referred them. (The discrimination survey also found a 100 percent success rate of resolution for discrimination complaints which were handled by "GBO only," and less than one-third success for other agencies [the Human Relations Commission and the Bureau of Employment Security].) Furthermore, of those people in the survey who were referred by the GBO's to other agencies, there was general satisfaction with the speed and quality of handling: 88 percent were given an interview within an hour, and 72 percent felt the interview was satisfactory. Had there been no GBO, 43 percent reported that they would have done nothing; 28 percent would have gone to another

agency; 25 percent would have taken self-action (including violence), 2 percent would have quit their job, and 2 percent were undecided on how they would have responded.<sup>44</sup> Thus the information obtained by personal surveys of GBO users also suggests that the GBO's stimulated a responsive stance in the street-level bureaucracies, and the ghetto residents who brought their latent demands to the Governor's representatives reported a high degree of satisfaction with the response which they received.

Evaluative statements of the GBO representatives about their experiences with local offices of other agencies provide another source of documentation of the responsiveness of agencies to GBO demands. In particular, there are many instances in the files of reports about problems with specific local offices. The files show that these reports were brought to the meetings of the entire Council for Human Services, and departmental secretaries were then directed to see that the situation was remedied. In addition, a number of the GBO representatives, as well as other informants who had been privy to these events, reported that changes in the orientation of street-level bureaucrats occurred as a result of such action. Moreover, several GBO workers who had worked in several different street-level bureaucracies during the early GBO period and then had moved into the GBO program at both local and state levels reported enthusiastically that they had observed significant changes in their agencies as a result of GBO prodding (and which stimulated them to become GBO representatives, themselves).

A final source of documentation on the dimensions of responsiveness reported in this section is contained in the statistics on response-time which were calculated on the central office class and legal advocacy cases. This data is presented with the caveat that these are cases which typically required waivers or changes in policy, regulation, or law, and as such, would be expected to take the most time to process, would encounter the most resistance, and would generate the most conflict of all GBO cases. Statistics on the responsiveness variables are presented in conjunction with the two system variables (problem and agency) and depict average variations in the response-time by problems and agency.

Table 12 reports the mean RESTIME by problem and represents the response-time of the various community value-allocating sub-systems to this class of GBO demands. It shows, first of all, that even in this relatively small group of cases, the GBO's placed demands on a variety of political sub-systems asking for organizational changes on behalf of individuals. Secondly, the crosstabulation shows considerable variation in average response-time among the various problem areas. Table 13 reports mean RESTIME by agency. These statistics also reveal a variety of jurisdictions upon which class and legal advocacy demands were made, and considerable variations in this dimension of responsiveness. While investigation of the reasons for specific variations was beyond the purview of this study, it is suggested that many of the differences are reflective of the ability or desire of actors in the various sub-systems and agencies to respond to the demands of the GBO's. Most directly related to

the topic under consideration, however, it is suggested that the degree of response-time represented in these tables is not unreasonable for the types of action which were demanded.<sup>45</sup>

Table 12: GBO Central Office Class and Legal Advocacy  
Mean RESTIME by Problem

Problem (Community Value Sub-System)	Percentage of Total Problems	RESTIME (Days)	
		Mean RESTIME	Median RESTIME
Employment	14.5%	52.9	34.5
Housing	10.1	74.4	56.0
Financial Aid	11.3	37.1	33.5
Medical	4.3	35.3	35.0
Police & Legal	6.3	87.5	47.5
Education	2.5	44.9	69.0
Community Health & Safety	8.6	56.3	44.0
Marital & Family	1.1	24.9	20.0
Complaints	36.6	55.8	32.0
	100.0	Overall Mean 51.4 days	Overall Median 34.5 days



Table 13: GBO Central Office Class and Legal Advocacy  
Mean RESTIME by Agency

Agency	Percentage of Total Problems	RESTIME	
		Mean RESTIME (Days)	Mean Deviation
Department of Justice (including Consumer Protection)	8.2%	79.5	+27.9
Department of Com- munity Affairs	13.2	73.4	+21.9
Council for Human Services	1.4	35.3	-16.2
Civil Service Commission	2.7	43.5	-8.0
Department of Education	5.7	40.4	-11.0
Department of Health	3.9	37.2	-14.3
Human Relations Commission	11.3	69.4	+17.9
Department of Insurance	2.2	84.9	+33.4
Liquor Control Board	1.2	32.3	-19.2
Department of Labor & Industry (including BES & BVR)	11.6	45.9	-5.5
Governor's Office of Administration	2.2	35.6	-15.9
Department of Transporta- tion	2.9	27.3	-24.2
Public Utilities Commis- sion	2.6	30.0	-21.5
Department of Revenue	2.3	20.4	-31.1
Department of State	1.6	20.9	-30.6
Department of Public Welfare			
a) Family Service	14.1	44.0	-7.4
b) MH/MR & MS	5.2	26.9	-24.6
c) Welfare (other)	2.7	41.0	-10.4
Department of Military Affairs	0.8	59.2	+7.8
Legislature	1.0	36.2	-15.2
All Others	2.8	35.6	-15.8

Mean RESTIME 51.4 (N=930)

Furthermore, this data was utilized in conjunction with the time variable (QUARTER) to explore statistically the question of whether the GBO's had any effect on response-time in this group of cases. In particular, the hypothesis was tested that if the GBO's could increase the dimension of responsiveness, there would be a successive temporal decrease in response-time. Table 14 depicts the mean response-time by three-month intervals from October 1, 1967 to September 30, 1970.

Table 14: GBO Central Office Class and Legal Advocacy Mean RESTIME by Intime (Quarter)

Intime (Quarter)	RESTIME	
	Mean (Days)	Mean Deviation
2*	47.2	-4.2
3	54.5	+2.9
4	53.3	+1.8
5	74.2	+22.7
6	47.2	-4.3
7	43.8	-7.7
8	33.5	-18.0
9	30.6	-20.8
10	33.8	-17.6
11	46.7	-4.8
12	28.7	-22.8
13	34.4	-17.1
Overall Mean 51.4 Days		

\*Quarter 1 was excluded to allow for the infatuation period which typically occurs when a highly publicized new program is introduced and which was heightened by the crisis during Summer of 1967. Quarters 14 and 15 were excluded to avoid the effects of the announced phaseout of the GBO's. (Response-time did increase in length during the last two quarters but the number of cases was such as to preclude statistical comparison.)

First of all, there is an observed trend during quarters 2 through 5 for response-time to increase; followed by a general decrease in

the time required to get a response from an agency (degrees of success and failure will be reported later). Thus it appears that after a period of learning and establishing a space in the organizational domain, the GBO's were able to increase the responsiveness of agencies over and above that which obtained initially. Secondly, calculation of Pearson's coefficient of correlation (r) for INTIME vs. RESTIME yields a statistic of  $r = 0.3281$  (at the 0.001 level of significance); this provides statistical support for the hypothesis that as time passed, agencies did indeed respond more quickly to the class and legal advocacy demands placed on them by the GBO's.

#### Summary

In conclusion, it is suggested that the several sources of data presented herein support the assertion that the GBO's precipitated the system to be responsive. To these ends, there is a convergence of information from three years of participant observation, reports of key informants, tabulation of citizen responses on postcards and surveys, documentary reports, review of case histories, and statistical analyses. Consideration of this data suggests that it is not unreasonable to infer that a large majority of the people who were referred by the GBO's to other agencies had efficacious, if not totally successful experiences; it is also suggested that the response-time and quality of treatment received by the ghetto residents who used the GBO's as a channel for their demands was considerably quicker and better than what they would otherwise have expected. It is concluded, therefore, that on the first two

responsiveness variables, the actions of the Governor and of the GBO's in particular, did indeed prod structures in the political system into a responsive stance. Consideration of the final responsiveness variable, resolution, is discussed next.

### Final Resolution of Demands

The ability of agencies to deliver services (system outputs) is a quite different issue from response-time and orientation to service delivery. The capacity of a particular agency or, in some cases, the entire array of agencies in a sub-system to deliver a service is often determined by socio-economic and political factors which are often beyond the control of agency heads or even governmental authorities. For example, the supply of jobs and housing is, to a great degree, not under the control of the various agencies which have been assigned the responsibility for placements, but rather are subject to the forces of the national economy. Public financial assistance levels and eligibility requirements are determined to a considerable degree by the U.S. Congress, federal executive agencies, and the state legislature. Thus, even if the agencies responsible for delivery of services made an all-out effort to respond to GBO demands, there is a high probability that they would not be able to satisfy all demands. While it has been demonstrated that the GBO's most likely did prod a remarkable number and variety of street-level bureaucracies to try harder to respond to the demands of poor, in particular black, people the final outcome of many of the

demands which were placed upon system structures was often unsuccessful.

Assessments of the ultimate responsiveness of community structures to the demands of the GBO's (resolution) are a vast and complex issue for which variation in capability to respond would be expected from structure to structure and organization to organization. Recall also that the ideology of the participants of the GBO program and its anti-bureaucratic character militated against systematic collection of any but the most basic information on volume and type of problem. The only operational form was the 5x7 "problem card"-- used primarily for alerting the Central Office to take action on cases and for providing a general picture of major areas of demand. The GBO's repeatedly rejected suggestions that data on follow-up and resolution could be useful in documenting areas of unresponsiveness as being "bureaucratic" and a diversion from the primary task of helping people. It was this orientation which also led to delay of the evaluation of the GBO's and to eventual return of the funds to Washington. Although some sources were obtained and are reported herein, attempts to document resolution were, for the most part, frustrated.

The following paragraphs comment on resolution of GBO demands in employment, housing, financial aid, and other community value areas. For reasons cited above, these comments are relatively brief, general and speculative. The two follow-up surveys mentioned in the preceding section provide some indication of results in employment and discrimination. The class of central office class

and legal advocacy cases provides definitive data on a limited number of, albeit the most difficult, GBO cases. It is also important to recall the many case examples cited in previous sections which give a general impression that there was a considerable degree of resolution of difficult, often complex, problems. Three years of participant observation and reports of a variety of key informants also tend to suggest that rates of resolution for these types of cases were higher than would otherwise have obtained. Finally, the most important information on system responsiveness revealed by this study is contained in the next chapter, which documents efforts to change various system structures in response to identified areas of unresponsiveness.

Concerning resolution of demands of individuals for employment, the average Pennsylvania unemployment rate was less than the U.S. average for the entire period of this study (the 1967-70 average for Pennsylvania is 3.3 percent, falling several times below 2.8 percent).<sup>46</sup> Thus, most people in the state were employed and most jobs were filled. Finding jobs for the hard-core poor was not just a matter of telling BES or the Civil Service Commission to place people. The Bureau of Employment Security (BES) was the major agency to which the GBO's made referrals (41.1 percent of the employment referrals from the study sample were sent to BES; the GBO employment survey in Pittsburgh in 1968 found 51 percent to BES, 29 percent to other public agencies, and 20 percent directly to private employers).<sup>47</sup> Official BES statistics report that 48 percent of the 3767 individuals referred from the GBO's for the period

August 1, 1967 to June 30, 1970 were given referrals to jobs. Of these, 27 percent were either placed (employment offered and accepted) in jobs or training.<sup>48</sup> The fact that these GBO referrals were hard-core unemployed is underlined by the fact that only about 2 percent (3767 of 189,749) of BES' non-white applicants for jobs during this period came from GBO's, and that 81.8 percent of all BES' non-white applicants were placed in jobs.<sup>49</sup> Thus, only about one in four of the people who were afforded access to the employment structures of the political system by the GBO's experienced a successful resolution of their demands. This lack of placements for poor people created an unacceptable situation for Dr. Georges and the GBO's and precipitated continual efforts at system change in the area of employment. These efforts to change the structures of the system toward being more responsive to the employment-related demands of poor, in particular black, people will be discussed in the next chapter on system change.

Housing is another area where resources are controlled in large part by factors beyond either government or housing agencies. Demands for housing were, perhaps, the most problematic for the Governor's representatives, and the least amenable to control by the Governor. Public housing is typically a local responsibility which is often assigned to an independent authority or board. It is thus difficult to influence policy even through local governing bodies. Private housing is allocated by thousands of contractors, landlords and realtors. Thus, the resources for housing are dominantly in the private sector and the control over supply and allocations is widely dispersed.

Where the GBO's were able to stimulate more responsive resolutions of the shelter demands of visitors to the GBO's, it was more often from a queueing phenomenon than from new or reallocations of this community value. That is, the poor people who came to the GBO's were given priority over other poor people, rather than being allocated new or middle-class resources. For example, Ray Crenshaw, a GBO representative who later became Assistant Coordinator in Harrisburg, indicated that his experiences with public housing authorities produced feelings of frustration and anger. Typically, if a citizen came to the GBO and public housing seemed to be the appropriate resource, Ray would call the housing authority and inform them that he was bringing people over.

We would walk up and there would be this long line of people waiting to make applications. The Man would come out and say, 'Hi, Ray. Come on in.' The people I brought would go right in and be given priority. I wanted to tell all those other people to go to the GBO so I could help them. Really put the pressure on the housing people. But then everyone would be in that same long line. And they would all think the GBO's were no good. This way we probably help those who need it most and the word gets around that the GBO's can do some good.<sup>50</sup>

Because they were not restricted to a particular approach, and their orientation was to get a resolution of citizen's problems by any legitimate means available, the GBO's most likely were able to stimulate more successful resolutions of housing complaints than could other agencies. But the broader socio-political system in controlling the supply of and major means of access to housing was a major factor in keeping the level of successful resolutions lower than was desired. Efforts to stay evictions, to get unfit houses



condemned (as illustrated in earlier sections), and to aid on loan applications were often made. The poor most likely received a much higher response rate to these types of demands than would otherwise have been obtained. On the whole, however, the record suggests that the GBO's were unsatisfied with the rate of resolution of housing problems; this area of community value also became a major issue on the Governor's agenda for "system change." (See Chapter 6.)

The third most frequent area of citizen demand on the GBO's was for financial aid. For this value area, no quantitative data on final resolution is available through the GBO's, although secondary data suggests that resolution was fairly high in cases where people could be qualified under existing regulations (e.g., the case cited above of the non-resident applicant for public assistance when her unemployment compensation had temporarily been cut-off). Moreover, the public assistance caseloads in Pennsylvania showed phenomenal growth beginning in 1967, (see Chapter 6) although the GBO's can be said to be only one of many causal variables here. It is important to recall that if the visitor was not eligible for public assistance, the Governor's representatives sought other sources of financial aid. In this way, ghetto residents experienced a higher level of responsiveness than would have obtained had they applied at the assistance office. Moreover, there was the large number of cases of class and legal advocacy wherein GBO representatives challenged the application of policy and

regulation by the bureaucrats; in this way, they precipitated a more responsive result than would have otherwise obtained.

In other service areas, the available evidence suggests varying rates of response. In the area of medical services, marital and family problems, and legal services, the response rate was fairly good--but then these were areas of low demand. Review of case records and other documentary evidence suggests that the response-rate with legal structures and the police was low. The resolution of community health and safety problems was fairly satisfactory. In the area of discrimination (which was a sub-set of others) the survey mentioned earlier suggests that for the cases handled directly by the GBO's the success rate was high; but for those referred to other agencies the success rate was less than one-third. All in all, consideration of these issues raised more questions than answers are available, for the dynamics of the GBO program and the research project upon which this study is based were such as to preclude overall systematic measurement in these areas. The analysis of Central Office class and legal advocacy cases, however, provides some indication of what might have obtained had data been collected.

#### Statistical Analysis of Case-Record Data

In addition to the statistics on response-time cited earlier, analysis of the central office class and legal advocacy cases yielded a similar set of data on final resolution. Again, this data is presented with the caveat that these are perhaps a

select sub-set of the most difficult class of cases; observations suggest higher (and in some cases lower) rates of resolution for many other categories of problem.

Table 15: GBO Central Office Class and Legal Advocacy Resolution (Percent Favorable) by Problem

Problem (Community Value Sub-System)	Percentage of Total	Action (Percentage Favorable)
Employment	14.5%	51.1%
Housing	10.1	56.4
Financial Aid	11.3	56.2
Medical	4.3	72.5
Police and Legal	6.3	28.8
Education	2.5	56.5
Community Health & Safety	8.6	63.8
Marital and Family	1.1	50.0
Complaints	36.6	44.7
Others	4.7	63.6
	100.0%	Mean % favorable 51.2% N = 930

Table 15 reports the percentage of cases in this group which were resolved favorably; that is, the initial request as written by the citizen on a problem card was resolved successfully. The data shows that just over half of these challenges to existing law, procedure or policy were resolved to the benefit of individuals (51.2%). Secondly, there is considerable variation in resolution among the various community sub-systems--the range being 28.8 percent to 72.5 percent. While adequate comparative data on other programs and appeal mechanisms is not available for judgment of the relative merit of these rates, it is suggested that the data reveals a generally "good" average in comparison to the more neutral ombudsman on what may be considered similar types of demands.<sup>51</sup>

Table 16 reports average resolution by agency. As was the case with response-time, these statistics also reveal wide variation in the success rate for GBO demands on other agencies. Visual inspection of these differences in light of more than three years of participant-observer experiences in the system suggests that many of these differences are reflective of the ability or desire of various agencies to do their work efficiently (RESTIME) and effectively (ACTION). These particular figures should not, however, be considered evaluative of such differences, for provisions in law may restrict certain agencies to specific types of procedure and action (e.g., the Human Relations Commission). In other cases, it is suggested that observed degrees of unresponsiveness as indicated by these statistics, may be the result of conflict, tension or resistant routines between the GBO's and particular agencies (e.g., Labor and Industry was considered a "tough nut to crack"), or even within agencies (in the Department of Public Welfare, the difference between the Office of Family Services and the Office of Mental Health and Mental Retardation [MH/MR], may reflect a conflict between the social work professionals and the supporters of Dr. Georges and the GBO's). In addition, the relative volume of demands for class and legal advocacy in various value-areas or for particular departments may be suggestive that a more general overhaul of policy and procedures was in order, perhaps to deal with changed public or socio-political environmental conditions. In fact, in the areas with the largest volume of problems (employment, housing, and financial need), the GBO's precipitated a considerable number of system change actions.

Table 16: GBO Central Office Class and Legal Advocacy  
Average Action (Percent Favorable) by Agency

Agency	Percentage of Total Problems	Action (Percentage Favorable)
Department of Justice (including Consumer Protection)	8.2%	23.3%
Department of Community Affairs	13.2	57.9
Council for Human Services	1.4	61.5
Civil Service Commission	2.7	52.0
Department of Education	5.7	66.0
Department of Health	3.9	63.9
Human Relations Commission	11.3	31.4
Department of Insurance	2.2	60.0
Liquor Control Board	1.2	54.5
Department of Labor & Industry (including BES and BVR)	11.6	46.3
Governor's Office of Administration	2.2	65.0
Department of Transportation	2.9	57.9
Public Utilities Commission	2.6	66.7
Department of Revenue	2.3	52.4
Department of State	1.6	40.0
Department of Public Welfare		
a) Family Services	14.1	55.0
b) MH/MR & MS	5.2	72.9
c) Welfare (Other)	2.7	44.0
Department of Military Affairs	0.8	71.4
Legislature	1.0	66.7
All Others	2.8	50.0
		Mean Action=51.2% N=930

Finally, the data on resolution of these cases was also used to explore statistically the issue of variation in resolution over time. Table 17 depicts the average percent favorable by three month intervals from October 1, 1967 to September 30, 1970.

Table 17: GBO Central Office Class and Legal Advocacy Average Action (% Favorable) by Intime (Quarter)

INTIME (Quarter)	ACTION (% Favorable)
2*	41.9%
3	42.9
4	48.4
5	56.1
6	51.9
7	55.9
8	52.6
9	66.7
10	62.5
11	50.0
12	54.5
13	64.7
Overall % favorable=51.2%, N=930	

\*See note on Table 15

A similar trend is observed as applied with response-time (Table 14); there is a temporal trend to increase the percentage of cases which are resolved successfully (with a slight aberration in quarters 11 and 12). Calculation of Pearson's  $r$ , for INTIME vs. ACTION yields a coefficient of correlation of  $r = 0.8561$  (at the 0.001 level of significance). This statistic tends to support the inference that over the four-year period of operation, the Governor's Branch Offices were able to precipitate increasing degrees of favorable action of a

variety of system structures to the class and legal advocacy demands of certain disadvantaged individuals.<sup>52</sup>

Finally, concerning the question of the ability of the GBO's to precipitate a successful response irrespective of how long it took to get action, calculation of the partial correlation of ACTION vs. INTIME controlling for RESTIME yielded a partial correlation coefficient of 0.9078, (at the 0.001 level of significance). Thus, it is inferred that the GBO's not only institutionalized the function, they continued to show improvement. Moreover, to the degree that the data upon which this statistic is based is representative of GBO activity in other areas, it seems reasonable to infer that the Governor's Branch Offices demonstrated a capability of establishing themselves in the organizational domain in a position to precipitate meaningful degrees of responsiveness from a variety of political sub-systems.<sup>53</sup>

#### Concluding Comments on Responsiveness

Consideration of the responsiveness of "the system" to the demands of the GBO's leads to the conclusion that the Governor's representatives enjoyed a considerable degree of success in advocating the demands of individual ghetto residents. While the circumstances surrounding the GBO program and the research project precluded the systematic collection and explication of "hard" data on the responsiveness variables, the convergence of data from a variety of sources tends to support the conclusion. Data on response-time suggests that the GBO's, in general, prodded agencies into a stance for more quick and courteous action on behalf of ghetto residents than would have otherwise obtained. Reports of citizen satisfaction by people

who had entered the system through the GBO's suggest that most people reported an efficacious experience. Observations about final resolution (outputs), however, suggest that where resources were available, the people who entered the system through the GBO channel most likely received fairly high degrees of success, but that broader societal forces also operated to present barriers to success. Thus, the successes of the GBO's, although varied, seem to be more salient than their failures.

Secondly, the existence of one group of fully-documented case histories from which quantitative data on the responsiveness variables could be drawn allowed for statistical exploration of the question of institutionalization. Statistics were calculated which suggest that both response-time ( $r = 0.3281$ ), and the average resolution ( $r = 0.8561$ ) improved over time. Moreover, when resolution is considered, controlling for response-time, the responsiveness coefficient (partial correlation) of 0.9078 at the 0.001 level of significance, tends to support the hypothesis that over time the GBO's got better results. These statistics also support the inference that the GBO's established an influential place in the organizational domain.

Finally, statistical observation that there was considerable variation in the response-time and resolution of GBO central office calls and legal advocacy demands by both community sub-systems and type of agency leads to a suggestion that systematic aggregation and analysis of citizens' complaints combined with data on the response of "the system" to the demands: (1) could provide immediate indicators



of felt social needs of citizens; and (2) might well provide indicators of organizational malfunctioning before a disrupting crisis occurs. In this way, such analyses could meet part of the objectives of both the social indicator movement and the management information system movement, both of which are under criticism for not having produced feasible institutions for ongoing, large-scale guidance of social policy and management.<sup>54</sup>

#### Concluding Comments on Citizen's Advocacy on Behalf of Individuals

The data presented herein tends to support the conclusion that a formalized citizen's advocate has the potential to provide, and in the case under consideration actually did provide, a significant degree of effective access for individuals to many sub-systems of the polity, on several levels, and in both public and private sectors. The data also suggests that the citizen's advocate precipitated a responsive stance on the part of many socio-political structures in terms of response-time and observed desire to fulfill the demands placed on them by the Governor's Branch Offices than would otherwise have obtained. Furthermore, in the case under consideration, the disadvantaged individuals whose demands were injected into "the system" by the GBO's most likely experienced a higher degree of responsiveness in terms of resolution of the demand than would otherwise be the case. While the Governor's Branch Offices were established in a period of system stress when it would be expected that community structures would exhibit a relatively high degree of responsiveness, after the crisis was over

the GBO's remained in the community and continued to provide a valuable, increasingly effective service in providing three types of citizen's advocacy for a class of disadvantaged individuals vis-a-vis the structures of a polycentric political system.

The data also suggests that, as explicated by Ostrom, Ries and others,<sup>55</sup> the question of responsiveness in the modern polity is an issue which is highly diffuse both from the point of view of control as well as from considerations of analysis. First of all, the degree of differentiation and concomitant division of jurisdictional authority among various sectors, levels and value-allocating sub-systems is so complex as to allow even the lowest unit of an organization a degree of decisional autonomy vis-a-vis others in its organization set. This phenomenon allows the members of each unit the capacity to thwart the direct application of authority by a chief executive or his duly authorized representative. Moreover, the structures for value-allocation, decision and adjudication in the polycentric polity are so diffuse and amorphous (kaleidoscopic) that no structure or level of authority has effective control over any area of community value. Consequently, consideration of the responsiveness of community structures to citizen demands--especially in the ultimate question of results (output)--is first of all a quite different and secondly a more complex and problematic issue than is access. Thus, the citizen's advocate may be able to develop the capability: (1) to provide effective access to the sub-systems of the polity; (2) to prod community structures into a responsive stance; (3) to provide a steering and linkage function among the diffuse and amorphous structures of the

polity; and (4) to precipitate a higher degree of responsiveness than would otherwise obtain for a given demand or set of demands. It is also suggested that the citizen's advocate will not (and perhaps should not) be able to develop the capability to control or command the supply of services which are available for allocation by community structures.

Thus, it seems reasonable to expect that citizen's advocacy programs can develop the capacity to affect changes within the system, but not "of" the system. In this latter area, however, it has been suggested that the citizen's advocate can provide a window on the immediate state of the polity and serve as an institution for the aggregation of the demands of otherwise unorganized individuals and interests, and which can, in turn, articulate these demands into issues for injection into broader political processes. In this way, it is suggested that citizen's advocates may serve as gatekeepers for changes in law, program and public policy.

The following chapter on the "system change" activities of the Governor's Branch Offices presents some formative data on the system change actions of the GBO's. In terms of the typology of citizen's advocacy which is presented in Chapter 2, these activities are defined as citizen's advocacy on behalf of interests, and in most cases represent demands for changes in various political sub-systems toward improvements in processes for existing allocations, for reallocations (redistributions) of existing values, or for creation of new or additional public allocations of values.

## Chapter 5: Notes

<sup>1</sup>GBO Archive: an internal staff paper, undated but most likely circa October 1967. The paper was oriented to consideration of how to solidify the existing program and to consider the dynamics of a strategy to move from the initial individual-oriented phase to "the more widely ramified phases of large-scale institutional reform [which] are therefore of extreme interest and importance."

<sup>2</sup>U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, General Population Characteristics by Race (1970), Table 22: Household and Family Characteristics by Race, (1970), reports 297,681 black households, 224,263 black families and 1,016,514 black individuals in Pennsylvania.

<sup>3</sup>Comparable breakdowns for the study sample are included in the following table (18):

Table 18: Local Level Citizen's Advocacy by Type of Advocacy and Sub-System (Study Sample)

Community Value Area	Column Total	Type of Advocacy			Row Total
		Case	Class	Legal	
Employment	20.7%	96.2%	2.4%	1.4%	100%
Housing	13.8	77.7	6.5	15.8	100
Financial Aid	17.8	91.1	0.0	8.9	100
Medical	1.5	86.7	13.3	0.0	100
Police	8.3	21.4	1.2	77.4	100
Education	1.6	93.8	0.0	6.3	100
Public Health	2.6	0.0	100.0	0.0	100
Complaints	9.9	68.0	29.0	2.0	100
Family	1.5	100.0	0.0	0.0	100
No Specific Problem	22.3	100.0	0.0	0.0	100
Column Percentages	T 100.0	T 80.3	T 8.6	T 10.8	N=1009 Ms.Data=3

<sup>4</sup>A systematic probability sampling plan was utilized. Following a random start (utilizing a table of random numbers), every fifteenth case was selected to provide a sample of roughly 1000 cases. Since the cards were numbered as they came in, there was no systematic bias in the variables used herein; this method of sampling was therefore considered acceptable. In fact, the percentages of the various types of problems, and the various types of advocacy in the sample, when compared to the overall statistics on the GBO's were found to vary, at most, by only a few percentage points. Thus, the study sample is considered to be representative of the larger population. (See Table 19.)

Table 19: Comparison of Proportions of Problems for Overall GBO Activity with the April-December 1970 Sample Periods & the Study Sample

Problem Area	Overall GBO* (Four Years)	Sample Period*	Study Sample
Employment	26.7%	20.7%	20.7%
Housing	15.6	15.2	13.8
Financial Aid	16.6	18.8	17.8
Medical	1.5	1.9	1.5
Police	6.3	8.2	8.3
Education	1.0	1.4	1.6
Community Health	1.7	2.8	2.6
Complaints	6.0	7.5	9.9
Family	1.0	1.2	1.5
No Specific	23.6	22.0	22.3
Total	100.0 N=78,039	99.7 N=15,102	100.0 N=1009

\*Source: GBO Archive--calculated from monthly statistics.

The sample was coded to reflect the interactions of the GBO's with other agencies. In some cases where demands were placed on another agency, however, a strict "referral" was not involved, e.g., if a person had been to an agency and then complained to the GBO, following which the GBO placed a demand on the agency on behalf of the individual, the case would not be considered a strict referral. Thus there is some discrepancy between the proportion of overall case statistics which are labeled "referrals," and the demands on other agencies which are reflected in the sample.

<sup>5</sup>It should be stated that the definitions and typology of types of citizen's advocacy were not developed until after the data on the GBO program was gathered. Nevertheless, the data shows that the GBO's provided all three types of citizen's advocacy in all value-allocating sub-systems with a wide variety of jurisdictional structures. These facts are both evidence of and testimony to the versatility of the GBO's; and of the utility of the field research method in allowing the grounded theory of citizen's advocacy to emerge from events in the field. Thus, it was the search for appropriate theoretical and methodological constructs to describe the phenomena which occurred in the arena of action that led to the eventual bringing together of perspectives on the polycentric political system, problems of modernization and the growth of the administrative state, representation and participation regarding access for individuals and unorganized interests, and the growing movement to search for new institutions to deal with these problems. While this discussion of local-level GBO action is organized under the three types of citizen's advocacy in order to explicate the interaction of the GBO's in the various functional areas of the political system, the underlying theory from these several bodies of literature should be kept in mind. The focus of the present discussion is most explicitly related to determining whether the GBO's were able to provide the three types of citizen's advocacy for unorganized, relatively unrepresented individuals, and thus to suggest that citizen's advocacy programs are one viable rationalizing and humanizing alternative in the face of greater complexity, diversity, specialization, remoteness, and depersonalization in the political system and the community at large.

<sup>6</sup>For example, if a visitor presented a complaint of discrimination by a community agency and the GBO representative decided to act directly with the agency (rather than rely on a third agency like the Human Relations Commission or a legal services agency), and if the demand was resolved solely in this manner, the case would fall into the "GBO only" category. If, however, the GBO representative placed a demand on a third agency to resolve the case, the case would fall into the category of a referral to or an intervention through another agency. (These latter types of demands will be discussed in a later section.)

<sup>7</sup>In support of the statement made earlier that people tended to present only serious demands to the GBO's, only one case in the sample might be considered a bit whimsical. This was a case wherein one woman wanted information on raising parakeets; but this, too, was taken seriously, providing additional support for the assertion that the Governor's representatives did, in fact, interact with people as people and that all problems were considered legitimate.

<sup>8</sup>Robert K. Merton, "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality," in Merton, et.al., eds. Reader in Bureaucracy, (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1952), p. 370. Also Gouldner, "Red Tape as a Social Problem," in ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Herbert Gans, The Urban Villagers, (N.Y.: The Free Press, 1965), also Sjoberg, et.al., op.cit., and Waldhorn, op.cit., and Gouldner, op.cit. for additional comments on the relationships between bureaucrats and clients, especially the lower class. See also Durkheim op.cit., and Kornhouser, op.cit., on lack of intermediate links between individuals and society.

<sup>10</sup> While not specifically addressed in this paper, it is suggested that this analysis recognizes the suggestion of Theodore Lowi that there exists not one political system, but rather several different political systems, each with its own area of community value, its own rules, its own constituency, its own rationality, and its own unique set of processes for decision-making, allocation and adjudication. The different types of methods and qualities of interaction vis-a-vis access to and responsiveness in the various value-allocating areas which were encountered by the GBO's tends to lend weight to his hypotheses. Theodore J. Lowi, Four Systems of Policy, Politics and Choice, (Syracuse, N.Y.: The Inter-University Case Program, Inc., November 1971), monograph.

<sup>11</sup> The following tables (20 and 21) contain further breakdowns of the data. The n's for these percentages are small; therefore, the percentages should be considered as suggestive rather than definitive. The proportions are varied enough, however, to support the points made herein that the pattern of demands was indeed very different for the different value sub-systems of the polity.

Table 20: Jurisdictional Structures and Types of Community Organizations upon which Demands were Placed by the GBO's by Community Value-Allocating Sub-Systems

Jurisdictional Structure	Value-Allocating Sub-Systems				
	Employment	Housing	Financial Aid	Police & Legal	Community Health
<u>GBO Only</u>					
Information Only	6.2%	18.7%	12.8%	14.3%	26.9%
Opinion	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.0
Advice and Aid	2.4	1.4	1.1	3.6	0.0
Transportation	0.5	0.7	20.0	1.2	0.0
Follow-up	0.5	2.9	0.0	3.6	7.7
Direct Service	4.8	0.7	1.7	0.0	0.0
Complaint-State	1.4	0.7	0.0	7.1	3.8
Complaint-Local	0.0	2.9	0.6	2.4	38.5
Complaint-Private	1.9	7.2	3.3	0.0	0.0
To Harrisburg	0.5	0.7	0.0	2.4	0.0
<u>Local Unit of a State-Level Department</u>					
Bureau of Employment Sec.	41.1	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.0
County Brd of Assistance	1.4	2.2	33.3	1.2	0.0
Civil Service Commission	4.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Department of Trans.	0.0	0.7	0.0	4.8	3.8
Human Relations Com.	1.4	0.7	0.6	0.0	0.0
Other State	1.5	2.9	0.6	4.4	3.8
<u>Local Governmental Agency</u>					
Local Government	2.9	10.1	0.6	7.1	15.4
Local Authority or Com.	0.0	15.8	0.6	0.0	0.0
<u>Voluntary or Private Sector</u>					
Voluntary Social or Private Health	2.1	2.9	12.8	1.2	0.0
College or University	1.4	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.0
Interest Group	1.4	2.2	1.7	3.6	0.0
Private Practitioner	9.1	7.2	2.8	2.4	0.0
<u>Local Anti-Poverty Agency</u>	7.7	9.4	1.7	0.0	0.0
<u>Local Legal Service Agency</u>	1.9	5.8	0.6	34.5	0.0
<u>Courts</u>	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.6	0.0
<u>Local Office of Federal Ag.</u>	1.4	2.9	2.2	1.2	0.0
<u>Problem Indicated but no Action Taken</u>	2.9	1.4	1.7	1.2	0.0
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0



Table 21: Types of Jurisdictional Structures with which the GBO's Interacted by Type of Advocacy

Jurisdictional Structure	Column %	Type of Advocacy			Total %
		Case	Class	Legal	
GBO Only	44.6%	75.1%	14.7%	10.0%	100%
Local Office of State Agency	24.7				
Bureau of Employment Security		100.0	0.0	0.0	100
County Brd of Public Assist.		92.4	5.7	1.9	100
Civil Service Commission		100.0	0.0	0.0	100
Department of Transportation		44.4	11.1	44.4	100
Human Relations Commission		33.3	0.0	66.6	100
Other State		68.0	12.0	16.0	100
Local Government	7.0				
Local Gov. Admin. & Other		75.0	11.4	13.6	100
Local Housing Authority		91.7	0.0	8.3	100
Private or Voluntary	10.7				
Voluntary Social Service & Private Health		90.5	4.8	4.8	100
College & University		100.0	0.0	0.0	100
Interest Group		69.2	0.0	30.8	100
Private Profit		91.5	0.0	8.5	100
Local Anti-Poverty Agency	3.4	97.1	0.0	2.9	100
Legal Services & Court	5.1	47.1	2.0	51.0	100
Court		66.7	0.0	33.3	100
Federal-Local Office	2.6	92.3	3.8	3.8	100
Total	98.1	80.3	8.6	10.8	100 N=1009

<sup>12</sup> Alfred Kahn, Social Policy and Social Service, discusses the need for and application of "access" as a social service, op.cit.

<sup>13</sup> GBO Archive: Feedback, (September 27, 1967).

<sup>14</sup> Eric Nordlinger, Decentralizing the City, (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1972), reviews several models for decentralization, finding multi-service systems tend to increase efficiency but no evidence of increased impact on the client population or any reported increase in responsiveness. Apparently, the improvement of such arrangements accrues to the administration and bureaucrats, not to their clients.

<sup>15</sup> GBO Archive: Undated memorandum, (circa October 1967).

<sup>16</sup> The major sub-headings and the number of sub-sub headings which were utilized are as follows: local office of a state agency (eight sub-sub headings), voluntary governmental agency, authority, or commission (five sub-sub headings), voluntary social service agency (one sub-sub heading), private health (one), colleges or universities (one), interest group, union or political party (one), private profit (one), poverty allies (three), courts (one), local office of federal agency (one). These categories represent natural groupings which emerged from review of the problem cards, and in a few cases where the number of problems was low, the categories were collapsed. See Note 11 above.

<sup>17</sup> Philip M. Stern, The Rape of the Taxpayer, (N.Y.: Random House, 1973), documents cases of special laws being passed by Congress on behalf of certain privileged individuals. Merton, op.cit., speaks of situations where individuals need or ask for exceptions to or for special rules to meet unusual situations. The concept of class advocacy as used herein includes both types of cases and can be used as an organizing concept for investigating issues of who gets what types of special rules and in what situations, and by what levels and structures of the political system. This study suggests that the GBO's were able to provide a degree of effective class advocacy on behalf of disadvantaged people.

<sup>18</sup> In fact, it was de rigueur among the GBO staff and the planners (especially white liberals) to belong to WRO and to sport a WRO button: "5500 or Fight."

<sup>19</sup> GBO Archive: Speech by Governor Shafer, (July 26, 1967).

<sup>20</sup> GBO Archive: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Governor's Office, "Remarks by Governor Raymond P. Shafer to Governor's Branch Office representatives," (August 15, 1967).

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Woll, op.cit., notes the narrow line between distinctions over class and legal advocacy.

<sup>23</sup> GBO Archive: Feedback, (October 11, 1967).

<sup>24</sup> Kahn, op.cit., Chapter 1.

<sup>25</sup> Nordlinger, op.cit., Chapter 1, provides a thorough review and analysis of the literature in this area. Also, pertinent is material on elaborate management mechanisms such as PPBS and community councils. See also George J. Washnis, Municipal Decentralization and Neighborhood Resources, (N.Y.: Praeger Publishers, 1972).

<sup>26</sup> Richard A. Cloward and Richard M. Elman, "Advocacy in the Ghetto," in Catherine Binstock, ed., The Politics of the Powerless, (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop Publishers, Inc., 1971), pp. 176-185.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> GBO Archive: Executive Directive #35, op.cit.

<sup>30</sup> GBO Archive: Governor Shafer's speech to GBO representatives, (July 31, 1967), op.cit.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> GBO Archive: Feedback, (September 11, 1967).

<sup>33</sup> GBO Archive: Speech by Governor Shafer, (July 26, 1967).

<sup>34</sup> GBO Archive: Feedback, (September 11, 1967).

<sup>35</sup> GBO Archive: draft of a procedures manual which was never formalized, but which was used to instruct workers in these principles in training sessions and telephone supervision.

<sup>36</sup> GBO Archive: Feedback, (August 28, 1967).

<sup>37</sup> A current project of the researcher on the successor program to the GBO's--the Governor's Action Center (GAC)--has systematic measures of response-time and resolution. This project has documented the fact that 87.5% of the "GAC only" cases are resolved in one day, 94.5% in one week. (Moreover, 85.6% of all GAC cases are resolved successfully.) Thus these conclusions about the GBO's do not seem unreasonable. Drew Hyman, et.al., the Governor's Action Center, Third Quarter Report, Pennsylvania State University, Center for Human Services Development (CHSD Report #44), (January-March 1974), monograph.

38 As mentioned in Chapter 3, the search of the GBO Archive revealed several file cases of fully documented case records. The discovery of these case records seemed unusual because the rhetoric of the program, and continued observation of operations, suggested that such detailed records were not typically maintained by the Governor's Branch Offices. Inquiries to the GBO Coordinator's staff about the characteristics of these cases were somewhat inconclusive: the cases were described as "the more difficult cases," "long-term cases that needed follow-up," and "policy-change cases." It was apparent, however, that this was not a completely accidental sample nor was it a random sample of GBO Central Office activity; these cases had most likely been separated out from all the rest for special treatment by some criterion, probably systematically, but the criterion was not explicitly set out. In light of the fact that there were few fully-documented histories of case actions, it was decided that this pool of records represented a valuable source of data, and information on the several responsiveness variables was systematically extracted.

During the review of these records it became apparent that they involved challenges to the various organizations and agencies in the system--many were complaints about policies or programs. Thus, the initial hypothesis of the researcher was that they represented traditional ombudsman-type demands for redress of grievances against administrative misjudgments. A few calculations concerning the proportion of the GBO caseload revealed that they represented approximately the same percentage of cases which are typically accepted by an ombudsman when compared to problems presented. If it could be determined that this was indeed the case, the data could be utilized to characterize the responsiveness of the GBO's in at least this one, and perhaps the most important aspect of the GBO program.

Further search of the GBO Archive revealed a procedures manual which outlined several criteria for processing GBO cases. While this manual had never been published (because of concern that it would tend to lock the workers into fixed routines and rigidify parts of the GBO operation), it was used by the Coordinator's Office in training workers. In fact, the manual was discovered in the file on training sessions. This manual provided further evidence which suggested systematic criteria by which cases were isolated for different types of handling. The categories of criteria for escalation of a demand to Central Office mentioned in Chapter 4, were drawn primarily from this document. Triangulation of these facts with interview and case-record data tended to confirm the hypothesis that these principles were applied in practice. As specifically related to the groups of cases under consideration here, one of the three criteria for central office handling is that a citizen demand "could not be resolved because of existing policy which must be waived or changed." This information lent further weight to the idea that these cases did indeed represent a systematic sample.

Later, with the emergence of the grounded theory of three types of citizen's advocacy, it was hypothesized that these cases represented some portion of the central office class and legal advocacy problems.

Breakdowns of the overall statistics on case-handling, and the analysis of the sample local-level handling by three types of advocacy revealed that 16.7% of the overall four-year caseload, and that 19.4% of the 1970 sample on local-level handling were class and legal advocacy. Conceding the validity of these figures, it would be expected that about 14% of the 10,633 central cases, or about 1480 cases, would represent central office class and legal advocacy demands. There were 1409 cases in the group of fully-documented cases, all of which the researcher, through actual review of the records, classified as class or legal advocacy. Thus, it will be assumed for present purposes that these cases represent the universe of class and legal advocacy for individuals cases which were escalated to the Central Office for action. (Despite some lingering reservations that this is indeed the case, it is considered important that the data be presented here for triangulation with the other sources.)

<sup>39</sup>GBO Archive: Feedback, (September 11, 1967), reporting results of the OPR tabulation to the Governor's Branch Office representatives.

<sup>40</sup>The postcards in this sample represent approximately 5% of the referrals made by the GBO's, and might well represent a systematic random sample. While it was suggested that these cards represent the selection by Governor's Office staff of every nth card from the four-year file prior to disposal in 1972, the researcher is not completely convinced of the reliability and representativeness of the sample.

<sup>41</sup>Tabulation of referral postcards from GBO Archive by the researcher.

<sup>42</sup>GBO Archive: "Survey of Employment Referrals in Pittsburgh," (March 1968).

<sup>43</sup>GBO Archive: "The Discrimination Survey," Office of the Coordinator, (1969).

<sup>44</sup>Ibid.

<sup>45</sup>The researcher could locate no work on expected or normal processing (RESTIME). Stuart Nagel's work, op.cit., on judicial delay is one work in this general area but does not present data on usual or expected time of processing. Likewise, the ombudsman literature does not report data other than volume and manner of handling of problems. Nor did Nordlinger report such information from his study of Boston's Little City Halls. One source of such information was located which gave the average number of days for processing various federal appeals. From this information, the data from 85 different reports was averaged yielding a mean length of

processing for federal appeals of 461.5 days and a median of 324.5 days. Thus, the federal appeals processes take an average of about a year for completion as compared to the less than two months for these GBO cases which represented appeals from local-level decisions or existing policy and regulation. See also Gellhorn, op.cit., Nagel, op.cit., and Rowat, op.cit., for data and a discussion of casework of legislators.

<sup>46</sup> Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 16th Biennial Report, (July 1966-June 1968), and 17th Biennial Report 1968-1970, Department of Labor and Industry, Bureau of Employment Security.

<sup>47</sup> GBO Archive: "Survey of Employment Referrals in Pittsburgh," (March 1968).

<sup>48</sup> Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 17th Biennial Report 1968-1970, Department of Labor and Industry, Bureau of Employment Security, p. 29.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid. The percentages were calculated from data on pages 10 and 29 of the BES report. The accuracy of these BES statistics is confirmed by the GBO survey of employment referrals in Pittsburgh. Both BES statistics and the reports of individuals who responded to the GBO survey of employment referrals report identical placement rates.

An alternative interpretation might suggest that the low percentage of placements for GBO referrals might well be due to BES attempting to sabotage the GBO program. All indications from the several sources of data upon which this study is based, including documents, statements of high and low officials, surveys and reports of people who visited the GBO's--would militate against this interpretation. The researcher has every indication to believe that BES, as other agencies, gave at least preferential treatment to GBO referrals.

<sup>50</sup> Interview.

<sup>51</sup> Donald C. Rowat, The Ombudsman, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), provides statistics from various sources on existing ombudsman systems. While he does not report directly on success and failure, it can be inferred that the proportion which was "discussed," or "investigated with no direct action" did not lead to citizen demanded action, and that "criticism," "prosecution," and "proposals to government" may indeed have. The percent of cases in the latter three categories for Sweden's Ombudsmen for civil affairs from 1910 to 1963 is 15.8%; for Finland's Ombudsmen in 1963 the figure is 3.3%, for Denmark's Ombudsmen the figure for 1963 is 5.6%; and for Norway's Ombudsmen for Civil Affairs the figure is 6.8%. GBO action in this class of complaints is 44.7% favorable.



<sup>52</sup>Comparison of the data on the Action variable of this portion of the GBO record with similar categories for the successor program, the Governor's Action Center, yields similar statistics (i.e., overall percent favorable for GBO's is 51.2% and for similar categories for the Governor's Action Center it was approximately 55%--compared to 90% for GAC case advocacy). While the methods of operation for the two programs differ greatly, their overall objectives of citizen's advocacy are similar, and the fact that the more rigorously prepared data from the latter program yields similar proportions as that from the GBO's tends to lend credibility to the inferences from the GBO data.

<sup>53</sup>Consideration of possible intervening variables tends to support, rather than challenge, these inferences. For example, especially in view of the charismatic use of authority, it might be expected that a particularly strong individual might have developed the capability to "move the system." In fact, there was no one except 36 of the local representatives who remained with the program for the entire four years. At the central office level, there were two different Secretaries of Public Welfare and two Acting Secretaries of Public Welfare. William Nagel, Executive Director of the Council for Human Services, became increasingly less directly involved after the first year of the program and left state government after the third year, leaving two staff members to carry on. There were four different GBO Coordinators and three different sets of the two Assistant Coordinators over the four year period. Such changes are typical for state government in Pennsylvania, and occurred in the departments with which the GBO's interrelated as well (i.e., there were several Secretaries of Labor and Industry, Administration, Community Affairs, etc.). Thus it seems improbable that a particularly strong individual was responsible for these results. A second possible intervening variable would be a change in the nature of or seriousness of problems; but review of cases and interviews with the different people who processed them suggests that as time went on the problems were as difficult and tough to deal with, or more so, at the end of the program as at the beginning. Consequently, it is the judgment of the researcher that these factors were not significant in leading to these findings.

<sup>54</sup>Hyman, et.al., op.cit., these ideas have been explicated elsewhere by the author and are not reproduced here. Moreover, a current project is developing the ideas and will lead to more definitive explication of these ideas in due time.

<sup>55</sup>See Chapter 1, especially footnotes.

## CHAPTER 6: "SYSTEM CHANGE": CITIZEN'S ADVOCACY FOR INTERESTS

Many writers, among them Lipset, Crozier, Weber, Dahrendorf, Jacoby, Strauss, Woll and Lowi,<sup>1</sup> have commented on the significant degree of control which professional bureaucrats have over their agencies, and the resulting politics by administration. These writers depict a situation wherein elected representatives and the general population, are to a considerable degree at the mercy of professional bureaucracies for value allocations, information on operations, development of legislative and political proposals, for spelling out general legislation into operational directives, and for oversight and evaluation of "the system." As a result, a large amount of public policy is controlled by the bureaucrats themselves: the bureaucrats tend to become what Strauss calls "ruling servants."<sup>2</sup>

The previous chapter demonstrated that the Governor's Branch Offices enjoyed considerable success in getting people into "the system" and in prodding organizations in the various community sub-systems into a responsive stance. This chapter suggests that the GBO's were also able to identify many specific areas of law, policy, program and procedure which were systematically creating barriers to the demands of poor, in particular black, people. In this second area of citizen's advocacy the GBO's functioned as a gatekeeper for the demands of the disadvantaged people whose



interests they were instructed to represent. The general patterns in demands of individuals, and frequently individual cases were utilized as "negative feedback" or "error signals" to identify specific problems in law, regulation, policy or procedure in order to precipitate the chief executive to take what were called "system change" actions.<sup>3</sup>

It will be shown that the Governor's Branch Offices precipitated many such actions in the socio-political structures of Pennsylvania. These changes were intended to make "the system" more responsive to poor, in particular black, people. The GBO's also presented demands in several areas which led the Governor to initiate action toward incremental changes of the system itself--i.e., toward public assumption of increased responsibility for providing housing, jobs, adequate income, etc. Each of the system change actions which are described below represent specific demands which the citizen's advocate (the GBO's) injected into the political process at the highest level of executive authority in the polity. In this manner, the Governor's Branch Offices provided a channel of effective access for the demands of disadvantaged interests, and thus included this public in the vital definition phase of the political process; thus, this chapter reveals a spectrum of demands on the political system which would otherwise be "non-decisions." Moreover, the use of citizen problems and complaints to identify problems of specific agencies or organizations which were structurally or procedurally problematic included these disadvantaged citizens in the accountability stage by providing a new mechanism which allowed the Governor

and his staff to break into the "cycle of stable rigidity" which pertains in many areas.<sup>4</sup>

The pattern of success and failure in this second area of citizen's advocacy, citizen's advocacy on behalf of interests, varies considerably. The experience of the Governor's Branch Offices in identifying systemic barriers, in seeking access for changes, and in trying to precipitate a responsive resolution leads to two major observations: (1) the citizen's advocate was capable of providing access for interests (system change) for a wide variety of demands, and was successful in precipitating a responsive stance in some of the authorities; and (2) success was most likely where demands were for changes within existing law and policy and not of basic structures. Throughout these discussions it is important to bear in mind that the phrase "system change" is used within a frame-of-reference wherein socio-political structures are seen as being relatively inaccessible and unresponsive to the demands of a certain class of people.<sup>5</sup> In this context, "system change" refers primarily to changes within system structures to provide a new channel of access and to make "the system" more responsive to certain interests by precipitating changes in law, policy, program or procedure; this use of the phrase is most compatible with the concepts of adaptation and reform. (While some of the people who used the term in GBO operations desired a general redistribution of power, the "system change" actions precipitated by the GBO's were, in practice, not demands for a general redistribution of power. i.e., for a socio-political revolution or a major change in the national

economic system.) The sections which follow discuss some of the citizen's advocacy for interests activities of the GBO's. First, the overall policy orientation of the Governor is addressed. Then sections are presented on some of the actions which were precipitated in the employment, housing, financial aid, law enforcement, legal services and other value-allocating sub-systems of the polity. These discussions are not intended to be exhaustive descriptions of the activity of the citizen's advocacy for interests of the Governor's Branch Offices nor are they represented to be analyses of the dynamics of "the system" in particular situations.<sup>6</sup> Rather, these discussions are intended to suggest that the GBO's experience demonstrates that a formalized citizen's advocate has the potential for providing an effective channel for (some of) the demands of unorganized individuals and interests.

#### "System Change" Activities of the GBO's

The officials in Pennsylvania who designed the state's response to the 1967 crisis were aware of the wide degree of autonomy which bureaucracies enjoy vis-a-vis elected officials; they were also keenly aware of the unresponsiveness which results.<sup>7</sup> In fact, one stated objective of Governor Shafer and his staff was to use the Governor's Branch Offices to identify organizational and programmatic malfunctions. This information, in turn, was intended to precipitate changes in law, policy, regulation, or procedure as required. For example, Dr. Georges' staffing paper on solidifying

the GBO's in the fall of 1967 indicates that while the GBO's were "frankly intended to provide an immediate lessening of tensions in the inner cities," they most importantly "represent a fortuitous implementation, in terms of mechanics and phasing, of two primary goals of the broader human services reform plan."<sup>8</sup> More specifically, Dr. Georges stated that the GBO's were intended

. . . to provide (1) an institutionalized challenge to the existing service establishment to achieve, in a humane and dignified manner its maximum effectiveness within the constraints of policy and resources; and (2) to document the need for specific reforms, expansions and innovations in human service programs.<sup>9</sup>

The fact that such statements were expressive of policy and were not merely symbolic is corroborated by the analyses in the two previous chapters, participant observation over an extended period, interviews with a variety of informants, and the documentary evidence on many system change actions presented below. It is suggested that the people who established the GBO's anticipated that problems brought to the citizen's advocates would aid them in identifying or verifying the "gaps, duplications, inefficiencies and deficiencies in existing human services programs and in the systems of procedures for delivery of services."<sup>10</sup> The system change actions outlined below are manifestations of this objective.

#### Reorientation of the Overall Program of the Governor

The people who established the GBO's did not anticipate that the demands which were placed on the system by the GBO's would precipitate a significant change in the basic orientation of the

Governor and his staff. It was expected that the citizen's advocacy activity of the GBO's and the areas for system change which they identified would relate primarily to "dysfunctions" in the socio-political sub-systems which were responsible for social services, physical and mental health, education, and the police. This expectation is not surprising for it was in keeping with contemporary theory about the problems of poor people.<sup>11</sup> The relative weight of the demands which people brought to the GBO's, however, presented quite a different picture for employment and housing were the top priority demands brought to the GBO's. Furthermore, the citizen's advocacy for individuals aspect of the GBO program provided for escalation of the more difficult problems to the Governor's Office; this meant that the top officials of the state were in daily confrontation with some of the more difficult problems of "the system."

Several informed sources, documentary evidence, and statements by Governor Shafer himself, suggest that the daily confrontation of the manifest demands of the "other America" led to a distinct change in the "characteristic thinking"<sup>12</sup> of Governor Shafer, several key aides, and a number of cabinet officers about the nature of the problems which faced poor people, and in turn the most appropriate response for the Commonwealth. These facts were stated explicitly; for example, the 1967 year-end report to the Governor of the Council for Human Services highlighted the fact that:

The range of problem types [brought to the Council by the GBO's] was much broader than might be expected. Surprisingly, the Governor's Branch Office experience indicated that the concentration of complaints lay not in the traditional areas of child welfare and mental health services, for example,

but in basic concerns such as housing, subsistence, and employment.<sup>13</sup>

As a consequence of establishing the GBO's and being open to their demands, Governor Shafer was led to a decision that the remainder of his term in office should place priority on providing for the demonstrated needs of the poor people of the state as they defined them, not as defined by the bureaucracies or other traditional sources of influence. Moreover, the Governor was led to an expansionist stance which was quite at variance with the hold-the-line-fiscal-conservative-Republican from rural, Meadville, Pennsylvania, orientation which would most likely have obtained. Several key informants, as well as close associates of Governor Shafer independently volunteered information which supports these facts. In Governor Shafer's own words: "The Branch Office program has, in a very real way, propelled my office into the immediacy of everyday's most perplexing human problems."<sup>14</sup> Thus, the problems which people brought to the GBO's were significant in establishing a high degree of attentive interest in the top levels of government in Pennsylvania, in stimulating the Governor to be responsive to the demands of black people, and, in turn, in his continued support for the Governor's Branch Office program.

(It is also significant to note that while this transformation occurred in Governor Shafer and his immediate staff, a similar change did not occur throughout the entire political system. In fact, Governor Shafer's change in orientation was not well received in conservative Republican circles, and led to an eventual decline

in support for the Governor's program, a fact which some observers have called his "political suicide." Moreover, on the other side of the legislative aisle, the Democrats were reluctant to allow a Republican Governor to have the credit for a large number of progressive reforms, and thus did not provide all of the support which would have been needed to enact many of the changes which were anticipated. While this study is not directed to the inter- and intra-party dynamics surrounding these events, this observation is suggestive of some of the factors which conditioned the responsiveness of "the system" to the system change actions described herein.)

Thus, the first act of citizen's advocacy on behalf of interests which was precipitated by the GBO's was a major change in the orientation of key authorities which in turn resulted in a transformation of the direction of government itself. Governor Shafer's decision that the remainder of his term in office should place priority on the development and improvement of the lot of disadvantaged people is seen as being intimately associated with the confrontation of the demands which were injected into the system by the Governor's Branch Offices and the people who were associated with their establishment and operation.<sup>15</sup> The following sections document some of the specific changes within system structures which were precipitated by the GBO's in the areas of employment, housing, financial aid, police, legal services, and "others."

Change in the Employment Sub-System: Improved Access and Responsiveness and Incremental Steps toward Publicly Assured Jobs

Increased Public Responsibility

The shift in focus of the Governor and his super-cabinet Council for Human Services (and in turn the Secretaries of several of the departments under it) from problems of social services, child welfare, health, and education, toward the areas of employment, housing and subsistence led toward governmental assumption of a larger role in the allocation of these values or public goods. The first efforts in employment involved an intensification of efforts by the state governmental authorities with the private sector to identify and to create new jobs. A "Task Force on Minority Employment" was established to influence the private sector, in particular large employers, to create and redistribute jobs. The Task Force also developed agreements for industry support of a new non-profit corporation using industrial contributions and public funds to provide jobs and training for black people.<sup>16</sup> A "Job Insurance Program" was obtained and financed through an OEO grant which insured employers for taking "high risk" employees at no loss to the company.<sup>17</sup> The State Department of Community Affairs was directed to establish "Job Action Teams" in seven cities to work with large companies to open and identify jobs for black people, and to recruit workers. Hundreds of placements were reported for each of the cities cited.<sup>18</sup> In addition, a "Manpower Development Task Force" was established with the mandate to "improve conditions of all state agencies concerned with manpower" (e.g., there were twenty-eight agencies working on employment in Philadelphia



alone).<sup>19</sup> These actions are evidence of the state's assumption of increased responsibility for assuring employment and for coordination of the activities of a variety of organizations in both sectors.

Secondly, in the area of direct public employment, efforts were taken to assure full state participation in the federal New Careers and Neighborhood Youth Corps programs. The state also made early use of the Work Incentive Program, and the "33 and one-third" work incentive provisions of the federal Social Security Act. The state of Pennsylvania, however, went beyond these federally aided programs and established a new, totally state funded, "Commonwealth Careers" program for people who did not meet the eligibility requirements for the other programs. This program provides work and training experiences in state institutions, offices and private employment. These programs combined provided publicly assured jobs for approximately 15,000 people in 1968.<sup>20</sup> While many of these jobs may have been created without the impetus provided by the GBO's (several were federally funded programs), the GBO's are credited with stimulating the Governor to participate early (well before the mandated date), for full participation, and for creation of the totally state-funded Commonwealth Careers program.

Two other system change actions related to public employment also emerged from the GBO experience. First, when complaints about discrimination in state employment indicated that many state agencies were not responding to the Governor's demands for no discrimination, Dr. Georges in 1968 formally structured one of the first "Affirmative Action" programs in the nation. This program required all institutions,

programs, agencies, hospitals, etc. under his jurisdiction to demonstrate that they were including "socially or economically disadvantaged candidates in their recruitment."<sup>21</sup> That this was more than a symbolic act is attested to by the fact that in 1968 the Department of Public Welfare pressed affirmative action to the point that the American Civil Liberties Union and other groups complained that the Department was discriminating against whites. Moreover, it was reported in March 1968 that as a result of the new policy, over half of the 3500 new employees of the Department were socially or economically disadvantaged (defined as "a person living in a recognized slum neighborhood or a person who is a Negro, Indian, Puerto Rican, or Oriental," or who is eligible for medical assistance).<sup>22</sup> The Governor subsequently extended the program to all state departments. A second system change action in this area involves GBO-initiated action which eliminated high school graduation as a prerequisite to taking the test for, and in qualifying for employment in, a number of civil service job categories. In this way, job possibilities were opened for many high school dropouts, as well as members of disadvantaged collectivities.

Thus the authorities in Pennsylvania, in responding to GBO initiated demands for employment were responsive to demands of disadvantaged interests. The importance of these actions for present purposes, however, is not in assessing the overall impact of these actions on unemployment, but rather in indicating that the citizen's advocate, by representing the latent demands of people in Pennsylvania's ghettos, provided for them a high degree of access

and provoked the responsiveness of the executive authorities of the state. The research also revealed that not all attempts at system change led to a completely responsive outcome. In fact, one agency under the Governor's jurisdiction, the Bureau of Employment Security, was one of the more resistant organizations to change which the Governor's Branch Offices encountered, although a considerable amount of change did occur.

### Changes within the State Bureaucracy

The state-federal Bureau of Employment Security (BES) program in Pennsylvania is administered by the Department of Labor and Industry. As indicated in the previous chapter, BES was the primary agency on which the GBO's placed demands for employment and job training. The first change in BES policy and procedure came immediately with the institution of special procedures for handling people who were referred from the Governor's Branch Offices as well as people who responded to the Governor's appeals to the private sector. BES established a priority on placement of black people, and in filling employer requests which were responses to the activity of the Task Force on Minority Employment.<sup>23</sup>

Initial feedback from the GBO's on the response of BES suggests that in the smaller cities (Erie, Altoona, Wilkes-Barre, Scranton, Chester, York), BES staff responded with courtesy and cooperation to GBO referrals. In Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, there were many complaints of slow interventions, long classification and testing procedures, lack of follow-through and little attention to

problems associated with hard-core poor people. These facts were presented to several meetings of the Governor's Council for Human Services in the Fall of 1967. The Council determined that changes should be made in response to these demands and assigned responsibility for action to the Secretary of Labor and Industry.

Several changes are apparent. First the period 1968-1970 "witnessed a considerable emphasis on regearing the structure of the agency [BES] to emphasize services to the socially disadvantaged."<sup>24</sup> Prior to this period, BES emphasized referrals to the "best qualified" applicant for jobs. The priority was on satisfying employers rather than people who were looking for jobs. "Less qualified" people generally experienced comparatively unresponsive service from BES. The new thrust was to focus attention on the individual needing a job. People who were "job ready," rather than being given priority attention, were provided a minimum of service.

The new policy of the Secretary of Labor and Industry was that "those who have the greatest problem competing in the economy will be the recipients of exhaustive services."<sup>25</sup> BES statistics reveal an increase in the number of job development contacts during the period toward finding and encouraging employers to advertise new types of jobs. The statistics also reveal a decrease in placements which was attributed to the emphasis on working with people who would have previously been excluded as "not job ready." In keeping with the new policy, BES also converted its Youth Opportunity Centers into Human Resource Development Centers in order to provide intensive, specialized services for disadvantaged adults as well as youth, and

opened several branch offices of BES in areas which were closer, and more accessible to, disadvantaged populations.<sup>26</sup> These changes, manifest in revised policy, procedures, program and actions occurred as the GBO's continued to provide information to the Governor concerning the demands of people who came to the GBO's.

The GBO's also provided a continual stream of information on the operation of specific offices of BES as well as on the program in general. For example, it was mentioned above that there were indications in early 1967 that the referrals in Pittsburgh and Philadelphia did not receive the prompt, courteous and dignified treatment which was demanded by the GBO's. Continuous prodding via the individual case-advocacy actions of the GBO's and system-level action through the Council for Human Services led to improvements to the point that almost every respondent contacted in a March 1968 survey of Pittsburgh referrals indicated that they received prompt and courteous treatment. A similar conclusion emerged from review of the referral postcards which were sent to the Governor by people who had been sent to BES.

In June 1969, the GBO's identified lack of referrals for Spanish-speaking people in two BES Offices in Philadelphia. Action was taken toward increasing the Spanish-speaking interviewers and job developers in these offices.<sup>27</sup> In October, 1969, another follow-up of referrals to BES in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh indicates that the changes were generally in effect in Pittsburgh, but that people who went to Philadelphia BES offices reported that they were "not heard in full," that they "felt put-down," and that the "interview

was not fair."<sup>28</sup> This information was used to precipitate additional change-oriented action. The record thus indicates that the GBO's were successful in monitoring the functions of BES offices and in stimulating more responsive service delivery on the local level.

A continuing irritation to GBO representatives during the entire period, however, was BES' insistence on extensive testing and classification before placement in order to match applicants with jobs. The GBO's felt that this policy worked against the hard-core poor. In the Spring of 1968, the GBO's in Pittsburgh and York, after receiving complaints from several large employers that BES did not respond quickly enough to announced job openings, especially in unskilled and short-term jobs, experimented with making direct placements themselves. The results of this experiment reinforced the conviction of the GBO staff that better results were possible than the experience with BES suggested.<sup>29</sup> As stated in the GBO report to the Council for Human Services:

The reason for this deviation [from GBO policy of not providing direct services routinely] stemmed from numerous employers contacting the Governor's Branch Offices requesting employees, and being directed to the Bureau of Employment Security. Some of the spontaneous responses were: 'We have called them before.' 'It takes two weeks for them to send someone, I need men today.' . . . since visitors came daily seeking employment, it was decided to satisfy both [the visitors and employers] by referring the visitor immediately to the employer.<sup>30</sup>

During the course of this experiment the GBO's followed the procedure of allowing the visitor and the employer to determine whether their needs were compatible. They instituted no screening of individuals or any bureaucratic processes for matching people to

jobs. That this quick-response approach was highly successful is evidenced by the variety of placements which was made by the GBO's during this short period. For example:

- \* Heinz and Company asked for six people; eight were referred and six hired.
- \* Pittsburgh National Bank asked for one person--one person referred and hired.
- \* Presbyterian Hospital and Magee Hospital each hired six people from referrals, and Allegheny General Hospital accepted four referrals for Nurses Aid Training.
- \* Western Geriatric Center hired three persons.
- \* Westinghouse Electric--five hired.
- \* Jolly Red Weiner--four referrals hired.
- \* Sign painter apprentice--one referred and hired.
- \* IBM employed and trained two young men.
- \* Pennsylvania Railroad called and requested forty men--fifty were referred and hired.
- \* Grocery sales training program--ten people accepted.
- \* Isaly's Dairy Store--clerk hired for neighborhood store.
- \* Carlton House Drug Store--four neighborhood people hired.
- \* Sears--six persons hired from referrals.
- \* North Carolina Mutual Insurance Company--six persons hired for training as agents.
- \* Board of Education--two referrals, two hired. <sup>31</sup>

Other probes into the provision of jobs by the GBO's yielded similar results. For example, during a tour of one of the state schools for the retarded on July 12, 1968, the GBO Coordinator was informed of 100 job vacancies because of "a lack of interested people to apply." The GBO's assigned four staff members, none of whom had a high school education, to contact visitors who had stated unemployment as their problem. Local radio stations were asked to make announcements. By noon on Monday, July 22, 1968, fifty-three persons had been hired with applications still coming in.

The Governor's Branch Offices, through these actions, were trying to impress upon BES that there was a demonstrated need to change basic routines or to develop a specialized routine for

disadvantaged people. The complicated testing-screening process which emphasized long-term, permanent placements militated against successful job placements for many of the hard-core poor. Sharkansky's discussion of routines would lead to the expectation that an organization will be blind to defects in its routines.<sup>32</sup> The GBO experience with BES found such to be true, however, in this case the GBO's were able to serve as an external watch-dog on the operations of BES and initiated demands for changes. This monitoring function, combined with the relationship of the GBO's to the authority of the Governor's Office provided an impetus to the changes outlined above. In this way, it seems likely that the GBO's played an important role in the overall dynamics of change in BES policies, programs and procedures, militated against a purely symbolic response, and assured longer-term change. Thus, while the people associated with the GBO's were continually dissatisfied with the BES response to their referrals and demands for system change, a broader look at changes in BES does suggest that the GBO's had a meaningful impact.

#### Change in the Housing Sub-System: Action in the Private Sector and vs Local-Level Authorities

##### Increased Public Responsibility

The local Governor's representatives and the staff in the Central Governor's Office agreed that action in housing was the most difficult and perplexing area they encountered. In September 1967, just one month after the Governor's Branch Offices opened, Secretary Georges wrote to Governor Shafer:



No problem has been less immediately responsive to the efforts of the GBO program than housing. No other area of concern has provided the GBO staff with more anguish. This is true in spite of some really commendable efforts by a housing task force located in the Department of Community Affairs. Evidence to date suggests that we are sorely pressed, if not unable, to find housing for the very poor who (1) have large families; (2) have illegitimate children; (3) have police records; (4) have past history of rent nonpayment; (5) are irregularly employed; (6) are on public assistance; and (7) are unable (in some cities) to obtain political sponsorship.

Government involvement in housing since 1946 has been massive. Millions of upper, middle and lower middle class people have found it possible to obtain private rental housing built under government renewal and housing programs. Other millions of similar people have been able to purchase homes through government guaranteed loans. The more reliable of the poor are eligible for public housing. However, the most inept or deprived of our citizens have had to grope for themselves in a jungle of deteriorating, privately owned slums. No government agency (Federal, state, or local) has assumed responsibility to be the 'housing service of last resort.' 33

The system change actions of the state in response to the demands for housing which were brought to the GBO's had two primary thrusts. First, there were several actions designed to establish state jurisdiction, and to use existing authority to stimulate the supply of housing in the cities of Pennsylvania. Secondly, the Governor's Branch Offices identified the need to use available influence to change local housing authority policies in several areas, and precipitated action in this direction.

Housing, like employment is a community value which is controlled primarily by the private sector. In employment, however, the state had a pool of public jobs and job programs upon which it could draw, and the Bureau of Employment Security had the responsibility for trying to match individuals with available jobs in both

sectors. Housing presented a different picture for there are few areas where state government had direct authority to intervene. Inspection and code enforcement were primarily in the domain of city and municipal governments; they could be only partially responsive to a maverick Republican Governor. Most landlords and realtors are private with few legal or political controls. Public housing is typically a locally controlled operation under semi-independent housing authorities. And lending institutions which finance federally guaranteed loans are also private institutions. The area of direct authority for a Governor is, therefore, extremely limited, but the Governor and his staff determined to take action wherever feasible.

Toward increasing the supply of housing several actions were taken. The newly created Department of Community Affairs (the first in the nation) was directed by the Governor to take action toward full utilization of existing resources in order to stimulate new housing. A "Fast-Action Housing Task Force" was created to implement this mandate. Citing the need for system change to the Task Force, Deputy Secretary of Community Affairs, Daniel Rogers noted that of all problems coming in to the Governor's Branch Offices, ". . . housing problems have constituted one of the major types of complaints, and the record so far indicates that few real solutions have been obtained."<sup>34</sup> Toward resolving these demands, a bill was introduced in the legislature to create a Pennsylvania Housing Agency which would allow the state to provide low-income housing. There were intensive contacts with contractors toward influencing them to undertake large-scale restoration of low-rental

housing. The Department of Community Affairs was directed to develop a comprehensive plan to bring federal funds into the state, and to assure that Pennsylvania Model Cities neighborhoods were developed so as to provide for, not exclude, disadvantaged people. Pennsylvania also went beyond the federal programs and created, on its own, a "Partner Cities" program for cities which did not receive federal Model Cities grants. These were actions which were precipitated, in part, by the demands of the GBO's; they were for the most part incremental changes of "the system," the politics of which were relatively long-range and in which the GBO's had little direct involvement.

#### Changes within the System: Local Housing Authorities

The second area of system change activity in housing concerned existing policies of various local housing authorities. The GBO's became more directly involved in change in this area for here were public projects designed to serve lower-income citizens and the disadvantaged but where complaints came pouring into the Governor's Branch Offices. In October 1967, the Governor's Branch Offices and the Governor's Council for Human Services forwarded to the Governor a voluminous document which cited hundreds of case examples of housing problems in Philadelphia alone.<sup>35</sup> Major areas for change were identified as: housing for unwed mothers, unsanitary conditions, over-crowded conditions, public housing authorities, redevelopment and relocation, evictions, complaints about certain individuals or agencies, and loans. But since local housing boards had jurisdiction,

the first issue was to determine how the GBO's could effect change for there was no direct executive authority for the Governor to intervene.

One alert aide to the Governor discovered that, while public housing authorities were indeed local governmental bodies, three of the five housing authority board members in each of the sixty-seven counties were gubernatorial appointments. These people were typically designated by the local party organization, but formally they served at the pleasure of the Governor. A plan was conceived to use this wedge as a lever to influence the boards to make changes in housing authority policies and practice.

On November 29, 1967, Governor Shafer called the members of the boards of the sixty-seven housing authorities in Pennsylvania and their executive secretaries to a "Seminar on Public Housing." The objective of this meeting was to indicate to them the Governor's policy that these practices should change, the priority placed on rapid change, and to convince them that they could not gloss over or avoid the issues with rhetoric because the GBO's provided a continuing tale of the conditions which existed in their housing projects. Several informants confirmed the fact that the meeting was intended to provide an environment wherein the Governor could "put the arm" on his appointees in order to secure a change in housing authority policies; to these ends, the "big guns were brought to bear."<sup>36</sup>

Governor Shafer himself assumed the role of stating the goals and setting the pace of the conference. Arthur Sampson,

Secretary of Administration, Budget Secretary, and Chairman of the Governor's Council for Human Services, presided. Dr. Thomas W. Georges, Jr., Secretary of Public Welfare and Secretary of Health, and Mr. Joseph Barr, Secretary of Community Affairs, participated for the full conference. Members of various local Welfare Rights Organizations (WRO) and representatives from the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) participated in the entire conference and were included in each of the workshops. Other key staff participated in a variety of formal and informal roles to assure that the message came through "loud and clear."

The agenda of the meeting was built exclusively around actual problems which were brought to the Governor's Branch Offices; in his charge to the conference the Governor got to the point immediately with hard data.

. . . This meeting was called because poor people of Pennsylvania have, during the past four months, spoken to this administration with compelling persuasiveness. Thousands of them have visited the Governor's Branch Offices which are located in nineteen poverty areas. These people have sought help with a variety of problems covering a wide spectrum of social concerns. The most unyielding of all these problems--the one most fraught with human tragedy and despair--has been that of housing.

. . .

On housing alone, I have received over a thousand very poignant requests for help. We have not been able to find solutions for many of these, in spite of the substantial efforts of several of you whom I have called upon for help. Let me assure you that I appreciate your effort, and I recognize the main obstacles which confront you. But let me share with you just a few of my problems.

. . .

There was the family of eleven from whom we received a call at the very moment of their eviction--sheriff and moving van waiting--because a seven-month search had failed to produce a home for them.

There was the Allegheny County family of eight--frantic, hostile, pleading, because of an eviction which resulted from the fact that their plain but inexpensive apartment lay in the way of expansion plans for a hospital.

Last Friday there was the call describing a young mother sitting at curbside in the rain and snow, guarding her furniture--her every possession--while a Governor's Branch Office representative tried to find housing for her and her little children who had, an hour earlier, been evicted.

Two weeks ago in Pittsburgh, a mother of six confronted me with a desperation I have seldom known. She had all sorts of problems--a boyfriend in jail, an impossible one-room housing situation, a flock of children perhaps born out of wedlock! Three years of fruitless searching for a better house had brought her nothing but complete despair.

And then there have been hundreds of Pennsylvanians who have written to me on blank postcards which they were given at the Branch Offices because a new highway, a new bridge, an urban renewal project threatened their home. Hopelessly, they anticipate being shoved further into the web of the ghetto.

. . . .  
It has been said that the apparent indifference of most Americans to our housing catastrophe is partly our remarkable ability to endure other people's acute discomfort.

I hope that many of us who share this day leave this place resolved to use our time, talents, and energies to dissolve any such difference in our respective towns and cities.<sup>37</sup>

Having set the tone of the meeting by indicating his direct involvement and interest in the situation, the Governor turned to Secretary Georges and Secretary Barr, the people with whom the housing authorities would most frequently interact; they reinforced the Governor's remarks, again with cases which related directly to the policies which were to be changed. Dr. Georges, for example stated:

Here are a few examples of problems on housing, I quote from the problem cards which come to us from the

Branch Offices:

--I have to move from my present home. I applied for public housing in 1964 and I was just now informed of my rejection. I was rejected because I am a single woman and have two children.

--A woman was trying to get into public housing for 15 years. She feels she's been getting the run-around because she is a Negro. Incidentally, she contacted her congressman and came back two days later and was informed she was being processed for admission.

--One woman applied for public housing two years ago and hasn't heard anything since. She was told by the local Public Assistance Office she was ineligible for public housing although she was on assistance. No reason was given for ineligibility. She applied for public housing several times and was given a different story every time. She has five children, attended night school in a pre-employment training program in preparation for employment. At the last visit she went to the office and was told she was ineligible and will remain ineligible because she has no marriage license.

--Another woman says, 'I need public housing. They keep refusing me. People with more income get accepted. High income people can get into the project but really low-income people can't. I live in an unheated four-room flat with five children. I need help!'

--A woman applied for public housing in 1962. In May of this year she was told that her application was lost. She reapplied and was told that the house she was living in would have to be condemned before she could be accepted.

--A woman on assistance with four children lived in a building that has been condemned. She has an application in with the Housing Authority but she hears nothing from them.

--Another one can't find suitable housing for herself and five children. The Public Housing Authority says she is ineligible because of her unmarried status.

And this is the way they go--well over 1000 cases.<sup>38</sup>

The remainder of the day was devoted to small face-to-face "workshops" wherein Dr. Georges, Mr. Barr, key aides from the

Governor's staff, representatives of WRO, HUD and the GBO's pressed for changes in policies which gave low priority to people with large families, families with unwed mothers, one-parent families, families with multi-social problems, and in racially segregated housing authorities. In this way, the GBO's demonstrated their ability to get the attentive interest of the Governor for the demands of the people who came to the GBO's, the ability to precipitate action toward responding to these demands. This particular case also demonstrated the capacity of the citizen's advocate to generate issues which confront not only the executive agencies over which the Governor had direct administrative authority (as in BES), but also other levels of government where the political base of party power could be effective.

In the short run, many local housing authorities did change their policies. All housing authorities were put on notice that the Governor was directly behind referrals from the GBO's-- especially where the six types of exclusionary policy mentioned above were concerned. In addition, there were several cases where local officials cited federal HUD unwillingness to fund social services staffs for housing authorities which led to the establishment of programs funded through the Department of Public Welfare as well as to the establishment of several tenants organizations.<sup>39</sup> Furthermore, continued monitoring by the GBO's of local housing authorities of the policies set out by the Governor led to identification of deviations in several cases and consequent action. For example, in early 1968 several visitors to the GBO's complained that



unwed mothers were still being excluded from public housing in Philadelphia. When the usual case advocacy prodding was unsuccessful, the GBO's tried another tactic, seeking the aid of Community Legal Services in Philadelphia. A subsequent class action, filed on behalf of the GBO visitor, led to a court order that the Philadelphia Housing Authority abolish its unwed mother policy, publish "conspicuously" new admission standards, inform all families which had been rejected for admission in writing of specific reasons and families previously rejected that they should reapply, and establish procedures for appeal from rejection.<sup>40</sup> This action was then used by the GBO's in instances where complaints to GBO's revealed that other housing authorities were not in conformance with the principles laid down by the Governor.<sup>41</sup> Legislation was also passed (in 1967) which legalized the withholding of rent money in escrow by rentors to enable them to pressure specific landlords for decent housing.

Finally, in the broader area of more housing, the Governor and the Secretary of Community Affairs pressed for utilization of existing authority through Model Cities, Partner Cities, Community Action Programs, etc. In these areas, the forces of the polycentric political system created many opportunities for "delay."<sup>42</sup> For example, the bill to establish the State Public Housing Agency did not pass the legislature until July 19, 1970, following which the Housing Task Force had to make final preparation of and get bureaucratic clearances on their report before action. When interviewed by the researcher in 1971, they were just "going into action."

Analyses of Model Cities programs by other researchers suggest a similar fate for "comprehensive planning" approaches to change.<sup>43</sup>

In conclusion, it can be said that in housing, as in employment, the Governor's Branch Offices were successful in representing demands of disadvantaged people to the highest authorities in the political system, and in precipitating the responsiveness of this decision-making arena; but also that ultimate responsiveness, especially where assurance of decent housing for all citizens is concerned, lay in broader factors in the environment of the GBO's and the Governor's Office.

#### Change in the Financial Aid Sub-System: Toward Welfare as a Right

The change in orientation of the Governor and key staff which was wrought in part by the racial crisis of 1967, and solidified by the demands presented by the GBO's also carried through to general changes in both policy and program in public assistance. There were also a number of specific changes in policy and regulations which were precipitated directly by the Governor's Branch Offices. Concerning the income maintenance sub-system of the community, the situation which Governor Shafer and Dr. Georges inherited was not dissimilar to that described in 1966 by Cloward and Piven:

Public welfare systems are under constant stress of conflict and opposition made only sharper by the rising costs . . . . And to accommodate this pressure, welfare practice everywhere has become more restrictive than welfare statute; much of the time it verges on lawlessness. Thus, public welfare systems try to keep their budgets down and

their rolls low by failing to inform people of the rights available to them; by intimidating and shaming them to the degree that they are reluctant either to apply or to press claims and by arbitrarily denying benefits to those who are eligible.<sup>44</sup>

In Pennsylvania, these conditions were manifest in a law which made the Department of Public Welfare responsible for assuring the "minimum level of health and decency for all the needy and distressed" in the state.<sup>45</sup> The legislature had also stipulated that the local Executive Director of the County Boards of Assistance would be appointed by local governmental officials (who were typically conservative and anti-welfare). Thus, local direction and supervision was often at variance with state departmental executives in Harrisburg. In addition, the Department of Public Welfare was forced to operate within a tradition of legislative appropriations which supplied funds for only 70.2 percent of the existing standard for less than an estimated one-third of those Pennsylvania citizens whose income was below the standard. Thus, the Department of Public Welfare was restricted in both practice and resources from carrying out its mandate. It was such barriers that the Governor, Dr. Georges and the GBO's encountered as they sought to cope with the demands for an adequate income for disadvantaged Pennsylvanians.

First, actions were directed toward achieving effective changes in overall policy at the service delivery level by going directly to the local caseworkers. The objective was to move the system from the restrictive orientation described by Cloward and Piven toward the "welfare as a right" principle which is expounded

by Welfare Rights Organizations (WRO). This policy was carried to the street-level bureaucrats first of all through the statements of Governor Shafer and Secretary of Public Welfare Georges when they announced the establishment of the GBO's. Their statements were subsequently reinforced in daily actions as many ex-public assistance workers, now Governor's representatives, referred people to the CBA's and interpreted regulations to caseworkers in individual cases. Secondly, the GBO's aided WRO in securing full copies of public assistance regulations, and in securing space in County Boards of Assistance in order that applicants could be advised of their rights and entitlements.<sup>46</sup> In this way, the GBO's through continuous monitoring of bureaucratic actions, assured that the new policy was implemented.

The general change in orientation and direction of policy was also manifest in specific changes in the public assistance program, itself, and in new or revised policies. The search of the GBO archive revealed a number of instances where changes in policy were precipitated directly by the demands of the Governor's Branch Offices. Among those identified by this study are:

--In Fall 1967 the initiation of an immediate emergency check for new applicants in dire need. Past policy, and the policy of most states today requires even emergency checks to go through several days, or even weeks, of processing.

--In Spring 1968 a policy was established which allowed immediate replacement of checks reported lost or stolen. Previous practice was for the Department of Revenue to conduct a lengthy investigation, which required poor people to live for weeks without the funds.

--In Spring 1968 the Department changed the burden of responsibility for overpayments from the client to the state thus ending the practice of reducing future grants to make up for past overpayments.

--Changes were made in medical assistance regulations to allow for payment for eyeglasses for eligible people.

--Changes were made in the policy which reduced the state's public assistance supplement when federal Social Security was raised (previously raises in federal checks would be countered by deductions in the state supplemental assistance).

--In July 1968 the GBO's induced local banks in one city to change the policy of not selling food stamps on Friday. (Many people had complained that their public assistance checks came too late Thursday for them to purchase stamps before the banks closed.)

--The GBO's also initiated action in January 1968, which led to important legal advocacy. Following a Governor's Branch Office referral, Community Legal Services in Philadelphia undertook legal action against the state leading to overturning of the residency requirement for public assistance in Pennsylvania, and later in the nation.<sup>47</sup>

Furthermore, the relative volume of requests for employment, housing and financial assistance compared to demands for traditional social services, led Governor Shafer and Dr. Georges to disregard the advice of the public welfare professionals that increases in social services were most needed to help the poor. Rather, it is reported that Dr. Georges agreed to forego all program and staff changes in social service programs for fiscal year 1968 in favor of increases in the public assistance allowances. As a result, on January 1, 1969, Pennsylvania went from 70.2 percent of the "minimum level of health and decency" to 90 percent of the standard, and on January 1, 1970 to 100 percent of the standard. That these changes were permanent is evidenced by the fact that this level has been

maintained since, and periodically revised for changes in the cost-of-living.<sup>48</sup>

The assertions herein that there was indeed a basic change in overall policy, and that the policy in turn led to additional allocations of resources to poor people is also supported by a study in February 1973 by The Pennsylvania State University, Center for Human Services Development.<sup>49</sup> An exploration of the "causes" of the "welfare explosion" of 1967-1972 found that "1967 is a clear demarcation point where the trend first starts to rise rapidly." Beginning in 1967, the city of Philadelphia experienced annual rises in caseloads between 500 percent and 600 percent of the 1955-1965 average. Other counties--Allegheny (Pittsburgh), Erie, etc. showed similar patterns leading to the conclusion that the patterns of change ramified throughout the state. Secondly, the study found that several of the traditional explanations for the rise--loose management, cheating, in-migration from other states, unemployment rates or the immediate state of the economy--explained neither the magnitude nor the pattern of change. The study concluded that "It is quite evident that population increase [especially in-migration], welfare cheating, and short-term economic fluctuations cannot be attributed as causes of the increase in caseload." The point was not that these variables had no effect; rather, "by far the largest part of the increase constituting the 'welfare explosion' is a consequence of policy and its implementation."<sup>50</sup>

It is recognized that the general trend in the nation during this period was toward an institutional (welfare as a right)

rather than a residual (welfare as a privilege) view of welfare. The "welfare explosion" occurred in other states as a consequence of factors such as urban unrest of the 1960's and the activity of many organizations and interests including WRO and other black people's organizations, the welfare lobby, and liberals in both political parties, etc. The dynamics of how this change occurred in each state, the relative timing, and the degree to which change actually occurred in each state, however, are typically obscure. What this work reveals is that there were general policy changes in public assistance in Pennsylvania during this period, that these changes coincided with the establishment and operation of the Governor's Branch Offices, that the GBO's carried the policies to both the street-level bureaucrat and to top policy-makers, and that the GBO's were the immediate precipitant of a number of specific policy changes.

It seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, that the GBO's were a significant variable in creating a responsive orientation in the Governor; and, backed by an able staff, he was able to take action and precede most of the nation in implementation of policies such as self-declaration, separation of cash assistance from social services, the 33 and one-third work incentive deduction, etc., as well as general changes in behavior of the street-level bureaucrats in the public assistance system. Thus, in the area of financial aid, the GBO's are seen as having served as an immediate precipitant of general policy changes in Pennsylvania, as well as the direct initiator of a number of specific policy changes.

Changes in the Law-Enforcement Sub-System: Success  
and Failure in System Change

Analyses of the precipitating "causes" of urban violence in the 1960's suggest that the actions of authorities, in particular the aggressive use of police and the character of police response, were crucial in triggering violent behavior on the part of ghetto residents. The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders suggested that "almost invariably the incident that ignites disorder arises from police action."<sup>51</sup> Moreover, the Commission stated that the initial police and community response to incidents "may well determine whether they remain relatively minor police problems--or balloon into major disorders."<sup>52</sup> The Commission also found that the use of community residents to provide information, to aid in maintaining order, and to serve as "counter-rioters," as an alternative to the para-military action of police could be crucial in dampening disturbances; and, it emphasized the importance of maintaining open communications channels to the ghetto and for providing channels of complaint and protest for perceived grievances and demands on socio-political structures of the community.<sup>53</sup>

The importance of political leadership in responding to the demands of ghetto residents is also stressed by writers such as Fogelson, Eisinger, Misner and Hahn.<sup>54</sup> These authors debunk the "rifraff" theory of violence, suggesting that urban violence in the sixties involved a wide spectrum of community residents and that support for and participation in violence was intimately related



with perceptions of and demands on unresponsive socio-political structures.<sup>55</sup> In Chapter 1, and again in Chapter 4, it was suggested that the response of Governor Shafer and the plan which was developed under the direction of Dr. Georges recognized the unrest and threats of violence in Pennsylvania's cities as legitimate demands on socio-political structures. The action of the Governor in relation to employment, housing, and financial assistance, was intended to provide both immediate and long-term responses to the wants and grievances of individuals. Chapter 4 also suggested that the plan of the Governor called for a different approach to tension incidents and countering violence if it did break out. The police were to be supportive of human service teams rather than vice versa. The Governor's Branch Offices were a keystone of this approach.

The GBO's served first of all as a presence of the Governor's Office in the immediate neighborhoods to hear and seek action to resolve the grievances and demands of disadvantaged citizens. In conjunction with the establishment of the GBO's the Governor appointed cabinet members as "state-to-city liaison" with local political officials, and deputy attorneys general to relate to local police departments. In this way, local political authorities and police officials were put on notice that the Governor was willing to use available sources of authority to implement his plan and that there were monitors (the GBO's) stationed directly in the communities. The documentary archive and reports of many informants reveal that the GBO's served two additional functions in addition to the functions described in the previous chapter, and in other sections of

this chapter: (1) they provided the Governor an alternate source of intelligence on tension incidents--as such the GBO's represented a neighborhood, black community resident's view of tension situations, rather than that of external, typically white police officers, and (2) as neighborhood residents, the Governor's representatives could and did maintain contact with local leadership and residents as representatives of the Governor. Thus, the Governor's representatives could roam the neighborhoods during tension incidents (and at other times) aiding in communications with residents, and in maintaining order toward dampening disturbances. There were many observations of this activity during the participant observation, several of which are corroborated by documentary evidence.<sup>56</sup>

The data which was available to the researcher provides documentary evidence: (1) that the Governor's Branch Offices provided a channel of information to the Governor which was separate from the police channel, and that the content of communications from the two channels was often different, at times contradictory; (2) that the Governor in several cases opted for the GBO representatives's interpretation of events and consequently withheld state police and national guard forces or took action to assure a restrained, non-reactive, activity on the part of these para-military forces of the state; (3) that much of the activity of the Governor's special representatives and the presence of the state police was used to assure that local police action was restrained; (4) and that the GBO representatives served as a channel of communications to community

leaders and residents and in some situations as a negotiator of community demands with local and state authorities--suggesting action toward non-violent expression of demands which (dependent on the response of the police and authorities) may have otherwise led to violent protest.<sup>57</sup> Thus, the Governor's Branch Offices provided a community-based communications channel from the ghetto to the Governor's Office and also served as an instrument of mediation and grievance-handling for demands on the socio-political structures of the community.

Thorough review of the extensive files on tension incidents and complaints against police reveals that in most cases complaints were against local police. The record shows that in these situations, GBO success depended in large part on the orientation of local political leadership, or at least on their receptivity to the influence of the Governor or other state officials. GBO files reveal instances where GBO reports on incidents led to the direct intervention with the mayors of cities. In these cities, the mayor agreed to cooperate in keeping the police under control. And, where violent incidents occurred, such as Pittsburgh and Harrisburg in 1968, the Governor kept the state police and national guard in peripheral and watchdog roles and local police acted in a restrained manner. During these incidents, the GBO representatives remained in the communities and kept up a continual stream of information to the Governor's Office. In addition to this more general role, the record also shows that in several specific cases where police

orientations and behavior led to frequent clashes with black people, the mayor agreed to initiate community relations work with the local police. In one case arising from a series of community complaints about police, residents even asked for and got a GBO established in their neighborhood. Thus, the record shows that the GBO's were active in influencing the general orientation of local political leadership toward use of local police forces in black neighborhoods as well as in having a direct impact on some police themselves.<sup>58</sup>

Despite these apparent "success" stories, the record also reveals a lack of any cross-jurisdictional authority for oversight of police behavior. Most of the interventions which were precipitated by the GBO's were informal. The Governor, his GBO's, and other state officials had to rely on negotiations with local officials; they did not have formal authority to act in identifying and taking action if police misconduct was found to exist (unless the Governor declared a state of emergency). Actions were always carried out in knowledge that local officials possessed the discretion to accept or reject the demands of state officials.

The accuracy of these assertions was borne out, for example, in one city where the aggressive use by local police of a canine patrol created a particularly explosive situation. In this situation, there were a number of incidents beginning in early 1968 where people had been bitten in what seemed to be routine arrests. In response to GBO initiatives, the mayor agreed to have police curb the use of the dogs in routine calls. The GBO files reveal subsequent

improvement in the community situation for several months. Later, when a few new incidents of alleged police brutality involving the use of police dogs led to increasing accusations against the police by the GBO's, local press, and community groups, the local officials fell in behind the police and became a defender of their actions. Information in the files and press coverage of a series of dog bite incidents over a six-month period tends to suggest increasingly defensive and hostile use of dogs by the police in the particular locality. Accusations of police brutality were typically countered by the police filing charges against the accuser (sometimes days after the incident). In subsequent police court action, the officer and the accuser would be relied on for testimony. The files reveal situations where witnesses who had made written statements on the incident were not called by the prosecution to testify as to the action of the police. The typical result seems to be exoneration of the acts of the police; accusers often ended up with fines and/or jail sentences for misdemeanors.

Of course, such incidents are not startling revelations to people who have studied police relations with blacks and lower-class people. Most writers seem to imply, however, that a consistent pattern, almost a conspiracy, exists at all levels. The GBO record indicates that a somewhat different pattern obtained in Pennsylvania during this period. The most telling fact revealed in such cases is the inability of other levels and sectors to take effective action where misdeeds or errors in action by local police are suspected. In particular, the GBO Coordinator in May 1968 used

the police dog incidents to determine whether and how the state could take action in such situations. The dog-bite cases were separately assigned to the state Attorney General, the Department of Community Affairs, the Human Relations Commission, and the Department of Health. In addition to seeking action on behalf of the individuals involved in the specific cases, the Coordinator's action was stated as being to determine whether or not some of these departments could take authoritative action in such cases.<sup>59</sup> In this particular situation, the GBO's convinced witnesses to lodge formal complaints against the police officers, with the local department and city council. When local officials refused to investigate, available evidence and statements of witnesses were provided to the State Department of Justice which was found to be impotent to intervene authoritatively. The state Human Relations Commission was prevented by law from intervention although it did "investigate" under a new amendment to the State Human Relations Act and reported to the Governor. When state police were asked to investigate, they typically talked only to the accuser and the police officers involved, and came out on the side of the police. In the non-public sector, the American Civil Liberties Union efforts also proved futile. Aggressive coverage by the press led to arrests and convictions of several reporters on misdemeanor charges. In at least one case, a reporter filming an incident from a curb was attacked and severely bitten by a police dog, and the reporter's camera was smashed by the police. Although the state Justice Department, the Human Relations Commission, and ACLU were involved, the result was

release of the officer involved and conviction of the reporter in police court, leading to a \$50.00 fine and twenty days in jail. (The support of local authorities for the police in the situation is revealed by the dedication of a monument to police dogs and promotion of three K-9 Corps officers during this period.) In the final analysis, the events in this particular city tend to reveal patterns of police attitudes and actions similar to those identified by the many excerpts from public and private reports on the police in the Becker and Murray volume on Government Lawlessness in America.<sup>60</sup>

Thus the GBO record tends to confirm the findings of Misner that local political leadership is perhaps the most crucial factor in shaping the nature of police action toward minority groups and in determining police response to tension incidents. The record also reveals the lack of any effective external controls on police if they are backed by their political executive. The fact that this pattern exists and was documented by the GBO experience would suggest that action should have been initiated by the Governor to provide some sort of mechanism for oversight or at least an authoritative grievance mechanism. In this direction, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act was amended to permit investigation of the causes of racial unrest "with the intent of avoiding and preventing the development of racial tensions," to allow hearings and recommendations, and the possibility of "orders if such recommendations are not met within reasonable time."<sup>61</sup> Primarily a fact-finding and investigating function, this recourse was not really effective. The Governor's main option in tension situations

involving the police was to utilize the informal channels of influence through party and position, or the heroic mechanism of declaration of a state of emergency, in effect, placing the city under martial law. Thus, citizens are for the most part at the mercy of local police forces, and development of mechanisms to determine whether or not they are acting properly remains a significant issue in Pennsylvania as elsewhere.

Lest the record of the relatively large number of successes which the GBO's had in dealing with police-community tensions be forgotten, it is important to remember that the GBO's: (1) demonstrated a capability to act in the identification of specific instances of grievances or misconduct of the police; (2) acted as an informal mediator in such situations for individuals and interests; and (3) had the capability to trigger the intervention of sympathetic state officials. The GBO's, in effect, served as an informal demand and grievance-handling mechanism. In situations where local authorities could be influenced to be responsive, the GBO's had a salutary effect; in situations where local authorities chose to be unresponsive, they were ineffective. The overall experience tends to support evidence from individual-level advocacy that the development of more adequate legal representation for the poor is a necessity; this message did not escape the GBO's and Dr. Georges. The following section discusses the development of legal services programs in Pennsylvania.



## Legal Services for Poor People

The need for more adequate legal representation for disadvantaged individuals and the potential for changing aspects of "the system" through law reform efforts constituted a continuing demand on the Governor's Branch Offices. The demands in this area emerged from the conditions of poverty and discrimination in the U.S. which are attended by conflicts between ghetto residents and landlords, merchants, police, public utilities, and a wide variety of public agencies, boards and commissions.<sup>62</sup> The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, in describing the need for legal services for poor people stated:

Though the legal obstacles are considerable, resourceful and imaginative use of available legal processes could contribute significantly to the alleviation of tensions resulting from these and other conflicts. Moreover, through the adversary process which is at the heart of our judicial system, litigants are afforded meaningful opportunity to influence events which affect them and their community. However, effective utilization of the courts requires legal assistance, a resource seldom available to the poor.<sup>63</sup>

The previous chapter presented data which indicates that the GBO's utilized a variety of community resources toward meeting demands for legal advocacy. A large number of cases were handled by the Governor's representatives themselves, others required the intervention of lawyers. The sources of legal aid included programs established by OEO, private attorneys who would agree to take cases, and state employed deputy attorneys general.

It soon became apparent, however, that the existing

system could not meet the demands for legal services which were being placed on the GBO's. Apprising the Governor of the situation, Dr. Georges stated in Fall 1967, that "high on the list [of demands brought to the GBO's], however, is the reported need for legal services. The complaints we receive are not very sophisticated."<sup>64</sup>

It is often difficult to translate into legal terms the halting inarticulateness of the messages received. Here is the text of one of the postal cards which was addressed to you:

'I have a problem with the Ford Motor Company. The Company excuss [sic] me of owing them for a repossed [sic] car. The freud [sic] and collection agency of the state is handling. I want it taken up by you.'

Then there was this problem. A woman initiated a petition against her husband for non-support. A hearing was set. The woman was picked up by the Sheriff's deputies the day before the scheduled hearing and lodged in the county jail as a material witness. The stated reason--'We have to be sure that the petitioner shows up in cases like this.' The woman visited the Governor's Branch Office the following day to see what legal rights she had in this matter.

A former Attorney General once said, 'Most people, in their daily lives, act as their own advocates. The poor do not. They concede defeat. They fear retaliation. The poor need advocates, not simply to present their side of the story, but to give hope to demonstrate that the law is not an enemy but a guardian, and that public officials are not their masters but their servants.'

The Governor's Branch Offices are attempting to serve this role but their resources in the area of legal services are few.<sup>65</sup>

The situation which prompted these remarks was that OEO legal services programs were available in only a few localities, and while they tried to respond to the demands placed on them by the GBO's they were neither numerous enough nor large enough to meet existing needs. Support for additional OEO programs was first

channeled through the Department of Community Affairs. As will be discussed below, the Department of Public Welfare later provided additional direct support for OEO programs and also became active in establishing other legal services programs in the state.

#### Failure of the Governor's Attorney General to Respond

If the local GBO could not provide for necessary legal advocacy and could locate no local source of legal aid, the problem was escalated to the GBO Coordinator in Harrisburg. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Coordinator would then either handle the demand himself, forward it to the Executive Secretary of the Council for Human Services, or assign responsibility to an appropriate cabinet-level department. In the latter case, attorneys were employed by the state in the Department of Justice. It was to this office that many cases were referred for legal aid.

In early 1968, however, the Attorney General and the General Counsel of the state informed the Executive Secretary of the Council for Human Services that, according to the Administrative Code of the state, it is illegal for the Attorney General's office to give advice to citizens. A folder containing seventy-five unanswered GBO problems accompanied the memorandum.<sup>66</sup> The Executive Secretary of the Council for Human Services shared with Dr. Georges his "sense of rage that these 75 problems . . . have not been answered. However, my rage will not lessen the burdens of the poor people concerned."<sup>67</sup> The memorandum concluded with a directive that Dr. Georges search for alternative means to provide legal services

for poor people.

Because the Department of Justice obviously feels that it cannot provide legal services under its mandate, and because the lawyers there are not inclined to 'bend their energies to finding creative solutions to these pressing problems' as directed by the Governor, I would suggest that you in Welfare, or in the GBO program itself, develop services in the area of legal advice to poor people.<sup>68</sup>

The Attorney General made it clear that there was no basis in either the Administrative Code, or in the Executive Directive of the Governor which established the GBO's, for state-employed Department of Justice attorneys to represent individual citizens. At this point, the discussion of Pressman and Wildavsky on "delay" in implementation of public policy is illuminating, for it was a full year and the fortuitous convergence of several events which led to the eventual establishment of one of the largest and most comprehensive statewide legal services program in the nation.

#### Initiation of a Statewide Legal Services Program

During the time when the above events were occurring, the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders was developing its recommendations on the establishment of legal services programs for poor people. OEO legal services programs were being developed in many localities, and the federal government was amending the Social Security Act to provide a 75% federal match for state social services to poor people--one of which was legal services. In the Fall of 1968, the amendment became law, opening the possibility for the Department of Public Welfare to establish legal services as a social

service. The priority of the social service professionals in Pennsylvania, however, placed emphasis on more traditional social services with the major expansion being into day care.

Early in 1969 the timing of several additional events led to action: (1) the Erie County Bar Association indicated its interest to the Attorney General in establishing a local legal services program, and (2) the federal Department of Health, Education and Welfare proposed regulations requiring state welfare departments to provide representation for fair hearings. An Attorney General's Task Force on Legal Services was convened in early 1969 in response to these events, which included representatives of the Department of Public Welfare.

The outcome of a series of meetings of the task force was a decision that the Department of Public Welfare would develop legal services as a social service program for disadvantaged people. A full-time community organizer in the welfare department came to be assigned full-time to the development of a statewide legal services program. The policy which emerged was to work with existing OEO programs if they were available and desired to cooperate. Contracts for additional services or expanded programs were worked out. In localities where no OEO legal services program was available, separate programs were to be established, always working with client groups and other local interests to ensure local support. The resulting program reflected the OEO legal services model, rejecting the voucher (Judicare) method utilized in several other states (and

which local Bar Associations tended to prefer).

The legal services program in Pennsylvania called for a full program of legal services and full-time lawyers. The principles upon which the program was founded emphasized both services to individuals in case-by-case actions, but also broader interests of poor people as a group. The full-time program was designed to assure that the lawyers were specialists in poverty law--their sole interest being to represent poor people (rather than sporadic involvement as would be the case with the voucher system). A full-time program also allows representation of broader interests through setting of local program goals, identification of repeated problems (patterns), and seeking areas for change either through case precedent or negotiations with legislators, chief executives, businessmen or local and state interests.

The outcome of the complex series of events which are but briefly described here is perhaps the first significant statewide legal services program for poor people in the U.S.; and the program remains the largest and most comprehensive of its sort in the country. (It accounted for \$2.4 million in federal social services funds in 1973, representing over 50% of the \$4 million expended nationally by DHEW for legal services.)<sup>69</sup> Thus, the demands of ghetto residents for legal services which were placed on the system by the GBO's may have been a significant factor in indicating the need for and precipitating a new, statewide legal services program. The dynamics of the process were complex and sporadic, often appearing disjunctive. Many of the participants in the process were not aware of GBO

involvement in this activity. In fact, the researcher, while on the scene of operations and close to both the GBO and the legal services program, was not aware of any direct connection until the initial facts presented above were revealed by the GBO archive. Subsequent probing into the events surrounding the establishment of the legal services program revealed some of the possible reasons why and how the statewide legal services program in Pennsylvania went further and quicker than those of other states.

### "Other" Citizen's Advocacy for Interests

The actions presented above were not the only acts of citizen's advocacy on behalf of interests which are contained in the GBO record. Typically, people came individually with their particular problem; sometimes a number of individuals presented the same problem forming a sort of ad hoc protest group. In only a few cases was it apparent that an organized interest group was involved in the initial demand for system change on behalf of interests, although, in the implementation stage, interest groups were often involved by the GBO's and other people seeking support for action. The record also shows that, as in citizen's advocacy for individuals, the citizen's advocacy for interests activity of the GBO's also ranged the political system at various differentiated structures, levels and sectors of the polity. In addition to the citizen's advocacy for interests actions in major problem areas which were outlined above, the review of case records also reveals that the GBO's were active in a variety

of other areas. The rather extended list which follows is illustrative, but not exhaustive, of the diversity of other citizen's advocacy for interests provided by the Governor's Branch Offices:<sup>70</sup>

- \*A twenty year infestation of rats was cleared up in three months after GBO-initiated action.
- \*Deletion of a question asking the race of applicants for Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Act Scholarships which a visitor felt led to discrimination in education.
- \*Erection of signs at a dangerous intersection on a curve after complaints to local officials had repeatedly failed to get action. Also, several instances of traffic lights installed in several localities (as well as unsuccessful attempts in other areas).
- \*When several visitors to the local GBO, and then WRO and the NAACP complained that the Erie County Board of Assistance was not formulating their citizen's advisory committee as recommended by the Secretary of Public Welfare, GBO action led to a reversal by the Erie C.B.A. and remedial action as demanded by the visitors.
- \*In one locality a school board eliminated bus service to a private school for handicapped children after twelve years of service. Numerous complaints by parents to the local GBO led the representatives to "keep the phone wires to Harrisburg hot for three days" leading to reinstatement of the program.
- \*Sewage treatment in one locality was upgraded after complaints to the GBO that municipal discharge polluted a lake.
- \*Complaints of low water pressure in one neighborhood was resolved by the water company constructing a larger-size water line.
- \*In another locality, neighborhood residents had arranged for a \$1.00 lease on property to be used as a playground for children (100 children in a three block area with no place to play except streets). Lacking funds for leveling and installation of a fence, the community appealed to the GBO's which arranged for a bulldozer and setting up of the fence.
- \*Complaints of poor, inaccessible and discriminatory treatment in the hospital in one city led first of all



to additional professional staff in the emergency clinic, and then toward development of outpatient and emergency services directly in the ghetto area.

- \*Complaints of 37 black people that all streets but one (theirs) in a borough were paved. Moreover, the street was being paved to the adjoining area on the other side. All people who lived on the street were black, there were no street lights, stagnant puddles led to mosquito infestations, and real estate taxes were in proportion with the rest of the borough. Borough, township and state officials provided no satisfaction until the GBO's entered the picture. The result was that the street was paved leading to "small-scale redevelopment of the area."
- \*Complaints of discrimination against state agencies had been previously turned over to the department against which the complaint was lodged. GBO-initiated action led to a new policy, and these complaints, as did others against public and private agencies, also went to the Human Relations Commission.
- \*The policy of one school district of excluding a youth from school because of his hair style was changed by direct GBO initiated pressure after parent appeals to the school board, the State Department of Education, the principal of the school and the courts had not proven successful.
- \*Information from a large number of complaints concerning the preponderance of consumer frauds contributed to activities to change the Pennsylvania Constitution to allow the state Attorney General to act in these cases: a Bureau of Consumer Protection was established in the Department of Justice.
- \*A complaint from a number of recently retired state employees that their retirement annuity withdrawals took 4-6 months, often longer, for processing. GBO investigation revealed a backlog of 213 retirement board actions, 52 of which were four or more months old. Subsequent actions led to clearing of the backlog and initiation of new procedures toward preventing future delays.
- \*The GBO was not successful in dealing with complaints of discrimination and poor treatment at one correctional institution for juveniles--even though a local community council, the Department of Justice, the Department of Public Welfare, the Pennsylvania Prison Society, the American Friends Service Community, the ACLU, and the Governor's Council for Human Services were involved.

\*The GBO's were not successful in getting a permanent water supply for 54 families in a rural township where mine operations apparently interfered with the ground water supply.

\*Nineteen complaints of infestations of rats revealed that the closing of a garbage dump in the area led to migration of rats to nearby residences. Borough officials would take no action, GBO initiated action by several state departments led to: (1) borough officials carried out a rat control program which cleared up the problem in several months; and (2) discovery of a sewerage outfall within 20 feet of the street, and subsequent extension by 125 feet to provide temporary relief to residents pending completion of a public sewerage system.

These examples, and those in previous sections, present a picture of citizen's advocacy which is as diverse as "the system" with which the GBO's interacted; they support the conclusion that the Governor's Branch Offices developed the capability to provide citizen's advocacy for interests in a polycentric political system. (For present purposes, the various examples are not separated analytically into political sub-systems or jurisdictions. Such would be possible, however, according to the analytic convention utilized herein.) These events illustrate the fact that the Governor's representatives precipitated changes in many system structures, in a variety of political sub-systems, on behalf of a disadvantaged class of people. Thus, the GBO's represented the interests of poor, in particular black, people to the lowest, and to the highest, authorities of the political system.

## Citizen's Advocacy on Behalf of Interests--Concluding Comments

As was the case of citizen's advocacy on behalf of individuals, the actions of the Governor's Branch Offices on behalf of disadvantaged interests ranged the boundaries of the polity (1) in many community sub-systems--employment, housing, income maintenance, police, legal, public health, utilities, transportation, education, etc.; (2) at several levels--township, borough, municipal, county, state and federal; and (3) in private voluntary and public sectors. The demands which the GBO's presented to these many jurisdictional authorities and the responses which they precipitated were at times general, as in the overall re-orientation of the Shafer administration; or middle-range, as in changed policies in employment, financial aid, tension-handling and public housing. Such actions had impact on large groupings of people. Other system change actions were more locality specific--as in clearing up infestations of rats, installation of traffic lights, establishment of new services in particular communities, or changes of policies in particular offices. Overall, the record suggests that the GBO's identified a large number of what would otherwise have been "nondecisions" in the polity under consideration, that the areas for change were not easily categorized or rationally structured, that existing structures were not effectively dealing with such non-decisions, and that a generalized citizen's advocacy program demonstrated a capability to do so.

Perhaps the major critique of the GBO's is that they did not go further in the "system change" area nor did they develop

systematic mechanisms for institutionalizing this function. The record shows that there was periodic interest in developing methods for identifying what were called "patterns" or "trends"; however, in final analysis, no systematic effort was put forth toward these ends. Reasons for this failure lie perhaps in the orientation of the people who considered themselves radical, for there was a great prejudice against any hint of bureaucracy which the idea of information systems and routinized research suggested. It seems clear to the researcher, however, that systematic perusal of the files of the GBO's, analyses of problem areas, and documentation of the responsiveness of various agencies to citizen problems could provide many valuable leads in this direction. For example, in reviewing the files, the researcher became aware of several cases of inter-agency non-cooperation (two different agencies which offered the same service but which had different eligibility criteria and did not inform applicants who were marginally ineligible for one program of the existence of the other program), or the practice of hospital emergency rooms of dealing only with medical problems even where the patient showed obvious mental illness. This practice is particularly questionable in suicide attempts during periods such as late evenings or weekends when many mental health facilities are closed. Also questionable is the refusal of unemployment compensation offices to even inform, let alone refer, people of other financial benefits such as food stamps or public assistance. The files also reveal that the state was often authoritatively impotent to act in many

situations except through informal procedures such as manifest in the GBO's. For example, the Department of Community Affairs had no authority to enforce action against local housing authorities; the Department of Education had no jurisdiction in many areas concerning policies and practices of school districts; the Department of Health could not compel local health departments to comply with many regulations; and the Department of Justice and the state police could not prevent local police departments from harassment of citizens.<sup>71</sup>

In addition, statistical analysis of the group of Central Office class and legal advocacy revealed wide variations in both response-time and action variables according to both types of problem and agency. Further analysis of such information, and then investigation of the sources of variation and determination of acceptable and unacceptable rates could provide a potentially valuable monitoring device.

On the other hand, the record does show a considerable number of acts of citizen's advocacy on behalf of interests. The Governor's Branch Offices placed demands on a variety of socio-political structures which resulted in changing a condition, policy, law, regulation or procedure on behalf of a large number of people--not just the individual(s) who presented the problem. In the areas where they acted toward changes "within the system," it is suggested that the Governor's Branch Offices demonstrated a considerable degree of success in precipitating responsive outcomes. The record also gives evidence that the citizen's advocate is not a panacea for

eliminating or overcoming systematic biases. Rather, the citizen's advocate can serve as a viable new mechanism for representing the interests of unorganized individuals and interests to a wide spectrum of sub-systems and jurisdictions in the political system. In this way, the citizen's advocate shows the potential of adding a new variable to the complex equation of political access and responsiveness, perhaps toward shifting biases in the direction of otherwise unrepresented individuals and interests.

## Chapter 6: Notes

<sup>1</sup>Seymour M. Lipset in Merton, op.cit., Crozier, op.cit., Weber, op.cit., Dahrendorf, op.cit., Jacoby, op.cit., Strauss, op.cit., Woll, op.cit.

<sup>2</sup>Strauss, op.cit.

<sup>3</sup>Ezra Krendel, "The Use of Citizen's Complaints as Social Indicators," IEEE Transactions on Systems Science and Cybernetics, Vol. SSC-6 (October, 1970), pp. 265-272; Drew Hyman, et.al., "Citizen's Complaints as Social and Organizational Indicators," a paper delivered to the Urban and Regional Information System Association, (Montreal: August, 1972); and Drew Hyman and Catherine Powanda, The Pennsylvania Governor's Action Center, (University Park, Pa.: The Pennsylvania State University, CHSD Report No. 56, October, 1974).

<sup>4</sup>Ries, op.cit., Jacoby, op.cit., Crozier, op.cit.

<sup>5</sup>For example, Rose, op.cit., suggests a third ideal-type of theory of poverty causation, the dysfunctional economic system: poverty in the U.S. is structural, localized in a lower class characterized by distinct, relatively isolated sub-groups, and they will remain poor unless adequate income maintenance programs are combined with increased employment of the sub-groups through policies to promote expansion of the economy, (p. 27). Many scholars and writers would argue about Rose's recommendations, especially the latter, expansion of the economy, suggesting that limits to growth and general redistribution of wealth, ownership and power are more appropriate alternatives. Rather than engage this dialectic herein, it is sufficient to recognize that the U.S. form of capitalism and policies of continued growth are not the only options available.

<sup>6</sup>It is a recognized fact that the GBO's were established in a period of general national awareness of the problems of poor, in particular black, people. In Pennsylvania as in other localities there were many efforts at reform, stimulated, no doubt, by a similar number of immediate causes. Many of the actions which were precipitated by the GBO's may have happened anyway--under different circumstances, with different timing, and perhaps, different actors. Certainly some of the changes mentioned below occurred elsewhere--where there were no GBO's. And just as certainly some of the actions precipitated by the GBO's were the "cause" of changes in other states. It is also a fact that a major recommendation of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders suggested the

establishment of GBO-type organizations at the city or metropolitan level. There is no way of knowing whether and how these changes might have otherwise occurred in their own time, in their own way--for it was their time. What will be asserted is that some of the changes were precipitated by the GBO's and that these actions would not have occurred at that time, in the particular manner were it not for the GBO's. Thus, the GBO's will be said to be the immediate cause of certain events. There will be no claim that some of the events would not have occurred otherwise; rather, the objective here is to demonstrate that the GBO's did enhance the access and the responsiveness of "the system" by representing the demands of unorganized interests (quasi or solidary groups) to the "authorities." See also National Advisory Commission, op.cit., Chapter 10.

<sup>7</sup>See, Chapter 1, above.

<sup>8</sup>GBO Archive: undated decision paper the contents of which indicate that it was prepared for a major policy meeting or series of meetings in late September or early October, 1967.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

<sup>11</sup>In particular, the group of theories which view socio-political "dysfunctions" as the causes of poverty, as described by Rose, op.cit.

<sup>12</sup>Scoble, (1967), op.cit., Chapter 3, contains a discussion of "characteristic thinking" or ideology.

<sup>13</sup>GBO Archive: Council for Human Services, 1967 Activity Report, Arthur F. Sampson, Chairman, Council for Human Services, to the Honorable Raymond P. Shafer, (February 29, 1968).

<sup>14</sup>GBO Archive: Governor Shafer's statements to a meeting on problems in public housing which included local housing authority managers and executive board members, welfare rights representatives, several cabinet members and federal housing officials, and GBO representatives.

<sup>15</sup>While it can be asserted that information was available elsewhere (Harrington's, The Other America, for example, and from interest groups like the Welfare Rights Organization) which most likely affected the receptivity of these people, the precipitating events which were active in this particular situation revolved around the



Governor's Branch Offices. It is also recognized that similar changes in orientation also occurred in other authoritative decision-makers as part of a wider nationwide trend. The significance of the GBO activity is not diminished, however, for it was the timing, the immediacy, and the irrefutability of the information which poured into the Governor's Office via the GBO's which led to the change in orientation and the changes in policy at the particular moment and in the particular direction.

<sup>16</sup>GBO Archive: Council for Human Services, 1967 Activity Report, op.cit.

<sup>17</sup>GBO Archive: Minutes of Governor's Council for Human Services, (November 20, 1967).

<sup>18</sup>Ibid.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid.

<sup>20</sup>Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Public Welfare, Annual Public Welfare Report (1968), and the Department of Labor and Industry, Bureau of Employment Security, Biennial Report (1967-1968), indicate that unemployment in the previous year (1967) was at 3.4% or at "full employment" with 165,400 people looking for work. Thus this effort was only a partial solution, but it is also a fact that many of these people were in the process of moving, were between jobs which they would find themselves, etc. Moreover, many of these were white, working and lower-middle class as well as middle-class people. Unemployment in Pennsylvania in 1968 decreased by 10,000 to 3.2% and to 2.9% in 1969. The causal connection between the actions of the Governor and employment are unknown but Pennsylvania did have a lower unemployment than the national average for this entire period.

<sup>21</sup>Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Public Welfare, Public Welfare Report, (1968).

<sup>22</sup>Harrisburg Patriot News, March 25, 1969, reported that the ACLU succeeded in getting the definition of "socially disadvantaged" changed to eliminate reference to specific groups of people.

<sup>23</sup>Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Bureau of Employment Security, 17th Biennial Report (1969-1970), p. 10, reports that 82% of the 189,749 non-white applicants during 1968-1970 were placed in non-agricultural jobs. It is also significant to note that 1968 is the first year the BES makes any mention of services to non-whites.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 15.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., p. 27.

<sup>27</sup> GBO Archive: "Governor's Branch Office Trend: Lack of Job Referral for Spanish Speaking Persons, Bureau of Employment Security," Memorandum, F. Clinton McKay, GBO Coordinator, to Clifford L. Jones, Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry, (June 20, 1969).

<sup>28</sup> GBO Archive: Memorandum, F. Clinton McKay, GBO Coordinator to Honorable Clifford Jones, Secretary of Labor and Industry, "Philadelphia and Pittsburgh BES Offices," (October, 1968).

<sup>29</sup> GBO Archive: several documents from March to June, 1968.

<sup>30</sup> GBO Archive: BES trend files.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Ira Sharkansky, The Routines of Politics, (New York: Van Nostrand-Reinhold Co., 1970).

<sup>33</sup> GBO Archive: "Saga of the Philadelphia Housing Situation," Governor's Council for Human Services, and the Governor's Branch Offices, (October, 1967), unpublished, p. 1.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> Interviews with several key informants which were corroborated by documentary information in the GBO Archive.

<sup>37</sup> GBO Archive: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, "Proceedings of the Governor's Seminar on Public Housing," Harrisburg, Pennsylvania (November 29, 1967), "Welcome and Charge to the Seminar," by the Honorable Raymond P. Shafer, pp. 1-3.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> GBO Archive: Proceedings of the Governor's Seminar on Public Housing, op.cit., and other documentary evidence.

<sup>40</sup> Civil Action No. 68-950, (May 7, 1968), Eastern States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

<sup>41</sup> GBO Archive: for example, the Chester Pa. Housing Authority was induced to change its policy in July 1968. Source: one of the files in the case and legal advocacy files which was discussed in the latter part of the previous chapter.

<sup>42</sup> Pressman and Wildavsky, op.cit.

<sup>43</sup> Rose, op.cit., Kershaw, op.cit., Donovan, op.cit.

<sup>44</sup> Richard Cloward and Frances Fox Piven, "Poverty, Injustice and the Welfare State," The Nation, (February 28, 1966), pp. 230-235.

<sup>45</sup> Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Public Welfare Code, Harrisburg, Pa.

<sup>46</sup> Interviews with GBO Coordinator.

<sup>47</sup> GBO Archive: These examples are from files in the GBO Archive. In the last case, the brief filed by CLS both mentions action of the GBO's in maintaining the family between the time of first indication of need, and of "bringing her case to the attention of Community Legal Services." (letter and attachments, Community Legal Services to Mr. James Reed, GBO #2, Philadelphia, P ., dated January 5, 1968). Also, Civil Action No. 42419, Eastern States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

<sup>48</sup> This action earned Dr. Georges the enmity of his social welfare professional staff, and the GBO's as Dr. Georges pet project became a center of conflict. Some of the differences in responsiveness of offices within Welfare noted in the previous chapter may be due to this conflict. In addition, Governor Shafer lost support in his predominantly conservative Republican Party as a result of this action. These comments again reveal the complex nature of politics in the polycentric political system--in this case the conflicts within the bureaucracy and the party which emerged from the Governor's responsiveness to the demands which flowed through the GBO channel. On the development of profession-oriented interests which replace original goals of bureaucrats, see also, Martin Rhein, "Professional Bureaucracies as Influence Systems," in Ermer, op.cit.

<sup>49</sup>Richard R. Ritti, The Welfare Explosion: Management Practice or Management Policy, (The Pennsylvania State University, Center for Human Services Development, Report #22, February, 1973), monograph. The study is based on data from federal characteristics surveys, Department of Public Welfare Records, and data from BES.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid.

<sup>51</sup>Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, op.cit. p. 206.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid., p. 324.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., pp.331-332.

<sup>54</sup>See, for example, Robert M. Fogelson, "White on Black: A Critique of the McCone Commission Report on the Los Angeles Riots," Political Science Quarterly, (September, 1967), pp. 337-367, and "From Resentment to Confrontation: The Police, the Negroes, and the Outbreak of the Nineteen-Sixties Riots," Political Science Quarterly, (June, 1968), pp. 217-247; Peter K. Eisinger, "The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities," APSR, (March, 1973), pp. 11-28, and "Racial Differences in Protest Participation," APSR, (June, 1974), pp. 592-606; Gordon E. Misner, "The Response of Police Agencies," in protest in the sixties, Philadelphia: The Annals, (1969), pp. 109-119; Harlan Hahn, The Political Objectives of Ghetto Violence, (American Political Science Association, 1969 Annual Meeting), paper. See also several articles on the police in Theodore L. Becker and Vernon G. Murray, eds., Government Lawlessness in America, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971).

<sup>55</sup>Gerald Caplan and Jeffrey Paige, "A Study of Ghetto Rioters," Scientific American, Vol. 219, No. 2, (August, 1968), pp. 15-21.

<sup>56</sup>A large portion of the material which follows is derived from the GBO Archive, the relevant files and documents of which are too extensive to list herein. This information was corroborated through interviews and reviews of newspaper coverage of incidents. In particular, there were files on incidents in each of the GBO Cities, all of which contained information, reports, and press clippings on several incidents.

<sup>57</sup>GBO Archive: Governor's Branch Office files indicate that the original plan was developed in 1967, and was reaffirmed in 1968, 1969, 1970 and 1971. The files also indicate, with reference to item 4, that if local groups or leadership was involved in

negotiating community demands, the GBO's remained passive (e.g., two incidents in Pittsburgh and Erie) but served as a channel of information to the groups and to the Governor. For example, in Pittsburgh disturbances after the assassination of Martin Luther King, community groups were very active. The GBO's remained passive, working with both groups and the Governor as communication channels but not becoming actively involved in bargaining for it was determined that local organizations were handling the situation well. Also, in the Pittsburgh situation, the state police and national guard were present but remained exterior to the disturbance area and made evaluative reports on assuring that the local police operated in a restrained and non-reactive manner. In several other situations, especially cities where black interest groups were not well developed, the Governor's representatives undertook a direct role in representing community interests to the local and state authorities.

<sup>58</sup> Savitch, op.cit., found that the police response to incidents correlated highly with the orientation of local political leadership. Thus, if the local political leadership could be influenced by the Governor, it seems probable that local police could in turn be restrained from precipitating-type behaviors.

<sup>59</sup> GBO Archive: Memorandum from F. Clinton McKay, GBO Coordinator, to Dr. Thomas W. Georges, Secretary of Public Welfare, dated May 1, 1968.

<sup>60</sup> Theodore L. Becker and Vernon G. Murray, eds., Government Lawlessness in America, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), especially Section I, "Police," and Section IV, "Courts."

<sup>61</sup> Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, PL44, as amended effective December 11, 1967.

<sup>62</sup> Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorder, op.cit., pp. 292-293.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., p. 292; also, U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity, "The Poor Seek Justice," (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967).

<sup>64</sup> GBO Archive: Thomas W. Georges, M.D., Secretary of Public Welfare, to the Honorable Raymond P. Shafer, "Report on GBO Operations," (September 26, 1967), p. 1.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> GBO Archive: Memorandum from the Executive Secretary, Council for Human Services to Secretary of Public Welfare, "Role of the Department of Justice in the Governor's Branch Office Program," (March 5, 1968).

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Public Welfare, Office of Special Programs, "Background Paper on HEW Legal Services," from the Director of Special Programs to Local Legal Services Programs, (February 22, 1973). Much of the material in this section comes from participant observation and interviews with the Director of Legal Services.

<sup>70</sup> GBO Archive: Case files or other documents.

<sup>71</sup> GBO Archive: Memorandum in the Council for Human Services File on problems arising from local autonomy, (February 2, 1968).

CHAPTER 7: THE CITIZEN'S ADVOCATE AS A FORMALIZED  
COMMUNICATIONS AND CONTROL MECHANISM

Consideration of the parameters of the citizen's advocacy provided by the Governor's Branch Offices is interesting and worthwhile in its own right. Citizen's advocacy programs--ombudsmen, little city halls, action lines and citizen's feedback programs--constitute a relatively new political phenomenon.<sup>1</sup> In fact, the demand for such programs is so great that one scholar has been prompted to speak of "ombudsmania";<sup>2</sup> that alone provides justification for investigating the nature, operations and activities of citizen's advocacy programs. This study might well have been confined to documentation and description of the GBO's as a particular experiment in citizen's advocacy. It was suggested, however, that the crisis situation which gave rise to the establishment of the GBO's, combined with the research setting, the richness of the field research methods utilized, and the generalist orientation of the researcher, and led to the establishment of a grounded theory of citizen's advocacy and placement of the study in several bodies of literature.

It is appropriate, therefore, at this point to recall the broader events which gave rise to the Governor's Branch Offices before summarizing their role in them. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to: (1) a review of the general crisis situation in 1967,

(2) placement of these events in the context of several trends within the modern polity, (3) review of the role of the Governor's Branch Offices as a citizen's advocate in a particular polity, and (4) a review of areas for further research and development. It will be suggested that citizen's advocacy programs can be viewed as movement toward formalization of a fourth function or "branch" of government-- an access and responsiveness function; and that such action is in keeping with the trends toward publicization of increasing aspects of community life, bureaucratization of more and more areas of community value, and the differentiation of decisional autonomy into many levels, sub-systems and sectors of the community.

#### The Immediate Precipitant: Urban Crisis in the Nation

The precursors of the crisis which gave rise to the establishment of the Governor's Branch Offices in Pennsylvania occurred in 1964, when seven eastern cities were struck by riots in black communities. "These riots were each a symptom of a sickness in the center of our cities."<sup>3</sup> A year later at seven o'clock in the evening an ordinary arrest of a black youth following a complaint by another black person about dangerous driving led to a series of events which touched off the Watts riots in Los Angeles, California. "The rioters seemed to have been caught up in an insensate rage of destruction";<sup>4</sup> but post-riot assessments suggest that the violence was not without direction or objects of rage:



The rioters concentrated primarily on food markets, liquor stores, furniture stores, clothing stores, department stores, and pawn shops. . . . We note with interest that no residences were deliberately burned, that damage to schools, libraries, churches and public buildings was minimal, and that certain types of business establishments, notably service stations and automobile dealers, were for the most part unharmed. . . . There is no evidence that the rioters made any attempt to steal narcotics from pharmacies in the riot area even though some pharmacies were looted and burned.<sup>5</sup>

Post-riot assessments suggest that while there is no reason to believe that there was organization behind this apparent directive violence, there was a "collective consciousness" underlying the action and which served to channel the violence in particular directions.<sup>6</sup> Hopes, aspirations, promises, and demands had been systematically blocked in the larger society. Normal avenues of change and redress were not responsive. Frustration, powerlessness and hostility cumulated.<sup>7</sup> Thus there were shared understandings among large numbers of black people about the reasons for and the "causes" of the black condition.<sup>8</sup>

In the mid-sixties the causes of the riots came to be defined generally as rooted in societal conditions of discrimination, scarcity, poverty and other terms used to describe a collectivity systematically excluded from participation in the "American Dream."<sup>9</sup> But being "disadvantaged" was not enough to touch off urban violence; black people had been disadvantaged for three-hundred years in this country. There was also hope: the hope of a decade of civil rights movement, and the promise of a massive "War on Poverty." Then hope had been dashed by bickering, controversy, delay and underinvestment

in the "War" and disillusionment over projects which were delivered.<sup>10</sup> The implications for black people seemed clear: "the System," and "the Man," would again assure that black people were kept in their place.<sup>11</sup> Thus blocked access and a political system which was unresponsive to the demands of black people led to increased frustration, disillusionment and hostility toward the system and the symbols of the system. Moreover, the structures for change within the system were perceived as being unresponsive to black demands.<sup>12</sup> The resulting pent-up resentment, alienation, and smouldering black rage needed only a spark to set off a spontaneous release of energy. In the mid-1960's, violence and civil disobedience were a collectively recognized outlet.<sup>13</sup>

Recall the statement of Carmichael and Hamilton that in the perception of many black people: "Given the illegitimacy of the system, we cannot then proceed to transform that system with existing structures."<sup>14</sup> Perceptions such as this make populations predisposed or prone to anti-systemic behavior, or to some form of action to break down barriers to access for demands. Collectivities under such conditions "are not simply neutral aggregates transformed into a violent mob by the agitation or charisma of individuals."<sup>15</sup> Empirical studies of conditions in riot (and nonriot) cities tend to support the hypothesis that such conditions existed in many U.S. cities for the period under consideration. Lieberman and Silverman, for example, in studying the precipitants and underlying conditions of urban violence in the sixties, found violence "much more likely to occur when social institutions function inadequately, or when

grievances are not resolved, or cannot be resolved under the existing institutional arrangements."<sup>16</sup> Also supporting the grievance hypothesis, Shuman and Gruenberg found race to be an important factor in citizen satisfaction with city services and that black citizens in riot areas were more dissatisfied than those in non-riot areas. Black people were more frequently dissatisfied with services than whites, and more importantly, the data demonstrates that while it is not clear that riot areas (in 1967) differed socio-economically from the rest of the city, once race is held constant, disorder areas (for the black sample) do differ in level of dissatisfaction with city services:

. . . black citizens living in riot areas experienced greater dissatisfaction with city services than blacks living elsewhere in the same cities. . . . We may have here one factor providing legitimacy for the kind of behavior and ideology that characterized the riots. In particular, the belief that the city administration discriminates against one's neighborhood in the provision of basic services could be used to justify actions ordinarily viewed as criminal.<sup>17</sup>

Furthermore, Heaps' study of U.S. riots from 1765 to 1970 finds violence, especially after World War II, to be overwhelmingly against the established order. Protestors and rioters felt that traditional society must be changed, and lacking other efficacious means, by violence if necessary. One result of such sentiments is that hostile relationships are manifest toward the agents and instruments of "the system." White store owners and shopkeepers fit the prescription, and the police are the representatives of "the system" which most frequently enter into conflict-laden contacts with ghetto residents. It is not surprising that black rage in the 1960's

was sparked by and directed toward the symbols and instruments of repression. Almost every incident of racial violence in the 1960's, in fact all major outbursts before 1968 when Martin Luther King was assassinated, were precipitated by arrests of black people for minor offences by white officers.<sup>18</sup> It is also generally agreed that the objects of violence were not unstructured, random targets, but were directed by an awareness of where the inequities of the system were most intensely manifest in the ghetto.<sup>19</sup> Hahn's study of the political objectives of ghetto violence suggests that:

In directing their anger at police officers as well as at local businesses, rioters have exhibited their disrespect both for the symbols of the legal order and for the personal and property rights that form the normative bases of political authority. The attacks on important social institutions or rules, manifested by violence, arson, and looting in several major riots have indicated that the objectives of civil disorders extended beyond the simple display of political discontent. By their statements and behavior, ghetto residents not only were seeking to arouse interest in their needs, but they also seemed to be calling for the establishment of new institutional arrangements to satisfy their grievances.<sup>20</sup>

It seems reasonable to conclude that the racial violence in the 1960's resulted from failure of "the system" to respond to significant demands of black people as a collectivity or quasi-group. It is suggested that institutional barriers to access and responsiveness and lack of formal institutions and channels for redress of grievances represented an institutional breakdown which was responded to with violence "directed at the inadequacy of the political system to process demands, and to make allocations in a responsive and responsible manner."<sup>21</sup>

In further support of these assessments, Greenstone and Peterson found that the flow of War on Poverty allocations was related directly to traditional centers of political influence--which black people in general did not share. The exception was riot cities which greatly increased their share of anti-poverty allocations. Clearly, "the system was not responsive to the needs and demands of black people except as it was forced to accept their demands by the occurrence of violent behavior."<sup>22</sup> Moreover, Savitch found the biases against black people--systemic, ideological, and regime--to be much more pervasive than Schattschneider identified in The Semisovereign People. The usual channels into and up the system were not adequate, and it was suggested that the situation could not be remedied by merely organizing the poor to take their place as still another liberal pluralist interest group. The situation existed because the systemic biases which were present in the system were:

. . . not primarily passive instruments or rules by which self-disenfranchisement among the poor takes place, though this also occurs. Rather political biases can be and are being used by particular groups to keep blacks and Puerto Ricans who live in the ghetto politically weak.<sup>23</sup>

Thus, when riots erupted across the nation in 1967, and ravaged one-hundred and twenty-eight cities,<sup>24</sup> the outbursts were defined by many scholars and policy-makers as resulting from the failure of community programs to reach a large, alienated mass of disadvantaged people in America's inner cities. It was concluded that various sub-systems of American society had failed to provide reasonable access to the promises of the American way of life. A large part of the failure was seen as resting in the politics of the

War on Poverty and the lack of delivery of services by various governmental bureaucracies to which disadvantaged people were entitled. Not only had the system not delivered promised goods and services, the structures for value-allocation had come to be perceived by black people as a chief antagonist. In this frame-of-reference, the problem was rooted in a fateful lack of linkages between the various institutionalities of the polity and the people; and secondly by the existence of areas requiring change where decision-making and service delivery systems had been structured to provide barriers to access and service responsiveness. The post-riot assessment by the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Riots, after exhaustive nationwide study, for example, stated:

People in poverty everywhere, in fact lack the channels of communication, influence and appeal that traditionally have been available to ethnic minorities within the city and which enabled them--unburdened by color--to scale the walls of the white ghettos in an earlier era. The frustrations of powerlessness have led some to the conviction that there is no effective alternative to violence as a means of expression and redress, as a way of 'moving the system.' More generally, the result is alienation and hostility toward the institutions of law and government and the white society which control them. These conditions have created a volatile mixture of attitudes and beliefs which needs only a spark to ignite mass violence.

. . .

Virtually every major episode of urban violence in the Summer of 1967 was foreshadowed by an accumulation of unresolved grievances by ghetto residents against local authorities (often, but not always, the police). So high was the resulting underlying tension, that routine and random events, tolerated or ignored under most circumstances (such as the raid on the 'Blind Pig' in Detroit and the arrest of the cab driver in Newark) became the triggers of sudden violence.

. . .

Coinciding with this high level of dissatisfaction, confidence in the willingness and ability of local government to respond to Negro grievances was low. Evidence presented to this Commission in hearings, field reports and research analysis of the 1967 riot cities, establishes that a substantial number of Negroes were disturbed and angry about local governments' failures to resolve their problems.<sup>25</sup>

The importance of these events for this study goes beyond the events of the 1960's and the conditions of black people, however, for they prefigure conditions which may (or have) spread into other areas. The Commission found these problems to be restricted primarily to the disadvantaged:

If the white middle class fail to get satisfaction, they can call on a variety of remedies--assistance of elected representatives, friends in government, a lawyer. In short, the middle-class city dweller has relatively fewer needs for public services and is reasonably well positioned to move the system to his benefit.<sup>26</sup>

Since then, however, the phenomenon has been identified as existing in the middle class and possibly beyond. A study of the national psyche, Hopes and Fears of the American People, indicates that almost fifty percent of Americans regard national tensions as grave enough to "lead to a real breakdown in this country."<sup>27</sup> And the survey found that, ". . . most citizens feel that the nation's difficulties are rooted in fundamental systemic causes, and that something needs to be done to cure the larger anomie."<sup>28</sup> Further support of this assessment is found in Philip Converse's analysis of national survey data on trust, efficacy and alienation for the period 1960-1968. Arther Miller's data on the period 1964-1970, provides additional evidence to substantiate this contention.<sup>29</sup> Moreover, there has been an accompanying rise in socio-economic conditions and political

participation, changes which typically prefigure radical changes in a polity.<sup>30</sup> It is suggested, therefore, that the urban violence in the late 1960's was but one manifestation, albeit dramatic, of the possible consequences of a political system which is viewed by significant groups in society as being inaccessible and unresponsive to their demands.<sup>31</sup> (It is neither suggested that violence always occurs when such conditions obtain nor that such activities will typically lead to change [for the authorities may respond with counter-violence supported by the authority and legitimate force of "the system"].) It is also suggested that the conditions which generated the alienation and discontent in a large number of black people in the 1960's are structurally generated and (continue to be) societally pervasive. Furthermore, this study suggests that one way to confront some aspects of unresponsive socio-political structures (among a variety of options) is to search for and to establish formalized access and responsiveness mechanisms.<sup>32</sup>

Although this study has not shown, nor did it seek to demonstrate, that the establishment of the Governor's Branch Offices and other aspects of the Governor's plan did in fact prevent violence in Pennsylvania in 1967, it is suggested that their establishment was fortuitous and not unwise. The establishment of the GBO's predates most of the works cited above, and this study demonstrates that they did provide a channel for demands on the value-allocating, decision-making and adjudicatory arenas of the political system--action which was suggested by a wide variety of scholars and policy-makers as possible remedies for some of the structural barriers which existed



in the polity. Moreover, the crisis was used by the Governor and his staff to introduce a new actor into the political domain, and as such must be recognized as the creative use of discontent to introduce a somewhat radical change within the political system. Nor does the significance of the Governor's Branch Office experience stop here, for it is asserted that they pioneered the explicit structuring of a "dialectical organization" as one alternative toward providing a formalized citizen's advocacy mechanism to deal with what are viewed as some of the inherent structural problems of the modern polity. The reasoning which underlies the conclusion that the factors which lead to unresponsive political structures are basically structural and are generally manifest in the broader polity is discussed in the following section.

#### Bureaucratization, Polycentricity and Citizen's Advocacy

The need to search for formalized access and responsiveness mechanisms emerges from several trends of political life in the U.S. today. One trend is the publicization (socialization) of more and more areas of community value; a trend which leads people to increasing dependence on (and hence the potential of domination by) secondary socio-political structures. In his work on the nature of domination in the U.S. today, for example, Theodore Lowi comments that:

. . . almost nothing is left to the family, clan, neighborhood or guild--or to chance. Even sandlot baseball has given way to Little Leagues, symptomatic of an incredible array of parental groups and neighborhood businesses organized to see that the child's every waking moment is organized, unprivate, wholesome, and, primarily oriented toward an ideal of advancement to adult life of rationality that comes all too soon.<sup>33</sup>

Integral to this trend is the assignment of many responsibilities which were once the domain of individuals or private groups to formal administrative structures. Herbert Kaufman has observed that contemporary bureaucracies "make a far greater number of decisions affecting individual citizens in intimate ways than do their chief executives, legislatures or judicial systems."<sup>34</sup> Business, agriculture, technology, finance, transportation, communications, utilities, education, health, welfare, social integration, domestic relations, housing, jobs, the economy, etc., are all in some way under the aegis of administrative authority. Moreover, as mentioned in earlier chapters, this assignment of responsibility has been neither rational nor planful. Rather, as Lowi points out, the dominant capitalist laissez-faire liberal-democratic philosophy prevailed in the U.S., and organizations proliferated much as in a market situation. One consequence of these trends is a transition from a highly privatized society dominated by a capitalist class, to a publicized society dominated by managerial interests and private minority factions.<sup>35</sup>

Emerging from these trends is a concomitant trend toward rule by administration which tends to impose a new form of governance on the commonweal, and which Tingsten describes as a "development from politics to administration, from principles to technique."<sup>36</sup>

While professional bureaucrats are, in principle, answerable to elected officials, Woll notes that "in all nations with developed bureaucracies, 'administrators' are deeply involved in politics--in the attempt to solidify and expand their power within the branches of government and over the general public."<sup>37</sup> It seems appropriate, therefore, to speak of a development toward politics by administration, a phenomenon which carries with it certain inherent structural problems.

Max Weber, in laying the foundation for the modern understanding of bureaucracies, pointed out their advantages as well as noting inherent "dysfunctions" in the form of problems of access, accountability and responsiveness.<sup>38</sup> His emphasis on the rational aspects of bureaucracy and professional neutrality led him to conclude, however, that bureaucracies will be responsive to external political controls.<sup>39</sup> Ralf Dahrendorf comes to similar conclusions, but notes the increasing difficulty of imposing external controls as bureaucracies become large, complex, and develop an "interest" of their own separate from the interests of either society or the political leadership. He suggests that bureaucracy tends to impose its own rationality and direction on society, becoming what Strauss calls "ruling servants."<sup>40</sup> Crozier's discussion of the vicious circle in organizations provides some insight into why bureaucracies, "whose dysfunctions, therefore, are part of its self-reinforcing equilibrium . . .," become unable to correct their own errors.<sup>41</sup> Henry Jacoby reinforces these observations and characterizes the phenomenon as a worldwide trend toward the restriction of the political structures of society by the administrative machinery:

The latter becomes so all-enveloping and complex that legislation cannot keep up with its demands and the need for administrative regulation becomes more pressing. The laws themselves become mere authorizations for the administration which determines their interpretation. The parliamentary regime is dependent on the legislative control exercised by its executive bodies, but this control is no longer able to supervise all the technical details and ramifications of public administration. For in order to be effective, parliamentary control needs information for which it depends in large measure on the administrative apparatus. The member of parliament is bewildered by the skilled way in which the administration advances its explanations; and parliament is also dependent on the administration for the legislation to be enacted, since the latter works it out.

Although the direction of the administration is controlled by parliamentary ministers, their functions are largely dependent on the ministerial bureaucracy. Each new minister confronts a smoothly running machine through which his political directives must pass. These are screened by the department of justice, the department of foreign affairs, and various other sections. Any plans for the future which the politician might have hoped to see realized are strangled and pushed aside by a wealth of official administrative business.<sup>42</sup>

Crozier and Jacoby make it clear that this is a worldwide phenomenon, and that different nations have responded with different approaches toward controlling the burgeoning administration. In the U.S.S.R., primary groups (in particular the party) are described as the major forces for control. In France, a tradition of resistance to authority by both individuals and administrative strata (bon plaisir) is a mitigating force on domination by higher levels. Britain is known for a tradition of deference and administrative neutrality, and the blurring of the legislative and executive functions. China seems to be developing a system of internal, lower-level criticism by subordinates and continual renewal through the concept of "permanent revolution" as manifest in the cultural revolution and the

Red Guards.<sup>43</sup> Such traditional controls, however, are not seen as being totally adequate and experimentation with the ombudsman and citizen's advocacy idea as a possible mechanism for imposing some degree of external control on administrative structures is a world-wide phenomenon.<sup>44</sup>

The particular response of the United States to these trends developed in the shadow of a dominant capitalist ideology, technocratic values, a belief in representative democracy, and a traditional laissez-faire aversion to governmental authority. The U.S. Constitution, for example, is a paradigm of controls on the machinery of government. The institutions of federalism, separation of powers, due process of law, judicial review, and elected chief-executives and legislatures were all constructed with a view to preventing dominance by any branch of government or societal group. The nature of these traditional controls, and gaps or inadequacies which exist have been discussed in-depth elsewhere by many writers and need not be repeated here.<sup>45</sup> The point must be made, however, that the relative inadequacies of these mechanisms as they now operate (and hence the "dysfunctions" of socio-political structures referred to herein) tend to arise from changes in the environment of the political system, not from inherent inadequacies or failures of these mechanisms per se. For this reason, most writers speak of the "search for additional controls" or the development of new mechanisms to supplement the traditional institutions rather than to replace them.<sup>46</sup>

The U.S. response to the trends toward publicization and bureaucratization of most areas of community life has thus been

characterized as a gradual blurring of the public-private distinction in response to various crises as they arose and typically with as little centralization as possible; this "publicization" occurred in the face of increasing demands for participation by various interests and by the larger mass of citizens in general. The trend being described is one in which public authority was parcelled out to varying levels and differentiated structures with little attention to rationality, accountability or control, and to both public and private sectors with decreasing distinction between the two.<sup>47</sup> Thus the net reduction in the ratio of private space to public space predicted by Marx has occurred in the U.S., but not in the form of violent class conflict as much as the gradual transition toward an administrative state, the structures of which are characterized by: (1) diffraction of authority to prevent undue domination by any single sector or level of government, (2) an ideology of expertise to provide accountability through neutrality and professionalism, and (3) interest-group liberalism to insure responsiveness to the public. In a word, the contemporary polity in the United States is highly polycentric, and public controls on the various levels and sectors of administration are diffuse and relatively weak.

Diffraction of authority, professional administration, and interest-group liberalism, however, are neither pathogenic in themselves nor necessarily symptomatic of system malaise. Most observers in the U.S., in fact, have tended to view them as benevolent institutions which complement other mechanisms--representative democracy,

separation of powers, due process, etc.--in preventing undue control by one interest or faction. As early as the 1940's when David Truman wrote his classic treatise which lay the base for the group study of politics, however, he detected portents of "pathogenic politics" in the polity. At that time competing interest groups tended to (or were believed to) check each other and assured governmental responsiveness through overlapping membership and group competition. Truman noted, however, that there remained large numbers of interests which were unorganized, and that their demands were underrepresented. In such a situation, he suggested, changes in demand patterns or changes in expected relationships might lead to new or increased latent demands, and if there were barriers to access or if the system was perceived as being unresponsive, events would lead to what Truman called "moribific politics." Another condition which could also lead to moribific politics would be specialization of organized interest groups to the point of domination of certain interest areas or community value sub-systems by special groups and the limitation of politics to certain strata or classes. The results in either case would be widespread movements at the grassroots level which could bring drastic changes (e.g., of the repressive fascist type) in government, or other conflicts (e.g., sporadic violent outbursts, terrorism, etc.) which could not be settled peacefully.<sup>48</sup>

. . . A pathogenic politics in the United States is possible, though not necessarily imminent. The processes through which unorganized interests restrain the activities of organized groups may not become operative in time to avert serious crises. Potential groups may remain latent as a result of deficiencies in the means of communication.

The claims of both organized and unorganized interests may assume an explosive character as a result of restraints upon the ability to organize, in consequence of rigidity in the established patterns of access, and as an outgrowth of delay and inaction made possible by the diffusion of lines of access to governmental decisions.<sup>49</sup>

Little more than a decade later the existence of "pathogenic politics" was documented by writers such as Lowi, Stern, McConnel and Keller in an environment of massive grassroots civil rights and peace movements, as well as widespread urban racial unrest and violence such as that described in the previous section.<sup>50</sup> The situation with which the nation is faced was recently described by Ries:

The power of government which was distributed among three branches at the national level and then divided between the national level and the states has been captured by 'minority' factions at the expense of the commonweal. Similarly, at local levels of government, civic reforms brought about by the Progressives to wrest the machinery of government from political bosses and return control to citizens by distributing governmental authority to an array of independent boards and commissions have permitted still other minority factions to capture parts of city government.

. . . This concept of participation shuts out the public--the mass not organized around an interest or in leadership positions within groups. The public is shut out of the vital definition phase of the policy process.

. . . The public is also shut out at the accountability stage [for] administrators are primarily accountable to groups and their own institutional (or occasionally, professional) norms . . . There is no social or substantive accountability, only functional accountability.<sup>51</sup>

The specific problematic aspects of these trends to which this study has been concerned, and for which answers must be sought today, are concerned with both the public and the political leadership. For the public there is first of all a need to find ways to describe, comprehend and understand the diffracted nature of the



polity, or at least, the creation of a mechanism which is capable of performing this function for both individuals and unorganized interests. Moreover, in order that their latent demands become part of the political process as well as those of highly organized interest groups, a mechanism must be found which can provide effective access and responsiveness to all arenas of the political system for these two types of political actor. Secondly, for political leadership, the people responsible for assuring that the political system and its bureaucracies are accessible and responsive to the public, there is first of all the need for an external "window" on political and administrative processes in order that specific problems can be identified in ways that are amenable to change-oriented action. There is, in turn, a need to develop mechanisms for impinging on administrative structures so as to stimulate more accountable and responsive administration, for as stated over three decades ago by Finer:

One lesson of the political and administrative history of all ages, the benevolent as well as the tyrannical, the theological as well as the secular, has demonstrated without the shadow of a doubt that sooner or later there is an abuse of power when external punitive controls are lacking.<sup>52</sup>

Hence, the search for realistic alternatives to deal with what has been identified as some structural problems of the contemporary polity is immediate and perhaps as diverse as the problems themselves.

Before proceeding to a discussion of one such group of alternatives, it is important to bear in mind that this study is concerned primarily with certain structural problems of modern polities, in particular with issues of access and responsiveness.

There is reason to believe that the general problems outlined above beset most modern political systems and that violence (in the form of sporadic outbreaks, revolt, and/or repression) may at some point be expected when effective channels of demand are non-existent or closed. There is neither a presumption that this is an exhaustive discussion of problematic aspects of the modern polity nor that the full range of options has been identified. To the contrary, the intent is simply to place the present study within the broader socio-political context of which it is but one small event.

It is also recognized that there are those who would view the tenor of this discussion as pandering to disruptive, ungrateful and dissident minorities. Others would suggest that changes to make "the system" more accessible and responsive are but palliatives for a wider malaise: they would suggest that any real change must be preceded by fundamental changes of socio-economic systems. For example, consider that economic indicators such as black income as a percent of white medians, unemployment rates, and housing conditions suggest that the condition of black people nationally continues to worsen rather than to improve. The failure of the War on Poverty to achieve its lofty goals, the non-implementation or dismantling of programs which were established, the effect of Watergate and associated events on political trust and efficacy, and the combination of inflation and recession have hit black people especially hard. These events have had considerable effect on whites as well. Thus, it is suggested that the larger political system has not responded adequately in the long run to the demands of disadvantaged classes of

people. At the same time, disadvantaged groups are perhaps more aware as a class (solidary group) of these conditions than before and are likely to be less tolerant of being held back. Furthermore, the apparent freedom of certain dominant factions and multi-national corporations to pursue their interests almost irrespective of the interests of other groups in society suggests that the root of the problem at the macro-system level may be beyond "dysfunctioning socio-political structures," and may be manifest fundamentally in the character of "the system" as it now operates. If such be the case, the establishment of citizen's advocacy programs to deal with such a situation could, at best (or worst), serve as a palliative to delay or to repress demands for general changes of the system.

Another perspective, and that of this study, suggests that issues of access and responsiveness are pervasive throughout modern political systems, that violence (both repressive and revolutionary) is undesirably disruptive, and that if socio-political structures can be made more responsive to the demands which arise from societal forces, many conflicts can be resolved (and change occur in a continuous process) without resort to violence (whether the demands be for allocations of values under existing rules, for adjudications of conflicts, or for new rules to achieve values such as economic redistribution, law and order, improved health care, procedural safeguards, or whatever). This position does not deny the occurrence of situations where violence is, from the perspective of certain interests, the only viable option, but rather suggests that those who would prefer change without violence are obliged to seek ways to make socio-political

systems more generally accessible and responsive. The next section identifies some current efforts in this direction which are most related to the experience of the Governor's Branch Offices, and focuses in particular on citizen's advocacy and ombudsman programs.

### The Search for Contemporary Alternatives

Despite the fact that they exhibit certain inherent disadvantages, and that they generally reflect the interests of ruling classes, bureaucracies are necessary and useful organizations in modern society. Size, complexity and technological imperatives demand that publicly administered or regulated programs perform an increasing number of tasks and perform them well. The threat of domination by a strong and active bureaucracy, however, commands those of us who champion the values of equal opportunity and representative democracy to search for, to develop and to institutionalize mechanisms which assure that public policy and administration are responsive to the demands of non-elite individuals and interests.

If we would preserve the liberal-democratic way of life, we must find means for allowing a wide range of administrative discretion without permitting the exercise of power to become arbitrary or irresponsibility.<sup>53</sup>

The number and variety of proposals for institutions to deal with the problems of bureaucracy is perhaps as diverse and fragmented as the political system they propose to reform. Some would vitalize traditional mechanisms as through the reform of the electoral process, realignment of political parties, participatory democracy, increased legislative staffs, or reform of the congressional committee system.

Others propose new mechanisms such as citizen's lobbies, juridicial democracy, polyarchic decentralization, enhanced administrative justice systems, and ombudsmen. Common to all of the proposals, however, is the common objective of securing means by which a highly organized society can cope with failures of its institutional mechanisms, in particular, lack of access for certain groups or types of political actor, systematic unresponsiveness, redress for wrongs, grievances and complaints, and the need for routinized mechanisms to identify specific areas requiring system change or conversion which are not identified by existing mechanisms.

In 1968, Herbert Kaufman postulated that demands for institutional change in this generation will be embodied in the search for mechanisms to make government more accessible and responsive to the public. He cited the development of various programs such as citizen complaint bureaus, ombudsmen, community control mechanisms and citizen participation in administration, as gropings toward institutional means to assure access, accountability and responsiveness.<sup>54</sup> The consumer movement and the growing spate of "whistle blowers"<sup>55</sup> are additional portents of change. These activities occur in the midst of an increasing number of official recognitions of bureaucratic shortcomings, most of which cite lack of regularized channels for dealing with complaints about, and problems of, institutional misdeeds on many levels and in many structures of the polity.<sup>56</sup>

In addition, citizen lobbies or public interest groups, such as the Urban League, Common Cause, and Ralph Nader's Public Interest Research Groups, organize as guardians for politically weak, diffuse

and unorganized interests. The success of many of these activities demonstrates the merits and techniques of interest group advocacy for excluded individuals or interests. But it is also a fact that these organizations are neither adequate nor capable of addressing all of the areas where channels of demand are closed or nonexistent. Based on the pluralist version of democratic accountability, such activities depend on individuals to rise up, take a personal interest in the situation, and organize others as a pressure group. This approach tends to tie action to special crisis areas, to activity by mass movements, to participation by dissident members of the upper strata, or to conflict between dominant interest groups.<sup>57</sup> That is, they rely on traditional channels of demand, and while the system functions in large part because of them, they do not create new, institutional channels of demand to address many of the issues of dysfunctions within "the system." Thus if the assertions cited above that the programmed society requires, in addition, an institutionalized mechanism to carry out the access and responsiveness functions which are not addressed by other institutions, these latter alternatives, while aiding in some areas, do not provide complete remedies.

Many scholars faced with these facts and concerned about the crisis of credibility in the American polity look abroad to the Scandinavian "ombudsman" as an institution which can begin to cope with the problems of individuals, and to identify areas where the system is not responsive, accessible, or accountable. The ombudsman is typically an impartial, high-level independent official, although some ombudsmen have been attached to the various branches of government.

Ombudsmen investigate complaints of individuals against officials, bureaucracies, administrative practices, and in some cases the courts. The authority of most ombudsmen, however, is limited and they have no direct control over courts or administration. Rather, the ombudsman's powers are typically restricted to investigation and reporting to the accused agency, the legislature, and the public. Some ombudsmen do have the authority to investigate on their own initiative and to prosecute illegal acts, but in situations where an authoritative citizen's advocate is required, the classical ombudsman institution seems to be more suggestive of how to proceed rather than a definitive mechanism to meet the needs defined above.

Empirically, ombudsman experience is extremely limited but is rapidly spreading. In 1955, only three Scandinavian countries had ombudsmen (Sweden, Finland and Denmark). By mid-1967, variations of the institution existed in twelve countries including the U.S. (the state of Hawaii), Canada (two provinces), the United Kingdom, West Germany, Israel and Guyana. Today some version of the ombudsman exists on every continent; the empirical data available on their functions and effectiveness, however, is minimal.<sup>58</sup>

Conceptually the ombudsman is the closest institution which exists for dealing with problems of access and complaints against organizational abuse. But investigation into the problems in the United States and the variations of the institution which are being tried, suggests that a much broader, multi-functional concept of citizen's advocacy is required. When contemplating transfer of the ombudsman to the United States as an institution for redress of

system wrongs, it is important to bear in mind that it has been developed in polities with smaller populations than many of the U.S. states. The ombudsman system assumes a competent administration with a concern to provide more efficient service. It deals with exceptions to the rule where wrongdoing by an isolated official occurs. The typical ombudsman can handle only a limited number of complaints. It is oriented to individual redress, not to identification of systemic malaise, system change areas, access or responsiveness. In short, the ombudsman is not equipped to deal with some of the problems identified above where insensitivity, slowness, remoteness, imprecision, misconceived scope of responsibility, conflictual relationships between organizations, or problems in law, regulation, policy or procedure become the rule not the exception.

The development of, and experimentation with, variants of citizen's advocacy in the United States is a new and continuing process. Such a trend is evident in the growing number of programs at all levels and in public and private sectors. Programs in the United States include classical ombudsmen in a number of states, mayor's information and complaint bureaus, prison ombudsmen, hospital ombudsmen, little city halls, citizen's feedback programs, newspaper and radio action lines, and of course, the Governor's Branch Offices. Comparative evaluation and theoretical extrapolation regarding the character and impact on the polity of such experiments is needed to determine whether these programs provide meaningful channels for citizen demands or whether they are but palliatives for broader system-level malaise.



The limited information on these experiences in the United States suggests, however, that the more than ninety percent of the typical ombudsman's complaints which are found to be "unjustified" because he is restricted to the redress function are indeed demands on the political system which cannot long be ignored. In Colorado, for example, when Lt. Governor Mark Hogan undertook the citizen's advocate role, he found many things were presented to him which the typical ombudsman would not handle.<sup>59</sup> There are many poor and underprivileged people who request access to services, help in private matters as well as in relationships with the state, and protection in the area of civil law. He found many cases where lack of adequate communications within an agency or between agencies where responsiveness could be enhanced. There were many cases of bureaucratic inaction because of mutual misjudgments or inconsistencies between citizens and agencies, or carelessness on the part of either. Many times public employees had "wrong attitudes," or were overzealous in their implementation of law and regulations. Many agencies could shrug off legitimate demands or complaints as not being their area of responsibility. And there were many citizens who wanted a sympathetic person to listen to their opinion or complaint, and who presented reasonable probability that the communication would reach the attention of someone in a position of authority. The Pennsylvania Governor's Branch Offices found a similar situation to exist, and they undertook the role of providing an effective channel of access and responsiveness for both individuals and interests. Available evidence suggests that new protections are required against bureaucratic

mistakes, intransigence, and abuses of power, which may be so pervasive that the focus should not be on "transfer of the ombudsman," but rather on the development of new citizen's advocacy mechanisms which provide for access and responsiveness functions as well as investigations and redress of grievances. Such a process involves conceptualization and development of new theory, and experimentation with alternative mixes of powers and processual arrangements. Hence, there is a need to compare and contrast the experience in a variety of polities and political sub-systems in order to build a more relevant theoretical framework around which the emerging institutions of citizen's advocacy can be built.

The analysis of the Pennsylvania Governor's Branch Office program found that about 85 percent of the demands of citizens which they received could be handled by local-level advocacy offices, and most of the remainder by a central coordinator's office. Only about one percent required the attention of the "Governor's Man," the content and volume of which seems to be comparable to the workload of the typical ombudsman. It is suggested, however, that the 99 percent of the citizen problems and demands which did not reach the most authoritative level are legitimate demands on the structures of the political system, and furthermore that the contemporary polity cannot, or at least should not, allow them to remain unresolved. Therefore, the experience of the Governor's Branch Office program, if viewed as an experiment which provided a mechanism broader than the ombudsman to represent the demands of certain disadvantaged individuals and interests to the political system, can provide insights into the

capability, functions, operation, and effectiveness of such programs. The review of the GBO experience in the following section is intended to characterize this program as a new channel for demands on the political system, and to summarize their experience in providing the three types of citizen's advocacy to a wide variety of community sub-systems and organizational structures for both individuals and interests.

#### Toward a Fourth "Function" of Government

It has been shown that the Governor's Branch Offices demonstrated that a formalized citizen's advocacy program is capable of providing three types of citizen's advocacy vis-a-vis the structures of the political system for a disadvantaged class of citizens. It was also demonstrated that the GBO's provided citizen's advocacy for both individuals and for interests; and furthermore, that the GBO's placed demands upon and precipitated the responsiveness of a wide variety of political sub-systems and the diverse sets of structures within them. In this manner, the Governor's Branch Office experience is suggestive that a formalized citizen's advocate exhibits a potential for serving as a mechanism to confront some of the problematic aspects of the modern polity.

More specifically, it was demonstrated that a considerable number of disadvantaged people (the equivalent of one for every 2.5 black households in Pennsylvania) received access to the structures for the allocation of values, special rules or waivers, or adjudication of conflicts of law or policy which otherwise would, most likely,

not have obtained. Most importantly, from the perspective of this study, the demands of a relatively unrepresented class of people received the attention of the highest executive of the political system in such a manner as to precipitate changes in law, policy, regulation and procedure on their behalf. In this way, the Governor's Branch Offices were instrumental in representing the latent demands of this disadvantaged collectivity in such a way that changes ensued in a variety of community sub-systems: employment, housing, financial aid, community health and safety, tension handling and control, legal services, and a variety of other areas. As a result, the structures of the political system became more compatible with the wants of poor, in particular black, people and more responsive to their demands.

At first blush, it seems unreasonable to assert that a program as small as the Governor's Branch Offices could have a meaningful impact on problems such as discussed above. (They were located in only twenty-one neighborhoods in a state with more than 2500 municipalities.) The record suggests, however, that while the impact of the GBO's cannot be described as having brought about a fundamental reorganization of the political system, from the perspective of the people whose demands they represented there was indeed a radical departure in both structure and response from the previous state of affairs. In the first place, the dialectical nature of the Governor's Branch Offices set them apart from "the system." The diverse sources of their authority, the charismatic character of their actions, their organizational structure and operational modalities, the criteria for selection and training of staff, the way visitors

were perceived, even the location and character of the offices themselves were designed to be the opposite of bureaucracies. The fact that this was an organization, in fact, the Governor's Office, which was responsible primarily for obtaining access to and precipitating system responsiveness for disadvantaged citizens, and to these ends was directed to call upon the entire range of resources in the polity for resolution of the demands, was in itself a significant innovation. The GBO's did not stop here, however, but went on to utilize the information derived from direct citizen contacts to identify specific aspects of "the system" which were problematic for this collectivity and precipitated changes in law, policy, program and regulation on their behalf. Here too, the GBO's can be considered dialectical for these are functions typically reserved for management and elected representatives. It seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, that the Governor's Branch Offices constituted a radical intrusion into the political system.

In the second place, the review of case records in the study sample suggests that people came to use the Governor's Branch Offices primarily where there were problems with or gaps in "the system." The gradual decline in the proportion of both demands which were classified as "referrals," and those escalated to the Central Office, rather than being an indication of decay of the program is characterized as the emergence of a true dialectical advocacy role. Analysis of the study sample suggests that the institutionalized role of the GBO's three years after their establishment was more charismatic and personalized than in the early years.

That is, rather than providing direct information and referrals about services in their communities, the GBO's came increasingly to function as a personalized source of service where gaps or inadequacies existed in current community systems, for aid in entry where street-level bureaucracies were perceived as being too complicated, remote or unresponsive, as a source of influence for class advocacy-type exceptions to rules, and for legalistic adjudications of conflicts over policy, regulation or procedure. In true charismatic fashion, the Governor's Branch Offices rose from the demands of black people during the crisis of 1967, resisted cooptation into the bureaucratic network, and became a formalized channel for demands on the structures of the polycentric political system. It was both the authority, character, and structure of the Governor's Branch Office organization itself and the nature of the demands which it placed upon "the system" on behalf of poor, in particular black, people that set it apart from both decentralized citizen's aid programs and classical ombudsmen as well as from the system itself.

Perhaps the best way to conceptualize the Governor's Branch Office program is to posit it as a communications and control mechanism with the mandate: (1) to receive the latent demands (needs, problems, wants, grievances) of citizens, (2) to search the boundaries of the polity for an appropriate agent of response, and (3) to place an authoritative demand on that resource toward resolution of the demand. This conceptualization postulates the GBO's as a new, formalized channel of demand on the political system rather than as a decentralized addition to existing political or social service structures.<sup>60</sup> In

this perspective, the GBO's were located on the boundaries of the political sub-systems and were effectively external to the various structures of the polity upon which they placed demands. Thus the Governor's Branch Offices were interposed between individuals (and interests) and the political system in a true advocacy role. It was from this definition of their role as a communications and linkage agent which they derived their capability to precipitate a seemingly large impact in comparison to the size of the program, for as described by Deutsch:

Communications engineering transfers extremely small amounts of energy in relatively intricate patterns. It can produce sometimes very large changes at the point of arrival, or in the 'receiver' of the 'message,' but these changes need in no way be proportionate to the amount of energy that carried the signal, much as the force of a gun shot need not be proportionate to the amount of pressure needed to set off the trigger.<sup>61</sup>

Recall the seven-function model of the political system; Almond maintains that political communication is the crucial boundary-maintenance function, the control, regulation or performance of which can regulate the input functions independently of interest groups and elite membership.<sup>62</sup> A political actor, such as the GBO's, which can command the communications function can "regulate the regulators" and thus be a critical variable in determining whether the authorities will or will not (can or cannot) be responsive to the public. In the Pennsylvania situation, Governor Shafer used "power engineering" in those actions designed to create new or revised service systems, and in actually delivering services. Action was also taken, in the creation of the Governor's Branch Offices, to create an information

and control mechanism to guide and direct the structures of the various political sub-systems. The function of the GBO's was thus to provide the necessary linkages between disadvantaged individuals and interests and the appropriate structures of the polity and to precipitate a responsive stance toward resolution of the demands of disadvantaged citizens. It was their dialectical character and their placement in the crucial boundary-maintenance function which enabled the GBO's to have what would seem otherwise to be an unexplainable impact.

There is reason to believe that the situation into which the GBO's were thrust was not unlike that which is described by Bachrach and Baratz where the system was structured to present barriers to both the voicing of demands by poor people as well as to resolving the demands which did gain access to the system:

The channel of communications was one-way, not two-way, from the agencies to the poor. Indeed, the agencies were a potent instrument for stifling grievances, in that 'uncooperative' and 'undeserving' clients could be, and probably were, denied service (force) or threatened with its denial (power).

Nor were there other avenues for the poor to air their grievances and gain redress. [Including] the two political parties, established private interest groups (white and black), and voluntary agencies, all of which provided the city's non-poor population a potential channel for expressing complaints and converting them into issues for decision.<sup>63</sup>

In the situation described by Bachrach and Baratz, the barriers to access and responsiveness for the latent demands of poor people operated to assure that most of them remained covert and thus went unresolved.<sup>64</sup> The strategy in Pennsylvania, however, was structured explicitly to make the demands of individuals and interests



among the poor overt through the overall plan of action, and in particular, through the establishment and operation of the Governor's Branch Offices. In this regard, the GBO's predate and anticipate a major recommendation of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders which suggested the establishment of organizations external to existing structures "to provide an effective channel for low-income citizens to convey their needs and problems to the appropriate officials"; to increase the ability of government to respond in a coordinated and timely fashion, to serve as an informal forum for complaints and grievances, and which would make programs and services known and available to ghetto residents.<sup>65</sup> The U.S. Riot Commission also stated:

. . . ghetto residents have need of effective advocacy of their interests and concerns in a variety of other contexts [in addition to] litigation, from representation before welfare agencies and other institutions of government to advocacy before planning boards and commissions . . . Again, professional representation can provide substantial benefits in terms of overcoming the ghetto resident's alienation from the institutions of government by implicating him in its processes. Although lawyers function in precisely this fashion for the middle-class clients, they are too often not available to the impoverished ghetto resident.<sup>66</sup>

The intention in Pennsylvania was to build into the system of authority a formalized procedure for demand and dissent, and thus to drain off in thousands of small everyday conflicts the hostilities and dissatisfactions which might otherwise cumulate and lead to violence.<sup>67</sup>

It is also significant to note that the Governor's Branch Offices undertook a conflict-oriented advocacy program for poor people at a time when other programs in the nation were experimenting

with a cooperative information-and-advice approach, and finding that this approach was inadequate. The Cloward and Elman study mentioned earlier is a good example. The program which they describe began in 1966 with a primary goal of providing liaison between poor people and agencies through providing "specific practical advice on problems of health, housing, welfare, education and employment."<sup>68</sup> The workers in the New York experiment, however, "soon found that they had to take sides in a continual dispute between their clients and the street-level bureaucracies. When they refused to do so, their clients abandoned them."<sup>69</sup> The Governor's Branch Offices, on the other hand, began with the advocacy goal, knowing full well that their role was to engage conflict with the system on behalf of the people who came to the GBO's. From their inception, the GBO's were intended to overcome many of the structural and procedural barriers to the provision of service, or to the resolution of the grievances of disadvantaged people in the communities in which they were located. The dialectical nature of the GBO's and the character of their authority were designed to enhance their potential as an advocate for disadvantaged citizens and to establish them as an effective channel for the demands of this collectivity.

From the perspective of the citizen, the Governor's Branch Offices provided a channel of demand for people who could not effectively deal with the system, who perceived the system as being unresponsive to their requests, or for whom other channels of demand were effectively closed. Many writers cited above, Merton, Gouldner, Thompson, Eisenstadt, White, and Gans, for example, suggest that

part of the "problem of bureaucracy" rests with people who are unable to determine where to go and how to negotiate the network of bureaucracies in the polycentric polity, or who are suspicious and frustrated with "the system." Studies like those of Van Til, Gans, Savitch, and the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, tend to confirm the perpetuation of such conditions by the broader polity.<sup>70</sup> Moreover, Shuman and Gruenberg documented the existence of such conditions in the ghettos of Pennsylvania as elsewhere.<sup>71</sup> In being located external to the usual structures of the system, staffed in large part by neighborhood residents, and imbued with the authority of the Governor's Office, the GBO's provided a means to overcome some of the personal, perceptual and structural problems which beset other organizations dealing with disadvantaged populations.

From the perspective of political leadership, the organizations for meeting the demands of the people were jurisdictionally diverse, programmatically highly differentiated, and organizationally dispersed into various localities, sectors, and levels of the community. The first task of the Governor's representatives, therefore, in providing effective access for citizens was one of identifying appropriate resources and strategies in order to assure access to the appropriate strand of the organizational network. Secondly, and perhaps more important, is the fact that many organizations were not seen as being receptive to ghetto residents or were prevented by operational conditions from being responsive to their demands. A situation prevailed much as described by Sjoberg, et.al., wherein the organizational milieu creates a situation wherein the street-level

bureaucrats are often unable to respond to lower-class people.<sup>72</sup> Other writers, Lipsky, Rhein, and Savitch, for example, suggest that the conditions under which street-level bureaucrats work (with a variety of political pressures, inadequate resources, ideological and procedural biases, and restrictions in policy and operational procedures) militate toward what Crozier calls the "cycle of stable rigidity" wherein the workers are effectively rendered incapable of responding successfully.<sup>73</sup> The result of such a situation is displacement of the formal goals of the organizations and a resultant inability or unwillingness to respond to the needs and wants of certain citizens or classes of citizens. It is into such conditions that the third-party citizen's advocates (such as the GBO's) can step, break into the cycle, precipitate more effective responses, identify specific areas for "system change," and thus overcome some of the inherent biases and structural problems of the modern polity which were identified above.

What is suggested is that the polycentric political system presents such a panorama of levels, sectors, sub-systems and structures that it is virtually unmanageable by any one. It also seems reasonable to suggest that most bureaucracies and agencies within the system generally desire to carry on their business in a responsible manner, but that there are inherent structural problems, as well as problems which arise from the characteristics of particular people or policies which will continually require external intervention. In addition, there are a number of existing mechanisms which address

aspects of the resulting problems, but which do not entirely resolve them. As a consequence of these factors, there is a need to experiment with new mechanisms through which non-influential individuals and interests can effectively place demands on the political system with a reasonable probability of receiving an efficacious response; and there is a need for mechanisms to identify specific problems in law, policy, program or regulation which are not addressed effectively by other institutions. It is suggested that one way to begin is to explore the potential of citizen's advocacy programs for providing a channel of demand to any or all of the arenas and structures of the political system, and which is available when other channels of demand are not open, or are not suitable because of the character of the actor or of the demand itself.

Thus the primary suggestion which emerges from this study is not that citizen's advocacy programs will restructure the political system in a major way,<sup>74</sup> but that they possess the potential of serving as a formalized fourth branch of government which assures that the communication and linkage function occurs. While current developments, in particular the widespread adoption of ombudsman and citizen's advocacy-type programs, suggest that the political systems of the nation, and indeed the world, are moving in this direction, there remain significant questions on a variety of theoretical and programmatic issues which are unanswered. The final section of this paper addresses some of these issues for further research and experimentation.

### Areas for Further Investigation

This study has placed the Governor's Branch Office experience in a theoretical milieu wherein significant structural problems which emerge from trends in modern society were addressed. It has been suggested that unless answers to the problematic aspects of these trends are found, the political system can expect to engage in more repressive activities vis-a-vis the citizenry, and/or be faced with rebellion by portions of "the people," or at a minimum sporadic outbursts of violence from time to time. It is recognized that non-violent alternatives are available for processing demands (cooptation, cooling-out, traditional channels of influence, even apathy, for example). It is suggested, however, that situations will arise wherein there are significant numbers of unresolved demands upon the political system (such as occurred in the late 1960's in the U.S.), to which "the system" is unresponsive, that is, nondecisions occur. In these "rare occurrences in politics," which may become increasingly frequent, the outcome will most likely be some degree of violence--either by the authorities or the people, vice versa, or both--unless some institutionalized mechanism for assuring access and responsiveness is established. It has also been suggested, rather optimistically, that a relatively minor program, the Pennsylvania Governor's Branch Offices, demonstrated the potential of a formalized citizen's advocate to address significant aspects of these issues. This study cannot conclude, however, without tempering the apparent enthusiasm of the author with a bit of reflection on a considerable number of unanswered

questions--which are perhaps as pervasive and diverse as the problems of the modern polity themselves.

#### System-Level Issues

On the macro-level of analysis, citizen's advocacy has been explicated as a possible formalization of the communications and linkage (gatekeeping) function of the political system. As such, it can be said to represent the explicit structuring into the political system of a fourth "branch" of government. Thus, a first set of theoretical issues which demand exploration concerns the general relationship of formalized citizen's advocacy programs to traditional gatekeepers--political parties, interest groups, professional administrators, lobbyists, and other actors in strategic elites. Of particular concern here are issues of competition, conflict, participation, and representation. A related system-level issue concerns the relationship of the linkage/gatekeeping function to the other analytic functions (or arenas) of government: rule-making, rule-application and rule-adjudication. The model of the political system upon which the typology of citizen's advocacy is based suggests that citizen's advocacy entails activities designed to provide access to and precipitate the responsiveness of structures in all three political arenas. While analytically separable from the others, it may not be necessary to speak of programmatic separation as the term "formalization" may suggest, but that the linkage/gatekeeping function can be provided explicitly and effectively by one or more of the existing institutions of government.

Another macro-level concern is the age-old issue, quis custodiet ipsos custodes, of the abuse and control potential of a formalized institution which regulates the crucial boundary functions of the political system. It is necessary to explore theoretically the relationship of such a new, formalized mechanism to traditional institutions for controlling the abuse of power by any one element, and for assuring accountable and responsible government, i.e., separation of powers, federalism, due process, judicial review, electoral representation, political parties and interest groups. While these issues extend far beyond the scope of this paper, it is suggested that they are not peripheral to the concerns which were addressed by the Governor's Branch Offices, they are inherent in what must be called the citizen's advocacy movement, and are central to understanding the relationship of this contemporary phenomenon to the political system.

In addition to these more theoretical issues, there are other macro-level issues which demand empirical investigation. First of all there are questions of the broad impact of the operation of such programs on the polity. From the perspective of the citizenry, it is important to determine the degree to which citizen's advocacy programs do in fact represent the demands of the people to the political system, and the degree to which they do, or do not, increase the effective support of the people for the polity. The degree to which feelings of powerlessness are, or are not, diminished, under what conditions, and whether such programs can provide the personalized



anti-bureaucratic responses which are demanded by many people, are also significant researchable questions.

Also from the system perspective, it is important to determine whether the type of prodding of "the system" on both the individual and system-change levels, as was engaged by the GBO's, leads to structures which are more accessible and responsive, or whether such programs simply provide cooling mechanisms for aggrieved citizens. In addition, the study of the Governor's Branch Offices demonstrates that the dynamics of public policy in the United States cannot be adequately explained without consideration of several levels, and often both private and public sectors. Thus, continued development of the analytic convention outlined herein is suggested toward explication of a linkage model of the political system. These are significant questions for which current methods and techniques of empirical research can provide answers, and such answers will, in turn, inform concerns at the middle-range of theory and analysis.

#### Mid-Range Issues

The macro-level concerns outlined above addressed issues of the general role of formalized citizen's advocacy in the political system. Middle-range issues address concerns of where to locate citizen's advocacy programs in the authority network of the polity, the scope of community values which will be addressed, and the range of citizen's advocacy in which particular programs can, and do, engage.

A first, and perhaps the most crucial, issue is the requirement to determine the appropriate locus, or mix, of authority which will assure that the citizen's advocate will meet the preconditions of responsiveness outlined in Chapter 2. In particular there is a need to identify ways: (1) to assure a reasonable probability that the citizen's advocate will have the capability to enter demands into the political process with an adequate level of intensity and direction of preference, (2) to have available the necessary support and resources, which (3) lead to interactions between the citizen's advocate and relevant political structures toward resolution of the demands. The Governor's Branch Offices were established in the executive branch, but were not an administrative entity in the usual sense. It was suggested that the sources of GBO authority were diverse, and that they used available authority in a dialectical manner, that is, as charismatic authority. Other citizen's advocacy programs have been more distinctly executive advocates.<sup>75</sup> Classical ombudsmen are typically independent instruments established by the legislature.<sup>76</sup> It is also conceivable that the judiciary take on such a "judge advocate" function either by explicit constitutional formalization, or through evolution of existing institutions such as public defenders, small claims courts, or legal services programs. The bureaucracies, too, through administrative justice systems and appeals mechanisms cannot be excluded from consideration, although this alternative seems to be too proximate to the source of the problem to be completely viable. Finally, there are aspects of the private sector which must be considered, for there are many newspaper, radio, and television

"action lines" across the nation. Comparative research into the dynamics of existing programs and experiments can shed light on how to provide citizen's advocates with an appropriate investment of authority or other resources in order to assure effective access to the several arenas of the political system without succumbing to debilitating pressures which preclude conflict with one or more significant aspects of the political system.

Also at the middle-range are factors which relate to the location of citizen's advocates in the political system and scope of values which are addressed. Given the polycentric character of the U.S. polity, the citizen's advocate could be located at the federal, state or local level, in either the public or private sector, or some combination. The scope of community values which are addressed by particular citizen's advocates is also a significant variable. For example, the GBO's were a generalized, state-level citizen's advocate which engaged practically all structures and levels of the polity for a wide range of community values. Other existing citizen's advocates, however, are restricted to particular localities: city, federal, state, or even particular bureaucracies or types of program. There may also be restrictions on the community values which may be addressed: consumer protection, mental health, veterans affairs, insurance, for example. Still others, such as hospital ombudsmen, nursing home ombudsmen and correctional ombudsmen, address particular organizations or institutions. Research into the successes and failures of generalized and specialist citizen's advocates is necessary

to suggest the breadth of issues which can be reasonably addressed by this new type of institution.

Finally, the type of advocacy--case, class or legal--in which the citizen's advocate is empowered to engage will condition the action options available. Investigation and documentation of emerging experience along this variable is crucial in determining the degree of flexibility open to the citizen's advocate in:

- (1) determining the access point upon which to place a demand,
- (2) the nature and range of demands which a given citizen's advocate can legitimately precipitate (a single allocation, or system change--in what arena of the political system?).

Comparative studies of various types of citizen's advocacy-type programs which now exist in various localities, which are established under different authority bases, which address different classes of demand, and which utilize different advocacy strategies, can illuminate these issues. At the same time, research should consider the more general question of whether citizen's advocacy programs are subject to the same general trends in the polity discussed earlier, in particular, whether the proliferation and institutionalization of citizen's advocacy programs may, in time, lead also to unmanageable diversity, barriers to access, and systematic unresponsiveness.

#### Micro-Level Issues

A final set of issues for further research is concerned with factors related to the remaining responsiveness variables. Variables such as methods of operation, decision-rules, staffing and training,

and accessibility of citizen's advocacy programs will affect the ability of citizen's advocates to choose the most appropriate strategy (type of advocacy), into and through the political system. These choices will, in turn, condition the timing of demands, the reactions of other actors, and the number and complexity of interactions. In final analysis, it is suggested that these micro-level variables ultimately determine the responsiveness of the system and the effectiveness of citizen's advocates in meeting the latent demands of citizens.

In terms of accessibility of the citizen's advocate, the Governor's Branch Offices utilized neighborhood walk-in offices and a mobile unit. The probable cost of a statewide network of neighborhood GBO's, however, was one major variable in the decision that they be phased out in favor of a statewide telephone network tied directly to the Governor's Office. Programs in other localities utilize store-fronts, mobile trailers, multi-service centers, telephones, or a combination of several of these methods. The relative efficacy of these various methods is an important variable in determining the effectiveness of the institution and whether people will use the program. (It has been suggested, for example, that poor people and some ethnic groups might not utilize a telephone line to a remote location in some state capitol, and thus be effectively excluded from access to the citizen's advocate.)

Another micro-level variable concerns the particular operational procedures and decision-rules used by citizen's advocates in choosing the type of advocacy to invoke in particular cases, the

sub-system into which to inject demands, and the particular jurisdiction within the organizational domain upon which to place demands. In addition to ascertaining how particular programs function at this micro-level, investigation of this variable may illuminate the nature and operation of the polycentric polity itself. As outlined in the discussion of the model of the political system utilized for the study of the GBO's, any demand in the polycentric polity, whether it be a request for allocation of a value by an individual or the introduction of a major reform by a powerful interest group, is analytically subject to the same access and responsiveness variables. Hence, micro-level documentation of the dynamics of citizen's advocacy interactions with polycentric political systems are, in effect, micro-system analyses. Such considerations of where, when, and how to inject a demand into the political system, the particular strategies of negotiation and timing, and factors related to the judicious (or non-judicious) use of available authority are potentially valuable beyond understanding specific programs for they can illuminate more general processes of the modern political system.

A final set of micro-level considerations concerns the structure of organization, staffing, training, etc. of citizen's advocacy programs. The GBO's were organized to provide a two-tier screening process through which the more difficult problems were filtered to higher levels. The success of this screening in that it did not lead to structural barriers to access at higher levels of authority is attributed to the anti-bureaucratic nature of the

organization. The operational procedures, staff selection and training complemented the dialectical organizational structure. Perhaps a comparable screening process and organizational characteristics among various levels and types of citizen's advocates could provide a broad network of citizen's advocates, and would in turn, obviate the probability that an enormous volume of demands would inundate a U.S. ombudsman.<sup>77</sup>

### Final Comments

In final analysis, it is important to recall the nature of the problems which people brought to the GBO's, and to note that while the theoretical and programmatic concerns raised herein provide many unanswered questions, the Governor's Branch Offices and other citizen's advocacy-type organizations in recent years have in their own manner discovered answers. The GBO's, for example, represented the demands of tens of thousands of disadvantaged, otherwise effectively unrepresented, individuals to the structures of the political system. In doing this, the Governor's Branch Offices placed demands upon the entire range of community value-allocating sub-systems, at all levels and sectors of the polycentric political system. Moreover, the Governor's Branch Offices provided all three types of citizen's advocacy and demonstrated that citizen's advocates can develop the capacity to be effective gatekeepers. In addition, the analysis of the Governor's Branch Offices contained herein suggests that the model of the political system utilized for the analysis is analytically appropriate. The

data which was gathered on the classes of citizen's advocacy activity of the GBO's provides, in effect, a quantified map of the types of demands which were brought to the Governor's representatives. The analysis, in turn, presents a panorama of what would otherwise have been political "non-decisions."

The demands which people presented to the GBO's were varied, intense, and meaningful. At the local level, the GBO's were a personalized, anti-bureaucratic channel for demands on the political system. In the words of one GBO representative, they were an authoritative instrument for "fighting for the poor and disadvantaged against the maze of governmental and private sector bureaucracies which are unresponsive to their needs."<sup>78</sup> Reflecting on a sampling of some of the local-level demands on the political system, one GBO representative cited problems which would not have been resolved without GBO involvement:

Rat control units working in certain infested areas for the first time.

A little-old lady finding out that she's entitled to a re-development grant to fix up her home.

A young couple with a growing family finding out that they can get out of their rat-infested apartment by purchasing a home of their own.

Knowing that a woman swindled in a wall-to-wall carpet deal will get her money back.

Seeing the relief on a father's face when he learns that public funds will be used to purchase care in a private institution for his retarded children.

Taking a blind, crippled lady to a clinic because taxi-cab drivers won't.



The end of real estate operators keeping deposits after prospective tenants decide they don't want the place.

The man picked up several times on a two-year warrant for extradition to another state even though the other state did not follow through with requesting formal extradition--an end to harrassment.

Getting scholarships for young people whose families could not afford to send them to college.<sup>79</sup>

Demands which were escalated to the central level were as intense but were more complicated or involved, or they required the application of "political" influence. Many demands required changes within system structures, final action on which went beyond aid to the individuals involved and led to general changes on behalf of larger numbers of people (interests). From the inside-of-the-system perspective, the researcher noted considerable changes in responsiveness of a variety of agencies (e.g., for the workers in welfare, housing and employment offices, it was a "whole, new ballgame"). Likewise, Secretaries of cabinet-level departments were put in a position, so to speak, of having a Governor with eyes in the ghetto who could see daily the grief caused by the bureaucracies.

While the changes within system structures precipitated by the GBO's were not revolutionary, they certainly were radical departures from the usual operation of existing socio-political structures. Recall that the citizen's advocacy on behalf of interests of the GBO's began by reorienting the Governor and top staff to the problems of disadvantaged people and continued into many specific changes in law, policy, regulation and procedure including:

Information obtained concerning the preponderance of consumer frauds which precipitated a change in the Pennsylvania constitution to allow the state Attorney General to act in such cases, and the establishment of a formal Board of Consumer Protection in Pennsylvania.

Changes in public housing codes to admit mothers with out-of-wedlock children, and multi-problem families.

Changes in state policy which allowed stolen or lost welfare checks to be replaced immediately instead of after a lengthy period of investigation.

Changes in state civil service procedures to eliminate high school graduation as a prerequisite to taking the examination for several job categories.

Changes in the procedures and policies of the Bureau of Employment Security to place increased emphasis on people who were 'not job ready,' in particular disadvantaged citizens.

Provision of a channel of demand linked directly to the Governor's Office which was separate from the other structures of the political system, and which was attuned to the demands of ghetto residents.

A direct link to the Governor in times of community tension and crisis. (See Chapter 6.)

The Governor's representatives and top staff in the Governor's Office did not act only in these more general issue areas; they were also active in bringing the authority of the highest executive authority of the political system to bear on the problems of individuals. No demand of individual citizens was considered unimportant as the GBO's pursued action on a wide range of individual demands leading, for example, to:

Results within several hours to a call to the local GBO after several weeks of complaints to City Hall on the city's negligence in trash collection had failed to produce results.

Intervention with a private employer at Expo 76 who refused to pay several employees which lead to a finding that the employer was in violation of several laws but that the legal process would be lengthy and expensive--GBO action resulted in payment of wages due, immediately.

Five years of frustration and harrassment of one family by local school authorities cleared up with children receiving physical examinations, psychological tests and special education.

A constable sale of a home averted after GBO intervention with a savings and loan association led to lifting of the lien.

Erection of signs at a dangerous intersection on a curve after repeated complaints to local officials had failed.

Provision of homebound instruction for a girl with a fractured leg whom the teacher had refused to visit because of the attitude of the mother.

Action on a claim from an insurance company that previously had paid no heed to the calls of the citizen.

Refusal of a housing inspector to declare a rat-infested home unfit for habitation reversed, leading to the visitor qualifying for priority in public housing.

An employee of the dietary department of a state institution, who had been trained and qualified for a supervisor's position for more than three years but never considered, placed in the next opening.

A threat to health, a traffic hazard and damage to vegetation ended with correction in three days of a defect at a sawmill which had caused smoke to inundate a trailer camp.

Upgrading of sewage treatment after municipal discharge polluted a lake.

Low water pressure in a neighborhood resolved by the water company constructing a larger water line.<sup>80</sup>

Thus while the events which gave rise to the establishment of the GBO's were occasioned by the urban crisis of 1967, the demands which were placed on "the system" were comparable to those which are said to emerge from the broader trends in the modern polity which

have been cited throughout this study. It is also suggested that non-decisions which result from barriers to access and responsiveness continue to be present in the political system. In the Pennsylvania situation, a large number of unresolved demands on the political system from several ghetto communities were made overt and were addressed by the various sub-systems of the polity as a result of the citizen's advocacy of the Governor's Branch Offices and the general reorientation of state officials which they precipitated. The questions which remain, nevertheless, concern whether the contemporary political system can allow such nondecisions to remain unresolved, or whether new institutions will be established to address them. As Barrington Moore, Jr., has stated in his Reflections on the Causes of Human Misery:

No institutional order can be perfect, and least of all, can it stay or seem perfect to those who must live under it. On that account there is always a need for protection against arbitrary authority, an arbitrariness whose specific content and definition change with changing historical circumstances. Essential to this protection is the possibility of effective criticism and complaint. Indeed, this possibility may be the best criterion with which to judge human societies.<sup>81</sup>

The response of each age, however, must be forged in the crucible of the forces operating in a particular historico-political situation. It is suggested that the Governor's Branch Offices provided an effective, new channel for demands on the structures of the political system: at state, local and federal levels, in public voluntary and private sectors, and in a variety of value-allocating sub-systems. Moreover, it is indicated that demands were placed upon

all three analytic "arenas" or "functions" of the political system: rule-making, rule-application and rule-adjudication. Furthermore, the Governor's Branch Offices did this for disadvantaged individuals and interests. Thus, the GBO's were an effective advocate for individual citizens and for changes within socio-political structures for the citizens of the neighborhoods they represented. In addition, the GBO experience suggests that a citizen's advocate can serve as an external window on the operation of socio-political structures for both the public and elected representatives. It is also suggested, however, that citizen's advocacy should not be regarded as a panacea for what has been described as some of the ills of the modern state. That is, if pathogenic politics<sup>82</sup> are repressive, if the dehumanizing aspects of the programmed society are undesirable,<sup>83</sup> if domination by a strategic elite of administrators and managers is unacceptable, other forces of change are required ultimately to bring about a general redistribution of power and to transform "the system." If, however, an institution of access for the problems and complaints of otherwise unrepresented individuals and interests is desired, if an advocate for substantive results vis-a-vis the functional, process-orientation of bureaucracies is desired, and if an external source of information on the performance of the structures of the political system<sup>84</sup> is an acceptable means toward assuring that socio-political structures are responsive to the public, then it is suggested that citizen's advocacy programs constitute a viable action alternative which deserves further investigation and experimentation.

## Chapter 7: Notes

<sup>1</sup>Donald C. Rowat, "The Spread of the Ombudsman Idea," in Stanley V. Anderson, ed., Ombudsmen for American Government?, (N.Y.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), pp. 7-36.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riots, Violence in the City: An End or a Beginning?, (Los Angeles, Ca., December 1967), p. 2.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 1.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., pp. 24-25. See also Stanley Lieberman and Arnold R. Silverman, "The Precipitants and Underlying Conditions of Race Riots," American Sociological Review, Vol. 30, (December 1965), pp. 887-893, who found black people less likely to be store owners in riot cities.

<sup>6</sup>Emile Durkheim, op.cit., uses the term "collective consciousness" to describe the ties that bind individuals into social groups. William Gamson, op.cit., speaks of solidary groups as something between quasi-and interest-groups: "They are collections of individuals who think in terms of the effect of political decisions on the aggregate and feel that they are in some way affected by what happens to the aggregate." (p. 35). Hobsbawm, op.cit., cites the medieval mob and other historical manifestations of such activity as systemic, rooted in believed wrongs, contrary to dominant values, but supported by the aggrieved minority.

<sup>7</sup>Robert H. Binstock, and Katherine Ely, eds., The Politics of the Powerless, (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop Publishers, Inc., 1971), p. 1 ff.

<sup>8</sup>Governor's Commission, op.cit., pp. 4-5.

<sup>9</sup>In addition to the many works on black poverty and discrimination cited in the selected bibliography below, see: Willard R. Johnson, The Colonial Analogy Applied to American Ghettoes, American Political Science Association, (1972 Annual Meeting), paper.

<sup>10</sup> See Rose, op.cit., The Governor's Commission, op.cit., Kershaw, op.cit., and John C. Donovan, The Politics of Poverty, (N.Y.: Pegasus, 1967).

<sup>11</sup> Recall the statement by Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton, op.cit., pp. 9-10, "By system we have in mind the entire American complex of basic institutions, values, beliefs, etc. By structures, we mean specific institutions . . . which exist to conduct the business of that system. . . . Our view is that, given the illegitimacy of the system, we cannot then proceed to transform that system with existing structures."

<sup>12</sup> Governor's Commission, op.cit., p. 4; also Harlan Hahn, The Political Objectives of Ghetto Violence, American Political Science Association, (1969 Annual Meeting), paper, p. 5; also footnote #57 in Chapter 6 above.

<sup>13</sup> Binstock, op.cit., and Lieberman, op.cit.

<sup>14</sup> Carmichael, op.cit.

<sup>15</sup> Lieberman, op.cit., p. 471, suggests that race riots are often misunderstood by the wider community. "We have encountered a number of accounts . . . attributing riots to communist influence, hoodlums, or rabble-rousers. Although lower-class youths and young adults are undoubtedly active during riots, potential participants of this type are probably available in almost any community. What interests us is the community failure to see riot in terms of institutional malfunctioning or a racial difficulty which is not met--and perhaps cannot be--by existing social institutions . . ."

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Howard Shuman and Barry Gruenberg, "Dissatisfaction with City Services: Is Race an Important Factor?", in Harlan Hahn, ed., People and Politics in Urban Society, (Urban Affairs Annual Reviews, Vol. 6), (Sage Publications, 1972), pp. 369-388. Specifically related to this study, the Pennsylvania cities surveyed (Philadelphia and Pittsburgh) showed similar dissatisfaction as other cities to riot cities (except for Newark which differed from both riot and non-riot cities). This finding tends to support the perception of decision-makers in Pennsylvania that they did have a volatile situation on their hands and that dissatisfaction with services was a major probable cause.

<sup>18</sup>Willard A. Heaps, Riots U.S.A.: 1765-1970, (N.Y.: The Seabury Press, 1970, rev.ed.), p. 7. For accounts of violence in riots in the U.S. see also: J.T. Headly, Pen and Pencil Sketches of the Great Riots, (N.Y.: Arno Press and the New York Times, 1969); Joseph Boskin, Urban Racial Violence in the Twentieth Century, (Beverly Hills, Ca.: Glencoe Press, 1969); Rodney F. Allen and Charles H. Adair, Violence and Riots in Urban America, (Worthington, Ohio: Charles A. Jones Pub. Co., 1969); and Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, Violence in America, Vol. 1, Staff Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, (June 1969).

<sup>19</sup>Governor's Commission, op.cit., p. 24. Also, Joseph Boskin, "The Revolt of the Urban Ghettoes, 1964-1967," The Annals, (Protest in the Sixties Issue), (March 1969), pp. 1-15, found a high level of support in the black community, demonstrated in both attitude and action, during the revolts. "Significantly, the two institutions which represented the white establishment, the police and businesses were singled out for attack. Entirely ignored were libraries, schools and civic buildings."

<sup>20</sup>Hahn, op.cit., (1969), p. 5.

<sup>21</sup>Peter A. Lupsha, "On Theories of Urban Violence," Urban Affairs Quarterly, Vol. 4, (March 1969), pp. 273-296.

<sup>22</sup>David J. Greenstone, and Paul E. Peterson, "Reformers, Machines, and the War on Poverty," in James Q. Wilson, ed., City Politics and Public Policy, (N.Y.: John Wiley, 1968), pp. 267-292, reports that after the Watts riots of 1965, Los Angeles leaped from being the city with the least OEO funds per poverty family to the top of the list in amount of War on Poverty allocations.

<sup>23</sup>Harold V. Savitch, "Powerless in an Urban Ghetto: The Case of Political Access and Differential Access in New York City," Polity, Vol. 5, (Fall 1972), pp. 19-56.

<sup>24</sup>David Mars, "The Federal Government and Protest," The Annals, (Protest in the Sixties Issue), (March 1969), pp. 120-130.

<sup>25</sup>National Advisory Commission Report, op.cit., especially pp. 205-207, and 283-299.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid.



<sup>27</sup>Potomac Associates, Hopes and Fears of the American People, (1972).

<sup>28</sup>Ibid.

<sup>29</sup>Philip E. Converse, "Change in the American Electorate," in Campbell and Converse, eds., The Human Meaning of Social Change, (N.Y.: Russell Sage Foundation, 1972); and Arthur H. Miller, Political Issues and Trust in Government: 1964-1970, American Political Science Association, (1972 Annual Meeting), paper.

<sup>30</sup>Craine Brinton, Anatomy of a Revolution, (N.Y.: Prentice-Hall, 1952), and William Flanigan and Edwin Fogelman, Patterns of Political Violence in Comparative Historical Perspective, American Political Science Association, (1972 Annual Meeting), paper.

<sup>31</sup>Savitch, op.cit., also Scoble (1968), op.cit.

<sup>32</sup>It is suggested that political kidnappings and terrorism are also manifestations of these conditions, as is apathy, interest-group activity, and other ways of working within the existing regime. These facts seem also to be recognized by authorities today, for it has been reported that the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration has allocated \$31 million to prepare local agencies for a wave of violence and terrorism expected to begin in 1976. In this direction, the Attorney General of California has stated that 1976 will "mark the beginning of an era of superviolence." The Philadelphia Inquirer, (Sunday, October 20, 1974), p. 25a.

<sup>33</sup>Lowi, op.cit., also Robert E. Agger, Daniel Goldrich, and Bert E. Swanson, The Rulers and the Ruled, (N.Y.: John Wiley and Sons, 1964).

<sup>34</sup>Herbert Kaufman, "Administrative Decentralization and Political Power," Public Administration Review, Vol. 29, (January-February 1969), p. 5. See also Chapter 1, footnotes 7 and 11 above.

<sup>35</sup>Ries, op.cit., p. 72.

<sup>36</sup>Herbert Tingsten, The Problem of Democracy, (Totowa, N.J., 1965).

<sup>37</sup>Woll, op.cit., p. 4.

<sup>38</sup>Weber, op.cit., especially Part III, pp. 324-385.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid.

<sup>40</sup>See Chapter 1, note 7.

<sup>41</sup>Crozier, op.cit., p. 195.

<sup>42</sup>Jacoby, op.cit., p. 162.

<sup>43</sup>Whyte, op.cit.

<sup>44</sup>Donald C. Rowat, "The Spread of the Ombudsman Idea," in Anderson, op.cit., pp. 7-36.

<sup>45</sup>An early discussion of this issue is contained in Herman Finer, "Administrative Responsibility in Democratic Government," Public Administration Review, (Summer 1941), pp. 335-351; also Glendon A. Schubert, Jr., "The Public Interest in Administrative Decision-Making," American Political Science Review, Vol. 51, (June 1957), pp. 346-359. General discussions of these various mechanisms for control on the exercise of power by the authorities are included in Hyneman, op.cit., Woll, op.cit., and Felix S. Nigro, Modern Public Administration, 2nd ed., (N.Y.: Harper and Row, 1970).

<sup>46</sup>Theodore Lowi, Four Systems of Policy, Politics and Choice, (Inter-University Case Program, ICP Monograph #110, 1972) suggests that the traditional controls were appropriate for nineteenth century "distributive" politics, but are inadequate for twentieth century "regulatory" and "redistributive" politics.

<sup>47</sup>Ries, op.cit., Kahn, op.cit., Agger, op.cit.

<sup>48</sup>Truman, op.cit., p. 52.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid., pp. 522-523.

<sup>50</sup>See Chapter 1, note 7 above.

<sup>51</sup>Ries, op.cit., pp. 71-72.

<sup>52</sup>Finer, op.cit.; also Carl J. Friedrich and Taylor Cole, Responsible Bureaucracy, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1932).

<sup>53</sup> Pennock, op.cit., p. 21.

<sup>54</sup> Kaufman, op.cit.

<sup>55</sup> Charles Peters, and Taylor Branch, Blowing the Whistle: Dissent in the Public Interest, (N.Y.: Praeger, 1972), discusses the growing spate of people within the system who are willing to take it upon themselves to expose corruption and wrongdoing.

<sup>56</sup> Edgar Shor, Administrative Representation for the Under-Represented, American Political Science Association, (1972 Annual Meeting), paper, states that: "In a stream of adverse reports on dozens of programs the General Accounting Office has provided a damaging bill of particulars. The U.S. Civil Rights Commissions' periodic assessments of equal opportunity enforcement recount in depressing detail the widespread laxity of administrators charged with these responsibilities. The report of the National Commission on Product Safety in 1970 called attention to serious deficiencies in the administration of consumer protection legislation. Unresponsive regulatory commissions were also chided by the conservative Ash Council. More immediately productive verdicts of failure have been rendered in court decisions supporting the right to intervention by public interest advocates. In a number of rulings federal judges have affirmed the injustice of unrepresentative agency decision-making."

<sup>57</sup> Lowi, op.cit.

<sup>58</sup> Rowat, op.cit.

<sup>59</sup> Mark C. Hogan, "Experiences of an Amateur Ombudsman," in Stanley Scott, ed., Western American Assembly on the Ombudsman, (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of Governmental Studies, September 1968).

<sup>60</sup> Eric A. Nordlinger, Decentralizing the City: A Study of Boston's Little City Halls, (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press 1972), and George J. Washnis, Municipal Decentralization and Neighborhood Resources, (N.Y.: Praeger Special Studies in U.S. Economic and Social Development, 1972). Both writers posit citizen's advocacy-type programs in a decentralization framework; it is suggested, however, that the communications and control framework utilized herein is more appropriate for such programs actually are neither decentralized executive authorities in themselves nor do they typically deliver services (although some direct services are located in some centers).

<sup>61</sup> Deutsch, op.cit.

<sup>62</sup>Almond, op.cit., pp. 3-64.

<sup>63</sup>Bachrach, op.cit., p. 69.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid., p. 74. See also VanTil, op.cit., Savitch, op.cit., and Kahn, op.cit. for discussions of barriers to access by poor people.

<sup>65</sup>National Advisory Commission, op.cit., p. 293, suggests the establishment of such programs at the municipal level. The GBO's were established at the state level. In addition, the Commission looked to lawyers to provide legal advocacy which, as has been demonstrated, was provided to a considerable degree by the GBO's.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid.

<sup>67</sup>Coleman, op.cit., p. 16; and Woll, op.cit., pp. 59-62.

<sup>68</sup>Cloward, op.cit., pp. 176-185.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid.

<sup>70</sup>Jon Van Til, "Becoming Participants: Dynamics of Access Among the Welfare Poor," Social Science Quarterly, (1974), pp. 344-357. See also Chapter 5, footnotes 8 and 9.

<sup>71</sup>Shuman, op.cit.

<sup>72</sup>Sjoberg, et.al., op.cit.

<sup>73</sup>Lipsky, op.cit.; Rhein, op.cit.; Savitch, op.cit.

<sup>74</sup>Major changes of the system are suggested by various writers who consider similar problems, i.e., Robert A. Dahl, After the Revolution, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1970); and Theodore Lowi, (1969), The End of Liberalism, op.cit. Additionally, it is suggested that a Marxist-type revolution, while perhaps addressing problems of an economic nature, would still be faced with similar bureaucratic problems, for as cited by Jacoby, op.cit., these problems exist in socialist countries as well as capitalist nations.

<sup>75</sup>Alan J. Wyner, ed., Executive Ombudsmen in the United States, (Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies, 1973).

<sup>76</sup>Rowat, op.cit., Anderson, op.cit., also discuss the degree to which executive and legislative casework informally fulfills this function.

<sup>77</sup>Lowi, op.cit.

<sup>78</sup>GBO Archive: Feedback, various issues.

<sup>79</sup>Ibid.

<sup>80</sup>GBO Archive: various case-record and documents.

<sup>81</sup>Barrington Moore, Jr., Reflections on the Causes of Human Misery, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972).

<sup>82</sup>Truman, op.cit., p. 523; also Shor, op.cit.

<sup>83</sup>Alain Touraine, The Post-Industrial Society: Tomorrow's Social History: Classes, Conflicts and Culture in the Programmed Society, (F.X. Mayhew, tr.), (N.Y.: Random House, 1971); and Michel Crozier, The Stalled Society, (N.Y.: The Viking Press, 1973).

<sup>84</sup>Krendel, op.cit.; and Drew Hyman, et.al., The Use of Citizen's Complaints as Social and Organizational Indicators, Urban and Regional Information Systems Association Conference, (Montreal, August 1974), paper.

## POSTSCRIPT

### A Note on Institutionalization of the GBO's

The Governor's Branch Offices were in existence for more than four years. During this time they placed demands on the socio-political structures for the equivalent of one out of every six black people in Pennsylvania. While this study did not document the impact of the citizen's advocacy of the GBO's on black people, it seems reasonable to assert that the many people who received their entitlements in the areas of housing, welfare, employment, health, social services, education and justice were better off than would have been the case otherwise. In addition, there are many neighborhoods which are better for the traffic lights installed, rat control programs initiated, utilities repaired, streets cleaned and repaired, and recreation programs established. It is also recognized that the Governor's Branch Offices could have had only a minor overall impact on a state with over 2500 municipalities. The GBO's were not intended to be a citizen's advocate for the more than eleven million people who live in Pennsylvania; they represented only people in twenty-one ghetto neighborhoods scattered across the state. It is also apparent that the impact of the changes in welfare policy, employment procedures, housing regulations, and the other areas of

citizen's advocacy for interests affected more people than those directly aided by the GBO's. More significantly, the GBO's demonstrated that the problems which were brought were not a one-time reservoir of discontent but that the problems of access and responsiveness are endemic to the contemporary political system in the U.S., and, in the judgment of the author, that there is a need to establish formalized channels for access and responsiveness.

It has also been shown that over a multi-year period, the Governor's Branch Offices established a place in the political domain. The GBO's engaged conflict with "the system" on behalf of disadvantaged people; and they were increasingly more successful. Staff in both the local GBO's and the central Coordinator's Office was established in "permanent" civil-service positions. Staff in the local offices was successfully trained, including the addition of new staff and a 50 percent turnover of local representatives. The offices were used consistently by people in their neighborhoods who recognized them as a source of help. Routines were established both internally to guide operations, and externally to assure autonomous authoritative relationships with other agencies. Evaluations of office locations led to changes which enhanced accessibility and use. Although there was no change in Chief Executive, the crisis of leadership succession was met as the GBO's operated successfully under two Secretaries and two Acting Secretaries of Public Welfare, several different Coordinators and Assistant Coordinators. The Governor's Branch Offices were established as an authority figure vis-a-vis environmental actors; this allowed them to engage in conflict and to cope with "degradations

from the environment."<sup>1</sup> It seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, that the Governor's Branch Offices had institutionalized their function, carried out their mission and meaningfully affected their socio-political environment. Thus the Governor's Branch Office experience was a valuable and instructional quasi-experiment for it demonstrated that citizen's advocacy programs can develop the capacity to provide a channel of political access and responsiveness for otherwise unrepresented individuals and interests.

It is also noted that despite the fact that the Governor's Branch Offices were both "institutionalized" and were an effective program for the people they served, they were phased out in 1971. This action occurred as part of a move by the succeeding Governor to establish a statewide citizen's advocacy program. On the one hand, this occurrence may seem inconsistent with the assertion that the GBO's were a fairly successful program; on the other hand, it can be considered an indication that the GBO's had demonstrated the need for and capability of citizen's advocacy programs in Pennsylvania. This final note will suggest that the elimination of the GBO's can be traced to a desire on the part of the new administration to make the citizen's advocate more generally available in the larger political system, and secondly, a wish by the new Governor to divest the expanded program of conflicts with a variety of socio-political elites and the resultant animosities which had occurred over the four-year period of GBO existence. In final analysis, it is suggested that the success of the GBO's in engaging in conflict on behalf of disadvantaged people led to their vicarious demise; this success convinced the new



Governor that their function should be enhanced and made available in the larger polity.

#### Key Events in the Decision to Phase-Out the GBO's

On Inauguration Day, January 19, 1971, the new Governor, Milton J. Shapp, stated that people's advocacy would be the keynote of his administration.<sup>2</sup> A major component of Governor Shapp's advocacy program was to be the enhancement of the Governor's Branch Offices. The Governor's decision to enhance the GBO's had been made over a several month period following consideration of a series of policy papers and meetings with an acting secretary of Public Welfare, the new Secretary of Public Welfare, key executive assistants, and staff from the Office of Planning and Research, and the GBO Coordinator's Office.<sup>3</sup> On March 16, 1971, in a major part of his policy address on human services, Governor Shapp announced the plan to make the Governor's Branch Offices a central component of his advocacy program.

The second and final point concerns the whole advocacy nature of this Administration. On January 19th, Inauguration Day, I said that this Administration would be the people's advocate. I meant every word I said. While considering the reorganization of government, you can be sure that I will have more to say about the PUC [Public Utilities Commission], the Milk Marketing Board and other state agencies which have, for too long, been the defenders of the vested interests at the expense of the public interest.

In line with this role, I am giving consideration to moving the Governor's Branch Offices under the administrative jurisdiction of my Office, merging our consumer efforts with our advocacy efforts, upgrading the professional level of the personnel and turning that operation into a genuine Ombudsman for the people.<sup>4</sup>

This policy was reiterated explicitly in Philadelphia on the following day. "One step that will shortly be taken by my

administration will be to utilize the Governor's Branch Offices as outposts for consumer programs right in the neighborhoods."<sup>5</sup> The seriousness of the intent of the Governor at this point is documented by a series of memoranda, communiques, and orders in the GBO Archive. In the succeeding weeks, key aides to the Governor, staff of both the Governor's Branch Offices and the Office of Planning and Research (in particular the author) engaged in preparations for the transition. The new program was to be initiated September 1, 1971. It appeared to all concerned that the Governor's Branch Offices not only weathered the transition to a new administration, but also would be enhanced, made into a statewide program, and elevated into a more authoritative role.

Hill's statement on the institutionalization of ombudsmen, however, notes that institutionalization can never be considered permanent.

Because political organizations are vulnerable to so many environmental and internal vicissitudes, we cannot with confidence examine Organization X or Y at Time Z and certify it as truly institutionalized in the sense that it is vulcanized against further change.<sup>6</sup>

This phenomenon is particularly true in polycentric political systems for the complex moves in many simultaneous games give little time for consideration and evaluation of options. Thus, it occurred that a new Governor with a desire to create a citizen's advocacy program statewide, but also with a need to establish the confidence of socio-economic elites and to placate a potentially hostile legislature, decided almost overnight to enhance the GBO Coordinator's function in the executive branch, and to phase out the twenty-one local Governor's

Branch Offices in favor of 253 local legislative ombudsmen.<sup>7</sup> This plan was never implemented. It is reported that the night before his first legislative message, Governor Shapp decided to sacrifice the GBO's in order to reconcile his differences with the majority (Democratic) party. Thus, on April 20, 1971, in his first legislative message, Governor Shapp announced a new plan to create legislative ombudsmen at the local level, and to collapse the GBO operation into a central clearinghouse in the Governor's Office.

I have thought seriously about creating an office of Ombudsman for the people of Pennsylvania, because I believe that no government is without its faults. Citizens need protection against government, as well as help from it. But it seems that the best possible ombudsmen are right here in front of me. You members of the Legislature know a great deal about government and you have a strong incentive to serve your constituents well. To do this you need additional tools.

I shall, therefore, include in my budget funds needed to permit each of you to set up a separate legislative office in your home district so that you may give better service to the people. Under this plan I also propose the abolition of the Governor's Branch Offices, and the establishment instead of a central clearinghouse in Harrisburg to be staffed by professionals with intimate knowledge of State Government. These people will be at the service of your constituents to supplement the role of your local office. With 253 Statewide (sic) outlets working for the people, channeling their problems into a central clearinghouse in Harrisburg, I believe we will establish a better system to serve the people. We shall reduce the impersonality of government and make our agencies more responsive to the needs of the people.<sup>8</sup>

From the perspective of the GBO's, this was a disastrous reversal of position; to the new Governor, it was a strategic move in the complex game of politics. Although they had institutionalized their functions and established a place in the organizational domain, the Governor's Branch Offices remained subject to the vicissitudes

of the polycentric political system in which they operated. As the moves in several "simultaneous games" were played out in the first months of the first term of the Governor, the GBO's were first elevated, and then eliminated, to be established in another form. Explication of the full dynamics of this process are not within the parameters of this study nor are they known to the author. It is suggested, however, that elimination of the GBO's came to considerable degree, in a serendipitous manner as a by-product of conflicts in the inter-organizational environment. Furthermore, it appears that their elimination was not intended to eliminate their function, but rather to expand and to enhance citizen's advocacy in Pennsylvania. In addition, it is suggested that the Governor had a desire to divest the citizen's advocacy program of conflicts and animosities which had built up over the years.

Dimensions of Conflict against the GBO's  
by "the System"

The dialectical character of the Governor's Branch Offices and their conflict role in "the system" generated a variety of pressures against them in the structures of the community. As a dialectical organization, the GBO's used all of their authority in a charismatic manner. That is, they pursued results in whatever manner available without regard for traditional inter-organizational customs and routines (Chapters 4 and 5). Furthermore, their mandate to be the citizen's advocate in their neighborhoods placed them in a conflict role with many organizations and agencies. The Governor's

Branch Offices had been established as an authority figure with environmental actors; they were able to cope with environmental challenges; and they continued to perform the citizen's advocate role in an effective manner.<sup>9</sup> Thus a variety of antagonisms against the GBO's developed in the power structures of the community: socio-political elites, anti-poverty allies, bureaucracies, and political parties. The vicissitudes of the political system are perhaps most manifest during a change of authorities, however; and the early months of the new administration provided an opportunity for socio-political elites to express their displeasure with the actions of the GBO's. The following paragraphs describe briefly some of these conflicts; they also illustrate the kaleidoscopic dynamics of polycentric political systems, for the feelings of antagonism which were expressed about the GBO's were as diverse and many-leveled as the conflicts with which the GBO's engaged "the system."

Early in the program, the demands placed upon landlords, businessmen and other members of local socio-economic elites by the GBO's generated intense pressure against Governor Shafer and his cabinet members. The Governor shared information on these pressures with a high official who was closely associated with the GBO's, "But he never asked us to lay off--and we didn't."<sup>10</sup> As mentioned in Chapter 6, the fact that the Governor continued to support the GBO's and to press for implementation of his revised program was a key factor in GBO success but also led to his "political suicide." Thus, this

continuing investment of authority in the GBO's allowed them to engage in conflict with socio-political structures; this conflict also generated a reservoir of opposition among socio-political elites against the GBO's which was manifest against the Governor in a variety of ways, and, was undoubtedly expressed to the new administration.

Conflicts with anti-poverty allies also detracted from the primary goals of the GBO's. Initially, the arena of GBO activity included outreach in the neighborhoods: community halls, churches, organization meetings, bars, apartment buildings, and the streets. Anti-poverty oriented organizations, especially Community Action Programs (CAP's) protested that their task was organization of the poor, therefore, the GBO representatives should stay out of the streets. In October 1967, agreement was reached that the GBO representatives would remain in their offices and outreach would be left for the CAP's and other such organizations. In addition, these organizations agreed to send people who needed help to the Governor's Branch Offices. Two factors intervened to make this arrangement unworkable. First of all, CAP's never completely trusted the GBO's for they perceived the GBO's to be part of "the system" which the CAP's were out to change. Secondly, information and referral (which was one service of the GBO's) was a service which CAP's could establish easily and which aided them in organizing the disadvantaged.<sup>11</sup> (In fact, one GBO was relocated because a CAP information and referral center was established just around the corner.)<sup>12</sup> This agreement, made in response to the demands of anti-poverty allies, reduced the

activist role of the GBO's until the initiation of a new outreach program, two years later.

The goal of advocating for the poor people caused a similar conflict with interest groups such as the Welfare Rights Organizations (WRO). This is not surprising since considerable WRO support resulted from advising people of rights and entitlements and from advocating their case to the welfare bureaucracies.<sup>13</sup> The GBO's supported WRO in this capacity, and in fact, aided WRO in securing a statewide welfare department policy allowing for provision of copies of policies and regulations to WRO, and space in welfare offices for WRO advisement of rights. Like the CAP's, WRO leadership tended to distrust the GBO's, contending that the task of advocacy for poor people should be left to them. "Go to the Governor's Branch Office?" quipped Mrs. Roxanne Jones, President of the Philadelphia WRO, "Why they refer people to us."<sup>14</sup> Such conflicts between supposed anti-poverty allies were not unusual for the politics of poverty in the 1960's. In the GBO case as elsewhere, such conflicts drained support and energies which might otherwise have been directed to helping poor people and to pressing for changes within structures of the system.<sup>15</sup>

Action was taken in the last year and one-half of the GBO program to counter the effects of these conflicts by instituting a new outreach program. Prior accommodation to CAP's, WRO and other anti-poverty allies had led to an order for the Governor's representatives to assume a more passive stance--to wait for people to come or

be referred by "allies" to the GBO's. As a result, for two years there was a gradual decline in the number of problems brought to the GBO's. This occurrence could have been attributed to the success of the anti-poverty programs; it was not attributed to that, but was considered to be a consequence of the passive stance of the GBO's. When CAP's lost support as the Nixon administration dismantled War on Poverty programs, a new outreach program was instituted. Almost immediately the numbers of demands on the GBO's rose to a level higher than at any time since the first few months in the Summer of 1967. This level was maintained throughout the remainder of the program, with problems distributed throughout the several community sub-systems, agency jurisdictions and types of citizen's advocacy. The fact that these were genuine demands on socio-political structures (and not just records of community contacts as some skeptics in Harrisburg suggested) is revealed in the problems in the study sample (Chapter 5) drawn from this period. Although the local GBO's were considerably invigorated as a result of the outreach program and demonstrated the continued presence in the political system of the demands which they addressed, the antipathy between erstwhile poverty allies persisted and, no doubt, was another source of influence on the succeeding Governor.

The most continuous and frequent conflicts, however, were between the GBO's and the many bureaucracies upon which they placed demands. These conflicts were manifest at the highest and at the lowest levels of organization and persisted for the duration of the program. As might be expected, a large number of bureaucracies did



not like the demands placed upon them by the GBO's and resisted their efforts. The success of the GBO's caused another source of conflict in the form of efforts to co-opt them into the existing social service network.

On the neighborhood issue, the primary task of the Governor's representatives was to provide the link between ghetto citizens and street-level bureaucracies, to prod the existing local-level agencies into a responsive stance in making them serve the ghetto resident. Michael Lipsky has commented upon the pressures which confront the street-level bureaucrat, and which the GBO's intensified and confronted.

In American cities today, policemen, teachers, and welfare workers are under siege. Their critics variously charge them with being insensitive, unprepared to work with ghetto residents, incompetent, resistant to change, and racist.

Men and women in these bureaucratic roles deny the validity of these criticisms. They insist that they are free of racism, and that they perform with professional competence under very difficult conditions. They argue that current procedures are well designed and that it is only the lack of resources and public support and understanding which prevents successful performance . . . <sup>16</sup>

The ideology, strategy and tactics of the GBO's communicated that they accepted the criticisms as true; the position, profession, and psychological accommodation of the street-level bureaucrats dictated that they follow the second.

While Lipsky and others analyzing such situations find some validity in each position, a conflict relationship was present because the bureaucracies and the GBO's approached similar situations from dialectical premises. Thus the GBO's challenged the basic operating principles of street-level bureaucrats daily and interfered

with their routines. The pressures from the Governor's Branch Offices resulted in the delivery of services to many thousands of perviously excluded ghetto residents. It is not surprising that conflict and antagonism resulted because the demands of the GBO's were, in effect, a daily reminder to the bureaucracies that criticisms of them were true.<sup>17</sup>

The primary weapon of the bureaucracies is the exercise of administrative discretion through the application of rules and procedure. Administrative discretion allows bureaucrats to resist taking action by just meeting the letter of the law--a phenomenon which has been labeled "satisficing," (that is, to satisfy and suffice, to "get-by," to "come out all right," to "avoid trouble").<sup>18</sup> Often GBO referrals were received with indifference or hostility. When the GBO's challenged such attitudes, bureaucrats would appear to make special efforts for GBO referrals--cases would be documented immediately, forms filled out, interviews held, and tests administered--then people would be told "we'll call you when we have a (job, house, etc.)." Often the people would not hear from the agency unless the GBO's aided with follow-up action. When situations were documented as "patterns" or "trends" for general changes in procedures or policy, and when orders from the secretaries of departments came down through the bureaucracy or political party structure, there was often resentment by supervisory and management staff. Complaints about excessive zeal on the part of the Governor's representatives were frequently raised by cabinet officers in inter-departmental

contacts and even in Council for Human Services meetings. There was a continuous need for advocacy on the part of the Governor's representatives to counter this subtle form of conflict at both the individual and interest levels of advocacy; and there was, in turn, a reservoir of resentment and antagonism in a variety of bureaucracies.

Harassment was a more direct form of conflict between bureaucracies and the Governor's Branch Offices. Since the GBO's were instruments of state government, they often were the subject of complaints from local public and private agencies through local governmental authorities or interest-group organizations. Recall that most of the Central Office GBO actions resulted from hostile refusals of agencies to respond to local GBO requests. As noted in Chapter 4, the GBO hierarchy always supported the local representatives, but the constant challenging of their authority was a debilitating source of tension. In addition, state bureaucracies could harass the GBO's; organizations directly under the authority of the Governor had a variety of means at hand. For example, early in the program, the Governor's representatives were transferred from various departments; this gave the parent agencies the opportunity for harassment through the threat of loss of jobs, promotions, etc. For example, the Director of the County Board of Assistance in one locality tried to require GBO representatives to sign in and out, file reports, and accept supervision as a branch of her office. A series of interventions by the Coordinator and a direct order by Secretary Georges (including an order to fire the CBA director) were necessary to end

this harassment.<sup>19</sup> While this particular source of pressure was soon obviated as GBO workers were placed in their own civil service positions, the bureaucracies were continually able to find ways to put counter-pressure on the GBO's at both local and central levels.

Another series of conflicts within bureaucracies over the form and function of the GBO's occurred at the highest level of authority. At the inception of the program, one faction of the original group of planners expected that the Governor's Branch Offices would act quickly to resolve the reservoir of needs and to identify gaps and barriers in socio-political structures. They believed that action to remove these "dysfunctions" could be taken quickly by the Governor, and that the GBO's would be transformed into multi-service "intake" centers for the social service bureaucracies. These people were primarily the social service professionals who had been part of "the system" before Dr. Georges and the GBO's arrived. The other faction in the top eschelons of state government coalesced around Dr. Georges and the GBO's; they believed that the problems were more endemic to the operation of "the system." They, therefore, set out to create in the Governor's Branch Offices a permanent organization, external to the bureaucracies and capable of advocating the cause of disadvantaged people. Thus Dr. Georges and his "black advocates" expected to intrude a radical new actor into the socio-political domain; the liberal professionals, however, wanted to co-opt the GBO's into the existing social service system.

Lipset has noted that the installment of authorities who propose radical changes in the operation of the state (such as Dr.

Georges and his followers):

raises the problem of whether such reforms can be successfully initiated and administered by a bureaucratic structure that is organized to regulate different norms, and whose members possess values that do not correspond with those the the 'radical' politicians.<sup>20</sup>

In the Pennsylvania situation the "establishment" faction was led by a group of liberals who, beginning in the early 1950's, had professionalized the Pennsylvania welfare system. Mr. Norman Lourie and a group who called themselves the "Jewish Mafia" had built a respectable empire in the welfare bureaucracy in Pennsylvania.

Shapiro, Lourie and Brody made welfare respectable and responsive. When they came in, public assistance (cash grants) was run by a separate department, a sort of 'poor people's agency.' There was no child welfare program. No program to assist the aged. Almost no medical care program. Welfare was run by political hacks getting the short end of the governor's patronage stick. Its budget was peanuts.

By [1957] the Pennsylvania welfare system was nationally recognized. Norm Lourie had a splendid reputation throughout the country. The Department was closely watched by everyone. And people came from far and wide to work with Lourie and Brody.<sup>21</sup>

Norman Lourie, as top professional in the Department of Public Welfare and internationally renowned figure in the field of social work, had influence. After fifteen years he was accustomed to running the affairs of the Department while the secretary handled the public relations and political affairs traditionally ascribed to the top political appointee.

When the ghetto crisis came, however, the leadership in Pennsylvania looked for a black man to handle it. Dr. Thomas W. Georges was chosen. A young, black M.D., Georges had grown up in

an upper-middle class family in Philadelphia. Graduating from Philadelphia's Central High School, he went to Howard University and then to medical school. He worked for ten years in the Philadelphia Health Department before accepting a professorship in Community Medicine at Temple University. He moved into the Department of Public Welfare as Assistant Secretary for Medical Affairs and initiated the new Medicaid (Pennsycare) program for poor people in 1966. He became Secretary of Health and then Secretary of Public Welfare in 1967. "One of the coolest people you'll ever meet," he had administrative experience and coin in the black community.<sup>22</sup> He was not the person for a figurehead job; he was not a front man. Concerned with the nitty-gritty of the programs he commanded, he wanted to run his departments.

At first the professional social service establishment cheered, for Georges appeared to be a strong leader in the Harry Shapiro tradition. One member told a reporter, "We were prepared to follow him into the jaws of hell . . . It was a very exciting period."<sup>23</sup> Everyone coalesced around Dr. Georges, working night and day to avert the crisis and to move ahead with the broader reform plan. There was total agreement on goals--to help the poor. In the first few months everyone pulled together, but as time passed divisions began to emerge. It became apparent that the perspective and long-range direction pursued by Dr. Georges differed greatly from that desired by the Jewish Mafia. He did not tour the state making speeches and shaking hands. He settled into his department and demanded to run it. The first break came as the

social service establishment pushed for increased investment in social services as their remedy for poverty. Georges' position, however, was that, "The only effective tool against poverty is money. Public assistance goes to the dominant class through capital gains, oil depletions, crop subsidies, tax write-offs, and no one feels degraded. The same should be true of the public assistance to poor people--it is a right, not a privilege."<sup>24</sup> As discussed in Chapter 6, the first priority of Dr. Georges for two years was to raise assistance grants to 100 percent of the standard. Toward this goal, increases in social service programs were curtailed. In pursuing this policy, Georges struck into the heartland of the social service establishment.<sup>25</sup> This was an unforgivable act. From this point on, the advice and consent of the social service professionals diverged in direction and philosophy from that desired by Dr. Georges; thus their characteristic thinking, strategy of change and professional loyalties came to divide Dr. Georges and key professionals in his department.<sup>26</sup>

Georges needed the social service professionals to run the routine programs of the Department; he could not fire them for most were protected by civil service positions or had enough political influence to retain their positions. Therefore, he had to find ways to cope with the conflict within the department. Norm Lourie was removed from the direct line control. Although Steve Brody was fired, the energy and support expended during the appeals process detracted from reform efforts. At one point, signs announcing National Social Work Week were ordered taken down, and Georges declined to address the annual meeting of the National Association

of Social Workers. The Central Office cadre which had been built up over the years by the social service establishment was dismantled and decentralized into a network of regional offices. In an unprecedented turnover, thirty top-level management people left the department over an eighteen month period (excluding those who died or retired).<sup>27</sup> These actions were designed to free Georges and his staff from the continual need to counter the influence of a somewhat hostile faction within their department. In fact, it had the opposite effect since he had to pay more attention to the routine items of day-to-day business. This detracted from his attending fully to the changes that were necessary.<sup>28</sup>

Many of the conflicts which resulted from these events did not directly affect the Governor's Branch Office program; however, they established the scenario for conflicts which did. In particular, Georges' insistence on retaining the advocate/ombudsman role of the GBO's was particularly problematic since the welfare professionals had hoped to enhance their empire by transforming the GBO's into multi-service intake centers. It was reasoned that if multi-service intake units could be established they would control service delivery and the flow of clients to a large variety of community human services. This approach is a variant of the steering and control mechanism which the GBO's established, but one which would enhance the direction and control of the social service establishment. Georges reasoned, however, that if the GBO's became a multi-service intake system, they would become part of the bureaucracy; they would become subject to the routines and procedures of service delivery.



While it is not the purpose of this study to examine the merits of multi-service approaches, Nordlinger's review of the experience of thirty-two minority and economically depressed neighborhoods found that "the bureaucratic model has not been especially successful in fulfilling its potential, and this despite its limited purposes."<sup>29</sup> Nordlinger is also quick to point out that the multi-service center model gives secondary attention to the citizens themselves.<sup>30</sup> Thus, experience with the multi-service center option seems to affirm Dr. Georges' judgment that it was not the way to secure change for disadvantaged people. Such administrative changes if not accompanied by political changes, including the opening of new channels of demand and the modifying of the behavior of street-level bureaucrats, are unlikely to alter the relationship of poor people to the bureaucracies.

In the case under consideration, the multi-service intake center concept for the GBO's was not acceptable to Dr. Georges because it would mean a fundamental change from the primary goals of access, advocacy, responsiveness, and identification of areas for "system change." The Governor's Branch Offices came to be a focal point for conflicts between Dr. Georges and his staff who stressed the advocacy and system change ideology, and the social service professionals who desired to continue perfecting the social service empire which they had engineered.<sup>31</sup> The conflicts in top ranks over basic policy directions meant that the resources commanded by at least one deputy secretary and two commissioners (out of three deputy secretaries and four commissioners) were only reluctantly

used to implement Dr. Georges' programs, and at times to resist them. Thus the establishment and institutionalization of the Governor's Branch Offices as a dialectical organization to counter some "dysfunctions" of existing bureaucratic structures precipitated conflict at the lowest and at the highest levels of the political system. Many of the people involved were influential in interest groups and had ties in the legislature; they were another source of advice and counsel when the new administration took office.

A final set of conflicts which the GBO's precipitated centers on the political parties in Pennsylvania. The local GBO's provided services to disadvantaged people in a manner not unlike the traditional party machine. The use of the party structure as a channel for authoritative pressure was resented by many local politicians and state legislators. Moreover, disadvantaged people were not the base of support for Governor Shafer's Republican party. And, credit for GBO successes flowed primarily to the GBO's and the Governor, not to the party and the legislature. At one point, Republican party resentment of GBO activity led to a demand by party leadership that Mr. William Nagel, Executive Secretary of the Council for Human Services, be fired. The Governor converted Nagel's job to a protected civil service position--a strong indication of his support of the GBO's. Furthermore, Governor Shafer's general re-orientation and support for the broader reform plan (which included the GBO's as a key element) was a major factor in intra-party opposition which developed during his administration.

When the succeeding democratic Governor, Milton Shapp, inherited the GBO's, concerns were generated in his party that the GBO's might serve as an independent local power base. Shapp is a "maverick" democrat who in his first term as Governor bucked the traditional party structure to get nominated and elected, and who bypassed the traditional party structure in dispensing thousands of patronage jobs. The GBO's looked to many people too much like a new version of the old ward machine. In fact, it was reported that one influential democrat "hit the ceiling" when he observed people lined up at several GBO's to collect emergency public assistance checks--a procedure which had been implemented in several neighborhoods since a large number of checks were stolen from mailboxes and postmen on welfare-check day. Moreover, the last full-time GBO Coordinator stated in an interview that one objective of the outreach effort was to organize the poor and to gain support of community organizations for the GBO's. The intention was to provide a local power base of the GBO's, and of course, the Governor. "If we'd had just six more months, they never could have closed us down," he said. At the same time, Governor-elect Shapp announced his intention to infuse more authority into the Governor's Branch Offices and to expand them into a statewide network.

Legislators in both parties had an interest in seeing the GBO's eliminated; and the new Governor had a need to gain legislative support. In view of the exigencies of the moment, it seems that the decision of Governor Shapp to phase out the GBO's in favor of a statewide legislative ombudsman in each district, and

to collapse the GBO's into a unit comparable to an enhanced Coordinator in the Governor's Office was not unreasonable. The intensity of party, and hence legislative reaction to this decision is reflected in the fact that the only standing ovation received by Governor Shapp in his first legislative message came when he announced that the GBO's would be phased out in favor of a citizen's advocacy program lodged primarily in the legislature. Thus the decision to phase out the Governor's Branch Offices is not attributed to their failure to institutionalize their function but rather to the vicissitudes of the political system.

Disestablishment and Reestablishment  
of the Citizen's Advocate

It is important to note that Governor Shapp recognized that the Governor's Branch Office program was meaningful, that an advocacy program was needed, and that expansion of the citizen's advocate to statewide coverage was a good idea. The decision to eliminate the GBO's did not result from a lack of need, but rather because of uncertainty over how to create a statewide program and at the same time cement the support of the legislature and other elite groups behind the new Governor. It is ironic that the decision to phase-out the GBO's was announced at the same moment that the work-plan for their expansion was being typed. I was seated at a typewriter in the Health and Welfare Building when the Executive Assistant of the new Secretary of Public Welfare walked in and dropped an open copy of the Governor's first legislative message on

my desk. It was opened to the statement on establishing legislative ombudsmen throughout the state. The announcement of the elimination of the GBO's was new to some of the closest people to the Governor and was apparently inserted the evening before as a means of placating democrats in the legislature. There was considerable protest from GBO neighborhoods in response to this action, and several delegations of people came to Harrisburg to protest to the new Governor. Community reaction lead to a gradual phaseout of the GBO's over a half-year period, rather than abrupt elimination of the program, and immediate initiation of plans for a successor program.

The successor program, the "Governor's Action Center" utilizes a statewide toll-free telephone network to the Governor's Office. (The funds earmarked by Governor Shapp for local legislative ombudsmen went to finance a substantial legislative pay raise and increases in expense accounts for legislators.) The new program builds upon GBO experience--the advocacy stance is emphasized, complete follow-up to resolution is insisted upon, independence from the bureaucracies is stressed, and all problems in all community sub-systems on all levels of jurisdiction are addressed. Only a few months of operation earned the new program the name among the bureaucracies of "Shapp's Vigilantes."

Unlike the GBO's, but as a consequence of GBO experience, the new program documents each case fully, has a computerized information system for storage and analysis, and utilizes the resulting data to gauge the character of its own activity and to identify areas for changes within system structures.<sup>32</sup> Although

the Governor's Action Center was phased-in gradually, with the most populous region (Philadelphia) being operational only during the latter part of the first year, the program acted upon the demands of over 30,000 citizens. Second-year activity will include over 60,000 cases and third-year projections exceed 100,000 cases. Analysis of data on the first-year operations shows that almost half (47.6 percent) were demands for service or aid in securing allocation of values (case advocacy). Most of the remainder (42.2 percent) involved complaints or other problems with bureaucracies and the remaining 9 percent included opinions and suggestions about current issues and policies (class and legal advocacy). Data is also maintained which documents the responsiveness variables outlined above (response-time, and resolution). Of those calls which required advocacy action by the Action Center during the first year, over 80 percent were completed within one week. For the same period, 82 percent were resolved successfully.<sup>33</sup> In addition, the information contained in these problems was used toward citizen's advocacy for interests by identifying problems in law, policy, program and procedure. To date, action on this level has been pursued in several community sub-systems including transportation, environment, welfare, health, community affairs, education, employment and consumer protection. Thus, it is suggested that the demands placed upon the successor program to the GBO's continue to demonstrate a persistent need for citizen's advocacy in the contemporary political system, and provision of access to and the responsiveness of socio-political structures for some of the demands of unorganized individuals and interests.

Postscript: Notes

<sup>1</sup>Larry B. Hill, "Institutionalization, The Ombudsman, and Bureaucracy," APSR, Vol. 68, No. 3, (September 1974), pp. 1075-1085. These comments are based on criteria for institutionalization of ombudsmen as derived by Hill; Hill's criteria are derived from critical analysis of the works of Polsby, Huntington, Selznick, Eisenstadt, Esman, and Bribante.

<sup>2</sup>The Honorable Milton J. Shapp, Governor of Pennsylvania, Inaugural Address, Harrisburg, Pa., (January 19, 1971).

<sup>3</sup>From participant observation of the author as a member of OPR staff working on the problem interviews, and documentary evidence in the GBO Archive.

<sup>4</sup>The Honorable Milton J. Shapp, Governor of Pennsylvania, Human Services: A Statement before the Human Services Forum, Harrisburg, Pa., (March 16, 1971).

<sup>5</sup>The Honorable Milton J. Shapp, Governor of Pennsylvania, Statement on Medical Care Insurance, Philadelphia, Pa., (March 17, 1971).

<sup>6</sup>Hill, op.cit., pp. 1083-1084.

<sup>7</sup>It was reported to the author by one informant that the statement on the GBO's was inserted in the Governor's speech the night before it was delivered.

<sup>8</sup>The Honorable Milton J. Shapp, Governor of Pennsylvania, Legislative Program for 1971, presented to the General Assembly, (April 20, 1971).

<sup>9</sup>These comments reflect the criteria for institutionalization of ombudsmen developed in Hill, op.cit.

<sup>10</sup>Interviews with key informants.

<sup>11</sup>Kahn, op.cit., Chapter 7.

<sup>12</sup>GBO Archive: There is considerable documentation in the GBO Archive on attempts to reconcile GBO's and agreements reached with CAP's in several cities.

<sup>13</sup>Kahn, op.cit.

<sup>14</sup>Philadelphia Inquirer, (Philadelphia, Pa., November 24, 1969).

<sup>15</sup>Kershaw, op.cit., Kahn, op.cit., Donovan, op.cit., Rose, op.cit.

<sup>16</sup>Michael Lipsky, "Street-Level Bureaucracy and the Analysis of Urban Reform," reprinted in H.G. Fredrickson, ed., Politics, Public Administration, and Neighborhood Control, (San Francisco: Chandler, 1972); also Ermer, Blacks and Bureaucracy, op.cit., and Cloward, op.cit.

<sup>17</sup>See for example Rosemary Steward, The Reality of Organization, (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1972), especially Part 2 on conflicts between organizations and environment and between departments, and Part 3 which discusses problems of interrelationships between superiors and subordinates, managers and specialists, and within management.

<sup>18</sup>Arthur Levin, The Satisficers, (N.Y.: The McCall Publishing Co., 1970).

<sup>19</sup>Interview with a GBO representative who was directly involved in this event.

<sup>20</sup>S.M. Lipset, "Bureaucracy and Social Change," in Merton, op.cit., p. 222.

<sup>21</sup>Laurence Rutter, "Let Georges Undo It," Philadelphia Magazine, (1958), pp. 157-161.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid.

<sup>25</sup>Epstein's study of professional social workers' attitudes in April 1968 found 92.6% to favor consensus strategies (manifest in traditional roles of individual counseling, rational discussion, planning, and contacts with public officials). Only 5.0% favored



conflict strategies such as informing low-income people of their rights, encouraging them to file complaints, campaigning for candidates, community organizing, strikes and protests. Irwin Epstein, "Social Workers and Social Action: Attitudes Toward Social Action Strategies," Social Work, (April 1968), pp. 101-108. A follow-up study in 1970 found that social workers with bureaucratic (agency) orientations tend to be "conservatized"; those with a client orientation tend to be "radicalized." And professionalism intensified the differences. Irwin Epstein, "Professional Role Orientations and Conflict Strategies," Social Work, Vol. 15, (October 1970), pp. 87-92. Martin Rhein also speaks of the dominant system-maintenance stance of professional social workers and calls for development of a social work profession, "that is directed not so much at encouraging conformity (adjustment to reality) but to marshaling the resources of clients to challenge "reality." Martin Rhein, "Social Work in Search of a Radical Profession," Social Work, Vol. 15, (April 1970), pp. 13-29. Also Archie Hanlan, "Counteracting Problems of Bureaucracy in Public Welfare," Social Work, Vol. 12, (July 1967), pp. 88-95, discusses informal routines and rules of social workers as deviating from both Weber and Merton's discussions of the formal aspects of bureaucracies.

<sup>26</sup>This phenomenon was not unique to Pennsylvania. Mencher notes the tendency in the 1960's of the traditional liberal establishment to confuse "battle strategy with the war" and to resist radical changes in program. "By expanding its own sphere of control in the political process, the welfare bureaucracy has removed much decision-making from the sphere of public accountability and reduced public sensitivity to policy-making. More directly, through its focal power over the influential benefits of the welfare system the bureaucracy can exert strong controls over those who need such benefits and defend itself against their dissatisfaction or opposition." Samuel Mencher, "Ideology and the Welfare Society," Social Work, Vol. 12, (July 1967), pp. 3-12. See also Cloward and Piven, The Role of Government in Social Change, (N.Y.: Columbia University School of Social Work, 1966).

<sup>27</sup>Rutler, op.cit.

<sup>28</sup>For example, the rules and regulations of the Departmental programs are codified into the Public Welfare Manual: but the manual was written over the years and was updated by issuing reams of supplemental memoranda and bulletins. Only someone with years of experience could know what the policy was at a particular time--and the capacity to interpret or withhold information is a significant power.

<sup>29</sup>A variant of centralization, Nordlinger calls this approach the "bureaucratic model." Eric A. Nordlinger, Decentralizing the City: A Study of Boston's Little City Halls, (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1972).

The rationalization of service deliveries is clearly the major premise [of the bureaucratic model]. Los Angeles is more effectively served by decentralized service centers. Similarly, San Antonio's scheme is an attempt to improve the utilization of manpower and equipment rather than enhance citizen convenience. And even where the notion of direct citizen contact is deemed important, as in Chicago and Norfolk, the rationale is primarily one of increasing the coordination and cooperation of diverse agencies in servicing their clientele at less cost, and only incidentally, to make an integrated assault upon some rather complex urban and individual problems. The citizen as client and consumer takes on a relatively low priority.

. . .

Then, too, most bureaucrats continue to act according to their middle-class values, commonly leaving them incapable of understanding or accepting lower class values and behavior. Thus in the low income and working-class ethnic areas bureaucratic decentralization does nothing to alleviate the clash between the bureaucrats' and residents' cultural norms and values. Moreover, it may just be that citizen demands and pressures for improved service deliveries are actually less effective when the bureaucracy is decentralized. Ibid., p. 12.

Nordlinger also found other models of decentralization including the pluralist representation model (advisory councils, etc.), and the governmental model (community control and neighborhood government) to also be insufficient to deal with problems of the inner city. He suggests that the Little City Hall model is better. The present study suggests that it too falls short because it is restricted to a single level, and does not provide the clout required to direct or order change.

<sup>31</sup>This is not to say that Dr. Georges was against better organization and delivery of social services. He supported attempts to establish a major multi-service center in North Philadelphia and in several other locations. In 1968, he approved the contract with the American Public Welfare Association to develop and implement a new social service system in Pennsylvania. What he was against was eliminating the GBO's as an external advocacy mechanism as a source of help when other agencies failed, and which could continue to identify problems which existed in the structure or processes of the service systems. He did not wish to relinquish the opportunity to provide a new channel for the demands of black people; one that would establish a steering and control mechanism to assure that the bureaucracies and governments of the polity were accessible and responsive to the demands of disadvantaged people.

<sup>32</sup>Drew Hyman, et.al., The Use of Citizen Complaints as Social and Organizational Indicators, (A paper presented to the Urban and Regional Information System Association, Montreal, Canada, August 1974).

<sup>33</sup>Ibid.

## SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aaron, Richard I. "Utah Ombudsman: The American Proposals." Utah Law Review, (March 1967), pp. 32-93.
- Abraham, H.J. "People's Watchdog Against Abuse of Power." Public Administration Review, (1960), pp. 152-157.
- Adams, Richard N., and Preiss, J.J., eds. Human Organization Research. Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1960.
- Agger, Robert E., Goldrich, Daniel, and Swanson, Bert E. The Rulers and the Ruled. N.Y.: John Wiley and Sons, 1964.
- Aikman, C.C. "The New Zealand Ombudsman." Canadian Bar Review, (September 1954), pp. 399-432.
- Allen, Rodney F., and Adair, C.H. Violence and Riots in Urban America. Worthington, Ohio: Charles A. Jones Pub. Co., 1969.
- Almond, Gabriel A., and Coleman, James S., eds. The Politics of the Developing Areas. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960.
- American Assembly. The Ombudsman. (Report of the 32d American Assembly), N.Y.: Arden House, October 1967.
- Anderman, S.D. "The Swedish Justitieombudsman." American Journal of Comparative Law, (1962), pp. 225-238.
- Anderson, Stanley V. Canadian Ombudsman Proposals. Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies, 1966.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Connecticut Ombudsman?" Case and Comment, Vol. 70, No. 2, (March-April 1965), pp. 1-8.
- \_\_\_\_\_. ed., Ombudsmen for American Government? Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Ombudsman Proposals: Stimulus to Inquiry." Public Affairs Report, Vol. 7, No. 6, (December 1966), reprinted in Congressional Record, (January 24, 1967), pp. A238-239.

- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Ombudsman: Public Defender Against Maladministration." Public Affairs Report, Vol. 6, No. 2, (April 1965).
- Bachrach, Peter, and Baratz, Morton S. Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice. N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1970.
- Banfield, Edward. Political Influence. N.Y.: The Free Press, 1961.
- Becker, Theodore L., and Murray, Vernon G. Government Lawlessness in America. N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1971.
- Berk, Richard A., and Aldrich, Howard E. "Patterns of Vandalism During Civil Disorders as an Indicator of Selection of Targets," American Sociological Review, Vol. 37, (October 1972), pp. 533-547.
- Binstock, Robert H., and Ely, Katherine, eds. The Politics of the Powerless. Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop Publishers, Inc., 1971.
- Bollens, John C. "Overlapping Governments." in Hirsch, Werner Z., and Sonenblum, Sidney, eds. Governing Urban America in the 1970's. N.Y.: Praeger, 1973, pp. 85-96.
- Boskin, Joseph. Urban Racial Violence in the Twentieth Century. Beverly Hills, Ca.: Glencoe Press, 1969.
- Brinkerhoff, Merlin B., and Kunz, Phillip R., eds. Complex Organizations and their Environments. Dubuque, Iowa: Wm. C. Brown Co., 1972.
- Brinton, Craine. Anatomy of a Revolution. N.Y.: Prentice-Hall, 1952.
- Chittenden, T., Jr., ed. Statistical Data Related to Administrative Proceedings Conducted by Federal Agencies. Washington, D.C.: Administrative Conference of the U.S., 1962.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Statistical Data Related to Administrative Proceedings Conducted by Federal Agencies for Fiscal Year 1963. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964.
- Cloward, Richard A. "An Ombudsman for Whom?" Social Work, Vol. 12, (April 1967), pp. 117-118.
- \_\_\_\_\_, and Piven, Frances Fox. The Role of Government in Social Change. N.Y.: Columbia University School of Social Work, 1966.
- \_\_\_\_\_, and Elman, Richard M. "Advocacy in the Ghetto." in Binstock, supra, pp. 176-185.

- Cohen, Nathan, ed. The Los Angeles Riots. N.Y.: Praeger Publishers, 1970.
- Coleman, James S. Community Conflict. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1970.
- Converse, Philip E. "Change in the American Electorate," in Campbell and Converse, eds. The Human Meaning of Social Change. N.Y.: Russell Sage Foundation, 1972.
- Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Human Services: A Report to the Governor of Pennsylvania, by the Legislative-Executive Task Force on Human Services. Harrisburg, Pa., 1970.
- Connery, Robert H., ed. Urban Riots, Violence and Social Change. N.Y.: Columbia University, Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, Vol. 29, 1964.
- Crozier, Michel. The Bureaucratic Phenomenon. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964.
- \_\_\_\_\_. The Stalled Society. N.Y.: The Viking Press, 1973.
- Crozier, Brian. The Masters of Power. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1969.
- Dahl, Robert C. After the Revolution. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970.
- Dahrendorf, Ralf. Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959.
- Denzin, Norman. The Research Act. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1970.
- Deutsch, Karl W. The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control. N.Y.: The Free Press, 1966.
- Donovan, John C. The Politics of Poverty. N.Y.: Pegasus, 1967.
- Downes, Bryan T. "Social and Political Characteristics of Riot Cities: A Comparative Study." Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 49, No. 3, (December 1968), pp. 504-521.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "A Critical Reexamination of the Social and Political Characteristics of Riot Cities." Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 51, (September 1970), pp. 349-360.
- Downs, Anthony. Inside Bureaucracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967.

- Easton, David. "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems." World Politics, (1957), pp. 383-400.
- \_\_\_\_\_. A Framework for Political Analysis. N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965.
- \_\_\_\_\_. A Systems Analysis of Political Life. N.Y.: John Wiley and Sons, 1965.
- Eisenstadt, S.M. Modernization: Protest and Change. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1966.
- Eisinger, Peter K. "The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities." American Political Science Review, Vol. 67, (March 1973), pp. 11-29.
- Epstein, Irwin. "Professional Role Orientations and Conflict Strategies." Social Work, Vol. 15, (October 1970), pp. 87-92.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Social Workers and Social Action: Attitudes Toward Social Action Strategies." Social Work, (April 1968), pp. 101-108.
- Ermer, Virginia B., and Strange, John H., eds. Blacks and Bureaucracy. N.Y.: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1972.
- Evan, William M. "The Organization-Set: Toward a Theory of Inter-organizational Relations." in James D. Thompson, ed., Approaches to Organization Design. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966.
- Farley, Marta Pisetska, and Farley, Andrew N. "An American Ombudsman: Due Process in the Administrative State." The Administrative Law Review, Vol. 16, (Summer 1964), pp. 212-221.
- Feagin, Joe R., and Hahn, Harlan. Ghetto Revolts: The Politics of Violence in American Cities. N.Y.: The Macmillan Co., 1973.
- Festinger, Leon, and Katz, Daniel. Research Methods in the Behavioral Sciences. N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1953.
- Finer, Herman. "Administrative Responsibility in Democratic Government." Public Administration Review, (Summer 1941), pp. 335-351.

- Flanigan, William, and Fogelman, Edwin. Patterns of Violence in Comparative Historical Perspective. American Political Science Association, (1969 Annual Meeting), paper.
- Frankel, Jack E. "Removal of Judges: California Tackles an Old Problem." American Bar Association Journal, Vol. 69, No. 2, (February 1963).
- Friedrich, Carl J., and Cole, Taylor. Responsible Bureaucracy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1932.
- Gamson, William A. Power and Discontent. Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1968.
- Gellhorn, Walter. Ombudsmen and Others: Citizens Protectors in Nine Countries. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966.
- Glaser, Barney G., and Strauss, Anselm. The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1967.
- Goffman, Erving. "On Cooling the Mark Out." in, Bennis, Warren G., et. al., Interpersonal Dynamics. Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1964, pp. 417-430.
- Goldrich, Daniel, and Kremers, Joseph A. From the Corporate State Through Vietnam to the Developmental Community. American Political Science Association, (1972 Annual Meeting), paper.
- Goodwin, Leonard. Do the Poor Want to Work? Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1972.
- Gouldner, Alvin W. "Red Tape as a Social Problem." in Merton, infra., pp. 410-418.
- Governor's Branch Offices. Trend Reports. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Public Welfare, (unpublished files, 1967-1971).
- \_\_\_\_\_. Feedback. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Public Welfare, (newsletters of the Governor's Coordinator to the GBO representatives, mimeo., 1967-1971).
- \_\_\_\_\_. Survey of Employment Referrals: Pittsburgh Governor's Branch Offices. (unpublished), March 1968.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Analysis of Human Relations Commission Action on GBO Referrals. (unpublished), undated.



- \_\_\_\_\_. Survey Report on GBO Activities. (unpublished statistical reports), monthly, 1967-1971.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Governor's Branch Office Program: Status and Recommendations. (Report from Acting Secretary of Public Welfare, Joseph Adlestein to Governor-Elect Milton Shapp), January 1971.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Saga of the Philadelphia Housing Situation. October 1967.
- Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riots. Violence in the City--an End or a Beginning? Box 54708, Los Angeles, Ca., (report), December 2, 1965.
- Graham, Hugh Davis, and Gurr, Ted R. Violence in America. Staff Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, Vol. 1, June 1969.
- Greene, Jee S., and Parthemos, George Steven. American Government: Policies and Functions. N.Y.: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967.
- Gusfield, Joseph R. Protest, Reform and Revolt. N.Y.: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1970.
- Haberstein, Robert W. Pathways to Data: Field Methods for Studying Ongoing Social Organizations. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1970.
- Hadden, Jeffrey K., Masotti, Louis H., and Larson, Calvin J., eds. Metropolis in Crisis. 2d ed., Itasca, Ill.: F.E. Peacock, Publishers, Inc., 1971.
- Hahn, Harlan. The Political Objectives of Ghetto Violence. American Political Science Association, (1969 Annual Meeting), paper.
- Hammond, Philip E. Sociologists at Work! N.Y.: Basic Books, 1964.
- Hanlan, Archie. "Counteracting Problems of Bureaucracy in Public Welfare." Social Work, Vol. 12, (July 1967), pp. 88-95.
- Headly, J.T. Pen and Pencil Sketches of the Great Riots. N.Y.: Arno Press and the New York Times, 1969.
- Heaps, Willard A. Riots, U.S.A.: 1765-1970. N.Y.: The Seabury Press, 1970.
- Heard, Alexander. "Interviewing Southern Politicians." American Political Science Review, Vol. 44, No. 4, (1950), pp. 886-896.

- Heller, Celia S. Structured Social Inequality. London: Collier-Macmillan, 1969.
- Hirsch, Werner A., and Sonenblum, Sidney, eds. Governing Urban America in the 1970's. N.Y.: Praeger, 1973.
- Howe, Irving, and Harrington, Michael, eds. The Seventies: Problems and Proposals. N.Y.: Harper and Row, 1972.
- Howton, F. William. Functionaries. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971.
- Hyman, Drew, and Powanda, Catherine. The Pennsylvania Governor's Action Center. University Park, Pa.: The Pennsylvania State University, Center for Human Services Development Report #56, October 1974, monograph.
- International Studies of Values in Politics. Values and the Active Community. N.Y.: The Free Press, 1971.
- Hyneman, Charles S. Bureaucracy in a Democracy. N.Y.: Harper and Bros., 1950.
- Jacoby, Henry. The Bureaucratization of the World. Berkeley: University of California Press, (Eveline L. Kaner, tr.), 1973.
- Johnson, Chalmers. Revolutionary Change. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966.
- Johnson, Willard R. The Colonial Analogy Applied to American Ghettoes. American Political Science Association, (1972 Annual Meeting), paper.
- Jones, Harry W., ed. The Courts, the Public, and the Law Explosion. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965.
- Kahn, Alfred J. Social Policy and Social Services. N.Y.: House, 1973.
- \_\_\_\_\_, et.al. Information in the Neighborhood: A Study and Some Proposals. N.Y.: Columbia University, School of Social Work, (draft report, unpublished), May 1966.
- Kaplan, Abraham. The Conduct of Inquiry. San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1964.
- Katz, Elihu, and Eisenstadt, S.N. "Some Sociological Observations on the Response of Israeli Organization to New Immigrants." Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 1, pp. 113-133.

- Kaufman, Herbert. "Administrative Decentralization and Political Power." Public Administration Review, Vol. 29, (January-February 1969), pp. 520-524.
- Kerlinger, Fred. Foundations of Behavioral Research. N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965.
- Kershaw, Joseph A. Government Against Poverty. Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1970.
- Kornhauser, William. The Politics of Mass Society. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1959.
- Laumann, Edward O. Bonds of Pluralism: The Form and Substance of Urban Social Networks. N.Y.: John Wiley and Sons, 1973.
- Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence, "April Aftermath of the King Assassination." Riot Data Review, No. 2, (August 1968), mimeo.
- Levin, A. Leo, and Wooley, Edward A. Dispatch and Delay: a Field Study of Judicial Administration in Pennsylvania. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Institute of Legal Research, 1961.
- Levin, Arthur. The Satisficers. N.Y.: The McCall Pub. Co., 1970.
- Lieberman, Jethro K. The Tyranny of the Experts: How Professionals are Closing the Open Society. N.Y.: Walker & Co., 1970.
- Lieberson, Stanley, and Silverman, Arnold R. "The Precipitants and Underlying Conditions of Race Riots." American Sociological Review, Vol. 30, (December 1965), pp. 887-898.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin. "Bureaucracy and Social Change." in Merton, infra., pp. 221-232.
- Loewenberg, Frank M. "Social Workers and Indigenous Nonprofessionals: Some Structural Dilemmas." Social Work, Vol. 13, (July 1968), pp. 65-71.
- Long, Norton. The Polity. Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1962.
- Lowi, Theodore. The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy and the Crisis of Public Authority. N.Y.: W.W. Norton, Inc., 1969.
- \_\_\_\_\_. The Politics of Disorder. N.Y.: Basic Books, Inc., 1971.

- Lupsha, Peter A. "On Theories of Urban Violence." Urban Affairs Quarterly, Vol. 4, (March 1969), pp. 273-296.
- Masotti, Louis H., and Bowen, Don R., eds. Riots and Rebellion: Civil Violence in the Urban Community. Beverly Hills, Ca.: Sage Publications, Inc., 1968.
- McCall, George J., and Simmons, J.L. Issues in Participant Observation. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1969.
- McConnell, Grant. Private Power and American Democracy. N.Y.: Knopf, 1967.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Major Economic Groups and National Policy. The American Roundtable, October 1958.
- Mencher, Samuel. "Ideology and the Welfare Society." Social Work, Vol. 12, (July 1967), pp. 3-12.
- Merton, Robert K., et.al., eds. Reader in Bureaucracy. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1952.
- Moore, Barrington, Jr. Reflections on the Causes of Human Misery. Boston: Beacon Press, 1972.
- Morris, Herbert, ed. Freedom and Responsibility. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961.
- Nader, Ralph. "An Answer to Administrative Abuse." Harvard Law Record, (December 1962), pp. 13-15.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "An Ombudsman for the U.S.?" Christian Science Monitor, (April 1963), p. 20.
- Nagel, Stuart S. "Measuring Unnecessary Delay in Administrative Proceedings: the Actual versus the Predicted." Policy Sciences, Vol. 2, No. 1, (1972).
- Nelson, Dalmas H. Administrative Agencies of the U.S.A.: their Decisions and their Authority. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1964.
- Nigro, Felix A. Modern Public Administration, 2nd. ed. N.Y.: Harper and Row, 1970.
- Nordlinger, Eric A. Decentralizing the City: a Study of Boston's Little City Halls. Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1972.

- Ostrom, Vincent, and Warren, Roland H. Polycentricity. Indiana Studies in Political Theory, 1971, monograph.
- Parsons, Talcott. Structure and Process in Modern Societies. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1960.
- \_\_\_\_\_. The Social System. N.Y.: The Free Press, 1951.
- Peters, Charles, and Branch, Taylor. Blowing the Whistle: Dissent in the Public Interest. N.Y.: Praeger Publishers, 1972.
- Pressman, Jeffrey L., and Wildavsky, Aaron B. Implementation. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973.
- Rhein, Martin. "Social Work in Search of a Radical Profession." Social Work, Vol. 15, (April 1970), pp. 13-29.
- Ridgley, F. "The Parliamentary Commissioner for Military Affairs in the Federal Republic of Germany." Political Studies, (1964), pp. 1-20.
- Ries, John C. "Interest Groups, Power and American Democracy." in Hirsch, supra, pp. 63-76.
- Riggs, Fred W. Prismatic Society Revisited. Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1973.
- Riot Data Review, Brandeis University: Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence, Vol. 1 (May 1968), Vol. 2, (August 1968), Vol. 3 (February 1969), mimeo.
- Rose, Stephen M. The Betrayal of the Poor: The Transformation of Community Action. Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1972.
- Rosenau, James M. Linkage Politics. N.Y.: The Free Press, 1969.
- Rowat, Donald C., ed. The Ombudsman: Citizen's Defender. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965.
- Savitch, Harold V. "Powerlessness in an Urban Ghetto." Polity, Vol. 5, (Fall 1972), pp. 19-56.
- Sawer, Geoffrey. Ombudsman. Australia: Melbourne Univ. Press, 1968.
- Schatzman, Leonard, and Strauss, Anselm L. Field Research. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1971.

- Schmandt, Henry J. The Quality of Urban Life. Urban Affairs Annual Reviews, Vol. 3, Sage Publications, 1969.
- Schubert, Glendon A., Jr. "The Public Interest in Administrative Decision-Making." American Political Science Review, Vol. 51, (June 1957), pp. 346-369.
- Scoble, Harry M. "Access to Politics." International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 1, (1968), pp. 10-14.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Ideology and Electoral Action: A Comparative Case Study of the National Committee for an Effective Congress. San Francisco, Calif.: Chandler Publishing Co., 1967.
- Sellin, Thorsten, and Lambert, Richard D., eds. Lagging Justice. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 328, (March 1960).
- Sharkansky, Ira. The Routines of Politics. N.Y.: Van Nostrand Reinhold, Co., 1970.
- Shor, Edgar L. Administrative Representation for the Under-Represented. American Political Science Association, (1972 Annual Meeting), paper.
- Shuman, Howard, and Gruenberg, Barry. "Dissatisfaction with City Services: is Race an Important Factor?" in Hahn, Harlan, ed., People and Politics in Urban Society. Urban Affairs Annual Reviews, Vol. 6, Sage Publications, 1972, pp. 369-388.
- Skolnick, Jerome H., ed. The Politics of Protest. N.Y.: Simon and Schuster, 1969.
- Stern, Philip M. The Rape of the Taxpayer. N.Y.: Random House, 1973.
- \_\_\_\_\_. The Great Treasury Raid. N.Y.: Random House, 1968.
- Steward, Rosemary. The Reality of Organizations. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1972.
- Stolz, Matthew F. Politics of the New Left. Beverly Hills, Ca.: Glencoe Press, 1971.
- Thompson, James D., and McEwan, William J. "Organizational Goals and Environment: Goal-Setting as an Interaction Process." American Sociological Review, Vol. 32, No. 1, (February 1958).

- Touraine, Alain. The Post-Industrial Society: Tomorrow's Social History: Classes, Conflicts and Culture in the Programmed Society. L.F.X. Mayhew, tr., N.Y.: Random House, 1971.
- Truman, David B. The Governmental Process. N.Y.: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955.
- United States. Congressional Record. 88th Congress, 1st Session, (1963). The extended remarks of Congressman Reuss on his bill, HR 7593, contain useful information and comment at pp. 2078, A806, A1329, A1367, A1496, A1593, A1690, A1952, and A2218.
- Van Til, Jon. "Becoming Participants: Dynamics of Access Among the Welfare Poor." Social Science Quarterly, (1974), pp. 344-357.
- Washnis, George J. Municipal Decentralization and Neighborhood Resources. N.Y.: Praeger Special Studies in U.S. Economic and Social Development, 1972.
- Webb, Eugene J., Campbell, Donald T., Schwartz, Richard, and Sechrist, Lee. Unobtrusive Measures: Nonreactive Research in the Social Sciences. Chicago: Rand-McNally, & Co., 1966.
- Weber, Max. On Law in Economy and Society. N.Y.: Simon and Schuster, tr. Max Rheinstein and Edward Shils, 1967.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Theory of Social and Economic Organization. N.Y.: The Oxford University Press, tr. Talcott Parsons and A.M. Henderson, 1947.
- White, Orion F., Jr. "The Dialectical Organization: An Alternative to Bureaucracy." in Ermer, supra., pp. 257-274.
- Whyte, Martin King. "Bureaucracy and Modernization in China: the Maoist Critique." American Sociological Review, Vol. 38, (April 1973), pp. 257-274.
- Wilkinfield, Jonathan, ed. Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics. N.Y.: David McKay Co., Inc., 1973.
- Woll, Peter. Administrative Law: the Informal Process. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963.
- \_\_\_\_\_. American Bureaucracy. N.Y.: W.W. Norton & Co., 1963.
- Zeisel, Hans, et.al. Delay in the Court. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1959.

Appendix I: Summary of the Evaluation of the  
Location & Staffing of the GBO's (February 1968)

GBO #1 - 1601 W. Columbia Avenue - Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

This office is located on the corner of 16th and Columbia Ave. in Philadelphia. This is a heavily populated Negro area made up of a number of small businesses. There is a scattering of social agencies throughout the neighborhood. This office can be considered to be in the very hub of activity in the North Philadelphia area.

The staff at this office consists of two male caseworkers, both Negro and two female indigenous workers, both female. This arrangement has proven quite effective.

Location, staffing, and office hours are to remain fixed for this office.

This office processes complaints related mostly to employment, housing and financial need. The location is identified as a tension area.

Recommendation: Retain

GBO #2 - S.E. Corner 19th & South Sts. - Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

This office also has an ideal corner location. It serves a 100% Negro population. There are many small businesses, a school, and a hospital located in the immediate vicinity. There is an acute lack of Social Services in the area. This office is also located in the center of activity in that neighborhood.

The staff consists of one male and one female caseworker, both Negro, and two indigenous, one male and female Negro worker. This staff is effective--especially the one male indigenous worker. The location is identified as a tension area.

Recommendation: Retain



GBO #3 - 4040 Lancaster Avenue - Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

This office is located in the business section of Lancaster Avenue. This is a heavily populated Negro area with many small businesses in the neighborhood. There are some social agencies in the area.

Staffing consists of one female caseworker, Negro, and five indigenous workers, one male and four female, all Negro. Except for the one male indigenous worker, the staff at this office is not as effective as it should be.

The location and office hours will remain the same. Staffing in this office will change. One staff member will transfer to the Kensington Office when opened. Hopefully, another male will be added to this staff.

This office processes complaints mostly related to employment, housing, and financial need. This area is not as critical a tension area as Columbia Avenue or South Street.

Although one of the staff members went out into the community to work with the people, we have no way of measuring the effectiveness of his activity. This office is one of the slower GBO's in Philadelphia. However, we suspect that increased community activity on the part of the GBO Representatives will not only enhance the image of the GBO, but increase the volume of activity as well.

Recommendation: Retain

GBO #4 - 42 South 60th Street - Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

This office is located in a higher income neighborhood. It is serving primarily a middle class type of clientele--certainly not the lower 20% of the economic scale. It serves a primarily Negro population. There are no social services in this area. This office, being a former real estate office, appears plush and this could tend to discourage its use. This office is located in a business district.

Staffing consists of three caseworkers, two male, and one female, all Negro; and two indigenous persons, one male and one female, both Negro. This staff is very active and quite effective.

Serious consideration should be given to relocating this office because:  
1) It presents a plush appearance, possibly deterring people from using it.  
2) The nature of the population being served is primarily middle class.

Staffing and office hours will remain fixed for this office.

Recommendation: Relocate (was not relocated)

GBO #5 - 431 West Girard Avenue - Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

This office is serving a racially mixed neighborhood. The neighborhood is predominantly Puerto Rican with white and Negro elements throughout. There is a school and a youth center in the immediate vicinity. There are a number of businesses throughout the area. Although this area has not been defined as a tension area, it has the potential to be one. Efforts should be directed to evaluate the needs of this community and what steps could be taken to assure its remaining a non-tension area.

Recommendation: Retain

GBO #6 - 2250 North Front Street - Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

(It was later suggested that an additional office be opened on North Front Street in Philadelphia. This recommendation was implemented.)

Recommendation: Open

GBO #7 - 2123 Centre Avenue - Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

This office is located in the heart of the Hill District. The location is ideal for the Governor's Branch Office, as most of the activity on the hill emanates from this particular area. This is also one of the tension areas in Pittsburgh.

This office is staffed by eight persons, five males and three females. The staff is all Negro and are classified as follows: two clerks, two casework assistant I's, three caseworkers, and one social worker I (Roland Matthews who is the local coordinator for Pittsburgh). At present, this office is over staffed, however, when the fourth office is opened, part of this staff will be assigned to that office. The total salaries of this office exceed \$50,000 a year, which is the most expensive office in the State. Although the most expensive, this office is one of the best in the State as far as effectiveness and ability to handle complicated situations, utilizing their own resources.

Recommendation: Retain

GBO #8 - 619 North Homewood Avenue - Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

This office is located in the heart of the Homewood-Brushton area of Pittsburgh. This is an ideal location; the area immediately surrounding the GBO is the hub of activity for this section of Pittsburgh. This area also is one of the city's tension areas. With a few repairs, this

office should be retained in its present location. This office is staffed by seven persons, all Negro, and all former employees of the Allegheny County Board of Assistance. Staff classifications range from clerk, casework assistant I, caseworker, and casework supervisor I. At present, this office is slightly overstaffed. When the fourth office opens, part of this staff will be assigned to that office. Present staff consists of five male and two female. This office is doing a good job and is able to handle most situations at the local level. Their volume is good and they are getting many problems that are very difficult to come up with solutions. This office has been accepted by the Community because they are able to get things done. The two women in this office tend to become over-involved in situations and get excited, however, the other staff help to control this problem.

Recommendation: Retain

GBO #9 - 1229 Pennsylvania Avenue - Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

This office is located in a residential section of the North side of Pittsburgh. This office is not located in the right spot. This office will be relocated as soon as a proper location can be found. A good spot had been located on Brighton Road, however, due to the delay in working out lease arrangements this location was lost.

The staff in this office consists for four females and one male, all Negro and former employees of the Allegheny County Board of Assistance. The staff is doing an adequate job in their present location, however, if the volume increases, some adjustments will be required.

Of all the offices in Pittsburgh, GBO #9 is the weakest in staff effectiveness. When the fourth office is opened, a major realignment of staff will be made in an attempt to balance the staff for each office.

Recommendation: Relocate (was relocated to 4142 2nd Avenue and an additional office--GBO #22 was also opened).

GBO #10 - 1106 Parade Street - Erie, Pennsylvania

This office is located in the business district of Parade Street, approximately two blocks outside of the district that we are trying to serve. This office should be moved and another location has been found. Several months have passed, and we are still waiting for Property and Supplies to move on lease arrangements.

The staff of this office consists of one female and two males, all white. The staff is doing an adequate job and are accepted by both the

Negro and white community. The fact that there are no Negroes in this office does not seem to have much effect on the number of persons coming to that office.

Recommendation: Relocate (was relocated to 1616 Parade Street.)

GBO #11 - 506 West 4th Street - Erie, Pennsylvania

This office is located in a residential part of Erie. The neighborhood is about 50-50 white and Negro. Office is a few blocks from the business district and seems to be a good location.

The staff consists of one female and two males. One of the males is Negro. Staff is doing adequate job, however, the number of complaints that require Harrisburg action (percentage wise) is greater than other offices in the State.

Recommendation: Retain

GBO #12 - 742 Adams Avenue - Scranton, Pennsylvania

This office is poorly located on the fringe of a predominantly Negro neighborhood. There is a high school across the street. There is very little activity in the area of this GBO because it is predominantly a residential district. In addition, an OEO Neighborhood Service Center is located a few doors from the GBO. This area is not considered a tension area.

The office is staffed with two white male caseworkers and one Negro casework assistant. One caseworker is to be transferred to the Wilkes-Barre GBO shortly.

Serious consideration must be given to relocating this office on Lackawanna Avenue in downtown Scranton, or for policy consideration, closing it completely. A mobile unit should definitely be considered for this area.

This staff has done an excellent job.

Recommendation: Relocate, close or create mobile unit (was closed and a GBO #12 was opened at 524 Walnut Street, Allentown.)

GBO #13 - 222 East Market Street - Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania

This office is located in a mixed neighborhood on the Hill District of Wilkes-Barre. This is a mixed business-residential area. Activity in this area is limited, and it is not considered a tension area.

The staff consists of two male, white caseworkers.

Consideration should be given to: 1) combining the Scranton and Wilkes-Barre offices and serving this area through a mobile unit. 2) Locating this office in downtown Wilkes-Barre, off the main square. 3) Using a mobile unit in this area.

Recommendation: Relocate, close or create mobile unit (Relocated to 105 South Main Street.)

GBO #14 - 1700 West Third Street - Chester, Pennsylvania

GBO #14 is located in the middle of a redeveloped area. It is a mixed business and residential area. It is located in a predominantly Negro neighborhood. There is an elementary school in the immediate area. Chester is considered a tension area. There are four caseworkers staffing this office--two Negro males, one female Negro, and one female white. This staff is highly organized, imaginative, and doing a much-needed job in providing services to area residents. This office processes complaints relating mostly to employment, housing, and financial need.

Recommendation: Retain

GBO #15 - 456 West Princess Street - York, Pennsylvania

This office is located in a residential section of town, which is in the heart of a rapidly deteriorating neighborhood. It is about four blocks from the main street in York.

This office is staffed by three males, two Negro and one white, all former caseworkers for the York County Board of Assistance. The present size of staff is adequate for this office. Their performance thus far has been excellent. This office is being used in a way that is somewhat different than most of the other GBO's. Other social agencies are referring people to the GBO, as well as ministers, lawyers, doctors, and other professional people. The staff has been accepted by the professional community as being able to provide a service. This office has overcome some very adverse publicity and at present this office is receiving very good publicity and newspaper coverage. One member of the staff is a very good friend with a feature reporter at one of the York

papers. The staff in this office has been actively seeking out new referral sources, particularly in that field of employment problems. In discussing particular tension areas in York, the staff there stated there were no concentrated tension areas in that city.

Recommendation: Retain

GBO #16 - 2010 North 6th Street - Harrisburg, Pennsylvania

This office is located on a business-residential street which is located in the right area to reach the segment of the community in need of services. However, this office is not being used as we had anticipated.

This office is staffed by two males, one Negro, and one white. The staff is adequate for the volume of business this office does. However, a problem would arise if the volume increased.

This office is located in one of the tension areas of the city.

Recommendation: Retain

GBO #17 - 33 North 13th Street - Harrisburg, Pennsylvania

This office is situated in a residential section of the Hill area, and possibly is located incorrectly. This office should have been located possibly around Cameron and Market Streets. This office has never been accepted by the residents and therefore has not been used. It is not uncommon for this office to go for a week or longer without a visitor. The present location is in an area where adults and youths tend to loiter. Minor incidents could occur in this vicinity. But, this area would not be classified as a tension area.

In view of this office's lack of business, it is difficult to justify continued operation. Therefore, this office should be closed. Although the lease runs until August, 1968, it would be cheaper and more feasible to discontinue services of this office now and pay off the remaining months of the lease. The staff of this office can be reassigned to the 6th Street Office.

Recommendation: Close (was closed)

GBO #18 - 32 South Mercer Street - New Castle, Pennsylvania

This office is located in downtown New Castle on the same block as the County Board of Assistance. The location is adequate since the poverty pockets are not concentrated in the city. There are about four poverty

pockets, one in each section of the city. The office is centrally located between them and is easily accessible. This office has never really functioned in New Castle. Like the 13th Street office in Harrisburg, it is not uncommon for several days to go by without a visitor.

The present staff consists of one female, white who was hired specifically for this office, and one male Negro who has been temporarily reassigned from Pittsburgh. It has been very difficult to find applicants to work in this GBO who can adequately do the job.

This office should also be included in the discussion for possible closing, or for conversion to a mobile unit.

Recommendation: Consider closing or creation of a mobile unit (was relocated to 520 Idaho Street Farrell and a mobile GBO established.)

#### GBO #19 - 1206 16th Street - Altoona, Pennsylvania

This office is located on the fringe of the downtown area less than one block from the section of town that is predominantly Negro. Up the hill from this office is the poverty area that is predominantly white. The location of this office is adequate for the purpose of the GBO.

The staff of this office consists of two male white and one female Negro. Through some extensive public relations work, this office has been able to more than double the number of weekly visitors. The present staff is doing a good job and has been able to handle about 98% of the problems at the local level. We will be losing two of the staff from this office soon.

The only area in Altoona that might be considered a tension area would be on 18th Street in the section of the town that the majority of the Negro population lives.

Recommendation: Retain

#### GBO #20 - 200 4th Avenue - Plan #11 - Aliquippa, Pennsylvania

This office is located in one of the poverty pockets in Aliquippa and is not being used by any of the other poverty areas. Since there are several poverty areas in the city, this office should be relocated in the business section of town where it will be accessible to the whole community.



The staff of this office is two former caseworkers from the Beaver County Board of Assistance, both male, white. They are doing an adequate job.

This office should have the mobile GBO assigned to it so that other poverty tension areas can be reached. The areas that can be included with the mobile GBO are Sharon, Farrell, Beaver Falls, New Castle (if GBO #18 is closed) and other areas to be determined later.

During a recent trip to Aliquippa, a staff member from the Coordinator's Office took a good long look at the Aliquippa area with reference to the various poverty pockets in the city. The Office is presently located in Plan #11, which is on top of the many hills in Aliquippa. This particular plan has approximately 4 to 5 thousand people of which approximately 50% are Negro. Generally speaking, Plan #11 is not really a poverty area. Approximately 50% of the people fall into the low-income bracket. However, Plan #11 extension, which is located on another hill, has approximately 7 thousand residents, 90% Negro, and approximately 95% of the people fall into the low-income bracket. People from Plan #11 extension do not visit the GBO because of difficulty in getting there. They must walk off of the hill they are living on and walk up the hill to Plan #11 where the Office is located. Another poverty area is located in Plan #7 which is on another hill. This Plan has approximately 4 to 5 thousand residents, 99% Negro, and almost everyone falls into the lower economic brackets. This is where the majority of the prostitutes, drug addicts, and alcoholics live. There is one other majority area in Aliquippa. This particular area is called Logtown and is located along the steel mill. This area is approximately five miles from the present Governor's Branch Office location and it is virtually impossible for residents of this area to get to the GBO unless they walk.

There is low cost bus transportation from all of the above mentioned areas, to the downtown area of Aliquippa. All of the bus routes converge on a central location in downtown Aliquippa, which is about one-half of a block from a large Foodland Super Market. This is where most of the people we are trying to reach do their shopping. Directly across the street from this supermarket there is a vacant store which would make an ideal location for the GBO. There is another location about one block up the street from the supermarket. This also would be a good location; however, not as good as the one across the street from the supermarket. The staff of GBO #20 has been instructed to get in touch with the landlords of these places to obtain information regarding a space rent etc. If we are going to relocate this office we should do so as soon as possible. We should also try to avoid the usual delays in processing the lease so that we do not lose this location as we did in Pittsburgh.

Recommendation: Relocate (was relocated to 329 Franklin Avenue.)



GBO #21 - 451 South Seventh Street - Reading, Pennsylvania

Established in February - March, 1968.

GBO #22 - 7830 Tioga Avenue - Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

Established February - March 1968.

NOTE: The numbers for GBO's go to #22, however, #17 was closed hence the statement that there were 21 GBO's. This appendix is based primarily on an internal evaluation, prepared for the GBO Coordinator. Information on action taken subsequent to February 20, 1968 was drawn from other documentary sources and added by the researcher. The original report also included statistical information, classification of neighborhoods as of business or residential characters, and per annum costs.

APPENDIX II: DOCUMENTS AND FORMS

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania



Governor's Office

HARRISBURG

July 31, 1967

SUBJECT: Governor's Branch Offices

TO: Heads of all Administrative Departments, Independent Administrative Boards and Commissions, and other State Agencies under the Governor's Jurisdiction

FROM: Raymond P. Shafer, Governor

This is to advise you that this week I am opening Governor's Branch Offices. A list is attached.

The purpose of these Branch Offices is to obtain for me direct communication with citizens living in areas where the greatest tension exists between government and people. They will hear citizens' problems and complaints and make referrals to appropriate resources where help may be obtained. State operated programs under your direction will be a prime source of help. My offices are under orders to address themselves vigorously, in my name, to the swift elimination of arbitrary and unnecessary delays in the provision of services to legally entitled persons.

Successful operation of these offices commands the highest priority attention from you and your employees.

I am directing you to advise all employees of the creation and purpose of these branches of the Governor's Office. Immediate attention must be afforded by all line units to requests and referrals originating from them.

Secretary Thomas W. Georges has been assigned primary responsibility for directing Branch Office activities and coordinating them with all Commonwealth service operations. He will keep you advised about the operations of these offices and will inform you and your staff on matters requiring your urgent attention and cooperation. I have also assigned the Executive Secretary of my Council on Human Services to Doctor Georges to expedite the handling of immediate inter-departmental matters.

It is my expectation that all Commonwealth employees will bend their energies to finding creative solutions to some of the more pressing problems of the administration of governmental services. Sound judgment, quick action, and respect for human dignity must prevail over procedural detail. A continuing and constantly renewed stress on courtesy, prompt service, and a scrupulous regard for the full rights and entitlements of citizens of this Commonwealth will assert our commitment to excellence in serving all of the Commonwealth's citizens.

I shall be pleased if you will make any recommendations regarding these centers directly to me or to Doctor Georges.

I know that you understand the importance of this new program and that you will give it your full cooperation.

Figure 6: Executive Directive No. 35

BULLETIN NO. 668

**Subject:** Governor's Branch Offices

**To:** OFFICE, BUREAU AND DIVISION HEADS  
INSTITUTIONAL SUPERINTENDENTS  
COUNTY, REGIONAL AND DISTRICT OFFICES

**From:** Thomas W. Georges, Jr., M.D.  
Secretary of Public Welfare

Attached you will find a memorandum issued by the Governor indicating the purposes of his Branch Offices.

The assignment to me by the Governor of the responsibility to expedite all Commonwealth services places an extra and very special duty on the employes of the Department. You are expected to assure yourself and me that your office is responsive to the referrals emanating from the Governor's Branch Offices.

I intend to be certain that there are no practices or attitudes within the programs of this Department that restrict or thwart their purposes and thus add to the tension that exists in our cities. Our citizens must be assured courtesy and prompt service, with scrupulous regard for their rights and entitlements. This is the basic condition of employment in this Department.


Certain of our local operating units, as well as those of other departments, will be receiving referrals from the Governor's Branch Offices by phone and a hand-carried postcard referral form. The individuals going to the Offices will have been given this postcard, addressed to the Governor, in which he has been asked to indicate the kind of treatment he has received. This card also requires the signature of the staff person who has seen the individual.

The Governor's Branch Offices have been asked to telephone my office to expedite service in individual problem cases. In addition, the Governor's Branch Offices will mail daily to me a card containing information on each referral situation. My office will analyze and I will immediately act on problems which these reports indicate are prevalent.

Figure 7: DPW Bulletin No. 668

Figure 8: GBO Problem Card (5" x 8")

STATEMENT OF PROBLEM	
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>GOVERNOR'S BRANCH OFFICE PROBLEM CARD</b></p> <p>SEND COPIES DAILY TO: Coordinator's Office Department of Public Welfare Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120</p> <p>Following Action Taken On Problem:</p> <p>PHONED: _____</p> <p>REFERRAL CARD TO: _____</p> <p>PROVIDED TRANSPORTATION: _____</p> <p>CALLED HARRISBURG, TALKED TO: _____</p> <p>OTHER ACTION: _____</p> <p>Harrisburg Should Know:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Matter Can Be Handled Locally</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Watch For Complaint Card To Governor</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Nothing Can Be Done Locally, Requires Action From Harrisburg</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Looks Like Pattern To Be Investigated By Governor</p>	<p>GBO: _____ ID NO. _____</p> <p>DATE: _____ INTERVIEWER: _____</p> <p>NAME: _____</p> <p>ADDRESS: _____</p>
GBO 5 - 9-67	

FIRST CLASS POSTAGE WILL BE PAID BY ADDRESSEE		<p style="text-align: center;"><b>BUSINESS REPLY MAIL</b></p> <p style="text-align: center; font-size: small;">POSTAGE WILL BE PAID BY ADDRESSEE</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>HONORABLE RAYMOND P. SHAFER GOVERNOR OF PENNSYLVANIA BOX 2637 HARRISBURG, PENNSYLVANIA 17120</b></p>
PERMIT NO. 1000 HARRISBURG, PA.	DATE _____ TIME _____	



This will introduce _____	
_____ who will appreciate your prompt attention to a matter of special concern. Sincerely,	
	 Governor
NAME OF AGENCY _____ ADDRESS _____ _____	
DATE _____	SIGNATURE OF AGENCY REPRESENTATIVE _____
Please check the boxes that will best explain to the Governor what happened when you went to the agency named on this card. Then mail it.	
Dear Governor Shafer:	
The people at the above agency:	
<input type="checkbox"/> WANTED TO HELP ME AND DID THEIR BEST	
<input type="checkbox"/> DIDN'T SEEM TO BE INTERESTED IN TRYING TO HELP ME	
<input type="checkbox"/> MADE THINGS DIFFICULT OR UNCOMFORTABLE FOR ME	
<input type="checkbox"/> I DO	WANT YOU TO USE MY NAME WHEN YOU DO SOMETHING ABOUT THIS
<input type="checkbox"/> I DON'T	
SIGNATURE _____	

Figure 9: GBO Referral Postcard (3½" x 5½")

Figure 10: GBO "Throw-away" Outreach Leaflet: Philadelphia (8½" x 11")

**GOVERNOR'S**  
**BRANCH**  **OFFICES**

**For Help With  
Your Problems**

*Call at*

*1601 West Columbia Avenue* *Now Open*

*5125 Market Street* *Now Open*

*4040 Lancaster Avenue* *Opens Friday,*  
*August 4*


*S. E. Corner,* *Opens Tuesday,*  
*19th & South Streets* *August 8*

**COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA**

**RAYMOND P. SHAFER, Governor**

Figure 11: GBO "Throw-away" Outreach Leaflet (8½" x 11")

Let Your  
GOVERNOR'S



BRANCH OFFICES

Help You Find  
Answers To Your  
Problems

Stop in soon if you want help on any of these things

EMPLOYMENT • HOUSING • CIVIL RIGHTS

EDUCATION • RECREATION • BUSINESS PRACTICES

CHILD PROBLEMS • TRANSPORTATION • LEGAL MATTERS

YOUR BEAVER COUNTY OFFICE IS LOCATED AT  
329 Franklin Avenue  
ALIQUIPPA, PENNSYLVANIA 15001  
PHONE - 375-7703 - 775-4757

YOUR COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

RAYMOND P. SHAFER, Governor